By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers
Tell Trump that a Russian Victory Could
Hurt Him
As with many other aspects
of their war against Russia, Ukrainians have reacted to the outcome of the U.S.
presidential election with a certain dark humor. The morning after the
election, Ukrainian social media was full of jokes, including soldiers
commenting that they were “preparing to go home soon, since the war will end in
24 hours.” They were referring, of course, to President-elect Donald Trump’s
long-standing claim that he could stop the war in a day if he were elected.
Ukraine has many
reasons to be concerned about a second Trump presidency. Trump has not said how
he would end the war, or even under what conditions. In his debate with Vice
President Kamala Harris, in September, he refused to say that he wanted Ukraine
to win. He has also repeatedly complained about the amount of military
assistance that the United States has been giving Kyiv. In the background,
there is his longtime admiration for Russian President Vladimir Putin, and
Trump’s running mate, JD Vance, who was one of the first Republicans to embrace
indifference to Ukraine as a policy position: “I don’t really care what happens
to Ukraine one way or the other,” he said in 2022. And in polling before the
election, where a clear majority of Democrats agreed that the United States had
a responsibility to support Ukraine, only about a third of Republican voters
said that it did. All this has led many to fear that Washington—by far Kyiv’s
biggest arms supplier—might cut off the flow of aid, or even allow Moscow to dictate
the terms of peace.
But the reality of
the war has made Ukrainians pragmatic: the situation can always get worse, but
they still need to adjust and search for a way out to survive. Setting aside
Trump’s campaign rhetoric, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is preparing to
work with him. After all, Ukrainians lived through the first Trump
administration and have some sense of what they are getting: dealmaking and
attempts to flatter Putin, but also, eventually, a major sale of lethal arms,
including Javelin antitank weapons, which have been critical in the fight
against Russia. Zelensky’s task is and will remain to find ways to receive what
his government needs to defend the population in the long run.
For Ukraine, then,
the meaning of a second Trump administration is complicated. Even if the
initial phase of Trump’s return to power is full of speculations, leaks, and
disappointments—and even if Washington decides to slow or freeze military aid,
causing even more casualties and losses of territory—Kyiv knows that Washington
is unlikely to simply cede victory to Putin. It is indisputable that Trump
dislikes long and expensive foreign wars. And Ukrainians themselves are ready
to end the war—but from a position of strength.
Reading the Crowd
Throughout the war,
Kyiv has never taken American support for granted. In sheer magnitude, the
United States has provided more military assistance than any other country, and
in some crucial areas, like cyberwarfare, advanced air defense systems, and intelligence,
U.S. resources cannot be substituted. Yet even a year ago, Ukraine began
planning for a future of waning U.S. support. Following the unsuccessful
counteroffensive in the summer of 2023, Ukrainian officials interpreted the
increasingly negative assessments of the war in the U.S. media as a sign that
Washington’s military assistance might shrink.
To prepare for this,
the Zelensky government accelerated efforts to expand domestic weapons
production and strengthened relations with other partners in Europe, as well as
with Canada and Japan. Kyiv also began stepping up its efforts to sell the
international community on its so-called peace formula—Ukraine’s multilateral
initiative, first announced in September 2022, that aims at recruiting a large
group of countries around key issues that will need to be addressed at the end
of the war, including food security and environmental damage, as well as the
restoration of energy infrastructure and nuclear safety. (So far, some 90
countries have endorsed the formula.)
Ukrainian sappers building defenses along the front
line, near Chasiv Yar, Ukraine, October 2024
Ukrainian officials
have also tried to ensure that if they are forced to negotiate with Russia they will not be alone and that the Ukrainian vision
of peace will already be on the table. Ukraine has made clear, for example,
that humanitarian issues such as the return of Ukrainian children taken to
Russia and the exchange of prisoners of war could become the basis for future
negotiations.
