While Hindu nationalists had long promoted the vision of an explicitly Hindu society, it was Indira Gandhi as we have seen in P.2 who brought this discourse back into the ideological mainstream. This instrumental manipulation of religion, however, opened the door for other religious and political activists who were more clearly defined (or constituted) by the norms and ideals associated with religious communalism.

While the religious beliefs of Indira Gandhi differed from those of her father, it appears, nonetheless, that her motivations were mostly pragmatic; religion, in this sense, was an effective means of mass mobilization. This instrumental manipulation of religion, however, opened the door for other religious and political activists who were more clearly defmed (or constituted) by the norms and ideals associated with religious communalism. The implications, however, were far-reaching.

These include Mrs. Gandhi's assassination by Sikh militants-which was a direct result of her policies in the Punjab-as well as the more general increase in communal violence throughout India. Moreover, the rise of the BJP to politica1 power, and the normalization of the other elements of the Sangh Parivar, demonstrates the long-term effects of Congress (1) Party's short-term strategies. Far from creating a durable coalition for the Party, it paved the way for a new era of Indian politics that privileged the ideas and discourse of Hindutva.

One of the key characteristics of Hindu nationalist militancy in India is the presence of overlapping, but highly disciplined, organizations that promote different facets of a unique interpretation of Hindu nationalism called Hindutva (Hinduness). The Partition of India was a traumatic event, but it was an Indian tragedy not a solely Hindu one despite efforts on the part of RSS and others to claim so.

See Case Study P.1:

Thus in India, even after the Congress Party's counter productive experiment with Hindu nationalism, it continues to use a 'soft Hindutva' as an electoral strategy.While Nehru and many of the early Congress party leaders actively opposed such ideas,this commitment faided in the years following his death. Particularly in the post Emergency period, the Congress party's appeal to Hindu sentiments was very much intertwined with the emerging challenge of the BJP and the Hindu right. By courting the Hindu nationalist vote, Indira, and later her son Rajiv, attempted to outflank the BJP and capture its base of support. The campaigns of the late 1980's and 1990's-as well as the more recent elections-were subsequently detined by a competition between the Congress party and the BJP, with each seeking to depict itself as the more authentie representative of assertive Hindu strength. By ceding the ideological debate in this way, the Congress allowed the Sangh Parivar to define the ideological frame of debate and subsequently became trapped within a discourse that tended to equate Hinduism with Hindutva.

It is clear that religion remains an important force in modem politics. While there are any number of explanations for the continuing resonance of religious belief generally-the lingering religiosity of traditional populations, an amorphous need for meaning, or the alienation associated with rapid socio-economic transformation-what is of primary importance for this research paper is the way in which religion has been politicized by state elites and how this has affected dominant interpretations of religious belief in the public sphere. This is particularly evident in the recent struggles to redefme religious and cultural orthodoxy in public life. As noted earlier, these debates are embodied in the struggle to define the nation, and involve differing conceptions ofboth religious authority
 and political community.

However this is not a conflict between 'civilizations,' as some have maintained, the many cases we have research far on this website (indicate that the real divisions lie within the different traditions themselves. Within the Hindu tradition, liberal and secular Hindus are very much at odds with members of the Sangh Parivar over both the nature of their tradition and the implications for sociallife. And despite the  claim by some, that, Western civilization is defmed by tolerance of diversity, even for example the internal debates within the American tradition over both religious interpretation and American nationalism illustrates that it, too, is divided over such core issues as the basis of religious authority and the merits of tolerating diversity and dissent.

However, the promotion of conservative populism has been intimately associated with a religious nationalism that perceives external groups and internal enemies as existential-and imminent-threats. Consequently, any action taken by state actors on behalf of the nation is perceived, by definition, as legitimate. In other words, the emerging dominance of religious nationalisms in India, the United States, the Middle East and elsewhere might be defining the current conflict in the international arena in religious terms. Hence, it is not that different civilizations reflect differing values or ideals, but, rather, each is succumbing to the allure of tribalism in its various guises.

Similarly, in India the conservative populism of the BJP, and the Congress Party's own efforts to mobilize on this basis, was greatly abetted by the existence of militant Islam in the region- Particularly in the 1980's and 90's, the existence of Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan helped to shape the construction of a nationalist discourse in India that was hostile to Islam in general, and to its Islamic neighbor in particular.

