By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers
How The World Can Deal With Trump's
Advice
In this year of major
elections around the world, none is more consequential than that in the United
States on the first Tuesday in November. Polling suggests Donald Trump will
enter the White House again in January 2025. If he does, he will return to
office perhaps no wiser but certainly more experienced and more convinced than
ever of his exceptional genius. More ominously, he will be determined to
rectify in his second term what he insists was the major failing of his first:
that both his advisers and Washington officialdom got in his way.
Like most
people, Trump is often wrong. Unlike most people, however, he is
never in doubt. A powerful narcissistic self-belief has given him the strength
to defy not just his many enemies but even reality itself. For four years, he
has denied the outcome of the 2020 election and persuaded most of his party,
and millions of Americans, to agree with him. There has never been such an
effective and relentless gaslighter.
As president, he
sought to surround himself with people who told him what he wanted to hear.
When they stopped doing so, they were quickly sent packing. If Trump returns to
the Oval Office, his instinct to crush critics and stack the executive branch
with yes men will likely get even stronger. He will characterize his domestic
critics as political opponents if they are Democrats and as traitors if they
are Republicans. Trump will feel invincible in his triumph as a Roman emperor,
but he won’t have a slave by his side whispering, “Remember, you are mortal.”
Other leaders,
especially those of countries that are close U.S. allies, have an opportunity
and a responsibility to speak to Trump with a blunt but respectful candor that
few of his advisers will be able to offer him. Around the world, leaders are
once again fretting about how they can flatter Trump and avoid his wrath. But
that pliant approach is not just the wrong strategy; it is the last thing
the United States needs.
A New Normal
After Trump became
president in 2017, most leaders around the world found themselves laboring
under two incorrect assumptions. The first was that Trump’s wild rhetoric on
the campaign trail would be abandoned there. The office and its
responsibilities, some leaders believed, would constrain him. In November 2016,
a few weeks after Trump’s surprising victory, the leaders of many of the
world’s largest economies met in Lima at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
summit. It was Barack Obama’s last summit as U.S. president, but it was
Trump who overshadowed the whole APEC conference. By way of reassurance, many
quoted former New York Governor Mario Cuomo’s remark: “You campaign in poetry.
You govern in prose.” The line was repeated so often that a frustrated
President Michelle Bachelet of Chile observed wryly that she had not seen many
signs of poetry in the campaign that had just ended.
Many leaders expected
that Trump would become more typically “presidential” once he entered the White
House. That was certainly the view held by Chinese President Xi Jinping.
He told me at the APEC summit that he was relaxed about the new U.S. president.
Xi thought Trump’s campaign rhetoric would have no bearing on how he would
govern, and most significantly, the Chinese president believed the U.S. system
would not allow Trump to act in a way that undermined the American national
interest.
And that was
generally the consensus view: the institutions of government would keep Trump
grounded in a conventional, administrative reality. His colorful campaign would
be followed by business, more or less, as usual.
Trump in office was,
if anything, wilder and more erratic than he had been on the campaign trail.
Four extraordinary years finished with him encouraging a mob to storm the U.S.
Capitol in a brazen attempt to overthrow the constitutional transfer of power
to the new president. If Trump returns to the White House in 2025, only the
willfully deluded could imagine that a second Trump administration would be
less volatile and alarming than the first.
Don’t Give In
The second
misapprehension world leaders held was that the right way to deal with Trump
was how Benjamin Disraeli, the nineteenth-century British prime minister,
advised people to deal with royalty: to use flattery and “lay it on with a
trowel.” Of course, men like Trump invite sycophancy. They use their power and
caprice to encourage others to tell them what they want to hear. But this is
precisely the wrong way to deal with Trump, or any other bully. Whether in the
Oval Office or on the playground, giving in to bullies encourages more
bullying. The only way to win the respect of people such as Trump is to stand
up to them.
But that defiance
brings with it great risks. Almost all world leaders hope to have a good, or at
least cordial, relationship with the United States. And they know that if they
have a falling out with the U.S. president, there is no guarantee that their own
people, let alone their own media, would take their side. This is particularly
so in countries where a right-wing, so-called conservative media generally
support Trump and his style of politics. Trump’s biggest echo chamber in the
United States is the Fox News network, owned by Rupert Murdoch, who also
controls extensive media assets in Australia and the United Kingdom.
