By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers
Jordanian Fighter Pilots
For many, the news
that Jordanian fighter pilots came to the defense of Israel during
Iran’s missile and drone attack last weekend must have come as a surprise.
While Israel and Jordan have had diplomatic relations for 30 years, the peace
between them has been cold even in the best of times, and since the outbreak of
the war in Gaza has gone into a deep freeze.
Whereby the picture
above is more than that she (Princess Salma) is the daughter of Jordanian King
Abdullah seen on the right.
Yesterday we
mentioned that: Above all, Jordan made no
effort to disguise the fact that it was shooting down Iranian drones to defend
its sovereign airspace, prompting angry exchanges between the two countries.
These included Jordan accusing Iran of having used the militant Muslim
Brotherhood group and its Iraqi militia proxies for months to mount
infiltration operations on its territory to stir up the largest Palestinian
population in the region.
Yet Jordan was not
the only Arab country contributing to Israel’s defense that night. The Royal
Saudi Air Force also shot down Iranian projectiles flying in its airspace and
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates reportedly provided critical intelligence before the attack.
There are several
reasons why moderate Arab powers chose to play a role that night. One is that
had the Iranian operation ended with significant loss of life or destruction,
Israel would have struck back hard, raising the risk of a regional war. Indeed,
an apparent Israeli retaliation early Friday against Iran appears to have been
limited.
Another is that many
Arab countries are no less anxious than Israel about Iran’s meddling—in Iraq,
Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen and the instability it has created.
But no less important
is that, for moderate Arab powers, Israel has become a key economic
partner—indeed, for Jordan and Egypt, Israel is an economic lifeline. That goes
a long way toward explaining why six months into the war in Gaza, Jordan, Saudi
Arabia, and the UAE have taken almost no concrete steps against Israel. When
Turkey finally did something, announcing on April 9 that it was banning a wide range of
exports to Israel, no Arab country followed suit.
Of these countries,
Jordan is the most reliant on Israel—not for the ordinary stuff of cross-border
trade or for investment (both of which are negligible) but for essential water
and energy.
Jordan is one of the
world’s most water-scarce countries, with just 950 million cubic meters available
annually to meet demand of about 1.4 billion cubic meters. Under the 1994 peace
agreement, Jordan was entitled to buy 50 million cubic meters of water a year
from Israel. That number has since doubled as Jordan’s population has grown, and Israel has
developed so much desalination capacity that it has fresh water to spare. And
the dependence is likely to grow: If a deal to swap more Israeli water for
solar energy from Jordan goes through, Amman will begin
importing an additional
200 million cubic meters.
The kingdom also
lacks domestic energy resources and relies on imports of Israeli natural gas
for electric power and its chemical industry. Gas accounts for more than 70 percent of electricity production in Jordan, and nearly
all that comes from Israel’s Leviathan field. Egypt also needs Israeli gas because domestic reserves are depleting faster than new sources are being found, and its
giant Zohr field is plagued by technical problems. When Israel briefly
slashed exports after the outbreak of the war in Gaza, Egypt had to double rolling blackouts to two hours a day and import liquefied natural gas (LNG).
Egypt’s demand for
Israeli gas goes beyond domestic needs. With its supplies so tight, it can no
longer export its gas as LNG to Europe and instead re-exports Israeli gas. That has not only earned Egypt
badly needed hard currency but ensures its role as the center of an emerging
east Mediterranean gas hub that includes Israel and will likely include Cyprus
one day.
The UAE’s economic
interests in maintaining ties with Israel are about something entirely
different: trade and investment, enhancing the Emirates’ role as a global
logistics hub, leveraging Israel’s high-tech prowess to build its own tech
industry, and partnering to solve the threat of climate change to the region.
Since the 2020 Abraham Accords, the UAE has also emerged as a major buyer of
Israeli arms. The export of Israeli weapons to countries that signed the
Abraham Accords grew from nil that year to $2.9 billion in 2022.
In dollar terms, the
Israel-UAE economic relationship remains comparatively small for both
countries. But it represents something larger and more aspirational, namely
part of an effort to reshape the Middle East—or at least as much of the Middle
East as is possible—from a place chronically in the grip of war and extremist
politics to one focused on economic development. The UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain
have taken the route of prioritizing economics over all else, and Saudi Crown
Prince Mohammed bin Salman is following their lead with his Vision 2030 plan to
turn his kingdom from an oil economy into a center of technology, finance,
tourism, and entertainment.
