By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers
How Takaichi
Can Triumph
Two competing visions
have emerged for how U.S. allies and partners should deal with a changing world
order. At the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum at Davos in January,
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney declared a rupture in global politics and
called for middle powers to work together to find alternatives to relying on
the United States. Fresh off a visit to China,
he cast Beijing as a viable counterweight to U.S. power. Meanwhile, in Japan,
Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi insists that China, not
the United States, is the most disruptive threat that countries face. Takaichi’s landslide victory in a snap election in February
gave her a mandate to chart a strategy for Japan - and potentially other U.S.
allies - based on increasing security cooperation with the United States
despite Washington’s unpredictability.
Carney’s speech
earned a standing ovation and plaudits from commentators and leaders across
Europe and as far away as Australia, and it scored major points in domestic
Canadian politics. The prime minister’s vision may be appealing to U.S. allies
tired of Trump’s bullying, but it does not constitute a grand strategy that
other middle powers will find usable or enduring. Indo-Pacific
countries sitting in Beijing’s shadow are already well aware that there is no
real alternative to U.S. power, and even European countries are likely to come
to a similar conclusion despite talk of strategic autonomy from Washington. If
countries want, as Carney said, to be “at the table” and not “on the menu,”
then Takaichi’s approach is much more likely to
succeed in a world in which Beijing’s disorder is still far more destabilizing
than Trump’s.
Takaichi’s strategy does not force a false choice between the
United States and middle powers. Rather, it recognizes that Japan must forge a
broader coalition of economic and security partnerships across Asia and Europe
with American power at the center. That is the only viable way to counter
China’s coercion. Just a few months ago, it seemed unlikely that the
heavy-metal-drumming, motorcycle-riding Takaichi
would last long as prime minister. Now, her foreign policy vision is setting
the most realistic path forward for responsible states confronting a shaken
world order.

Long in the Making
Takaichi’s vision for Japanese foreign policy is an extension of
what her mentor, Shinzo Abe, pursued when he was prime minister from 2006 to
2007 and 2012 to 2020. Takaichi, like Abe, wants to
focus on increasing Japan’s security and restoring its leadership.
Abe’s vision
developed in the years between his two terms as prime minister, when
Chinese encroachment on Japanese-controlled islands and waters in the East
China Sea humiliated Japan. In 2013, after he returned to office, Abe’s
government conducted a series of war games to prepare for the country’s first
published national security strategy. These simulations revealed that Japan on
its own would soon be unable to handle China’s military in a major clash in the
East China Sea. Worse, Abe’s team concluded that the United States would also
find it increasingly difficult to counter China’s regional ambitions without
more help from Japan and other allies.
Up to that point,
Japan’s strategy had been to leave geopolitics to the United States so that
Tokyo could focus on economic growth and improving diplomatic ties with
partners around the world. Every Japanese government since World War II had
interpreted the peace clause of Japan’s constitution, which renounces the right
to wage war to resolve international disputes, to mean that Japanese forces
could not participate in coalition military activities with the United States
or other regional allies except for the purpose of defending Japan (the
so-called ban on collective self-defense). This clause was the perfect excuse
to keep Japan out of wars in Vietnam and the Middle East. But for Abe, facing a
rising China, it was a liability. Japanese leaders could no longer step aside
while the United States led the way; the Japanese archipelago, after all, would
now be on the frontlines of any future conflict. Instead of avoiding
entanglement in American wars, Japan now needed to help shore up U.S.-led
deterrence in Asia.
Abe’s strategy was
rooted in hardheaded realism, not just an ideological commitment to the
alliance with the United States. Abe persisted even after he
received a mixed reaction from the Obama administration, which at the time was
trying to reassure Beijing that the United States did not aim to contain
Chinese growth. Abe championed what he called the “free and open Indo-Pacific”
strategy, which sought to limit China’s regional influence by investing in
Southeast Asia and strengthening diplomatic, economic, and security
partnerships with democracies such as Australia and India. He pushed through
legislation reinterpreting Japan’s constitution to allow forces to join
collective defense coalitions (on the condition that there was a threat to
Japan’s survival), and he reversed Japan’s declining real defense spending. He
also expanded infrastructure financing in Asia to counter China’s Belt and Road
Initiative; championed the Quad security partnership among Australia, India,
Japan, and the United States; and worked to link NATO with Asian allies and
hold together G-7 countries despite European friction with the first Trump
administration. Abe’s goal was to reinforce connections among democratic powers
and increase their collective resolve.
This framework gained
traction in Washington as well as Canberra, London, and even Seoul. The first
Trump administration adopted the term “free and open Indo-Pacific” to describe
its own approach to Asia, and the Biden administration kept the label, too. Abe
had imagined and then spearheaded the collective action Japan needed to manage
an increasingly powerful and ambitious China.

