By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers
America and Israel’s War to Remake the
Middle East
he United States and
Israel may have different names for their latest military campaigns in Iran - Epic
Fury and Rising Lion - but there is nothing separate about them. They
constitute the first truly combined U.S.-Israeli military operation - and it is
hard to overstate how groundbreaking the partnership is. Normally, the U.S.
military works in broad coalitions, designing the operation, commanding it, and
doing most of the fighting. In the U.S.-NATO engagement in Afghanistan that
began in 2002, the United States conducted most airstrikes and deployed the
bulk of ground forces; the United States conducted the vast majority of the
opening salvos during the 2003 “shock and awe” campaign in Iraq. In the
mid-2010s, when Washington launched Operation Inherent Resolve to oust the
Islamic State (also known as ISIS) from Iraq and Syria, it led the air campaign
while training and funding partners on the ground. Indeed, the United States
has not fought an adversary in a fully combined manner - dividing targets and
working equally within a shared operational construct - since World War II.
With the opening of
this new chapter against Iran, the U.S.-Israeli relationship has
crossed a threshold. The United States and Israel are equal partners in this
war, fusing their intelligence operations, dividing labor, and combining risk.
U.S. and Israeli lives are both on the line. Israel and the United States, of
course, have long had a special partnership, and the foundation of this joint
campaign was built on decades of U.S. financial and military support. But the
collaboration was nowhere near as comprehensive, even nine months ago, during
the June 2025 12-day war.
There is another
unusual feature of this partnership: the U.S. and Israeli militaries are fusing
their operations even as their publics drift further apart. Israelis have long
seen the Iranian regime as an existential threat. They were anticipating a return
to war this year and are - at least initially - rallying around the campaign.
Americans, meanwhile, were barely prepared by President Donald Trump
for war with Iran. Myriad polls in January and February showed that the
prospect of a war with Iran was deeply unpopular in the United States, and influential
members of each U.S. political party (particularly within
Trump’s coalition) are increasingly questioning the very value of the
U.S.-Israeli relationship. A protracted conflict will deepen this skepticism,
and Israel’s reliance on the United States to replenish its fast-depleting
arsenal will become more visible.
The strikes on Iran
are accelerating a bifurcation in the U.S.-Israeli relationship, characterized
by ever-deepening closeness between the two countries’ militaries and growing
political criticism of the partnership. That may not seem to be such a challenge
right now, as generals lead frontline operations in the thick of war. But the
close (and valuable) military collaboration cannot last alongside such
divergent views of the conflict among the U.S. and Israeli populations. And if
U.S. and Israeli leaders do not work to change those views, the military
collaboration will become a victim of the political rift.
Come Together
The decision to unite
Israeli and American forces was not an impulsive one, recently made by Trump.
The preparations for a joint war have been a long time coming. In 2020, Trump
directed the Pentagon to move operations related to Israel from the United States
European Command to the United States Central Command (CENTCOM),
whose area of operation includes the Middle East, reflecting a commitment to
the normalization of ties between Israel and its neighbors. This organizational
change - along with the increasing recognition in Washington that countering
Iranian threats required new approaches - opened the doors to the integration
of U.S. and Israeli military capabilities at all levels.
CENTCOM already had
ties to Arab militaries and quickly identified practical ways to facilitate
Israel’s inclusion in regional initiatives, such as sharing intelligence and
radar feeds. U.S. backing for the normalization of Israel’s ties with Middle
Eastern countries coincided with rapid advances in defense technology that made
it easier, faster, and cheaper to integrate with partners in areas such as air
defense. U.S. military leaders also invested in personal relationships with
their Israeli counterparts and built trust: before Israel’s move into CENTCOM,
CENTCOM’s top leaders had only ever visited Israel twice. General Erik Kurilla, CENTCOM’s commander
between 2022 and 2025, visited Israel at least 40 times during his tenure.
U.S.-Israeli military
ties continued to deepen under President Joe Biden. The January 2023
U.S.-Israeli military exercise, Juniper Oak, remains underappreciated, given
its significance as the first “all domain” exercise between the U.S. military
and any partner in the Middle East. It brought together air, land, sea, cyber,
and space forces, testing how they shared information and fought together
against different threats, and assessing how they might fight together in
wartime. Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack
on Israel put this collaboration to the test. In the immediate aftermath of the
assault, the United States dramatically increased its military posture in the
Middle East; scaled up many kinds of assistance to back Israeli military’s
operations; executed its own strikes against Iran’s proxies in Iraq, Syria, and
Yemen; and, in April 2024, coordinated a multinational air-defense coalition
with Arab and European partners to defeat an Iranian ballistic-missile attack
on Israel. In October 2024, during another Iranian attack, Washington shifted
toward a more active participation in Israel’s defense, intercepting at least
half of Iran’s missiles.
But the Biden
administration always conceived of its role as supporting Israel’s
defense; it emphasized protecting U.S. forces and de-escalation to prevent
interstate war. Biden stopped short of implementing policies that involved the
United States in offensive strikes with Israel against Iran. This firm position
was based on the view that Iran’s retaliation in response to such actions would
not only risk American and Israeli lives but also endanger Arab civilians and
critical infrastructure across the region.
The 12-day war still adhered to this separation.
