By Eric Vandenbroeck
and co-workers
Russia's Target Of 300,000 Additional
Troops
Having been keen
observers of the Ukraine war two weeks ago when Russia started to mammas troops
two weeks before its invasion, we now have to ask if Moscow has partly
recovered from the military setbacks we reported?
“All the dumb
Russians are dead.” So said Ukrainian officials in July 2022 as they sought to
explain why the Russian army had abandoned the overambitious strategy and
amateurish tactics that defined its conduct in the early weeks of the war. It
was probably too early to make this quip. The Russians continued to do many
dumb things and still do. But broadly speaking, the Ukrainians’ intuition in
the summer now appears correct: when it comes to overall military strategy,
Moscow seems to have gotten smarter.
Russian strategic
decisions are finally starting to make military sense. The partial mobilization
of reservists that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered in
September has strengthened Russian forces at the front. The bombing campaign
against Ukrainian energy infrastructure that began in October is forcing
Ukraine and its allies to divert resources toward the defense of the
country’s urban population, which is vulnerable to bitter winter
weather in the absence of electricity. And the withdrawal of Russian
forces from the city of Kherson in November has saved capable units from
destruction and freed them for action elsewhere.
In July, I argued that the war was stalemated. Given Ukraine’s
subsequent successes in the liberating territory in and around Kherson and
Kharkiv, my assessment was premature. But it is worth noting that Ukraine
achieved these successes when Russia’s forces were weakest and its leadership
was at its poorest. Despite Kyiv’s advances, the grim truth remains that then
and now, the ratio of Russian casualties to Ukrainian casualties stands at one
to one according to U.S. estimates.
This is not a war
that is simply cascading in Ukraine’s favor. Instead, it is turning into a war
of attrition, a contest in which any gains by either side will come only at a
high cost. Even the dim outlines of this future should make Ukraine and Russia
wish to avoid it. Still, neither country seems ready to negotiate, much less
make the difficult compromises that might provide the ingredients of a
settlement.
Ukraine and its
backers may hope that Russia comes to its senses and abandons
the war, but that outcome looks unlikely. They may also hope for a
Russian collapse at the front or home, but the chances of either scenario are
slim. The most promising course would be for the United States to nudge the two
sides to the negotiating table since only Washington can do so. But it has
decided not to do so. And so the war goes on at a tragic human cost.
Fresh Forces
Putin’s initial
plan—to overthrow the Ukrainian government in a raid by special operations and
airborne forces—failed spectacularly. The Russians tried to salvage the
campaign by moving large tanks, artillery, infantry and supporting troops
overland. Still, that effort fared a little better amid constant Ukrainian
ambushes.
As Putin’s hopes for
a quick and easy victory vanished on the battlefield, losses on both sides
mounted. Calculating casualty figures is hard. The U.S. intelligence community
has released estimates that put the total casualties at 100,000 for the
Russians and 100,000 for the Ukrainians. It is unclear how these numbers are
derived. Still, on the Ukrainian side, they are roughly consistent with the
13,000 military deaths that Ukrainian officials state their army has suffered
and track with the ratio of dead to wounded that U.S. forces experienced in
Iraq. If one uses the ratio that U.S. forces participated in the European
theater of World War II, the number of Ukrainian casualties is probably closer
to 50,000. Given U.S. officials’ view that casualties have been roughly
comparable, Russian losses should lie in the same range: 50,000 to 100,000
deaths.
Since most casualties
fall in combat units for Ukraine and Russia, this estimate would mean that each
army has lost nearly as many combat soldiers to death or injury as it fielded
at the beginning of the war. The lightly wounded may have returned to the front
or will do so soon. But even if that factor effectively erases half of each
side’s losses, each side has still permanently lost half the initial personnel
in its tank and infantry battalions—a significant reduction in combat power.
To restore that
power, Ukraine and Russia scrambled to refill their ranks. Ukraine managed
to replenish its army relatively effectively. Part of its advantage came from
the tens of thousands of Ukrainians who, eager to defend their country,
volunteered for combat in those early months. But Ukraine’s ace in the hole was
likely the tens of thousands of experienced veterans who had fought in the
Donbas since 2014 and were drawn into the Ukrainian army’s reserve structure
once they completed their initial duty period. Many of them were used to bring
Ukraine’s initial forces up to full strength at the time of the invasion, but
some probably remained available to replace killed and wounded soldiers as the
months went on.
