By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

The Anti-Jewish Dimension Of Russia

The relationship between church and state was symbiotic: being upheld by the secular authority, the spiritual one supported the former and its policy. In a word, as the Emperor's will was justified by religion, a real secularisation of state power was excluded. The inherent conservatism of the Orthodox Church made it perceive church tradition, not the Gospels, as the ultimate authority. Even in our days, this traditionalist thinking sometimes manifests itself within the Russian Orthodox Church and the rhetoric of some national patriot thinkers. In the nineteenth century, ideas were continuously exchanged between Slavophilism and German nationalism. The influence of German idealistic romanticism on original Slavophilism, in general, has already been mentioned. More specifically, Johann Gottfried Herder's philosophy of history inspired the Slavophiles to emphasize the organic character of development and society. Yet, the Russian idea was not a copy of German national thought ('Teutonophilism') as Orthodoxy colored it and, consequently, still represented traditionalism. The degeneration of the Russian idea towards advocating imperial chauvinism and Panslavism, and outright anti-Semitism during the last three decades of the nineteenth century, had its approximate nationalist parallel in Germany.

The anti-Jewish dimension of the Russian idea had already become a vital issue in Russian domestic politics by the 1880s. However, this phenomenon differed from the traditional confessional anti-Semitism cultivated from time immemorial by the Russian Orthodox Church. The new kind of anti-Semitism had come from crisis-stricken Germany, where it served as a backlash movement against the accomplished political and economic Emancipation of the Jews. Among the modern German anti-Semites, the radicals represented racial biology, and the moderates wanted to oust the Jews from public service (ibid.). The latter category became predominant among Russian rightists after the revolutions in 1917 when the Russian Jews got access to government offices.

In the 1920s and 1930s, Nikolai Danilevsky's geopolitical ideas were paralleled and surpassed by the German national socialists' geopolitical projects. The semi-fascist Russian extreme right is often called the `Black Hundred' (chernosotentsy). The name refers to the paramilitary groups that belonged to the Union of Russian People (Soiuz Russkogo Naroda). This most crucial rightist party had emerged before the first Duma elections in 1906. The new message of the Black Hundred was that the real confrontation of the contemporary world was `Russia versus Jewry.' The idea of a Jewish conspiracy against Russia was gaining ground among Russian nationalists mainly due to the appearance of the notorious Protocols of the Elders of Zion (Protokoly Sionskikh Mudretsov), an infamous forgery attributed to the tsarist secret service, the 'Okhranka.'

One of Russia’s most influential Jews was quoted in Russian media supporting President Vladimir Putin's claims of his "military operation bringing about the ‘Denazification’ of Ukraine.

In recent years, there has been a systematic glorification of Nazi criminals, torchlight marches, and the like, said Rabbi Alexander Boroda, who serves as chairman of the Board of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia (FJCR). He spoke to the Russian news agency Interfax on March 4. During the interview, he expressed “bewilderment that neo-Nazism was actively asserting itself in a country like Ukraine.

“The participation of the UPA (The Ukrainian Insurgent Army) in punitive actions concerned not only Jews but also other ethnic minorities," Boroda said, giving, "for example, the Volyn massacre, which destroyed fifty thousand Polish civilians.”

People walk near a banner depicting Russian President Vladimir Putin as Adolf Hitler, in Poznan, Poland, on 16 March 2022.

Given the above context, it is also interesting to see how the Russian Orthodox Church has played an essential part in the Kremlin’s war on Ukraine, according to the following testimony:

I arrived in Soviet Russia in 1989, as perestroika and glasnost were in full swing, to help rebuild the Jewish community destroyed by 70 years of Communist rule.

One winter day in 2003, the Federal Security Service (FSB) official assigned to the Moscow Choral Synagogue, a man I’ll call Oleg (his name has been changed purposely)—invited me to a police station at 40 Sadovnichevskaya Street. Oleg and his colleague started saying that I, a Swiss citizen, had been using a business multiple entry visa to stay in Russia, which is illegal since I was a religious worker; however, they were ready to overlook this issue if I started reporting to them. They pressed me to sign something, yet I refused categorically, saying that it was against Jewish law to inform others.

After badgering me for over an hour, they finally let me go. I was shaken to the core of my being. Oleg came back twice to try to convince me. Once, he even stopped my car in the street — from that moment on, I understood that the driver might also be working for the FSB. Two years later, in 2005, I was expelled from Russia—possibly related to my refusal to cooperate with the intelligence agencies. I was eventually able to return only after the intervention of then-Prime Minister of Italy Silvio Berlusconi.

Years later, I know of multiple attempts to recruit my colleagues in the Jewish community. In addition, FSB operatives regularly monitored, visited, and intimidated heads of religious organizations, ensuring everyone was aware of their presence. Some Jewish student leaders were invited to the offices of the FSB on Lubyanka Square.

Perhaps most notably, in 2000, the Kremlin allied with the Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia (FEOR)—a partnership that served several purposes. First, it was an alibi for Putin not being an antisemite as he destroyed the oligarchs, many of whom were of Jewish descent (Mikhail Fridman, Vladimir Gusinsky, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Boris Berezovsky)—as a class.

