By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers
The Rest Of The World
Not so long ago,
policymakers in the US and other Western capitals gave little apparent thought
to the possibility that the rest of the world might hold opinions distinct from
their own. There were some exceptions: governments that the West deemed “good partners”—in
other words, those willing to advance U.S. and Western security or economic
interests—continued to benefit from Western support even if they did not govern
themselves by Western values. But after the Cold War ended, most Western
policymakers seemed to expect that developing countries would, over time,
embrace the Western approach to democracy and globalization. Few Western
leaders seemed to worry that non-Western states might bridle at their norms or
perceive the international distribution of power as an unjust remnant of the
colonial past. Leaders who voiced such views, such as Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez,
were dismissed as eccentrics, their ideas behind the times.
Today, by contrast,
many Western policy discussions treat it as a fact that a global
South exists with its distinct outlook. The phrase has become a nearly
unavoidable shorthand—my colleagues and I use it ourselves at the International
Crisis Group, the organization I lead. And, indeed, non-Western leaders
including Narendra Modi of India and Mia Mottley of Barbados have begun to
articulate the priorities of a collective—if still rather amorphous—global
South on issues such as climate financing and the role of international
institutions. Disappointed by many developing countries’ refusal to take
serious steps to penalize Russia for its aggression in Ukraine, U.S. and
European officials have started to pay new lip service to concerns of this
group of states.
Although this
acknowledgment of the rest of the world’s interests is a welcome development,
it is connected to a particular understanding of the global South, which, as a
term, is conceptually unwieldy. There is no hard-and-fast definition of the
global South, but it is typically used to refer to the bulk of countries in
Africa, Asia, and Latin America. It lumps together powerful members of the
G-20, such as Brazil and Indonesia, with the world’s least developed countries,
including Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste. These countries do share some common
historical experiences and future objectives, such as changing the balance of
power in the international system. In conversations with politicians and
officials from countries considered to be members of the global South, I have
encountered a range of views on how coherent a unit it is. Some accept the
term—but others do not. For these countries can also have dramatically
diverging interests, values, and perspectives.
Policymakers in the
West risk losing sight of the diversity the term encompasses. When they regard
the global South as a more or less cohesive coalition, they can end up
simplifying or ignoring countries’ individual concerns. Western officials who
want to cultivate better ties with their non-Western counterparts may become
tempted to focus on winning over a few supposedly leading global South states,
such as Brazil and India. Their assumption is clear: bolster ties with Brasilia
or New Delhi and the rest will follow. The Biden administration and
its allies invested so heavily in making last year’s G-20 summit in India a
success at least in part for this reason.
A policy that focuses
too heavily on a narrow cadre of non-Western states is insufficient. It can
obscure the tensions among developing countries and the unique pressures—such
as debt, climate change, demographic forces, and internal violence—that are shaping
politics in many of them. In doing so, such a policy may also veil
opportunities for building better ties with small and middle-sized states by
addressing their interests. The term “global South” may offer a compelling but
misleading simplicity (as can its counterpart, “the West”). Treating countries
across Asia, Africa, and Latin America as a geopolitical bloc, however, will
not help solve the problems they face, nor will it bring the United States and
its partners the influence they seek.
Who Speaks For The Global South?
It is true that the
countries of the global South, as defined here, have some common causes as well
as incentives to coordinate. Most of these states fought against colonialism
(and, in some cases, U.S. interventions) and cooperated in the Non-Aligned Movement
and the Group of 77, coalitions that brought developing countries together
during the Cold War. Both live on as formal blocs at the United Nations.
In many multilateral settings today, non-Western states often opt to negotiate
as a team rather than parley with the U.S. and its allies alone. This
coordination enhances the affinity among countries frustrated with an
international order that too often works against their interests.
