By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

As tensions rise again across the Taiwan Strait, the policy debate in Washington remains fractured. U.S. strategy broadly revolves around deterring China from attacking Taiwan, and for the past three presidential administrations, it has consisted of three central components: increasing the ability of the United States and Taiwan to defend the island militarily; using diplomacy to signal U.S. resolve to protect Taiwan while also reassuring China that Washington does not support Taiwanese independence; and using economic pressure to slow China’s military modernization efforts.

But there is little consensus on the right balance among these three components, and that balance determines, to some degree, how deterrence looks in practice. Some contend that diplomatic pressure, along with military restraint, to avoid antagonizing China, will keep Beijing at bay. Others warn that unless Washington significantly strengthens its military posture in Asia, deterrence will collapse. A third approach would emphasize that bolstering Taiwan’s self-defense and enabling offshore U.S. support is the best route to sustaining deterrence while also mitigating the risk of escalation.

These prescriptions have merit but fall short of grappling with the paradox at the heart of U.S. strategy: deterrence can fail in two ways. Do too little, and Beijing may gamble it can seize Taiwan before Washington is able to respond. Do too much, and Chinese leaders may conclude that force is the only remaining path to unification. Navigating this dilemma requires more than a stronger military or bolder diplomacy. It requires a calibrated strategy of rearmament, reassurance, and restraint that threads the needle between weakness and recklessness. Combined properly, forward-deployed capabilities, diplomatic restraint, and selective economic interdependence can reinforce one another to maintain credible deterrence while avoiding provocation.

So far, however, the Trump administration’s approach to Taiwan has veered between harsh transactionalism, such as the imposition of a 32 percent tariff on most Taiwanese goods last month, and quiet reaffirmations of support for Taipei through bipartisan visits and a pause on the highest tariffs. The administration still has time to settle on a coherent strategy, but the window of opportunity is closing.

The Taiwanese military is conducting a military exercise in Pingtung, Taiwan, in May 2025

 

Loose Lips Start Wars

Currently, the U.S. military is improving its force posture in the vicinity of Taiwan, most notably through expanded access to bases in the Philippines and by reinforcing capabilities in southwestern Japan and the broader western Pacific. In the Philippines, thanks to the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, the United States gained access to four new strategic sites, bringing the total there to nine. Several, such as those in Cagayan and Isabela Provinces, are just a few hundred miles from Taiwan.

The story is not unlike Japan’s military case. Washington and Tokyo agreed in 2023 to restructure the U.S. Marine Corps presence in Okinawa from the artillery-focused 12th Marine Regiment, part of a force of roughly 18,000 marines stationed in Japan, into a 2,000-strong Marine Littoral Regiment, a quick-reaction force designed to operate along the so-called first island chain encompassing Indonesia, Japan, portions of the Philippines, and Taiwan. To complement this effort, the U.S. military has increased joint military exercises and expanded integrated air and missile defense systems across allied territories.

But U.S. military capabilities in the Pacific need more than just quantitative upgrades; they require qualitative shifts to be able to block China from forcibly unifying with Taiwan. The United States needs a greater forward presence in the region, as well as specific capabilities that would prevent an invading force from making its way across the Taiwan Strait, such as strategic bombers, submarines, and antiship missiles. Once those were deployed, they would also require significant operational flexibility. For example, Washington should prioritize securing forward-deployed submarine tenders in Japan and the Philippines to enable submarines to reload, resupply, and rearm without returning to Guam or Hawaii. And it should work to establish permanent bomber bases in Australia and the Philippines and deploy antiship missile systems in Japan’s southwestern islands and the northern Philippines.

So far, the U.S. military has stopped short of seeking such changes because they are politically sensitive both at home and abroad: host countries worry they might become greater targets of Chinese aggression, and some U.S. policymakers worry that such moves could cross a redline for Beijing. But if Washington follows a few principles, such improvements will not necessarily provoke Chinese aggression. First, the United States should not make a public announcement or a spectacle of enhancements to its military force posture. As U.S. forces increase their activities around and in Taiwan, be they joint exercises, freedom of navigation exercises, or training, U.S. officials should refrain from making statements to which China might feel forced to respond. Military upgrades should be concealed or downplayed until they are fielded to minimize the likelihood that China will effectively launch a coercive campaign against their deployment.