Russia had a distinct
disadvantage in the race to make up for battlefield casualties because Putin
had sent his best forces to Ukraine. For the initial phase of the invasion, the
Russian military appears to have committed about half of its significant
formations—some 40 brigades. Those 40 brigades likely included most of Russia’s
experienced soldiers. Most Russian combat units feature many drafted troops
serving alongside professional armies, but Putin insisted that no conscripts be
sent to the front. By necessity, the 40-odd brigades left behind were denuded
of their best-trained personnel.
The hodgepodge
replacement force Russia scrounged up in the early summer failed badly on the
battlefield. Russian units became weaker and weaker, and Russian commanders had
to rob troops from one part of the front to reinforce other parts. The
Ukrainians pounced, taking advantage of thin Russian defenses, particularly in
Kharkiv, to liberate more territory in their impressive drive in early
September. Putin realized that he needed more troops.
Hence his order
to mobilize Russian reservists was announced in late
September. For all the anecdotes about inexperienced recruits, substandard
barracks, inadequate equipment, and limited training, the mobilization seems to
be a reasonable response to the Russian army’s operational and tactical
problems. Russia has announced a target of 300,000 additional troops, and the
math adds up. The army needs 200,000 new soldiers to bring the 40 brigades left
behind in Russia back to full strength, plus 100,000 to make up for the troops
killed or wounded in battle.
Although some
mobilized Russian reservists may have no military skills, many likely do. Even
before the invasion, the Russian military trained some 250,000 conscripts every
year and sent them back to civilian life. The mobilization indeed found many of
these men. Admittedly, to avert immediate disaster, Russia has been sending to
the front a mix of the trained and untrained, the competent and incompetent,
without much refresher training. But some 200,000 troops are receiving more
substantial movement in Russia and Belarus.
U.S. intelligence
agencies are undoubtedly doing what they can to determine whether this effort
is serious. In 1982, an interagency intelligence memorandum concluded
that the Soviets could mobilize reservists, retrain them, and be ready for
offensive operations in roughly a month. If today’s Russian training effort is
more than mere theater—building in extra time to account for the fact that the
Russian army is in worse shape than its Soviet predecessor—40 fresh and
moderately well-trained brigades should be ready for combat within several
months. What the Russians will do with these forces remains to be seen. At a
minimum, these brigades will stiffen the defense at the front and significantly
raise the cost of Ukrainian efforts to recover their land in the four districts
Russia has claimed. They might even be used to renew the offensive, although
given the strength and determination that the Ukrainian military has
demonstrated, such a move would be unwise.
A Smart Retreat
Like the
mobilization, Russia’s withdrawal from the city of Kherson in November made
military sense. As Putin observed, the contact line between Russian and
Ukrainian forces was long, stretching nearly 1,000 miles, and Russian troops
were spread thin. Ukraine’s successful breakthrough in Kharkiv in September
shortened the front that Russia had to defend to roughly 600 miles. But even
that was not short enough. Russian forces had necks on the west side of the Dnieper
River at Kherson. The intelligent decision militarily was to withdraw them, and
after much vacillation and considerable Ukrainian military pressure, that was
precisely what Russia did. That Putin was willing to do something he did not wish to
do suggests that he now has some confidence in his commanders—and that some of
them are giving sound military advice.
There is no denying
that the Russians were forced to retreat, and the mere fact that they had to do
so no doubt upset Putin. But the Russians pulled off one of the most complex
military operations: retreating during a significant attack without suffering
the disintegration or annihilation of their forces. It was no small feat to
move some 20,000 soldiers and most of their combat equipment across the Dnieper
after Ukrainian forces had destroyed vital bridges. And even while under
intense intelligence surveillance by the West and Ukraine, they managed to
maintain the element of surprise. In the end, no one in Ukraine
or NATO seemed to be sure that Russian forces were leaving.
Their rear-guard units kept a coherent defense, even though they must have
known that their comrades closer to the river were escaping.
Somehow, the Russians
managed to repair damaged bridges while under fire, throw up pontoon bridges, and
employ ferries to get their people and equipment out, defending each avenue of
escape from the Ukrainian attack. The Ukrainian army will have to fight these
units somewhere else, perhaps under less favorable conditions. If only through
a Darwinian process the Russian military has finally found some competent
planners and battlefield commanders.