Recent global events
have made schisms between these countries and the West more pronounced. When
many non-Western governments refused to take sides after Russia
invaded Ukraine, some Western leaders acknowledged the need to address
allegations of a double standard—specifically, the perception that they only
took principled stands when a European nation was attacked. Only with the
support of a large bloc of states that are usually considered part of the
global South, after all, could the UN General Assembly deliver a strong show of
solidarity with Ukraine. But Western governments did not seek to apply this
lesson beyond the Russia-Ukraine war. If the war in Gaza posed the next test of
whether Western leaders truly grasped the importance of facing accusations of
hypocrisy, those leaders appear to have failed. Across Africa, Asia, and Latin
America, officials and citizens believe that the United States and some of its
allies in Europe have greenlighted Israel’s wholesale destruction of Gaza. The
perception of double standards is stronger than ever.
Similarities in
outlook, however, do not mean the countries generally assumed to belong to the
global South act as one. Non-Western leaders are no different than their
Western counterparts in their desire to pursue their states’ own interests, and
not all of them see their countries as members of a broad-based group. Take,
for example, their recent actions at the United Nations. In debates
in the General Assembly over development policy, a small caucus of hardline
G-77 members, led by Cuba and Pakistan, insists on an aggressive approach to
negotiating reforms to the international financial system with the United
States and the European Union, and the group denounces the West for failing to
live up to past aid pledges. Russia, in coordination with this caucus, used
discussions of the UN Sustainable Development Goals in 2023 as a platform to
criticize the global economic impact of U.S. sanctions. Yet in private, many
other G-77 members expressed discomfort with this sharp-elbowed diplomacy,
arguing that it undercut efforts to find common ground with Washington and
Brussels to reduce their debt burdens.
Splits within the
putative global South extend beyond economic issues. Some Latin American
countries led by liberal governments, for example, would like to promote
progressive agendas on gender issues and LGBTQ rights at the UN, but they run
into opposition from more conservative G-77 members, including many
Muslim-majority states. Brazil and India have long pursued permanent seats on
the Security Council, but regional rivals such as Argentina and Pakistan aim to
stymie them. And although non-Western diplomats often have practical reasons to
stick together, those representing larger powers put their national positions
ahead of group solidarity when it suits them.
While many purport to
speak for the global South—at the UN or otherwise—no single country can claim
the mantle. Over the last year, Brazil, China, and India have tussled to
present themselves as the group’s most effective leaders. All three countries
are founding members of the BRICS, whose core members also include Russia and
South Africa. During India’s 2023 G-20 presidency, Modi promised to represent
“our fellow travelers from the global South” and helped the African Union gain
a permanent seat. China, meanwhile, concentrated on expanding the BRICS,
leading a successful push to extend invitations to Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates to join. (Argentina declined its
invitation.) Brazil plans to use its role as president of the G-20 this year
and host of the COP30 climate summit in 2025 to advance what President Luiz
Inácio Lula da Silva (known as Lula) has presented as a vision of a
“multipolar, fair, and inclusive order” in which countries of the global South
would have greater influence than they do today.
Yet even as these
powers vie to lead developing countries, some of their recent foreign policy
choices suggest they prioritize other relationships. China has been quietly
strengthening its ties with Russia since the two powers declared a “no-limits
partnership” in 2022. India has increased its trade with Russia and has drawn
closer to the United States and U.S. allies in its role as part of the Quad
(Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), a maritime security forum that also includes
Australia and Japan. The Modi government broke with a majority of the members
of the Non-Aligned Movement at the UN in October, too, when it refused to sign
on to a General Assembly resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire in
Gaza. Although New Delhi supported a subsequent resolution in December, the
October vote testified to India’s deepening ties with Israel in recent
years.
Lula, meanwhile, has
taken a more strident stance than other non-Western leaders on
the Israel-Hamas war, comparing Israel’s offensive in Gaza to
the Holocaust—comments that got the Brazilian president declared persona non
grata in Israel in February. But Brazil has also sought favor with the world’s
great powers, deftly navigating the frictions among China, Russia, and the
United States in order to bolster ties with all three. For Brazil, China, and
India in particular, claiming leadership of the global South offers clear
advantages, including opportunities to expand their global diplomatic heft and
firm up economic relationships. Despite their rhetorical support for the
countries in this group, however, hard-headed realpolitik frequently takes
precedence.