See Case Study P.3:

This trend contributed to the on-going denigration of the Muslim minority within India as a threat to the 'Indian nation.' The conflicts in the region-particularly the on-going dispute over Kashmir-have thus helped to further entrench a communalist interpretation of the respective nationalisms in South Asia. In short, what is transpiring in each case is not a conflict _ of differing value systems, but, rather, a clash between different groups defined by religious identity. The communalization of politics in one society has subsequently helped to instill a similar vision in other societies. This has greatly contributed to a deification of the nation-and, hence, the state--and the corresponding demonization of those who are seen as opposing it. The perception of amorphous threats to the nation, moreover, have provided license for persecuting individuals and minorities within the various communities, and has sanctioned-at least in the popular mind-the willful violation of international human rights norms.

This resurgence of Hindu nationalism is particularly significant because it challenges the 'idea of India, as an inclusive and cosmopolitan society. Since independence, the country has been faced with the problem of integrating a diverse collection of peoples into a common social and political framework. The leaders of the nationalist movement recognized the importance of this task, and actively sought to create an Indian nationalism that would serve as a common basis of citizenship. They were opposed, however, by communal organizations that had a very different vision of the country's future. For these latter groups, national identity was more properly defined in religious terms, and the control of state power rightly belonged in the hands of the Hindu majority. Moreover, the inclusive cosmopolitanism ofthe nationalist movement was anathema to them, reflecting their embrace of the 'organic' conception of nationalism common in 1930's European thought. Particularly given the strong roots of communal politics in the decades preceding independence, and the bitterness engendered by Partition, countering such communalist discourses was a formidable task.

The commitment of state elites to the construction of an inc1usive Indian nationalism in the 1950's, however, allowed for the institutionalization of secularism as part ofIndia's founding consensus. This commitment, particularly by Jawaharlal Nehru and other members of the early Congress party leadership, was based upon the recognition that an inclusive social order was a prerequisite for building a viable and enduring state. The leadership of these early state actors was crucial in constraining the communalist tendencies, and institutionalizing secular norms and ideas in India' s constitution. The ideology of 'Hindutva' (political Hinduism), which embodied the ideals ofHindu nationalism, suffered a significant setback in this struggle. Although an influential force in the 1930's and 40's, these communalist ideas were largely in retreat until the 1980s. The BJP's precipitous rise in the early 1990s consequently raised a number of questions about what had changed in Indian society that allowed for the re emergence of Hindutva as a dominant ideology. Why, in short, did the ideas and organizations associated with Hindu nationalism (as opposed to India nationalism) find a new audience at this particular moment in time?

As we have seen, a key-and often overlooked-factor in explaining the precipitous rise of Hindu nationalism is that unlike Nehru, Indira and Rajiv Gandhi consistently used religion and religiously-inspired nationalist appeals in the post-Emergency period to mobilize popular sentiments behind their rule. This use of religion was a calculated strategy designed to appeal to the Hindu majority. It was also part of a homogenizing discourse of national unity that stressed the danger of minority separatism and the necessity of a strong centralized state. . It also sought to portray the Congress party as the one true (and capable) defender of the Hindu nation.Whatever the motivations, this strategy represented a gradual abandonment of secularism in favor of an explicit Hindu majoritarianism. As the Congress Party's traditional coalition fell apart, the Party leadership sought to tap the one constituency large enough to ensure an electoral plurality: the Hindu majority. The party subsequently appropriated the rhetoric and symbols of Hindu nationalism-and even worked at times with its former adversaries in the RSS and VHP-in order to appeal to Hindu populist sentiments. This embrace of Hindu. nationalism, however, had a number of unintended consequences. It gave the ideology and organizations associated with Hindutva a credibility which they had historically lacked, and facilitated their entry into the mainstream of Indian politics. In this way, the Congress party leadership helped to normalize what was previously perceived as a sectarian and discredited ideology.

The abandonment of secularism was also linked to a corresponding shift by the Congress party leadership away from its historical commitment to social justice. The de-emphasis on the socialist ideals and the anti-poverty programs of the 1960' s and 1970's-many ofwhich remained unimplemented-reflected the state's limited ability to address issues of poverty, as weIl as a lack of will to do so. This, in turn, constrained the Congress party from mobilizing voters on a progressive agenda. Perhaps more importantly, the shift away from the socialist ideals of the Nehruvian consensus reflected a rejection of the state's earlier role as a prlmary agent of social change. Rather, the state leadership became more explicit defenders of the status quo. The new rhetoric of religious nationalism, then-along with its emphasis on national unity-corresponded with a diminished commitment of Congress Party elites to earlier positions on social reform and helping the poor.