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, after calling
for a snap election, Tokyo, January 2026
A New Game in Town
Few observers
imagined that Takaichi would be the torchbearer of
this geopolitical vision. She began her political life not in Japan but in the
United States, where she interned in the late 1980s for the progressive
Colorado congresswoman Patricia Schroeder. She then rose through the ranks of
Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) as a devout protégé of Abe, but she was
not one of the politicians he initially spotlighted for future leadership.
When she became prime
minister in October after the resignation of the more centrist Shigeru Ishiba,
the LDP was struggling to stay in power without a majority in the Diet. Takaichi was prepared to borrow and spend for defense and
economic security, moves that were likely to provoke pushback from China, the
Japanese left wing, and possibly bond markets. She calls Margaret Thatcher her
hero, but critics predicted she would be more like Liz Truss - whose term as
British prime minister lasted only 49 days - because Takaichi’s
agenda seemed out of sync with where politics and markets were headed.
Takaichi hit turbulence early, after a November debate in the
Diet in which she suggested that a Chinese attack on or blockade of Taiwan
would represent a threat to Japan’s survival. This incurred the wrath of
Beijing, which imposed severe economic and diplomatic boycotts of Japan. Almost
on cue, the LDP’s pacifist coalition partner Komeito
defected to the opposition in the hope of knocking Takaichi
from power and forming a new governing coalition with other internationalist
parties on the political left. Takaichi held her
ground; the public loved her resolve. When she called a snap election in
February, Japanese voters rewarded the LDP with a supermajority in the Diet.
Newly empowered, Takaichi will issue her own national security strategy
later this year. Defense spending will likely hit the 2027 target of two
percent of GDP, or $58 billion, ahead of schedule, and the next five-year plan
is expected to raise the target further. Japan will use export controls and
invest more resources in critical minerals supply chains and R & D to
reinforce its technology advantages over China. Takaichi
will also push for the resumption of Quad summits, which were interrupted in
2025 when the relationship between Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra
Modi soured. And she will continue to promote defense cooperation and sign
production agreements with key partners: Japan is already developing new
fighter jets with the United Kingdom and Italy, and exporting Japanese warships
to Australia.
Takaichi’s goal is to restore a favorable balance of power in
the region centered on an even stronger security relationship with the United
States. She is working with Washington to set up a new side-by-side command
headquarters in Japan, accelerate bilateral planning for a potential Chinese
invasion of Taiwan, and increase Japanese investment in critical minerals and
energy development in the United States. Japan is also expanding joint missile
production, maintenance of U.S. naval vessels and aircraft in Japan, and
cooperation on supply chain resilience with the United States. At international
forums such as the G-7, Takaichi will likely follow
Abe’s example and push for solidarity among the leading democracies rather
than, as Carney suggested in his Davos speech, “de-risk” by seeking more
distance from the United States.
None of this will be
easy. In a national poll conducted last year by the newspaper Yomiuri
Shimbun, only 22 percent of Japanese respondents said they trusted the
United States. There is anxiety in Tokyo that Trump might undermine Takaichi in his desperation for a trade deal when he meets
with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Beijing at the end of the month, possibly
adopting China’s language on relations with Taiwan or its dispute with Japan.
But despite that unease, polls conducted by the Japanese government show that
public support for the alliance with the United States has risen since the
middle of President Joe Biden’s term, from 90 percent in 2022 to 92 percent in
2025. This is not because Trump is more popular than Biden, but because China
continues to remind the Japanese public that even a wobbly United States is
indispensable.

Grappling With Uncertainty
Takaichi is expected to visit the United States for a summit
with Trump on March 19, shortly before the U.S. president heads to Beijing to
meet with Xi. What will come out of the Takaichi-Trump
meeting is uncertain: despite overwhelming support for Japan among the American
public and members of Congress, the Japanese prime minister knows from history
that U.S. presidents can surprise and disappoint. Journalists still write about
how U.S. President Richard Nixon unilaterally announced troop withdrawals from Southeast
Asia and ended the dollar’s convertibility to gold in the 1970s, for instance,
which ushered in severe inflation and raised fears that the United
States was abandoning the region.
But uncertainty can
help generate a serious strategy. And Takaichi has
the most serious strategy on offer right now, one built on reinforcing the U.S.
alliance rather than speculating about a post-American world. Partnering with
Washington is not about acquiescing to Washington’s needs, but about using
leverage effectively to ensure that the alliance works to Japan’s advantage.
When Takaichi was minister of economic security from
2022 to 2024, Japan’s strategy was to become indispensable because of its technology,
investment, and military capabilities. As prime minister today, she knows that
Japan is essential to U.S. efforts to deter Chinese military encroachment and
to obtain critical minerals. Key advisers around Trump also know
this. A strategy centered on working with the United States will allow Japan
more opportunities to harness U.S. power to address the challenging
circumstances it faces in the western Pacific, even with all the uncertainty
emanating from Washington.
For the United
States’ Asian allies, Japan’s example has clear advantages. Xi has barely
concealed his ambitions to make China the dominant force in the Indo-Pacific,
often pressuring and threatening neighboring countries if they do anything to
upset Beijing. This is why in Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and South
Korea, support for a stronger alliance with the United States remains high even
as trust in the Trump administration has sunk.
Takaichi has a better hand to play with Trump than her
European counterparts do, especially because the “America first” wing of the
Republican Party has historically supported a focus on Asia over Europe. Yet Takaichi’s vision is likely a better fit than Carney’s for
Europe, too. The United States is responsible for more than 70 percent of NATO
spending; no European (or Canadian) leader has the political capital or power
to shift that ratio significantly. Moreover, although countries are championing
self-sufficiency in defense production, they are mainly pursuing rent-seeking
national projects rather than pan-European weapons systems that are strong
enough to replace U.S. capabilities. And NATO still needs the U.S. alliance
network in Asia to counter the growing alignment of China and Russia.
Perhaps the most
memorable description of the situation was that of a seasoned British diplomat
who is said to have responded to his European counterparts’ complaints about
the Reagan administration in the 1980s by acknowledging, “Everything you say
about the Americans is true … but they’re the only Americans we have.” For
middle powers from Ottawa to Rome to Seoul, maintaining or even expanding
economic and security cooperation with the United States - supplemented by
other partnerships - is still by far the most realistic strategy to maintain a
favorable balance of power against Beijing, which represents the greatest
disruption to the international system. Carney read the Zeitgeist at Davos. But
when it comes to dealing with the rupture in the international system, it is Takaichi who really understands the geopolitics.
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