By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers
Why isn’t the United States doing more to prepare for war with China
over Taiwan—precisely to deter and thus avoid it? The visit to Taiwan this
month by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and
Beijing’s dramatic response to it has crystallized the gravity of this issue. A
war with China over Taiwan has gone from what many regarded as a remote
scenario to a fearfully plausible one. We also showed why Taiwan was not part of China.
Many will remember when in 2014, Chancellor Angela Merkel (who while
all smiles) probably knew well about the hidden message
gave her counterpart, Chinese President Xi Jinping; the 1735 d’Anville map showed “China proper” as a landmass
separate from areas like Xinjiang, Tibet, Mongolia, and Manchuria. The island
of Hainan is drawn in a different color, as is Taiwan. This depiction is
utterly at odds with how history is taught in China today. On 17 May we reported that the
US director of national intelligence said China was seeking the military
capability to conquer Taiwan.
Yet the disquieting reality is that the United States does not appear
to be adequately preparing for such a conflict despite a
strengthening commitment, especially by the Biden administration, to the island
and its autonomy. Given its public statements and strategies, it would make
sense for Washington to behave as though the United States might be on the
verge of a major war with a nuclear-armed superpower rival. But
although the administration may be moving in the right direction, the changes
it has made so far appear to be unequal to the urgency and scale of China’s
threat. As a result, the unnerving truth is that the United States does not
seem to be backing up its strong and, in many ways, commendable rhetoric with
the degree of effort and focus needed to be ready to defeat a Chinese assault
on Taiwan.
From remote possibility to
conventional wisdom
Until just a few years ago, many argued that China was not such a
daunting threat to the United States and that its threat to Taiwan was modest
or far over the horizon. Some voices still hold to those views. But the Biden
administration has repeatedly made clear it does not.
Instead, the administration has assessed that China is the most
significant challenge in the world to U.S.
interests. Moreover, senior leaders are increasingly forceful and direct in
their assertions that China’s military is a near-peer rival. As administration
officials and senior military officers compellingly point out, the People’s
Republic is amid a historic military buildup, one that includes the dramatic
expansion of its nuclear forces, rapid
advances in critical military technologies that in crucial
respects outpace U.S. innovation, and the construction of the world’s largest
navy. Overall, official and expert assessments have made clear for several
years now that the U.S. military advantage vis-a-vis China has eroded
significantly and that China is continuing its daunting buildup.
The Biden
administration has also been increasingly forthright about
the growing threat of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. As recently as last year,
many eyes rolled when Admiral Phil Davidson, then Commander of U.S.
Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), warned that China might be able to invade
Taiwan by 2027 successfully. However, Davidson’s assessment appears to be the
administration’s official position. As Director of National Intelligence Avril
Haines testified in May, there is an “acute” threat of a Chinese attack on
Taiwan. In using the specific term employed by administration officials to
describe the threat from Russia after it invaded Ukraine, Haines signaled a
nearer-term threat from Beijing.
Meanwhile, Bill Burns, director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, stated that Xi Jinping had in no way dispensed with his
goal of seizing Taiwan. More recently, in July, he said that Beijing is
determined to take over Taiwan and is prepared to use military action to do so;
he also judged that Beijing would conclude from Russia’s experience in Ukraine that overwhelming
force would be the right way to resolve the Taiwan issue in its favor.
Department of Defense officials have also emphasized that a Chinese fait
accompli against Taiwan is a real and pressing danger. At the same time, there
are serious questions
about whether the United States can win a war against China over Taiwan.
Against this worsening backdrop, the Biden administration has signaled
that the United States will come to Taiwan’s defense, further strengthening
perceptions that American credibility in Asia is linked to Taiwan’s fate. Most
prominently, the President has indicated on no fewer than three separate
occasions that the United States would defend the island. Moreover, despite
staff-level disavowals of those comments, the fact is that his administration
has telegraphed a solid commitment to Taiwan through a wide range of other
avenues. For instance, the State Department has repeatedly described the U.S.
commitment to Taiwan as “rock solid.”
These statements have not been confined to the political level. On the
military side, the administration’s 2022 National Defense Strategy maintained
its 2018 predecessor’s identification of China as the Department of Defense’s
top priority. The Pentagon has formally designated Taiwan as the focus of a
“pacing scenario” and underscored its commitment to being able to deny China’s
ability to pull off such an attack successfully. Senior officials, including
Kathleen Hicks, deputy secretary of defense, and General Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have
meanwhile affirmed that a denial strategy is the best way to deal with the
threat China poses to Taiwan.
But here is the rub: the Biden administration’s actions to field a
military that could deny a Chinese invasion of Taiwan do not appear to match
its rhetoric. We can see the gap between words and actions by examining four
critical levers the United States could pull: spending more on defense,
transforming the American military to be better suited to taking on China, and
using the force in ways more focused on the threat posed by Beijing, and
getting U.S. allies to contribute more, directly or indirectly.
