By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

Which American military bases could be in Tehran’s sights?

As Israel and the United States launched Operation Epic Force, aka Operation Lion's Roar, against Iran on Saturday (Feb 28), tens of thousands of troops deployed across the Middle East face a retaliatory threat.

When historians look back at this moment in the not-too-distant future, they will view this not as a war of necessity but as a war of choice. There was no imminent threat of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons or launching attacks on the United States and its allies and partners in the Middle East. But both the United States and Israel see an opportunity to exploit the weakness of one of their worst adversaries. Iran does not control its own airspace as a result of last June’s war, its regional proxies are decimated, and it’s feeling existential angst as a result of the popular uprising.

Trump also has a personal stake here. In January, on at least nine occasions, he drew firm redlines, insisting that if Iran killed protesters, the United States would come to their aid.  Trump incited people to the streets during those protests, telling them to go seize state institutions and that help was “on the way.” For Trump, the greatest motivating factor seemed to be his own credibility, more than any imminent threat to the United States.

This is an existential moment for a regime that has long been homicidal but never suicidal. What’s paramount for this regime is to remain in power and live to fight another day against the United States and Israel. So they have to make a critical decision, and that is, Do they unleash everything they have against the United States and its partners in the region, a course that could lead to a massive response that triggers the implosion of the regime, or do they retaliate in a measured way in the hope that this operation will soon cease and that they can emerge from the rubble?

Historically, they’ve chosen the path of restraint because they want to remain in power. It’s too soon to say whether the regime in Tehran will choose to fight back in a meaningful way or whether it might be prepared to offer profound concessions, on the nuclear program, missiles, and proxies, to secure an end to U.S. and Israeli military operations. This regime recognizes that it is no match militarily for the United States, but it doesn’t need to win. It just wants to survive. The question is, what does it see as the key to its survival?

Khamenei’s death could result in the regime and its security forces closing ranks to survive, or it could serve as the equivalent of a giant cannon blast blowing a hole in a ship, causing the ship to sink and its leadership to bail out to save their own skins. The issue with this regime is that it’s one of the loneliest regimes in the world. There isn’t a good exit plan for any Iranian officials. There are very few places in the world where they can go into exile. For many of them, they assume that they must either kill or be killed.

They likely rush to close ranks behind a new leader, whether a cleric or a Revolutionary Guards commander, rather than allow some greater power transition to take place. But whenever someone who has been ruling for four decades abruptly departs, it creates a power vacuum that could take many years to fill.

Psychology is a much more valuable prism through which to try to understand this than political science. Iranian society has been traumatized by the events of the last six weeks because the killing was so widespread that millions of families around the country either lost a loved one or knew someone who lost loved ones. And for the last five weeks, people were just waiting to see what Trump was going to do.

And they are likely continue to wait to see how long this operation continues and what opportunities there might be to rise. But the regime forces are highly armed, highly organized, and willing to kill to stay in power. And the opponents of the regime, while far more numerous, are broadly unarmed and disorganized. And because they’re trying to separate mosque and state, not join mosque and state, it’s not a population that believes in mass martyrdom.

There are other challenges. We know from history that revolutions require two kinds of leadership, inspirational and organizational. Many Iranians, both inside and outside the country, have coalesced around the inspirational leadership of Reza Pahlavi, the son of the former shah, although certainly not all. The monarchists can be a polarizing movement. It’s not clear to what extent, if any, that movement has organizational leadership on the ground inside Iran.

The paradox of revolutions is that to be viable, they need to attract a critical mass of people. But a critical mass of people won’t join the revolution unless they think it’s viable. No one wants to go out and get slaughtered; no one wants to join a losing team. And so the question remains whether protests start to emerge again and whether they snowball. Much will depend on how Iranians feel. Do they believe that the repressive apparatus of the regime has been defanged? They will be watching closely.

What outside attacks tend to do is accentuate people’s existing political dispositions. If you’re a supporter of the regime, you have even more reason to dislike the United States and Israel and to double down on your support for the regime. But if you’re an opponent of the regime, you blame it for bringing this upon the Iranians. As a result of these military attacks, people won’t really switch teams.

If there is any rally-around-the-flag effect, it would be what happened last June, what I described as just a temporary sugar high. Once the dust settles, even if this regime manages to stay afloat, in time the daily economic, political, and social indignities of life in Iran will reemerge. And even if Khamenei is not eliminated, he’s still 86 years old, and Iran will in any case be a country on the cusp of a leadership transition and potentially on the cusp of a political transformation.

Insecurity tends to benefit security forces, because when power vacuums are introduced, it’s usually the men who can mobilize violence who prevail. It’s not writers and intellectuals and human rights activists who rise to the top when power vacuums form in a society.