But whatever the
future of U.S. aid, Kyiv has long recognized the need to retain the support of
both major parties in the United States. That lesson was learned during Trump’s
first impeachment trial in 2019, when Trump’s phone call to Zelensky, asking for
the Ukrainian president to investigate Joe Biden, became a primary focus of the
inquiry. For close to two years, the first Zelensky cabinet had worked with
Trump. At the time of the impeachment, Trump was still in the White House, but
Ukrainians understood that they needed to engage with Democrats. Conversely,
after Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, despite the fact
that the Democrats were now in power and were their primary
interlocutors, Kyiv continued to reach out to Republicans, as well.
That understanding of
U.S. politics has been particularly important in obtaining continued military
assistance; none of the five Ukraine aid bills could have been passed without
Republican votes in Congress. In late 2023, as the Republican-controlled House
of Representatives held up a further aid bill, Kyiv began reaching out to even
more legislators and others from the Republican camp. In November of that year,
Zelensky welcomed Fox News Corporation CEO Lachlan Murdoch for a meeting in
Kyiv. And Ukraine pursued these contacts until the long-delayed aid package was
finally approved by Congress in April 2024. In the end, Republican Speaker of
the House Mike Johnson, who had been a skeptic of more U.S. support, was fully
persuaded: “I think providing aid to Ukraine right now is critically
important,” he said, in announcing his endorsement of the bill.
Kyiv’s courtship
continued throughout the presidential campaign. In July, following the
Republican National Convention, Zelensky had his first call with Trump since he
left the White House, in 2021. (At the time, Trump called it a “very good phone
call.”) That month, Zelensky also visited Utah for a National Governors
Association meeting, where he engaged with a large group of Republican
politicians. Then, in September, Zelensky received Senator Lindsey Graham, a
Trump ally, and other members of Congress in Kyiv. After the meeting, Graham
called for delivering more weapons to Kyiv, noting that Ukrainians are “trying
to stop the Russians so we don’t have to fight them.”
Zelensky welcoming U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham in
Kyiv, March 2024
These efforts
culminated in late September when Zelensky again visited the United States and
met with both Trump and Vice President Kamala Harris. As some analysts have
noted, Trump’s willingness to meet with Zelensky during the final weeks of his
campaign was not a given, and the fact that he did so shows that he was taking
Ukraine seriously. By this point, Kyiv had an additional priority: with the war
situation becoming increasingly tough and some Western allies beginning to show
signs of war fatigue, Ukraine wanted to show that it had a viable strategy for
winning. Thus, Zelensky took the opportunity to present his “victory plan” not
just to the Biden administration but to both presidential candidates, as well.
Although its most
important parts remain confidential, the victory plan outlined, among other
things, how Ukraine would use more sophisticated kinds of weapons to change the
reality on the battlefield: by waging a more high-tech war, Ukraine would be
able to destroy Russia’s logistics hubs, thereby preventing Russia’s control of
airspace along the front and decreasing pressure on Ukraine’s infantry. So far,
the U.S. reaction to the Zelensky plan—whether from the Biden administration or
Trump’s team—has been hard to assess, but for Kyiv it was another way to make
clear that it could work with whoever captured the White House.
Learning from Reality
After two years and
nine months of fighting, Ukrainians hold few illusions about the limits of U.S.
backing. They have long since recognized that the Biden strategy—massive
amounts of military assistance, but with many constraints on kinds of weapons
and how they can be used—has allowed them to sustain the fight but fallen short
of letting them change the direction of the war. At the same time, they are not
engaging in wishful thinking or expecting radical breakthroughs with Trump.
Of course, what is
said by a head of state must be taken seriously. When
Putin repeats that he is planning to destroy the Ukrainian state, it is naive
for Ukrainians to think he doesn’t mean it. With Trump, however, it is unclear
what he really means when he vows to end the war in 24 hours. For one, it does
not appear that he has much leverage with Russia, and there is also little
indication that Russia is prepared to listen—unless Trump agrees to allow
Moscow to occupy the rest of Ukraine, which seems highly unlikely.