That said, the Saudis
appear less convinced than the Emiratis that Israel has an important role to
play in the new Middle East. But as the normalization talks that got underway
last year demonstrated, Riyadh is willing to recognize Israel as part of
a wider deal with the United States, something that would have been
unimaginable a decade ago. While the war in Gaza has disrupted the talks and
raised the price the Saudis are demanding from Israel on the Palestinian issue,
Riyadh has signaled it is still willing to move forward.
The economic
imperatives that have driven these relations face powerful headwinds. Even
before the war in Gaza, public opinion even among Israel’s peace partners was
overwhelmingly hostile to Israel. A year ago, just 15 percent of Jordanians said they would support business
deals with Israel if they would help their country’s economy, according to a
poll conducted by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Even though
their country would struggle without Israeli gas and water, ordinary Jordanians
frequently call to sever ties with Israel and rescind the import agreements.
Under immense public pressure after the war in Gaza erupted, Jordan last
November canceled a water-for-energy deal with Israel (although it
has since sought quietly to resurrect it).
In Egypt and Saudi
Arabia, about 38 percent of respondents in the poll a year ago accepted the
idea of doing business with Israel. When the Washington Institute asked Saudis more recently whether they should be allowed to
“have business or sports contacts with Israelis,” just 17 percent said yes,
down from 42 percent in the summer of 2022.
Under the
circumstances, it should be no surprise that the business Arab countries do
with Israel is an elite affair confined to government-to-government deals and
big state-affiliated enterprises. The ordinary ways of doing business, with
executives attending industry conferences and exhibits or making sales calls,
don’t exist. Tourism is a one-way affair—with Israelis visiting Arab countries
but little reciprocation.
The UAE has been
somewhat of an exception to this rule, certainly in the honeymoon period after
the Abraham Accords were signed in 2020. Israeli executives and tourists flocked to the Gulf, and companies were signing
investment and partnership deals. Abu Dhabi’s Mubadala Petroleum took a 22 percent stake in Israel’s Tamar gas field, and many
other investment deals were under discussion. A Comprehensive Economic
Partnership Agreement went into
effect a year ago and
in 2023, two-way trade reached $3 billion, up from $190 million in 2020. Even then, however, the
people-to-people warmth exhibited on the Emirati side was tepid: The Washington
Institute poll found only a 45 percent minority of Emiratis thought doing
business with Israel was “acceptable.” Emiratis didn’t visit Israel, except for
business.
Even though Emirati
leaders say they remain committed to the economic and political partnership
with Israel, there has been a perceptible chill since the onset of the war in
Gaza. Last month, Abu Dhabi’s national oil company, ADNOC, put on hold a deal to buy, together with BP, a 50 percent
stake in Israeli energy company NewMed. They cited
the “external environment,” presumably the war, for the decision.
Fortunately for the
future of these relationships, it appears that the war in Gaza is winding down.
It is by no means certain that it won’t re-ignite with an assault on Rafah, as
Israel has threatened, or that the low-intensity conflict between Israel and
Hezbollah won’t spiral into a full-fledged war. But for now, as a testament to
the prioritizing of realpolitik and economic interest by Arab leaders, these
ties have stood the test.
The View From Washington
President Biden and
his national security team watched with mounting alarm on April 13 as monitors in
the White House Situation Room showed 30, then 60, then over 100 Iranian
ballistic missiles
streaking toward Israel.
Iranian cruise missiles and a swarm of drones were
already in the air, timed to arrive at the same time as the missiles—a massive
barrage that Biden and his aides feared could overwhelm the strengthened
defenses they and Israel
had spent more than a week preparing.
Iran’s foreign
minister on Friday refused to acknowledge that Israel was behind the recent
attack on his country and
described the weapons that were used as more like children’s toys.
“What happened last
night was not a strike,” the foreign minister, Hossein Amirabdollahian,
said in an interview with NBC News’s Tom Llamas. “They were more like toys that
our children play with – not drones.”
Amirabdollahian, who spoke to NBC News in New York where he was
attending a U.N. Security Council session, said Iran was not planning to
respond unless Israel launches a significant attack.
He said Israel had
not taken responsibility for the strikes on Thursday and his country was still
investigating what happened.
Muslim Americans
"Outraged,"
"point of no return" and "absolute disaster" are how some
Muslim American organizers have described their reactions to an aid package
for Israel that
is making its way through Congress for President Joe Biden to sign into law.
Many Muslim Americans
were already
furious with the Biden
administration over its handling of the Israel-Hamas
war, with activists organizing Democrats to
vote “uncommitted" rather than support the president in some state
primaries this year.
Separately, a White
House official pointed to the administration’s numerous meetings with state,
local, and interfaith leaders, as well as outreach to Muslim, Arab, and
Palestinian communities.
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