By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers
American Aid Alone Won’t Save Ukraine
After months of
delay, Congress’s passage of a nearly $61 billion U.S. aid bill to Ukraine has provided
a vital lifeline to Kyiv. But the aid package alone will not solve Ukraine’s
larger problems in its war with Russia. Ukrainian forces are defending
frontlines that span some 600 miles of the south and east of the country, and
prolonged inaction in Washington has left them severely stretched. The influx
of U.S. weapons and ammunition should significantly raise the cost to Russia of
its impending summer offensive. The aid also offers Ukrainian forces enough
materiel to support more systematic military planning for the summer and fall.
Yet ending the war on
terms favorable to Ukraine will require far more than a new pipeline of
equipment. More than two years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine,
its objective in the war remains unchanged: the Kremlin seeks to subjugate
Kyiv. Inconstant support and political delays among Ukraine’s international
partners have left that outcome all too plausible. If Ukraine is to prevent
Russian victory in the longer term, it will need a comprehensive strategy. This
means training, equipping, and mobilizing new forces. It means convincing the
Kremlin that continuing the war will become increasingly risky to Russia over
time. And it means establishing a position of sufficient strength to be able to
set forth, on Ukraine’s own terms, the parameters of a lasting peace.
None of these tasks
will be straightforward, and none can happen overnight. Nor can Ukraine and its
international partners afford to fritter away months formulating a way forward.
The United States and its NATO allies will need to make explicit long-term
commitments; compelling Russia to negotiate will be especially difficult. But
the alternatives are far worse. In the absence of such an overall strategy, the
duration of the conflict may be extended, but its trajectory will not.
Since the fall of
2023, Ukraine’s battlefield situation has steadily worsened. Largely because of
ammunition shortages, Ukrainian forces have had to cede territory to Russian
forces, often after sustaining significant casualties. Russia has amassed approximately
470,000 troops in Ukraine and seems intent on using them to try to complete the
conquest of Donbas over the remainder of 2024. Russian forces have been
focusing their attacks on key eastern towns that, once taken, will allow them
to threaten Ukraine’s main logistics hubs in and around Donetsk.
Talk of a new Russian
offensive may conjure up images of tank units assaulting Ukrainian lines,
breaking through, and then trying to exploit those gains deep into
Ukrainian-held territory in order to cut off Ukrainian units. But Russia’s
forces are not currently able to carry out these kinds of operations, nor do
they intend to. After more than two years of war, Russia’s army has suffered
heavy losses among its officer core, and its ability to plan and synchronize
large-scale attacks is limited. Russian attacks mainly consist of successive
assaults at platoon and company scale, resulting in slow advances with heavy
losses.
Ukrainian soldiers manning an artillery position near Chasiv Yar, Ukraine, April 2024
Still, Russia
currently enjoys a more than ten-to-one advantage over Ukraine in available
artillery. With the passage of the new U.S. aid package, that advantage will
likely shrink to three to one in some regions, which will increase the rate of
Russian casualties. But Russia has several ways of pulling Ukrainian forces
into fights that are also costly to Ukraine. For example, Russian forces have
been using converted glide bombs to devastating effect. These are
Soviet-designed FAB500s—large, half-ton bombs—that have been outfitted with
wings and guidance kits and that are lobbed by Russian aircraft from behind the
Russian lines. With an approximately 40-mile range, they can easily strike
Ukrainian towns, collapsing buildings and driving out local populations.
As a result,
Ukrainian forces have often been forced to expend significant resources
defending costly single positions, simply to shield
civilian settlements from coming into Russian glide bomb range. Take Chasiv Yar, a small town on a key ridge line in the eastern
Donetsk region. If it falls, Russian forces will gain a commanding position
from which to bombard towns in Donbas and key Ukrainian supply routes. Thus,
Ukrainian forces are desperately trying to hold on to it, even as the tactical
situation becomes less favorable. The challenge has been amplified by Ukraine’s
overstretched air defenses, a situation that now permits Russian planes to come
close to the frontlines, increasing the accuracy of their bombing.
Unfortunately, the more Ukraine needs its surface-to-air missile systems to
protect its cities, the greater it puts at risk its ground forces at the front.