Spending more
Setting aside the economic and political merits and demerits of such a
course, spending much more on defense would give the U.S. military more
resources to address the China threat. Remember that China’s economy dwarfs those
of the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, or imperial Japan and that China has
increased defense spending yearly by six to ten percent for a quarter century.
It has sustained these spending increases even in the face of slower national
growth in recent years. Beijing’s defense outlays are now at least a third of
the U.S. defense budget, with some respected analysts arguing that the actual
figure is much closer to parity. Moreover, China has the advantages of
proximity, technological catchup, lower personnel costs, and focused attention
on Taiwan and the Western Pacific, reducing the United States’ advantage of at
least nominally higher defense spending.
Despite China’s growing military power, the Biden administration’s
defense budget request for fiscal year 2023 was set below the inflation rate
Its request for the previous fiscal year was also essentially flat. In effect,
the administration proposed shrinking the defense budget. Although Congress
beefed up the 2022 defense budget and seems likely to do so again for 2023,
these actions still fall well short of the consistent year-on-year real growth
of three to five percent deemed necessary by the 2018 National Defense Strategy,
with its call for prioritizing China. Thus, that prioritization does not appear
to be happening. In light of this, we can conclude that the administration has
left the option of spending significantly more on defense to address the
growing Chinese threat to Taiwan essentially unused.
Overhauling the force for China
As for overhauling the military to focus much more on defeating a
Chinese attack on Taiwan, the military is undertaking a range of promising
initiatives. But it is far from clear that the Pentagon is investing adequately
in developing and fielding the capabilities required to defeat an invasion,
especially those needed in the coming decade.
Last year, for instance, Congress lambasted the Department of Defense
for trying to use funds from the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), an effort
specifically designed to meet INDOPACOM’s urgent requirements for improving the
U.S. ability to defend Taiwan, to finance programs that were not even on the
requirements list and would in fact be used across many regions. Although the
department made better use of PDI this year, it left INDOPACOM with $1.5
billion in unfunded requirements.
To make matters worse, the department continues to procure key
munitions at insufficient levels for a conflict over Taiwan, even as the war
in Ukraine has made clear that
deep inventories of vital munitions are essential. For instance, the U.S. Navy
recently informed Congress that the air force and navy had chosen not to
produce critical long-range anti-ship missiles at the maximum rate that the
U.S. defense industry can sustain despite lacking a near-term substitute.
Similarly, the navy opted not to fully fund the acquisition of SM-6 missiles or
naval mines, which are critical for defeating Chinese naval forces in a Taiwan
invasion scenario.
The story with major defense platforms is just as troubling. In May,
the chief of U.S. naval operations, Michael Gilday,
testified that even the most optimistic option in the navy’s latest
shipbuilding plan would be unable to meet the operational requirements for
defeating a Chinese attack against Taiwan before the 2040s—15 years after the
date when Davidson warned that Beijing aims to have the capability to take the
island. Meanwhile, the navy is rapidly reducing strike capacity by divesting
itself of cruisers, destroyers, and submarines that could contribute to a
Taiwan fight (albeit at a higher cost), despite not having any plausible
capacity to replace them in years to come. Both the air force and the army have
relegated key programs for such a fight—including critical spare parts, long-range
fires, watercraft modernization, and assured precision, navigation, and timing
systems—to their unfunded requirements lists, indicating they are a lower
priority. This is a far cry from the significant investments needed to restore
what the war in Ukraine makes
clear is necessary: a robust and active defense industrial base.
To be sure, essential steps are occurring within the Department of Defense
to address the China threat. The Marine Corps Force Design 2030 is an example
of such an effort. Crucial efforts are being made within the air force,
INDOPACOM, the U.S. Strategic Command, the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
and a few other places. But these appear to be less the norm than noble
exceptions in their urgency and resolve to overhaul the military to meet the
challenge. Most other signals, including those from the department’s senior
leaders, give the impression of something closer to business than the “all
hands on deck” approach that the situation merits.
Key U.S. officials and the nation’s most highly regarded defense
experts warn that the changes required to deter China effectively are not
occurring at the necessary scale and pace. Defense strategist Andrew
Krepinevich, for instance, has repeatedly pointed out that the Joint Force has
not yet developed and implemented an operational concept well suited to taking
on China. In June, David Ochmanek, a former deputy
assistant secretary of defense, wrote, “Neither today’s force nor the force
that will exist in 2027… have all of the capabilities called for by the
emerging joint operating concept” needed to defeat a Chinese invasion of
Taiwan. Other highly informed and credible analyses point in a similar
direction.