By all accounts, the
Russians are settling in to defend the shorter front that their tactical
defeats and retreats have produced—and doing so with newly reinforced combat
units. According to press reports and satellite imagery, Russian troops are
digging defensive positions all along the line of contact and constructing
sequential barriers of concrete obstacles and bunkers. They are also presumably
seeding the ground with mines, a simple and time-honored weapon of the Russian
military. More fully manned units on shorter fronts and well-prepared defensive
positions are the ingredients of a potentially effective defense. Unless
Russian military morale collapses and produces mass mutinies and desertions,
the Ukrainians will have to do the bloody work of evicting those units from
their new positions.
Bombing To Win?
Finally, the Russians
have launched a cunningly effective bombing campaign against Ukraine’s
electricity generation, transmission, and distribution system. The strikes
against Ukraine’s electrical grid are particularly effective—and not just
because they could turn the winter into a brutal struggle for survival for
Ukrainian civilians. This campaign has not proved decisive, but like most
strategic bombing campaigns, it imposes direct and indirect military costs.
Modern military
systems for air defense, command and control, and intelligence gathering
run on electricity. If they cannot get it from the grid, they must get it from
generators. But making that transition is not as easy as flipping a switch, and
it can degrade these systems’ performance. Moreover, relying on generators
places additional demands for fuel on Ukraine’s military logistics system.
Meanwhile, the heat signatures produced by generators add yet another data
point that Russian intelligence can use to produce a more accurate picture of
Ukrainian forces.
Russia’s bombing
campaign also imposes opportunity costs: the Ukrainians must expend resources
to adapt to the attacks. They have already made defending electricity
infrastructure from airstrikes a military and diplomatic priority. The
country’s powerful weapons and ammunition industry depend on electricity, as
does much of the rail system that moves war materiel around the country. With a
damaged electricity grid, Ukraine’s soldiers and civilians will have to rely
more on diesel-powered trains and diesel generators or shift to generators
powered by scarce natural gas. These exigencies will divert more fuel that
could otherwise have been used for military operations or impose more costs on
Ukraine’s allies, which will need to deliver the power. The West is helping
Ukraine repair the grid as best it can while under constant attack. But from
the Russian perspective, this is good news, as the repairs consume resources
that cannot be used to support fighting at the front.
The most alarming
thing about Russia’s bombing campaign is that Moscow knows what it is doing.
The Russians are hitting a few targets with relatively few weapons and
producing disproportionate effects. Even though U.S. and British officials have
regularly predicted that the Russian military would exhaust its munitions
supply, it found them somewhere. Russia’s well-executed campaign suggests that
its air force, which has had little success attacking Ukraine’s ground forces,
has learned from its past mistakes.
No End In Sight
Moscow now seems
reconciled to a simple war aim: to hold on to the land, it has seized. And it
appears to have settled on two new military strategies to pursue this
objective. The first, as exemplified by the retreat from Kherson, the
mobilization of reservists, and the construction of new barriers, is to create
a dense defense and make the Ukrainians pay dearly for every effort to recover
territory. The second, as exemplified by the bombing campaign, is to exploit
the vulnerability of Ukraine’s electrical infrastructure to divert resources
from the Ukrainian war effort at the front while making the continuation of the
war painful for Ukrainian society and ever more costly for allies.
Putin may hope that
this approach ultimately brings Ukraine to the bargaining table. Or he may hope
that the never-ending costs will cause Ukraine to gradually cease its attacks
without conceding anything, resulting in another frozen conflict. Few people
know what Russia’s overall war strategy is if it even has one. It is also
possible that the recent period of reasonable military decisions and competent
implementation will turn out to be a blip rather than a harbinger. The most
mysterious question is whether Russia’s efforts to train large combat-capable
units will work. And it is an open question whether Moscow has, or can
manufacture or import, the weapons and ammunition needed for another year of
intense combat. But if it can generate these new units and fight sensibly, the
war may continue in its present form: a brutal slugfest.
Russia’s war appears
to have morphed from a regime change into a land grab. Suppose the Kremlin can
continue to make military decisions that are merely sensible and act on them in
simply clever ways a year from now. In that case, Western intelligence agencies
may count another 50,000 to 100,000 casualties for each side, and Western
legislatures may debate another $100 billion of economic and military
assistance for Ukraine. Diplomacy has little chance of altering this trajectory
because both sides are politically invested in the war. Each thinks that
victory is possible and defeat is unthinkable.
The United States could
develop a diplomatic strategy to reduce maximalist thinking in Ukraine and
Russia if it wanted to. But to date, it has shown little interest in using
its leverage even to coax the two sides to the negotiating table. Those in the
West who recommend such a diplomatic effort are regularly shouted down. If this
bloody, costly, and risky stalemate continues for another year, that may
change.
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