By Eric Vandenbroeck
As pointed out before
during the 1980's, largely due to the relatively liberal political environment and
the policies of reform-minded top leadership, Chinese nationalism had a
moderate orientation, this changed following the 1989
Tiananmen crackdown when history and memory were developed to become a new
power.
The centerpiece of
this post-1989 state-sponsored revival of Chinese
nationalism was the so-called patriotic education campaign, a comprehensive
program that revamped history textbooks, reconstructed national narratives, and
renovated historical sites and symbols throughout China. The sole purpose of
this program was to rekindle the Chinese population’s sense of national humiliation
and, consequently, their antipathy toward the West. The “patriotic education
campaign” achieved remarkable success in reawakening the most parochial and
xenophobic strains in Chinese nationalism. Through official propaganda and a
distorted historical narrative, the CCP was able to convince large segments of
the Chinese population that the West would not want to see a powerful and
prosperous China. Periodically, the official propaganda apparatus would go into
overdrive whenever there were international incidents in which China was
apparently disrespected or poorly treated. A first example that we have
previously analyzed was the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. Other examples are
the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by NATO during the Kosovo
war in 1999, and the midair crash between a Chinese fighter jet and an American
navy reconnaissance plane over the South China Sea in 2001.Of course, American
responsibility in some of these made it easier for the Chinese regime to
convince their population that the United States harbored hostile intent toward
China. For instance, Washington attributed intelligence failure to the bombing
of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. This might be true, but it sounded
unconvincing to the average Chinese, who firmly believed that the United
States, the world’s most advanced country, was incapable of making such dumb
mistakes.
Deng Xiaoping’s
strategy meanwhile was the redefinition of the
“one-hundred year history of humiliation” as a new
source of legitimacy of the CCP’s rule and the unity of the Chinese people
and society.
The first batch of
secret transcripts known as "The Tiananmen Papers" was published in
English in January 2001 by PublicAffairs
a Hong Kong-based publisher. The extended Chinese version of this book was
published in April that same year under the title 中國六四真相 (Pinyin: Zhōngguó Liùsì Zhēnxiàng, translated as
June Fourth: The True Story) by Mirror Books in Hong Kong.
Rather than meeting
the demands of protesters for more liberal reforms and free markets, the
Communist government doubled down on repression, aiming to stamp out the spirit
of liberty behind the protests.
"For some time,
an extremely small group of people who stubbornly promoted bourgeois
liberalization cooperated with foreign hostile forces to call for revising our
constitution, schemed to destroy [Deng Xiaoping’s] Four Cardinal Principles
[for upholding socialism and Communist Party rule] and to tear down the
cornerstones of our country; they schemed to change . . . our country’s basic
political system and to promote in its place an American-style separation of
three powers; they schemed to change our People’s Republic of democratic
centralism led by the working class and based on the worker-peasant alliance
into a totally westernized state of capitalist dictatorship," Peng Zhen,
the former chair of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress,
said shortly after the massacre.
Foreign
Affairs magazine published these remarks late last month before they became
public when a new batch of documents was published as Zuihou
de Mimi: Zhonggong Shisanjie
Sizhong Quanhui “Liusi” Jielun Wengao
(The Last
Secret: The Final Documents From the June Fourth Crackdown).
The speeches once
again make clear how the lessons taken from Tiananmen continue to guide Chinese
leadership today.
For example ice President Wang Zhen expressed a widely shared
view that the demonstrations werejust the latest move
in a decades-long plot to overthrow communism:
After the October
Revolution [of 1917], 14 imperialist countries intervened militarily in the
newborn Soviet regime, and Hitler attacked in 1941. After World War II, U.S.
imperialists supported Chiang Kai-shek in the Chinese Civil War and then
invaded Korea and Vietnam. Now they’d like to achieve their goal the easy way,
by using “peaceful evolution”: . . . buying people with money, cultural and
ideological subversion, sending spies, stealing intelligence, producing rumors,
stimulating turmoil, supporting our internal hostile forces, everything short
of direct invasion.
By demonizing
domestic critics and exaggerating the role of foreign forces, the victorious
conservatives revealed their blindness to the real problems affecting their
regime.
But although the
first post-Tiananmen leader, Jiang, claimed the label of “core,” he did not
establish true dominance over the system, and his successor, Hu Jintao, did not
even claim the label. President Xi has made himself a true core and awarded
himself the label in 2016, after four years in office. He achieved that
position by purging all possible rivals, packing the Politburo and the Central
Military Commission with people loyal to him, creating an atmosphere of fear in
the party and the military with an anticorruption campaign that targeted his
opponents, and moving quickly to crush any sign of dissent.
Xi’s placing himself in an unassailable power position,
with no rivals and no limitation on his time in office, in 2018, Xi pushed
through the removal of constitutional term limits on the state presidency, has
created the conditions for a future succession crisis. When the question of
succession arises, as it must in one form or another, according to the Chinese
constitution, whoever is serving as vice president should succeed Xi as state
president. But there is nothing on paper, and no informal norm or custom, that
says who should succeed him as general secretary of the party or as chair of
the Central Military Commission, positions that are far more powerful than that
of state president. There is no evidence that Xi has designated a successor, as
Mao did, and this may be because Mao’s experience showed how a designated
successor can become a rival waiting in the wings. On the other hand, failing
to name an heir is equally problematic if one wishes to see a smooth power
transition.
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