Israel went in first and cleared an air corridor to facilitate strikes on
Iranian military and nuclear targets; then, more than a week later, the United
States stepped in with bombs only it possessed, with the sole objective of
destroying Iran’s deeply buried nuclear enrichment facilities. Israel’s
military accomplishments enabled the United States to temporarily join the war
and achieve a shared objective, but the two operations were sequenced clearly
and separately.
Stress Fracture
A half-decade of
deepening - and publicly underappreciated - collaboration between the U.S. and
Israeli militaries allowed for a seamlessly coordinated attack this past
weekend. The two militaries are demonstrating, in real time, truly joint air
defense and strike frameworks, comprehensive deconfliction, and continuous
intelligence fusion. The U.S. and Israeli roles in the war reflect nuanced
planning, such as the division of targets in the initial days of the campaign
before air supremacy was achieved over Iran’s skies. It is also clear that the
United States and Israel have shared intelligence on the most sensitive
targets. Israel eliminated Iranian leadership while the United States focused
on targeting missile-storage facilities and the Iranian navy. With the freedom
to fly over Iran, and building on insights gained during the 12-day war, Israel
and the United States jointly increased the intensity of their strikes against
all elements of Iran’s missile program. The combined campaign features
offensive and defensive cyber-operations and coordinated information campaigns
to “blind” the Iranian regime and influence Iranian public perceptions.
At the very same
time, however, the traditional bipartisan foundation of political support in
the United States that sustained the special partnership with Israel is
eroding. In late February, for the first time in 25 years, the Gallup World
Affairs Survey found that a larger proportion of Americans stated that their
sympathies are “more with the Palestinians” than with the Israelis in the
Middle East; this reflects a massive drop in U.S. sympathy for Israelis, from
60 percent in 2020 to 36 percent now. An August 2025 Quinnipiac poll found the
same level of support for Israelis among Americans - an all-time low since
Quinnipiac began surveying U.S. support for Israel in 2001 - and that six in
ten voters, including nearly half of Republicans, opposed continuing military
aid to Israel. Recent polls of young Americans, in particular, find especially
low support for a U.S. military partnership with Israel.
And Americans’
experience of this new war differs sharply from the Israelis’. According to a
late February poll by the Israeli media outlet Channel 12, a large majority of
Israelis backed a joint U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran, while in a CNN survey
released on Monday, 60 percent of Americans disapproved of the campaign and
wanted Trump to seek congressional approval for any further military
collaboration. Israelis’ daily lives are now dominated by the sound of air raid
sirens while Americans question the war’s necessity. The coming days and weeks
may well fracture the MAGA coalition as casualties rise or as Trump, who
promised his supporters “no more foreign wars,” fails to end the conflict
quickly.
The difference in the
U.S. and Israeli views on the current war is likely to deepen the divide
between the two countries. Most Israelis believe the 12-day war ended too soon
and that the threat from Iran cannot be eliminated as long as the regime of the
Islamic Republic persists. This time around, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu has stressed his interest in creating the conditions for regime
change. Trump has intermittently echoed these calls but expressed an openness
to working with remnants of the regime, much as he has done with Venezuela
after the U.S. military removed President
Nicolás Maduro.

Long Division
Although the events
following Hamas’s October 7 attack propelled the U.S. and Israeli militaries
toward this peak kinetic moment of combined operations, the narrative around
the war could easily result in strategic loss. U.S. and Israeli military
leaders are winning according to conventional metrics for assessing military
effectiveness. The end of the fighting, however, will not be the end of the
war.
Just like last
summer, it will end when Trump decides to end it. But the stakes are higher
now. Iran is targeting civilian airports, hotels, port infrastructure, and
energy installations in the oil-producing Arab states, whose leaders Trump
counts as key allies. That endangers not only U.S. troops and civilian
populations but also the entire Gulf business model, which is based on a lack
of conflict within their territories, and global energy markets. As U.S.
casualties rise and Trump confronts the financial implications of Operation
Epic Fury, he may seek an off-ramp short of full regime change in Tehran. This
will diminish the immediate threat posed by Iran but leave the region in a
holding pattern.
Long-term damage to
the U.S.-Israeli relationship is the most worrying possibility. Israel is
exactly the kind of ally that the United States needs to confront an array of
threats as the nature of warfare rapidly changes and creates a pressing need
for new technologies and scalable defense industries. Israel is a capable,
willing partner with irreplaceable intelligence aptitudes and a thriving
defense innovation ecosystem that is already directly benefiting U.S. forces.
Moreover, Israel is willing to put its own forces at risk for a shared
objective and carry its share of the warfighting burden.
As the United
States considers how to best protect its interests across an array of
theaters, Israel should be a security partner of choice. But if questions about
the value of the partnership continue to mount, that will make it increasingly
difficult for U.S. military leaders to turn to Israel for help in times of both
crisis and peace. Trump and Netanyahu have shown themselves to be particularly
unwilling to reach beyond their bases and engage broad swaths of their
societies to build consensus. And because each man is politically vulnerable
and facing a critical upcoming election, neither is likely to take up the
mantle of leadership needed to put the U.S.-Israeli relationship back on a
solid footing - or to clearly communicate what kind of Iran strategy would
leave the world safer after the guns fall silent. A failure of political
leadership may accelerate the breakdown of an effective military collaboration,
undermining the deeper partnership that teamwork could have bolstered. That
would not just be a bitter irony. It would be a tremendous loss.
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