But Ukrainians have
something else to go on: how Trump dealt with Russia and Ukraine during his
previous term in the Oval Office. Consider the recollections of former U.S.
Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch. In a meeting with the American
Ukrainian community in Pittsburgh just a few weeks before the 2024 election,
Yovanovitch described Trump’s press conference in 2018 when he said that he
would trust the Russian president more than his own intelligence community.
According to Yovanovitch, Trump also refused to push back on Russia over its
attack on a Ukrainian ship in international waters in the Black Sea; later, he
also canceled joint U.S.-Ukrainian naval exercises. (In 2019, Yovanovitch
herself was recalled from her post by Trump.)
In 2024, the Trump
campaign was hardly more reassuring. At Trump and Vance campaign rallies that I
attended in Pennsylvania and Michigan in late October, neither mentioned the
war in Ukraine, but their recurring promises to stop “financing foreign wars” was
loudly cheered by the audience. Nonetheless, Trump supporters themselves show a
range of views about Ukraine, and even include a sizable number of Ukrainian
Americans. In those two swing states, Ukrainian Americans supporting Harris
were terrified by the possibility that the United States might end support for
Ukraine.
But many others I
spoke to supported Trump. Father Jason Charron of the Ukrainian Catholic Church
in Pittsburgh, who offered a benediction at Trump’s rally in Butler before the
assassination attempt, is a vocal supporter of the former president. Many echo
the arguments that Trump himself makes: the war didn’t start under Trump, and
it was Trump who provided Ukraine with its first lethal weapon—the Javelins.
A Ukrainian soldier unpacking U.S.-supplied Javelin
anti-tank missiles, near Kyiv, February 2022
Many in Kyiv hope
that Trump and his team will become more pragmatic once they start getting
security briefings. During Trump’s first term, there was no visible
breakthrough, but the level of U.S. support for Ukraine did grow little by
little, mainly because over time there was a better understanding of the
situation on the ground. That could apply again: once Trump is confronted with
what Russia is doing on the battlefield, how deeply North Korea and Iran (a
hated enemy of Trump) are involved, and how effective Ukraine can be at
destroying Russian weapons, he may see that it is crucial for the United States
to do everything possible to prevent a Russian victory.
But in a larger way,
Ukraine also understands that Trump’s ultimate policy direction will depend on
which people become most prominent in his administration. Trump’s announcement
on November 11 that the Republican congressman and retired Green Beret Mike
Waltz would be his national security adviser sets down one marker. In the
United States, Waltz has been called a Ukraine skeptic, and he is known for
questioning U.S. aid packages to Ukraine and claiming that Europe should share
more of the burden. He has also said, in the run-up to the election, that there
should be some kind of “diplomatic resolution” to end the war.
But Waltz’s precise
views may be more complex. During the early stages of the war, Waltz was
engaged with Ukrainian civil society members and was adamant in his criticism
of Moscow. He also said that Biden was not doing enough to support Ukraine,
even arguing, in July 2022, that the United States should send military
advisers into Ukraine. “Let’s win this damn war!,” he
said at the time. More recently, he has said that if Moscow did not want to
negotiate, Trump might try “taking the handcuffs off of long-range weapons we
provided Ukraine,” thus allowing Ukraine to raise the cost to Russia.
Also important may be
Elon Musk, who in Ukraine remains an ambivalent figure. On the one hand, his
Starlink satellite network has been crucial to Ukraine’s war effort. But in the
fall of 2022, he denied a Ukrainian request to use Starlink over Crimea, at a
time when Ukrainians were targeting Russian warships in the area with no
remorse. Musk claimed that he wanted to prevent a scenario in which Putin might
use a nuclear weapon. Musk’s move hindered Ukrainian operations, but Ukrainian
forces nonetheless managed to make successful strikes on Russian targets in
Crimea.