Around three-quarters of authoritarian transitions lead to another authoritarian form of government. And when those authoritarian transitions are triggered by either external or internal violence, the likelihood of a democratic transition is much lower. The statistical odds are slim that Iran will transition to a stable representative secular democracy - even if I do believe that Iranian society is ripe for such a change.

A regional war, for one. There are two types of actors in the Middle East: those who are in the business of building and those in the business of destroying. The Gulf countries surrounding Iran have had very different priorities over the last five decades than Iran has. They’ve sought to become hubs of global finance, transport, and artificial intelligence. And Iran has been in the business of destroying and filling power vacuums and preying on the misery of failed and failing states in the region.

It’s a lot easier to destroy things than to build things. There is a danger of a regional war in which Iran attempts to destroy the positive things that have been built in the Gulf and to go after oil installations to spike the price of oil. Israel is better equipped to defend itself because of its military prowess and its distance from Iran, but those Gulf countries are more vulnerable.

Internally, the regime could emerge intact and become as brutal as North Korea, even more brutal than it has been in recent weeks, after killing thousands of Iranians. There’s also the possibility of state collapse and a potential civil war, given how polarized Iranians are and because of agitation among ethnic groups.

In the aftermath of the current attack, if Iranians can cooperate and coalesce together, there could be a transition to, at best, a representative tolerant democracy or, at a minimum, a country that is stable and prioritizes its economic and national interest before ideology and allows people to live a normal life, as many Iranians have experienced firsthand in places such as Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.

 

US bases in Middle East

Where are US military bases located in the Middle East? Here's all you need to know about US bases in the Gulf.

 

Bahrain

Bahrain reported on Saturday (Feb 28) that a facility housing the US Fifth Fleet headquarters was struck by a missile as Iran launched its retaliatory attacks following US and Israeli strikes. "The Fifth Fleet's service centre was subjected to a missile attack. We will provide you with details later," Bahrain's National Communication Centre said in a statement.

The tiny Gulf kingdom of Bahrain is home to the US Navy's Fifth Fleet and the US Naval Forces Central Command headquarters.

Bahrain's deep-water port can accommodate the largest US military vessels, such as aircraft carriers, and the US Navy has used the base in the country since 1948, when the facility was operated by Britain's Royal Navy.

Several US ships have their home port in Bahrain, including anti-mine vessels and logistical support ships.

 

Iraq

US troops remain stationed in Iraq’s Kurdish region as part of the anti-ISIS coalition, though their mission is expected to conclude by September under a bilateral agreement.

American forces have already withdrawn from federal Iraq. In recent years, bases in Iraq and Syria have been targeted by Iran-aligned groups, particularly after the Gaza war began in October 2023.

 

Kuwait

On Saturday, Kuwait's Chief of Staff said in a statement that "air defence systems engaged incoming missiles detected in the airspace".

Kuwait hosts multiple US military facilities, including Camp Arifjan, the forward headquarters of the US Army component of CENTCOM.

Ali al Salem Air Base serves as a "primary airlift hub and gateway for delivering combat power to joint and coalition forces" and hosts assets such as MQ-9 Reaper drones.

 

Qatar

In Qatar, air defense systems were activated on Saturday, as warning sirens sounded across parts of the country. An official told AFP that a US-made Patriot interceptor brought down an Iranian missile mid-air.

Qatar hosts the Al Udeid Air Base, the largest American military installation in the region. It houses forward elements of CENTCOM along with air and special operations forces.

The base supports airlift, refueling, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions. Iranian missiles previously targeted Al Udeid in June last year following US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.

 

Syria

US troops have long operated in Syria as part of efforts against ISIS, though a full withdrawal is now underway and could be completed within weeks.

Amid current tensions, Syria temporarily closed parts of its southern airspace near the Israeli border.

 

United Arab Emirates

The United Arab Emirates said it had intercepted Iranian missiles and reserved its right to respond to the attacks, while Kuwait also engaged incoming strikes on Saturday.

"The Ministry of Defense announced that the United Arab Emirates was subjected today to a blatant attack by Iranian ballistic missiles. The UAE's air defenses responded with high efficiency and successfully intercepted a number of the missiles," it said in a statement.

Abu Dhabi said it "reserves its full right to respond", slamming the attacks as "a dangerous escalation".

The UAE-based Al Dhafra Air Base hosts the US 380th Air Expeditionary Wing, along with combat aircraft and MQ-9 drones.

The UAE said its air defenses intercepted Iranian ballistic missiles and described the attack as a dangerous escalation, while reserving the right to respond.

 

Israel

As Israel and the United States launched Operation Epic Force, aka Operation Lion's Roar, against Iran on Saturday (Feb 28), tens of thousands of troops deployed across the Middle East face a retaliatory threat.

 

 

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