The solution to this
challenge would usually be what military strategists call an “active defense,”
using small-scale counterattacks to disrupt the attacker from consolidating its
advances. If, say, Russian forces seized a key position in Chasiv
Yar, the Ukrainians could use counterattacks to isolate the position so that
the Russians were unable to dig in and keep moving forward. But Ukraine has few
reserves and has lost many of the tactical vehicles needed to exploit Russian
vulnerabilities soon after they take positions. Lacking the reserves to
counterattack, Ukraine must settle for maximizing Russia’s losses for each
position it takes, thereby slowing down its rate of advance.
Under these
conditions, even the passage of the U.S. aid bill can only do so much to change
the battlefield calculus. The long delay in Washington means that it will take
time to repair much of the damage to Ukrainian capabilities. Ukraine will lose
ground to Russia this summer. The question is how much, and how high a price
Ukrainian forces can make the Russians pay for their gains.
Fresh Blood, Not More Blood
Other than the
immediate provision of ammunition, the greatest effect of the new U.S. aid
package is the certainty it offers. After months in which the timing and amount
of U.S. support was in doubt, Ukraine will now have enough clarity about
military resources for the next six months to allow for broader strategic
planning.
Paramount is the need
to generate new forces. To do so, Ukraine will need to mobilize more people,
improve its training pipeline to maintain a qualitative advantage over Russian
units, and adequately equip those new troops. Until now this has been impossible.
Lacking equipment and weapons, and unable to predict if and when more might
arrive, Ukraine’s military leadership was forced to prioritize all materiel for
troops already at the front. The size of the U.S. aid package—and the further
support of European partners—means that Ukraine’s military leadership can now
implement a deliberate plan to train and equip more troops. Contrary
to widespread assumptions, Ukraine does not lack people to mobilize. (According
to one recent analysis, there could be several million additional Ukrainians
who are able to serve.) What it has lacked is an effective recruitment and
training system to bring available people into the force and equipment to
provision them. These problems can and must be resolved.
Ukrainian commanders
must form new brigades rather than simply bringing their existing formations
back up to strength. The army currently lacks enough brigades to rotate them as
a whole off the frontline. Instead, individual brigades have been rotating exhausted
battalions just off the line of contact for brief respites—a strategy that
provides rest but does not allow for collective training of the brigade, since
brigade staff and enabling equipment remain at the front. Thus, Ukraine must
build and train additional brigades now, so that it can mount an active defense
in the fall. Over time, these new units will greatly enhance its ability to
counterattack.
A member of a Ukrainian artillery brigade in Donetsk
region, Ukraine, April 2024
The military must
therefore pursue mobilization in three stages. First, it must immediately raise
battlefield replacements for the existing force. But then it must regenerate
reserves to allow existing units to rotate and, after that, build
new units able to conduct offensive action. The first is the easiest to solve.
Equipment is the limiting factor for the second. For the third, the most
limiting factor is officer training. This can be addressed, but it must be done
imminently if Ukraine is to generate the needed forces by fall.
Russia will likely be
most dangerous in the final months of 2024. By that point, having weathered
months of Russian offensive operations, Ukrainian forces will be stretched
thin, their air defenses depleted. Russia will likely have enough troops to
rotate its units to allow for successive offensives in the fall.
But Russian
capabilities are not unlimited. Moscow has made some industrial and military
choices that are likely to restrict its offensive potential over the course of
2025. For one, it has decided not to expand production of artillery barrels,
with the result that fewer new guns will be available next year. Based on the
current loss rate, Russian stockpiles of armored vehicles will also likely be
depleted by the second half of 2025. This means that Russian forces will be
entirely dependent upon newly produced equipment rather than refurbished
equipment from existing stock, severely constraining their ability to replenish
weapons systems lost in battle. At the same time, beginning in late 2024,
European armaments production will begin to climb steadily as investments made
last year and in the first months of this year begin to bear fruit. By 2025,
then, supply problems should be less acute for Ukraine and more acute for
Russia—if Ukraine can hold on until then.
With this longer-term
perspective in view, the challenge facing Ukraine and its allies becomes clear.
The top priorities must be to ensure not only that Russia’s summer offensive
culminates at a high cost to Moscow but also that newly raised Ukrainian troops
are in place to blunt further offensives in the autumn—and, ideally, to
establish a stable frontline by early 2025. It is only from such a position
that Ukraine can regain the initiative. Achieving that objective will depend to
a significant degree on how rapidly Ukraine can mobilize and equip its forces.
