By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

Spiraling Conflicts

Many Western leaders press allies and partners not to hit back hard when their enemies attack. After the foiled Iranian attack on Israel last month, for example, U.S. President Joe Biden told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to “take the win” instead of retaliating. Ukraine has been similarly pressured by its Western supporters not to strike targets in Russia—such as oil refineries—even if their unobstructed functioning directly aids Russia on the battlefield. Restraint has become the West’s guiding strategic principle, seemingly preserving a modicum of international stability by keeping wars from escalating out of control.

Even if Israel and Ukraine don’t heed them, such requests to practice restraint are dangerous. They incentivize the attacker to be more aggressive, not less. By conveying to Russia or Iran—and by extension, China—that Western partners will be pressed to absorb the attack and fight a strictly defensive war on their territory, Western policymakers achieve the opposite of what their risk aversion intends: They elevate the risk of a widening war. They are making aggression relatively cost-free for imperial powers, to be fought only on the attacked country’s land or thwarted by expensive defensive means. Paradoxically, restraining allies that have been attacked is destabilizing; the Western attempt to control escalation ultimately makes it more likely.

Take, for example, the recent case of Iran’s onslaught on Israel. Deterrence failed as Iran directly attacked Israel for the first time using a substantial and layered package of missiles and drones. Iran chose to attack despite a standing Israeli policy to punish every attack on its territory and citizens—and despite the effective denial technologies fielded by Israel. It was the largest drone and missile attack in recent history, more substantial than anything Russia has launched against Ukraine in a single night.

But whereas deterrence failed, Iran’s missiles and drones were almost completely intercepted by Israel with the aid of the United States, Britain, France, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Only a few missiles fell on two Israeli air bases, causing minimal damage; one civilian was wounded by shrapnel in the Negev desert. Such a failure should cause relief and be a source of celebration. After all, what could have been horrific devastation in Israel turned into an embarrassing turkey shoot for Iran. Punishment for such a failed attack, the argument goes, was not warranted: Defense was a success, and the strategic interaction was over. Restraint ought to prevail.

Undoubtedly, the restraint advocated by many in the West is appealing. It may bestow a veneer of moral superiority to a country willing to suffer attacks without responding in kind. Tit-for-tat, after all, seems childish, and revenge even worse. In the case of a successful defense such as Israel’s interception of Iran’s missiles, retaliation may even look unnecessary.

But erecting the air defense necessary to deny such attacks comes at great cost, and the shield is not perfect. The resources necessary to develop, deploy, and operate a complex, multilayered defensive system capable of intercepting ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones are substantial. Iran’s attack probably cost it around $100 million, whereas the bill for Israel’s defense during that single night probably reached something in the $1 billion range. Israel is estimated to have incurred more than half of these costs, with most of the rest borne by the United States. The fiscal equation favors the attacker.

Beyond the sheer expense, there is the unquantifiable cost of potentially greater insecurity. The more successfully a defensive system protects a country—even as it fails to deter the attacker in the first place—the less credible the threat of punishing retaliation will be. This invites the attacker to strike again, while the defender is pressured to absorb the attacks without responding in kind. Given how cheap drones and even ballistic missiles have become, Iran can seek to saturate Israeli defenses and increase the likelihood that missiles get through. Alternatively, too many attacks could bankrupt the target. And yet, Biden seems to think that one failed Iranian attack will deter further assaults. “Israel demonstrated a remarkable capacity to defend against and defeat even unprecedented attacks,” he said in a statement, “sending a clear message to its foes that they cannot effectively threaten the security of Israel.”

 

 

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