Bolstering Taiwan’s independent military capabilities - a long-standing U.S. policy - presents an arguably even bigger risk of provocation. Beijing worries that Taiwan will become so certain of its ability to protect itself that it will consider declaring independence. In recent years, Taiwan has acquired defense capabilities to deter potential Chinese aggression. It has bought asymmetric warfare systems, such as coastal defense cruise missiles and HIMARS rocket systems, moving away from traditional high-cost platforms such as submarines. It has also pledged that its defense budget will exceed three percent of GDP in 2025 and that it will prioritize precision-guided munitions, air defense upgrades, command-and-control systems, equipment for reserve forces, and anti-drone technologies. These are sensible steps, but they also pose a risk: the less Taiwan depends on U.S. assistance, the more China’s leaders worry that Taiwan’s president, Lai Ching-te, could be emboldened to declare independence unilaterally, further incentivizing Beijing to invade sooner rather than later.

To prevent deterrence from morphing into provocation, the United States should provide Taiwan mainly with capabilities that rely on continued U.S. support. In 2024, for example, the Biden administration approved the sale of three National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems to Taiwan in a deal that was brokered to increase U.S.-Taiwanese interoperability. In other words, this system was designed to function best in tandem with U.S. support. The United States should continue to encourage Taiwan’s asymmetric defense, particularly by prioritizing the speedy and reliable delivery of systems such as the highly mobile precision HIMARS rockets; advanced air defense missile systems such as the NASAMS, and antiship missiles such as the RGM-84L-4 Block II Harpoon. But Washington should also highlight the aspects of Taiwan’s military capacity that are linked to the United States, reassuring Beijing that the island cannot act alone.

Reassuring Beijing is a critical component of a successful deterrence strategy. But during both the Trump and the Biden administrations, the United States has relaxed its longstanding policy of “strategic ambiguity,” wherein U.S. policy has avoided defining whether and under what circumstances Washington would intervene to defend Taiwan. Instead, the United States has been signaling to China its determination to defend Taiwan, especially by making incremental moves toward establishing formal diplomatic relations with the island, such as direct interactions between American and Taiwanese officials.

The growing might of China’s military and its increasingly aggressive posture toward Taiwan have made deterrence in the Taiwan Strait a tougher challenge than ever before. It is incumbent on the United States to support Taiwan’s efforts to develop a defensive “porcupine strategy.” Washington can help Taiwan’s military stockpile and train with coastal defense and air defense weapons, field a robust civil defense force, and create strategic reserves of critical materials such as food and fuel to deter and, if necessary, defeat an invasion or blockade of the island. 

Joe Biden was the first U.S. president to invite Taiwan’s diplomatic representatives to attend his inauguration, for example, and he repeatedly referred to a U.S. “commitment” to Taiwan’s defense, even saying once that U.S. forces would defend the island in the event of an “unprecedented attack.” (White House officials stated at the time that there was no change to the official policy of “strategic ambiguity.”) Officials in the second Trump administration, including Mike Waltz before he was ousted as national security adviser, have advocated ending strategic ambiguity and moving toward “strategic clarity.” And in February, the State Department removed a statement about not supporting Taiwan’s independence from its website - a deletion that China interpreted as provocative.

Although they may seem merely symbolic, such diplomatic slights have real consequences, making it harder for Beijing to maintain a veneer of progress toward unification of the mainland with Taiwan. Chinese leaders see any drift toward Taiwanese independence as a threat to their legitimacy. So, far from deterring Beijing, U.S. provocations - official diplomatic interactions, references to Taiwan as a country, calls for a U.S.-Taiwanese alliance - could incentivize Beijing to undertake a cross-strait invasion.

Reassurance that Washington does not support Taiwanese independence should include public criticism when Taiwan’s leaders make statements or take actions that suggest otherwise. For example, in December 2003, President George W. Bush publicly rebuked Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian during a joint press conference with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, stating that the United States opposed any “unilateral decision by either China or Taiwan to change the status quo,” noting that Chen’s “comments and actions” had indicated “that he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally to change” it. In 2006, after Chen angered Beijing by scrapping a government council that had been established to guide unification with China, the Bush administration once again signaled its disapproval, denying the Taiwanese leader’s request for a high-profile U.S. stopover during a presidential trip to Latin America. These sorts of reassurances helped convince Chinese leaders that future “peaceful reunification” remained possible, reducing the likelihood of an invasion.

The United States should also keep trying to build a multilateral consensus for peace in the Taiwan Strait. For instance, joint statements issued at the G-7 summit last month and at the Munich Security Conference in February reaffirmed cross-strait stability and expressed opposition to any unilateral actions that threaten peace in the Taiwan Strait, including through force or coercion. Washington should pair these diplomatic signals with a clear reaffirmation that its “one China” policy remains in place, that any resolution must be nonviolent, and that the United States is not against peaceful unification with Taiwan’s assent.

 

 

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