While the strategy of appealing to Hindu majoritariansm worked for the Congress party in the short-run-most evidently in - the 1984. electoral landslide-it had dire consequences in the longer term. The communalization of politics ultimately cost Indira her life, and the Congress party its dominance. It also led to the communalization of local governments and police forces, to increased incidences of communal riots (often with the support of local authorities), and to a greater stigmatization of minority populations. More to the point, it facilitated the transformation of political discourse, and legitimated the ideas and ideology of Hindu communalism. In short, by pursuing a majoritarian strategy, Indira and Rajiv Gandhi facilitated a shift in the ideoIogical frame of debate, which both legitimated and gave strong impetus to the communalist forces that previously been relegated to the margins of mainstream politics. In this way, the strategy of the Congress party facilitated the transformation of Indian politics and contributed to the resurgence of communalism that characterized the 1990's.

In the end however efforts by the Sangh Parivar to foment communal polarization for example through an agitation over a place of worship in Bangalore / Chikmagalur District failed to gain the BJP advantage at the 2004 election. It was however the neglect of the poor, lower castes and women by the NDA Government that has cost them their power.

While religion, and the discourse of tradition, is used to justify such policies, the modes and purposes to which they are deployed are a by-product of the modem nation state. Preoccupation with security and its promotion of nationalist homogeneity has stigmatized dissent and minority groups as anti-national, and sanctioned a variety of military actions against perceived enemies.

See Case Study P.4:

During the completion of this report we talked to several people in New Delhi whose impression of the RSS today seems to be that of  a secretive, subversive, behind-the-scenes player. In addition, the RSS continues to be the object of strong criticism particularly by the better educated young members of society in India today. In fact the image of the RSS today is somehow synonymous with images of its shakhas, or morning meetings, which are widely disseminated by the print media, and indeed by the RSS itself: neat rows of men dressed in khaki shorts and white shirts saluting a solitary saffron flag. The ideology of the organization, including its views on social reform or education, have been greatly overshadowed by the power of such images, which seem to evoke only a deep-seated fear of such ordered, militaristic nationalism. Indeed, it would not be far from the truth to suggest that the Indian intelligentsia generally regards this, or for that matter any other form of public nationalism, gratuitous and therefore well-near pathological today (in the absence of any Colonial power, which already long ago left).

The images of RSS shakhas, combined with the group's focus on "Hindu hurt" in the telling of history, have further led critics to assume that RSS schools are the nodes through which deliberately distorted versions of history are propagated, causing irreparable harm to the secular fabric of Indian society. Activists, for example, often express serious concerns about the RSS or VHP setting up more schools and teaching their own versions of history, and so also greatly undermining the efficacy of any kind of "secular intervention."

Thus also oleographs, calendars, posters, and cards depicting Bharat Mata have flooded the market throughout the twentieth-century, their early popularity following the curve of the growth and development of chromolithographic technologies in India . Some representations show Bharat Mata handing weapons to or blessing such important nationalist figures as Subhash Chandra Bose and Gandhi; others present her as a solitary figure standing over the Indian peninsula. Abanindranath Tagore's watercolor Bharat Mata, painted in the wake of the 1905 British partition of Bengal and quickly became popular, shows her as an ascetic figure attired simply in pale saffron robes, iconographic ally divinized but not adorned. And only became the more dynamic, even fearsome goddess following Bankim Chandra Chatterjee's 1882 novel Anandamath. Mother India in Mehboob Khan's 1957 film of the same name shows her in the post-independence Nehruvian socialist landscape on the brink of industrialization, struggling with village life and poverty, but ultimately enduring; quite human, but still mythologized. Temples have been built to her, too: one in the early decades of the twentieth century and a second in 1983. The earlier temple was sponsored by nationalist and founder of the Kashi Vidyapeeth at Banaras, Shivprasad Gupt. It had no idol but a large relief map of India in its sanctum sanctorurn: as such, the temple was self-consciously designed to be a religious, dedicated to "equality," but with "Vande Mataram" inscribed at its gate, all in keeping with the prevailing nationalist mood. The later monument constructed by the VHP in Hardwar is an eight-storied temple (dedicated to Bharat Mata and the worship of the heroes and saints of India, both ancient and modem), which for the first time sets an idol of Bharat Mata created in the likeness of popular North Indian Radha-Krishna forms at the head of a relief map of the (unpartitioned) country. Mother India also assumed local form as linguistic nationalist movements from the 1920s through the 1950s personified and frequently deified language as regional Mother, producing such icons as Tamilttai and Telugu Talli.

see P.2



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