By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

Thailand, China, And The US

Thailand will hold its first national election this weekend in over four years, and only its second since a coup d’état nine years ago. Regardless of its outcome, the adage that “politics stops at the water’s edge” is sure to hold concerning the kingdom’s prevailing foreign policy orientation toward China and to result in further weakening of its treaty alliance with the United States.

Last year was the United States’ strongest in Thailand since the coup. In February, in the Biden administration’s report on the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy—the first to be released publicly from the White House—Thailand was mentioned on page one, and the first-ever combined U.S.-Thailand Strategic and Defense Dialogue took place in Washington in May. The Thais then remained in town for the U.S.-ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Special Summit, the first ever to be held in Washington, D.C., and effectively an apology for the Trump administration’s treatment of Thailand during its ASEAN chair year in 2019.

Thailand then joined 12 other nations in signing on to Biden’s new Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity. An agreement in June concerning technology that detects threats to military installations was little-noticed but significant, as it was negotiated by the U.S. Air Force, which had expressed concern about increasing Thai-Chinese air force cooperation since 2015.

During the summer, the United States stepped up its ground game in Thailand with high-level visits. U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin discussed military modernization and interoperability with his Thai counterparts. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Thai Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai signed a bilateral communiqué they extolled as an expansion of the “communiqué in Washington 60 years ago that solidified the US-Thai alliance,” signed by then-Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman and then-U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk. And the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok received a new ambassador, Robert F. Godec, who differed from his predecessor, appointed by former U.S. President Donald Trump, in having held two previous ambassadorships during 37 years of foreign service experience.

The fourth visitor arrived in November, accompanied by controversy. On the one hand, the attendance of Vice President Kamala Harris at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) gathering could only be seen as the quintessentially American mistake it had been making in Thailand for 25 years. After Bangkok agreed to change the original APEC dates to accommodate midterm U.S. congressional elections, Biden still chose to attend the moveable feast of his granddaughter’s wedding over a gathering of 15 fellow heads of government. The Thais gave Chinese President Xi Jinping a rock star’s welcome and, six months on, have primarily forgiven the White House but not forgotten.

Yet somewhat blunting the damage was that Harris was in Thailand after skipping it on a trip to the region in 2021, and that earlier in the month, Biden himself had attended the ASEAN summit in Cambodia and upgraded U.S.-ASEAN relations to a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” To the last in-person ASEAN summit, Trump had sent a national security advisor who was less than two months into his job and had never worked in Asia.

In contrast to a banner year for America, Chinese relations with Thailand in 2022 hit an equally rare rough patch. Beginning in January, Beijing upset trade ties with the continued closure of its land borders, which Thais depend upon for many of their exports of rubber, electrical parts, produce, and other perishables to China. The same happened to Thai seafood, cars, and other goods when turnaround times at ports in Shanghai and Shenzhen went from hours to weeks. Nor could coveted Chinese travelers leave their country: Thailand’s total 11.5 million tourists in 2022 was nearly equal to those from China alone in 2019.

Pre-COVID-19, the Chinese had also bought the largest share of Thai condominiums sold to foreigners—nearly 10 times larger than the next country. During the first quarter of 2022, however, transfers to Chinese buyers dropped by 38 percent as city after city in China went into lockdown.

This hit Thailand’s private and public sectors hard, as its post-coup governments had bet heavily on unchecked condo construction. Overall, Thailand’s trade deficit in goods and services with China, which had soared from $21 billion in 2020 to $30 billion in 2021, crested $31 billion last year when it might have decreased substantially instead.

This concerned the Thais, but they knew that China’s zero-COVID policy would eventually end. According to this author’s official sources, what unsettled them was Beijing’s abrupt replacement of policies and practices governed by information and a balance of interests—and which had fueled its growth for three decades—with those driven by ideology.

Thais welcomed China’s belated opening in December but worried about what newly arrived tourists might be carrying with them since Beijing continued to share risible COVID-19 statistics when it deigned to share them at all. From the start, it had made available to its citizens only domestic vaccines, refusing to acquire Western-developed mRNA versions and even sowing disinformation about them. This, too, mattered to Thailand since Sinovac and Sinopharm vaccines, which it purchased from China, had long proven less effective than the vaccines in the United States since the coup.

In 2016, Thailand’s junta drafted a new constitution establishing a 250-seat Senate appointed entirely by military officials. Because the Senate votes for the prime minister alongside the House of Representatives, the lower house of the Thai parliament, this move boosts the junta’s preferred candidate. In Thailand’s most recent elections in 2019, Prayuth won a second term—despite the opposition Pheu Thai Party winning more seats in the House.

 

How Will Sunday’s Election Work?

Around 52 million people are eligible to vote in Thailand, or approximately 72 percent of the population. This year, voters will fill out two ballots for the first time: one to choose their local representative in the 500-seat House of Representatives and one to designate their preferred party. The House will allocate 100 seats for appointed party officials based on which parties receive the most public support. The threshold for a party to qualify for seats has increased, providing bigger parties an advantage.

Unofficial voting numbers are expected on Sunday night, but local election authorities said the official results would likely not be confirmed for weeks. At that point, parties that garnered more than 25 seats in the House can put

forward a candidate for prime minister, with a vote likely to be held in August. To win the top post, a candidate must secure 376 votes, which can be drawn from both the House and the Senate.

Recent polling shows that the opposition parties could overcome the military’s Senate advantage if they band together. This year is also likely to be the last time the Senate will vote for Thailand’s prime minister, as a rule, was established in 2017 as a temporary measure.

 

Which Parties Are Running?

The newly created United Thai Nation Party leads the conservative pack led by Prayuth. He hopes that solid backing from the military will propel him to a third term, but a split within the junta could threaten his success. Former army chief Prawit Wongsuwan now leads the military-aligned Palang Pracharat Party. Another conservative party, Bhumjaithai, also threatens Prayuth’s dominance. Bhumjaithai ruled in the current coalition government and won some public support by leading the charge to decriminalize marijuana in Thailand.

Prayuth's campaign

Prayuth’s most significant challenge comes from the pro-democracy PheuThai Party, led by 36-year-old political scion Paetongtarn Shinawatra. The Pheu Thai Party is currently showing in polls and hopes for a landslide. Other progressive parties are scrambling for seats, too, specifically the Move Forward Party. Led by Pita Limjaroenrat, Move Forward has taken Thailand’s youth by storm. The party campaigned to reform Thailand’s monarchy and ban the military from politics.

The Pheu Thai Party must tread a fine line between achieving an extensive enough victory to overcome the Senate’s challenge and not sparking another coup. However, this compromise may rankle its supporters, not to mention the reform-minded young activists who led mass protests in 2020.

 

What Are The Most Significant Issues On The Table?

Thailand, which is Southeast Asia’s second-largest economy, is facing a financial crisis. The COVID-19 pandemic hit the country’s tourism sector hard, and recovery has been slow. This has made boosting the country’s prospects for solid economic growth a key campaign issue. Many candidates have proposed changes to state welfare benefits and increasing the minimum wage.

 

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