By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers
What Syrians Want
A year after the fall of President Bashar al-Assad, Syria remains a
country very much in transition. Much of its infrastructure is in tatters, and
the price tag for rebuilding the war-torn state stands at over $200 billion. It
is in desperate need of laws and institutions that can facilitate reconstruction,
hold war criminals to account, and ensure that the new government is responsive
to its citizens. The country, in other words, must
remake itself at a time when it is struggling to function.
To figure out how
Syria can best rebuild, its leaders and international supporters must
understand the wants and needs of the country’s citizens.
But there are reasons
to be optimistic about Syria’s future. We found that the country’s people are
hopeful, supportive of democracy, and open to foreign assistance—including from
the United States and Europe. They approve of and trust their current government.
But our results also provide reasons for concern. For starters, Syrians are
broadly unhappy with the state of the economy and with public services. They
are worried about internal security. They want to right past wrongs—those that
happened both before and after the fall of the Assad regime—yet they disagree
about which ethnic and religious group’s suffering is most deserving of
attention. Finally, the government’s popularity varies wildly by region. Ahmed
al-Shara, the country’s new president, is liked overall. But he and his team
suffer from low ratings in some governorates dominated by the country’s
minorities.
Damascus thus has a
tough task ahead. The new government has bought itself time to transform the
country for the better, thanks to its favorable ratings. But eventually, the
honeymoon will end, and the government will be judged by its own performance.
If Shara and his team cannot make Syrians more prosperous in
the near future and engage all of the country’s
citizens, their ratings might plummet, and Syria’s internal strife could come
back with a vengeance.
Good News, Bad News
In politics,
perceptions can change quickly. But for now, Syria’s new government has
approval ratings that should make other world leaders envious. According to our
survey, 81 percent of Syrians are confident in Shara. Seventy-one percent are
confident in the national government as a whole.
Sixty-two percent are confident in the courts and the legal system, and 71
percent support the army.

These positive
responses do not appear to simply be the result of political repression. Many
of the government’s critics were not shy in their remarks with our
interviewers. Yet healthy majorities of Syrians agree that they have freedom of
speech (73 percent), freedom of the press (73 percent), and the freedom to
participate in peaceful protests (65 percent). A smaller number—53
percent—are confident that the newly elected People’s
Council, the country’s unicameral parliament, will represent their interests.
Just 40 percent believe that the government explained the election process for
parliamentarians clearly and gave everyone an equal opportunity to compete.
Nonetheless, 67 percent of Syrians agree that the government is very responsive
or largely responsive to what people want.
It isn’t hard to see
why Syrians are enthusiastic. The country’s current leadership has been in
power for just over a year, and people are comparing its nascent record to
Assad’s lengthy, brutal tenure. Seventy-eight percent of Syrians report
experiencing one or more life-upending challenges between 2011 and 2024, such
as displacement, the confiscation or destruction of property, the disruption of
livelihoods or education, the deaths of family members, or political
intimidation or harassment. In comparison, just 14 percent report experiencing
one or more of the same challenges since the start of 2025. Fifty percent of
citizens believe that corruption currently plagues national state agencies and
institutions, but 70 percent see it as less widespread than it was under Assad.
Seventy-six percent believe their children’s lives will be better than their
own. It thus follows that 76 percent of Syrians think that Shara’s policies
will be better for Syria than those of his predecessor.

But eventually,
memories of Assad will fade, and Syrians will begin to evaluate Shara by how
they feel contemporaneously. And when they do, Syria’s new government may find
itself in trouble. Syrians most commonly cite the economy as their main
political concern, and just 17 percent are happy with its performance.
Inflation (31 percent), a lack of jobs (24 percent), and poverty (23 percent)
were cited as the most serious challenges facing the country when citizens were
given a menu of choices. On an individual level, 56 percent of Syrians report
that securing their basic needs is difficult. A staggering 86 percent suggest
that their net household income does not cover their expenses, and 77 percent
of citizens are dissatisfied with the efforts of governing authorities—although
this is not always the national government—in generating employment. Food
insecurity affects an alarming share of citizens, with 65 percent of all
Syrians and 73 percent of self-described internally displaced persons reporting
that in the last 30 days, they often or sometimes ran out of food before having
the money to buy more. Likewise, most Syrians are deeply unhappy with the state
of public infrastructure. Fewer than half of all Syrians are satisfied with the
provision of electricity (41 percent) and water (32 percent), the availability
of affordable housing (35 percent), and the health-care system (36 percent).
Finally, Syrians
remain worried about their security. Although almost all Syrians—94
percent—report feeling safe in their own neighborhoods, they list the need to
secure a monopoly over the use of force as the second-biggest challenge facing
the country. Most Syrians believe that collecting weapons from all armed,
nonstate groups (74 percent) and unauthorized individuals (78 percent) are
critical threats that they want the government to address. Kidnapping is seen
as a critical threat by 63 percent of citizens.