Other aspirants to
lead the global South seem even less equipped to claim the position. South
Africa, for one, seems to take seriously the idea that it could represent this
group; South African officials have been especially keen to play a peacemaking
role in Ukraine. President Cyril Ramaphosa led a delegation of African leaders
to Moscow and Kyiv last summer—but he made no progress toward ending the war.
South Africa has arguably had more influence by bringing a case against Israel
under the Genocide Convention before the International Court of Justice, a move
that has shaped international debates about the war in Gaza. But a South Africa
that still struggles to project itself as a leader on its own continent—where
other powers such as Kenya and Nigeria prefer to chart their own paths—will not
find it any easier to rally a globe-spanning coalition.
No other candidates
for the leadership position are likely to emerge. The small but influential
Gulf Arab countries, for instance, caucus at the UN with developing nations in
the Non-Aligned Movement and the G-77, and they have used these ties to garner support
for the Palestinian cause during the Israel-Hamas war. But Arab officials tend
to present their interests as separate from those of the global South, given
their countries’ economic growth and relative political stability. Russia has
also tried to win the backing of non-Western countries, and it uses
anticolonial rhetoric to justify its confrontation with Europe and the United
States. But many officials in these states see Moscow as too erratic and
bellicose to trust in full, and Kenya in particular has criticized Russia for
waging an imperialist war in Ukraine.
Fix The Real Problems
Ultimately, there is
little value in striving to identify who, if anyone, can lead the global South.
When officials in poorer countries look at the cast of contenders, they often
question whether they have anything in common with those major and middle powers.
As one African politician recently told me, smaller, poorer countries worry
about being pushed into the role of the “South of the global South”: in need of
outside support and facing condescension not only from former colonial rulers
but also from non-Western states that are better off.
The parlor game of
global South leadership also pulls focus from the real challenges facing small
and medium-sized states. Just as Western pundits have started to speculate
about what new kinds of power developing countries can exert as a bloc, the
fortunes of many individual non-Western states have taken a turn for the worse.
Almost two-thirds of the world’s least developed countries now face serious
debt distress. Some of the poorest—including several in West Africa—are
experiencing political instability and deteriorating security conditions, which
will only compound their economic woes. Regional bodies that were set up to
mediate political problems, such as the African Union and Organization of
American States, have lost credibility amid squabbles among their members.
Helping vulnerable countries, particularly those that face conflict and
humanitarian catastrophe, navigate the mutually reinforcing shocks of violence,
inflation, food insecurity, climate change, and the lingering effects of the
pandemic is more pressing than determining which power’s cues they follow in
international diplomacy.
Even the states that
aim to lead Africa, Asia, and Latin America face serious internal fractures,
such as the high level of criminal activity in Brazil and South Africa or the
recent upsurge of ethnic conflict in northeastern India. Ethiopia’s stature may
have risen with its invitation to join the BRICS, but the country is recovering
from a bloody civil war and contending with multiple insurgencies. The
governments of many major non-Western powers are attempting to take a greater
role on the global stage while facing persistent or increasing instability at
home. Although the same can be said for several advanced economies in the West,
in neither case is this a recipe for consistent leadership and
problem-solving.
The recent spike in
chatter about the global South has at least done the service of highlighting
mounting problems faced by countries beyond the West—problems that will require
a global effort to address. To head off future instability, the United States
and its allies must work to ease the international debt crisis and help
vulnerable states resolve internal conflicts and governance issues. Progress
will require multilateral negotiations to reform the global financial
architecture—during which developing countries will likely continue to work as
a bloc—and increased attention to each country or region’s specific economic
and political circumstances. With Chinese initiatives such as the South-South
Cooperation Fund and the BRICS New Development Bank presenting alternatives to
Western public finance, genuine efforts from Washington and its partners to
address these countries’ concerns will be particularly important.
But the terminology
problem remains. Although many Western policymakers think they know better than
to treat the non-Western world as an unvariegated whole, they should use the
phrase “global South” with particular care. Specific dynamics within and among
the countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America will shape their political
futures more than their identity as a group. The West must see these states as
they are, not fall for the fallacy that they operate geopolitically as a single
entity.
For updates click hompage here