By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

It’s Now or Never for Engagement in Syria

Among the powerful images following the overthrow of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime was the sight of thousands of political detainees streaming out of Syria’s prisons—a sign of hope and simultaneous grief for the thousands who never emerged. Days later, as Geir Pedersen, the United Nations special envoy for Syria, arrived at the notorious Sednaya prison near Damascus, a woman yelled out to him: “You’re just coming now? It’s too late!” Her anger should not just be seen as an indictment of the past decade of global inaction—it’s a warning.

While quick to impose punitive measures, the international community too often drags its feet when opportunities for positive change arise. At precisely the moment when the world should be rushing to support Syrians, decisive action is lacking.

It is a false choice to hinge all U.S. engagement with Syria on political recognition of the new authorities, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a former al Qaeda affiliate. For years, concerns about the Assad regime’s corruption, interference, and violence stifled foreign investment and development programs. With its fall, new opportunities have emerged to support the Syrian people directly—with or without a recognized government—while providing clear benchmarks for the transitional government to unlock wider integration.

There is now a window of opportunity for recovery. There is a clear moral imperative to alleviate human suffering. Maintaining the status quo of economic isolation punishes Syrians for a government they did not choose and that no longer exists. Millions of Syrians have resorted to extremes to survive the country’s economic collapse, such as pulling children out of school to beg or work, sending daughters into child marriage, and selling off assets such as livestock and land.

Scaling up humanitarian aid is critical. (Last year, donors provided only one-third of the required humanitarian aid for Syria—the lowest level in a decade.) But emergency aid is only ever a Band-Aid solution; it cannot cover the gaping wound of an economy in ruins, shattered by war and suffocated by blanket sanctions. Already, the war cost Syria 85 percent of the value of its GDP and the equivalent of 35 years of development. Today, 90 percent of Syrians live in poverty. Soon, some of the 5.5 million Syrian refugees abroad could return prematurely to devastated homes, gaps in infrastructure, and overstretched public services, creating the risk of repeated internal displacements.

This is a recipe for tension and renewed violence—and will leave Syria stuck in a perpetual state of crisis. There is strategic value in the United States taking every opportunity to mitigate the risk of Syria veering toward state collapse and a security vacuum in a country with a lingering risk of a resurgence of the Islamic State or other armed groups.

Instead, in its hesitation, the United States risks undermining the very stability it seeks. Over the last 14 years, world leaders have voiced their solidarity with the people of Syria. How long will Syrians now have to wait for economic relief?

There are three steps that the Trump administration should prioritize to lay the groundwork for an economic road map for Syria and to catalyze global action.

First, the United States should provide legal clarity and sanctions relief. Syrians need immediate access to more humanitarian aid, commercial activity, and imports to begin recovery. In a welcome first step, the Biden administration released a new license this month, enabling transactions with the transition government, including payments of civil servant salaries. However, its scope is limited. The license fails to lift sanctions or authorize broad commercial activities, private investment, and technical assistance to financial institutions. Its six-month duration risks being too short to give real confidence and produce lasting change. And perhaps most importantly, it sidesteps the fundamental question of HTS’s terrorist designation.

Syria is caught in a web of contradictory legal restrictions. It seems to inherit all U.S. sanctions placed on the Assad regime (first imposed with Syria’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism in 1979 and later intensified after the civil war erupted in 2011). At the same time, it has been saddled with the confusion over whether the terrorist designation of HTS applies to the entire transitional government. While U.S. leaders herald the fall of the Assad regime, the Biden administration quietly affirmed this month that key Assad-era restrictions remain in place.

The United States should make clear that these are new authorities in power, representing a range of groups and not synonymous with HTS or the previous regime. The United States should also reconsider its foreign terrorist organization (FTO) designation of HTS. FTO designations are not an appropriate tool for groups that govern large populations, as the designation creates criminal liability risks for aid workers, businesses, traders, and others if they provide material support to the group.

 

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