At a protest in support of Syrian territorial unity in
Damascus, Syria, November 2025
A House Divided
Yet perhaps the most
concerning finding for Syria’s government, which is still trying to unify the
country, is that its backing is geographically uneven. The state’s leadership
is popular in most governorates. But in Latakia, Sweida, and Tartus, far fewer have confidence in the
national government (36 percent), the courts (33 percent), the army (22
percent), and the president (36 percent). Syrians living in these three
governorates also do not believe that they have extensive personal freedoms.
Far less than half think that freedom of speech (31 percent), the press (34
percent), and assembly (16 percent) are guaranteed. Meanwhile, just 35 percent
of people in these areas believe the government is responsive to their needs,
and only 41 percent are satisfied with the national government’s performance.
These numbers likely
reflect sectarian divisions that were cultivated by the Assad regime and have
continued to fester after its fall. Latakia and Tartus are home to large shares
of the country’s Alawites, and Sweida is home to the
largest share of its Druze population: two of Syria’s numerous ethnoreligious
minorities. Assad’s government was dominated by Alawites and systematically
privileged and co-opted both its own group and certain other minority
communities, including, at times, the Druze (although no group was, or is,
monolithic in its allegiances). Assad largely repressed and systematically
excluded Syria’s Sunni Arab majority from the same preferential treatment. Now,
however, this ethnoreligious majority holds power, and it has not provided
sufficient protection or inclusion for Syria’s other communities. Throughout
2025, there have been retaliatory killings, lootings, and massacres against
Alawites in Latakia and Tartus and against the Druze, validating these groups’
worst fears about life in post-Assad Syria.
Syrians are keenly
aware of this sectarian challenge. Seventy-eight percent believe that
intolerance of others is a problem affecting the country. They want to build a
more inclusive Syria. When asked to name the most important lesson from the
events of 2011 to 2024 (the years of Syria’s uprisings), a plurality—41
percent—cited the acceptance of one another and of one another’s differences.
We asked Syrians about who most needed assurance surrounding their safety,
political preferences, and acknowledgment of injustices suffered before and
after 2024. A little over half—53 percent—agreed that both the majority and
minorities equally need to feel secure. Fifty-one percent agreed that both the
majority and minorities need to have their political preferences respected by
other Syrians, and 55 percent agreed that both the majority and minorities
should be represented in the government.
But these figures are
hardly overwhelming. And there is even less consensus on which communities
deserve justice. Pluralities of Syrians believe that the pre- and post-2024
suffering of both Syria’s majority and minorities needs recognition (40 percent
pre-2024, 31 percent post-2024). But a notable share, 38 percent, believe that
the injustices suffered by Syria’s majority pre-2024 require more
acknowledgment.
Syria will thus need
a carefully crafted system of transitional justice. This will likely require
reforming the country’s existing national justice commission. Right now, that
commission is tasked with investigating crimes, holding perpetrators accountable,
compensating victims, and promoting reconciliation exclusively for wrongs
committed by Assad’s regime. It thus leaves out the thousands of killings and
atrocities committed by other armed groups. Thankfully for the state’s future,
70 percent of Syrians believe the commission should also cover these crimes.
And overwhelming majorities of Syrians are opposed to extrajudicial violence.
Just nine percent believe extrajudicial measures lead to fairer resolutions,
and just 19 percent believe they lead to faster ones.
Creating a better
judicial mechanism will do much to tamp down sectarian tensions. Yet to build a
truly stable and fair country, Syria will need to become a democracy. Most
Syrian citizens do not see the current government as terribly democratic, but
71 percent believe democracy, despite its problems, is better than the
alternatives. Fewer than half (43 percent) agreed with the statement, “This
country needs a leader who can bend the rules if necessary to get things done.”

Help Wanted
Building a
prosperous, inclusive, and democratic Syria is no doubt a very tall order. But
the country doesn’t have to go it alone, and it
doesn’t want to. According to our survey, most Syrians are open to aid from
other countries. When given a menu of options, around 80 percent identified the
need for external economic assistance of some kind: 45 percent wanted economic
development aid, and 36 percent wanted assistance with the rebuilding of
infrastructure. Only four percent indicated they didn’t want assistance at all.
Damascus has many
potential partners that would have popular legitimacy. Saudia Arabia and Qatar
top the list, with favorability ratings of 87 percent and 83 percent,
respectively—perhaps a reflection of the millions of dollars each has given or
pledged to give Syria. Turkey comes in third, at 73 percent. A very similar
percentage, 69 percent, has a favorable opinion of Turkish President Recep
Tayyip Erdogan’s foreign policies, which suggests that most approve of his
support for the Syrian regime and the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham movement that Shara
founded and that helped overthrow the Assad regime. But this feeling is not
universal. Only 38 percent of those who self-identify as a member of a minority
have a favorable view of Erdogan, compared with 81 percent of those who do not
identify as such. As with views about domestic politics, there are important
divisions within Syria on views about foreign relations.
Syrians across
multiple identities, however, are supportive of Europe and Washington. Seventy
percent of citizens, including 66 percent of those who self-define as
minorities, have a favorable view of the European Union. A similar number, 66
percent, have a favorable view of the United States, including 60 percent of
self-identified minorities. Sixty-one percent of citizens have a positive view
of U.S. President Donald Trump himself. This figure is strikingly high for the
region, where Trump is generally disliked. But it makes sense. Not long after
taking office, Trump lifted the punishing economic sanctions Washington had
placed on Syria.

Trump’s ratings,
however, do not mean Syrians support his quest to build ties between their
country and Israel. In fact, only 14 percent of Syrians support normalizing
relations. Almost all (92 percent) see Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian
territories and strikes on Iran, Lebanon, and Syria as critical threats to
their security. Just four percent have a favorable opinion of Israel, similar to the five percent who support Iran and the 16
percent who support Russia—the two countries that most directly backed Assad’s
regime. These findings suggest that Trump should drop his quixotic push, which
risks placing Syria’s current government in direct opposition to the
preferences of the vast majority of its citizens.
Instead, the United States and its allies will have more success if they
continue to provide Syria with the financial and technical assistance it needs
to rebuild and address its internal social challenges. By doing so, they can
help the state become a stable U.S. partner in a critical region for American
interests. (The United States and its allies appear to have an edge over China
in Syria, which only 37 percent of citizens support.)
To succeed, however,
Washington must act quickly. So, too, must Syria’s government. The country’s
people are glad that the Assad regime is gone. They are hopeful about what
might come next. Yet they are still wary of the future and unhappy with the
present. There is an opportunity to build a better Syria. But the window won’t
stay open forever.
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