The second task of FEOR was for the Western world: As Putin became more authoritarian and Western powers became apprehensive, the heads of FEOR were dispatched to the West to convey one message: As wrong as Putin is, any alternative would be worse, and Jews would be persecuted. As protests grew in Moscow after Putin announced his return to power in 2012, FEOR rabbis quickly demanded that their Moscow congregants desist and not take part in the demonstrations, upholding the general government effort of depoliticizing civil society.

Later, as Russia conquered Crimea, FEOR leaders were at the forefront of pushing the line on social media as protests erupted from Russian Jews: Jews, don’t get involved; this is not our fight.

Within the context of the Russian propaganda narrative of fighting neo-Nazis in Ukraine, the Museum of Tolerance, built by FEOR and centering on the history of World War II, was used again and again to push the line that the war against Ukraine was a war against the resurgence of Nazism. This line was used by Rabbi Alexander Boroda, the president of FEOR, to support the war. FEOR’s sister organizations outside of Russia, such as Chabad, barely said a word.

Even though the Kremlin partly succeeded in controlling and instrumentalizing the Jewish community of Russia, the FSB continued with its war of attrition against the rabbis, mainly of foreign origin, exiling more than 11 communal rabbis during the last decade—namely, those who did not follow the party line established by the FSB and modeled by the  Russian Orthodox Church.

Indeed, the Russian Orthodox Church has played an essential part in the Kremlin’s war on Ukraine. As the world marks the first anniversary of the Russian invasion, we must examine how religion has been weaponized—and perverted—to justify crimes against humanity.

Kirill's support for the war in Ukraine has deepened a rift between the Russian branch of the Orthodox Church and other wings of Orthodoxy worldwide. Pope Francis, head of the Catholic Church, has been a vocal opponent of the war and has appeared to scold Kirill's position in several public addresses, including earlier this month when he said God does not support the war.

The head of the Russian Orthodox Church has said that Russian soldiers who died in the war against Ukraine will be cleansed of all their sins, days after President Vladimir Putin ordered the country's first mobilization since World War Two.

Patriarch Kirill is a key Putin ally and backer of the invasion. He has previously criticized those who oppose the war and called on Russians to rally around the Kremlin.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 left all the constituent entities in the complex structure of the ROC facing a dilemma: speak out against Patriarch Kirill for his support of the war, or remain loyal to the church leadership and risk becoming seen as Kremlin agents in their own countries, with all the ensuing legal and reputational ramifications. As far as it is known, the Moscow Patriarchate has not offered any recommendations to its churches. 

Under church law, these constituent churches cannot independently separate from the ROC: they would be considered schismatics. Theoretically, they can arrange to be recognized by the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, the “first among equals” of the Eastern Orthodox Church.

Also, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) has long retained an important presence in Ukraine, making up one-third of all the parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (ROC) is the ‘Moscow Patriarchate’ tag, arguing it is based in Ukraine. But it has long resisted pressure from the Ukraine side to adopt autocephaly, most notably at the same Sobor (bishops’ council) of the Russian Orthodox Church in 2000 that canonized Nicholas II and his family.

Any new structure is unlikely to have many congregation members right away: in other former Soviet countries where parallel jurisdictions are in place, the ROC generally retains most worshippers. Churchgoers fear becoming schismatics and losing grace (standard ROC propaganda) and don’t believe themselves capable of making decisions on their religious affiliation. But the existence of an alternative and competition changes the situation, especially when the state organs are also interested.

As seen above, Patriarch Kirill of Moscow identifies entirely with the Russian regime and Putin’s political elite. He cannot envisage a future for the ROC that does not reach the outer borders of the Soviet Union. He has supported the war for almost a year, demonstratively appearing at Kremlin events, blessing murder, and justifying aggression. He isn’t thinking about the situation he is creating for all the other Orthodox constituent entities of the ROC outside of Russia’s jurisdiction: the bishops, priests, and millions of congregation members, including victims of the war.

On 29 December, the ROC Synod indefinitely postponed the next meeting of the Council of the Primates. That meeting is impossible: neither the Ukrainian nor European primates will attend, meaning there will not be a quorum. In its current state, the ROC is becoming ungovernable and can only be preserved if Russia conquers all those countries by force. This is why the ROC’s support for the war is only getting stronger, to the detriment of its constituent parts in other countries.

These centrifugal processes may eventually halt, after which some kind of new Orthodoxy in the Russian tradition will emerge: without the ROC and Putin. First, it remains to be seen how the Patriarch will solve the unavoidable issues, such as the status of the Lithuanian Church and autocephaly for the Latvian and Ukrainian churches, and whether, by that time, his decisions will even carry any weight.

And in the end, Russia’s war in Ukraine has touched every part of the world. The consequences will be felt for years, if not decades, to come.

Born to a Ukrainian Jewish family, the President of Ukraine grew up as a native Russian speaker in Kryvyi Rih, a major city of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in central Ukraine. He obtained a degree in law from the Kyiv National Economic University.

 

 

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