The one commodity it desperately lacks is time.
Bringing Moscow To The Table
Even if Ukraine is
able to blunt Russian gains by rapidly training, equipping, and deploying new
forces, these steps will not in themselves produce a pathway to ending the
conflict. Ultimately this is because Kyiv’s international partners have built
their case for support on the simpler objective of preserving Ukraine in the
fight rather than on compelling Russia to negotiate on favorable terms.
The United States and
its European allies need to recognize that helping Ukraine negate Russian
attacks is not the same as putting Ukraine in a strong negotiating position.
The Kremlin is keen for negotiations based on the war’s current dynamics: it
believes that once talks are underway, Ukraine’s Western backers will agree to
nearly anything, seeing any settlement that can be reached as successful, even
if it fails to protect Ukraine in the long term. And Russia’s demand would
remain what it has been throughout: a surrender in all but name. For Moscow to
truly negotiate, it must be confronted with a situation in which extending the
conflict further will present an unacceptable threat to itself. It is only then
that Ukraine will be able to extract meaningful concessions.
Russia already faces
several pressure points. First, Russia’s battlefield losses of critical
systems—such as air defenses—matter, because they form the bulwark of Russia’s
conventional deterrence of NATO. Equipping Ukraine to be able to damage or
destroy prestige Russian assets is strongly in NATO’s interest. Second, Russia
will be unable to fund the war indefinitely. Western sanctions are
only one of the tools for damaging the regime’s financial liquidity, and are
less effective than other options. Damage to Russia’s oil infrastructure is
likely to have a much greater impact. Although there are good reasons for the
West to avoid directly aiding such attacks, that does not mean that Ukraine
shouldn’t undertake them.
Third, although the
Russian public largely supports the war, there are deep frustrations with the
Russian government that can be exploited. So far, Western
governments have not aggressively pursued information operations against the
Russian government, partly because they are perceived as escalatory and partly
because they are not expected to have immediate effect. By contrast, Russia has
been conducting active information operations across Europe with the intent of
destabilizing the West.
This asymmetry needs
to be remedied. Western concerns that information warfare could provoke
escalation are unconvincing: the Kremlin is as determined as the White House to
avoid a direct confrontation over Ukraine. Moreover, the Kremlin has long
assumed that the West has pursued extensive information operations against it
since 2011, even though this is not the case. Any potential escalation risk of
such operations is therefore already baked in. Moreover, most of the Kremlin’s
routes to escalation do not actually involve countering such activities. Given
this situation, there is much more that the West can do. Over the longer term,
more and better information operations could heighten Moscow’s awareness of the
domestic risks that its costly war has stirred up.
The Firepower Fix
Given the extent to
which it is currently outgunned, Ukraine doesn’t yet have the ability to set
forth favorable negotiating terms to end the war. A cease-fire would likely see
Russia reconstitute its military power, while Ukraine would not be able to maintain
its own forces at their current size. Moreover, Kyiv would likely receive
waning support for reconstruction if renewed Russian hostilities were
anticipated in the near future. Rebuilding Ukraine will depend critically on
investment from the private sector, and the threat of a new conflict will make
any such financing risky. To ensure that Ukraine can negotiate in the
confidence that it can secure a lasting peace, Kyiv’s international partners
will have to offer security guarantees that it trusts. Because Ukraine cannot
propose those guarantees, it will be up to its international partners to make
the first move.
Ultimately, any
successful end to the war will depend on NATO’s ability to convincingly deter
Russia. That posture requires the alliance not only to field sufficient forces
to counter a threat from Russia but also to establish sufficient production
capacity among its members to sustain a steady flow of munitions in the event
of another war. Establishing this supply will be necessary regardless of how
the war ends. In the short term, expanded production of munitions will be
essential to Ukraine’s ability to degrade the Russian military. If Ukraine
manages to protract the conflict and the war is terminated in its favor, its
partners will need munitions to bolster the credibility of their security
guarantees. If, on the other hand, Russia achieves its objectives, then these
munitions will be needed to underwrite the future security of NATO.
The U.S. military aid
package was passed just in time to stave off a Ukrainian collapse. But to truly
shift the direction of the war, it will need to be accompanied by a far more
comprehensive strategy to successfully end it. And that must come from Washington,
its NATO allies, and Kyiv itself.
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