The Potential Australia Trade Wars
In 2016, an agreement
with Obama was reached that several asylum seekers who had sought to
enter Australia irregularly by boat could be settled in the United
States, subject to the usual security vetting. Australia had learned over the
years that the only way to stop human smuggling was to ensure that nobody who
came unlawfully by boat could settle in our country. This policy had been
strictly applied under Liberal Prime Minister John Howard, who held the office
from 1996 to 2007 but was modified under his Labor successors Kevin Rudd and
Julia Gillard. The result was a dramatic increase in human smuggling. When Rudd
returned as prime minister for a few months, in late 2013, he tried to
reinstate the Howard-era policies, and as a consequence, several thousand
asylum seekers were intercepted and detained in Papua New Guinea and Nauru.
The Liberals returned
to government in October 2013 under Tony Abbott. Most governments have followed
a strict zero-tolerance approach to human smuggling. And it has worked. But
there were still the asylum seekers who had been diverted to Papua New Guinea
and Nauru. If they were brought to Australia, there was a fear that the flow of
boats would start up again. So the deal with Obama was a practical and humane
solution. In return, Australia had agreed to accept some very difficult
immigration cases for the United States.
Trump made it clear
that he was proceeding with the deal unhappily. But he also accepted, as I had
suggested, that he could honor the deal his predecessor had made without
endorsing it as a good one. Details of the call were leaked in Washington,
eventually with a transcript, all designed to show that Trump went along with
the deal with reluctance.
There was enormous
anxiety in Canberra about how their deal with Trump would play out. Would he
honor the deal? As it turned out, he did. Would this row adversely affect other
aspects of the relationship? And most important, would Trump bear a grudge?
Make The Case
Most presidents and
prime ministers delegate considerable authority, formally and informally, to
their advisers and officials. Meetings with foreign leaders are negotiated well
in advance by ambassadors and officials. The outcome of the meeting is as scripted
as the talking points.
The Trump White House
did not work like that. Trump was the only decision-maker. Staff could advise
him however they pleased, but most didn’t last long anyway. The only word that
mattered was Trump’s, and he did not like being scripted—in any event, he rarely
read from the script. He was the dealmaker, so he wanted to do the deal, on the
spot, in the room.
For Trump, this meant
that ambassadors and foreign ministers, no matter how capable, could offer much
less assistance or influence. The key relationship lay between Trump and the
foreign leader.
This practice poses
both a challenge and an opportunity for foreign leaders trying to gain traction
in the White House. It means that their ambassadors are less influential. On
the other hand, if it is possible to persuade Trump that it is in his interest
to change course, he will. But to do that, a foreign leader has to win Trump’s
respect and make a strong case.
In March 2018, Trump
announced he was going to impose tariffs on steel and aluminum imports of 25
percent and 10 percent, respectively. Not only was Trump keen on these tariffs,
but so were some of his key advisers, including Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross
and Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer.
Turnbull and Trump in Washington, D.C., February 2018
Trump’s views on trade
were simplistic. But they were strongly held. He viewed a trade deficit as
evidence that the United States was losing and a trade surplus as a sign it was
winning. He gave Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe a hard time on the U.S.
trade deficit with Japan, as he did other allied leaders, but his greatest
anxiety was the huge trade deficit with China.
A 25 percent tariff
on Australian steel would not make U.S. steel more competitive on the West
Coast; it would simply raise the price of steel roofs. We went through the
numbers several times. He knew the building industry, and he knew the product,
and he listened more attentively than usual.
Second, if Trump’s argument
for tariffs was to correct trade terms with other countries that were not fair
and reciprocal, why should he impose any tariff on Australian exports?
Australia and the United States had maintained a free trade agreement for
years. The United States also enjoyed a large trade surplus with
Australia.
If the United States
imposed tariffs or an import quota on Australia, with whom it had the best
possible trade deal, it would be seen as doing so simply because it could.
Speaking Truth To Trump
The caricature of
Trump as a one-dimensional, irrational monster is so entrenched that many
forget that he can be, when it suits him, intelligently transactional. Like
most bullies, he will bend others to his will when he can, and when he cannot,
he will try to make a deal. But to get to the deal-making stage, Trump’s
counterparts have to stand up to the bullying first.
Foreign leaders who
need to get business done with Trump should be able to do so, but they will
need to deal with him directly and persuade him why their proposal is a good
deal for him. Leave the sentimental stuff about alliances and friendship for
the press conferences. Trump’s question is always, “What’s in it for me?” His
calculus is both political and commercial, but it is very focused. That should
be no surprise—“America first” is his explicit slogan.
A Trump returned to
the White House, convinced of his genius, and with the evidence of an election
win to prove it, will be surrounded by more yes men and sycophants than ever.
In that environment, who will be prepared to tell him what he doesn’t want to
hear?
The leaders of the
countries that are the United States’ friends and allies will be among the very
few who can speak truthfully to Trump. He can shout at them, embarrass them,
even threaten them. But he cannot fire them. Their character, courage, and candor
may be the most important aid they can render to the United States in a second
age of Trump.
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