By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

China Signals More Support For Russia

Attempts to establish a so-called floor for U.S.-China relations have crumbled, revealing a gaping abyss beneath. Earlier this month, the spy balloon controversy strengthened hard-line anti-U.S. views within the Chinese leadership. One year after Russia invaded Ukraine, Beijing is signaling stronger support for Moscow, despite U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s warning that any lethal aid would bring “serious consequences.”

The result is a barrage of diplomacy and propaganda against Washington in favor of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Over the last week, top Chinese diplomat Wang Yi visited Europe, participating in the Munich Security Conference before traveling to Moscow. In Munich, Wang refused to apologize for China’s intrusion into U.S. airspace and called Washington’s reaction “weak” and “near-hysterical.”

Anti-U.S. sentiment in Chinese state media has increased since the spy balloon crisis began. Much of it has focused on Russia’s war in Ukraine, which Chinese outlets portray as a righteous response to NATO aggression. This week, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a clumsy communique on U.S. hegemony to Western journalists, seeking to draw attention to the “perils of the U.S. practices to world peace and stability and the well-being of all peoples.”

Although there have been backdoor efforts to portray the balloon as a mistake, China’s public statements have largely overridden them. Part of the problem may be that Chinese officials are used to saying things in public for domestic political reasons that differ from what is said in private.

Meanwhile, other stories that could reflect poorly on the United States are receiving significant coverage in China, including correspondent Seymour Hersh’s dubious reporting that claims a U.S. conspiracy was behind sabotaging the critical Nord Stream natural gas pipelines from Russia to Germany last year. Chinese state media has also focused on more speculative claims about the environmental effects of the derailment of a train carrying toxic materials in Ohio.

Wang has reinforced anti-U.S. messaging while in Moscow. On Wednesday, he called the China-Russia alliance “as stable as Mount Tai,” using a common Chinese idiom. He added that a “third party” would not be able to trouble it—seems to respond to Blinken’s injunctions over lethal aid.

But it’s unclear what caused the U.S. secretary of state and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, to speak out about the possibility. China has so far kept its support for Moscow's rhetoric and economics; crossing that line would be a dangerous step. European Union High Representative Josep Borrell said he’d been reassured in “frank” private discussions that China won’t supply such aid.

Instead, China seems keen to play to developing countries, many of which are unenthusiastic about Western efforts to defend Ukraine. It may push a Beijing-brokered peace deal that would likely leave Russia in control of seized territory in Ukraine, including Crimea. This could be a useful Chinese propaganda tool demonstrating its desire for peace. But it’s not likely to gain traction, mostly because Ukraine does not see China as an honest partner and because surrendering territory is a non-starter.

According to U.S. officials, China may already be providing non-lethal military aid to Russia. Supplying weaponry would be a major escalation—but a plausible one in the current geopolitical context. China may also see the war in Ukraine as an opportunity to test its weaponry, which hasn’t been used on the battlefield since the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979, save for brief skirmishes in the mid-1980s. But the lethal aid Russia could use in Ukraine wouldn’t bear much resemblance to the components needed for a naval and air war over Taiwan. 

Beijing seems determined to find trouble for itself regarding hawkishness in Washington. After all, it is convinced that the United States already sees it as an enemy. But every incident of Chinese intransigence convinces more U.S. officials that China is not a good-faith partner. Furthermore, any U.S. response to lethal Chinese aid would be swift. After the spy balloon incident, additions of Chinese firms to the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Entity List, a key national-security trade tool, went from conception to implementation in just five days.

If China starts to treat Ukraine as a proxy war against the West, it will solidify global divisions for the coming decades. Russia’s war in Ukraine increasingly feels like this generation’s Korean War—a brutal conflict instigated by Moscow that sets the stage for the Cold War.

One of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s big buzzwords during his third term is likely to be his Global Security Initiative (GSI), which boils down to the supremacy of sovereignty, a disdain for democracy promotion, and opposition to “blocs” (read: the United States and its allies).

The GSI got a boost in coverage this week regarding China’s position on Russia’s war in Ukraine. Much of it likely appeals to developing countries unhappy with U.S. hegemony—except for China’s neighbors, which increasingly resent Beijing’s regional power.

There is nothing particularly new or interesting about the concepts laid out in the GSI. Still, it could follow the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in that regular diplomacy will get swept into its remit. As the year goes on, U.S. politicians will likely portray the GSI—as with the BRI before it—as a world-spanning plan rather than just another piece of jargon.

 

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