More asia,
less elsewhere
A third way for the United States to focus on China’s
military threat to Taiwan would be to redirect and carefully husband U.S.
military forces for that prospect. For instance, it was widely anticipated that
the Department of Defense’s flagship Global Posture Review would announce
significant new initiatives for the Indo-Pacific and shift the overall focus of
U.S. military activity to that region. Yet the administration did not do so.
Indeed, in some critical ways, the United States has gone backward in
its force posture. For example, the administration has increased U.S. forces in
Europe from 60,000 in 2021 to more than 100,000. Moreover, according to General
Christopher Cavoli, commander of the United States
European Command, these levels are likely to remain until the cessation of
hostilities in Ukraine. Given that the administration has judged that the war
in Ukraine is likely to be
protracted, this may mean indefinitely.
Even worse, the administration has increasingly signaled that it
intends to reengage in the Middle East.
As if to leave little doubt about what this will mean for U.S. forces, General
Michael Kurilla, commander of the U.S. Central
Command, said, “This region is at the center of America’s strategic competition
with Russia and China.” This is especially disturbing because a high demand for
the diversion of forces to Central Command helped undermine the Department of
Defense’s implementation of the 2018 National Defense Strategy during the Trump
administration.
As a result, U.S. forces’ overall deployment and positioning is not
enough to address the worsening military balance concerning Taiwan.
Getting allies to step up
Inducing far greater military contributions from important allies, both
in Asia concerning China itself and other theaters such as Europe and the
Middle East, would free up U.S. forces to focus on Asia. Except for some valuable
efforts within Asia, the administration does not appear to be pressing allies
to take on much more.
Instead, much of the administration’s rhetoric and engagement appear
focused on reassuring allies that the United States will continue operating as
it has in the past—as a dominant military presence across multiple theaters.
For instance, Washington has not seriously pressed European allies to take on a
greater role in the traditional defense of NATO or meaningfully
sought to raise the level of expected defense spending, even though it should
now be evident that the standard of two percent of each country’s GDP should be
regarded more as a floor than an aspiration. By not insisting on the greater
allied assumption of responsibility in Europe and the Middle East, the administration’s
message is far from what would seem to be needed to enable the Pentagon to
concentrate more on Asia.
The writing on the wall
Stepping back, then, and surveying these four areas, we can see a
fundamental mismatch between the administration’s stated goals and assessment
of the threat and what it appears to be doing to address it. While commendable
and important initiatives are taking place, there does not appear to be
anything like the fundamental change needed to produce a Joint Force ready and
able to deny a Chinese assault on Taiwan in the shorter or longer term. It
simply does not add up, especially when compared with the awe-inspiring and
historic military buildup China is
undertaking.
The Biden administration is not alone in allowing the United States to
fall behind in preparing to meet China’s increasingly dire threat to Taiwan. On the
contrary, the responsibility is generously shared across multiple
administrations and Congresses dating back decades. Moreover, making a
strategic shift is hard—both the Obama and Trump administrations struggled in
their efforts to shift focus to Asia. Nor is it the Biden administration’s role
alone to act: Congress, as well as the United States’ allies, must also do
their part. But President Joe Biden and his team are in charge now, when the
situation is clear and urgent. It falls to them, therefore, to act to avoid
disaster.
We simply do not know whether China will attack Taiwan in this decade. But
it is a reasonable presumption that Beijing is much more likely to strike if it
concludes it would succeed. Significant factors indicate that it may judge this
decade to be the most propitious one. The United States and its allies are
approaching or perhaps already facing a window of vulnerability over Taiwan.
They cannot afford to only focus on the distant future and must confront both
the near and longer-term threats. Even if it turns out that Beijing believes
waiting until the 2030s is advisable, urgency is critical. Defense strategy is
not a short-term matter; decisions taken now will often take years, if not
decades, to bear fruit. Accordingly, the United States must act swiftly and
sharply now to confront the immediate threat and hope to be ready for the
2030s.
The administration seems to share this view of the threat and what
needs to be done. Yet what it is doing does not seem to add to a solution. If
this assessment is accurate, this is a recipe for disaster.
We do not have access to all the facts. So let’s give administration
officials the benefit of the doubt. How are they addressing this apparent
mismatch in the coming decade and over the long term? Perhaps some of this
cannot be publicly discussed, but surely the broad outlines can be. The voting
public and its representatives must understand the nation’s overall plan and
how it will be implemented if they provide the support needed for an urgent
shift to deter and thus avoid a war with China. During the Cold War,
Washington provided very detailed and rigorous public explications of its
strategies to prevent and, if necessary, defeat Soviet aggression. Indeed the
current administration can at least approach the clarity and seriousness of
such presentations.
However, without such clarity or evidence of a sharp change, Americans
must ask themselves: Is this how their government should be behaving if it
thinks a major war with a peer superpower is looming? Surely not. And that
should worry us all.
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