At first, the
Ukrainian government held back criticism of Musk, but Zelensky challenged the
tech billionaire later that fall, after Musk outlined his own version of a
“peace plan” in which he seemed to echo Moscow’s own narratives about the war
and suggested that Russia should be allowed to keep Crimea. According to an
October report in the Wall Street Journal, it was also in late 2022
that Musk began to have occasional contacts with Putin. (Moscow has denied any
contacts beyond a single phone call in which they discussed “space as well as
current and future technologies.”) Still, Musk briefly joined Trump’s call with
Zelensky after the election, and, according to reports, told the Ukrainian
president that he would keep sending Starlink ground stations to Ukraine.
Hard Just Got Harder
There have been many
attempts to decipher what Trump means when he talks about ending the war in 24
hours. Apparently, he would persuade Putin to negotiate, although it is unclear
how he would do this. (It is possible that Musk, who brags about talking to
Putin directly, or that Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who is friendly
with both Trump and Putin, could be potential brokers of such talks.) Even if
such a channel were opened, however, it is far from clear what, if anything, it
might yield.
Many Ukrainians view
the prospect of Putin-Trump talks in the light of Trump’s attempts during his
first term to deal with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. In the end, the
special rapport that the former president cultivated didn’t lead to any
substantial agreement. And Putin, over whom Washington has even more limited
leverage, is a stronger leader than Kim. Already, in the immediate aftermath of
the election, leading Russian propagandists have asserted that Moscow doesn’t
care about any peace initiatives and warned the United States not to issue
ultimatums. They also reiterated that Putin intends to destroy Ukraine. In the
end, there is no reason to have the U.S. president be the broker of peace if
that role is reduced to pressuring Kyiv to submit to Moscow’s conditions.
In September, a
group of Ukrainian soldiers close to the Russian border, freely admitted how
tired they were of the war, but they also were unanimous in opposing
negotiations with Putin. As they saw it, the Kremlin would use a cease-fire to
arm itself, strengthen Russia’s war economy, and prepare for an even more
devastating invasion of towns like Dnipro, Kharkiv, and Poltava in the near future. And if that happened, Russian
retaliation against the families of Ukrainian soldiers would be extreme. This
has already been shown in Russian-occupied territories, where Russian forces
have targeted anyone who served in the Ukrainian Armed Forces before 2022. By
now, almost every Ukrainian has a family member engaged in the war effort, so
every Ukrainian would be a target.
To deal with an
uncertain American future, Ukraine’s strategy is straightforward: to explain
that a Russian victory would be extremely dangerous for the United States. Not
only would it strengthen China, Iran, and North Korea; it would also tempt
other autocracies to invade their own neighbors. At the same time, Kyiv can
remind Washington that a very large portion of the military aid that the United
States has provided to Ukraine is largely spent at home: the American defense
industry receives government funds to produce ammunition on American soil by
American workers.
From afar, the
Zelensky government’s rush to embrace the incoming administration may look like
sheer opportunism. But Kyiv is also being strategic.
It knows that the Biden administration will have little window for action in
the time it has left and that Ukraine must quickly
prepare for a different world. What the Biden administration has presented to
the press as a final financial package—$6 billion in additional security
assistance—was planned a while ago. (In fact, it is simply the remaining part
of the $61 billion aid package passed in April.) In the months before the
election, Zelensky tried to persuade Biden to support a formal NATO invitation
for Ukraine, arguing that it could form a part of his foreign policy legacy.
After Trump’s election victory, it is hard to imagine that Biden will try
anything so significant. And under Trump, joining NATO will likely be off the
table.
Yet the fact is that
throughout all the hardest moments of Ukraine’s history, the United States has
stood up for the country and its people, making it possible for the nation to
survive. Thus far, this has been true under both Republican and Democratic presidents,
even when they have differed significantly on policy. It is also true that
prolonged war is not something Ukrainians like. Instead of supporting the
country “as long as it takes,” as Biden has often said, they would prefer more
decisive measures. Whatever happens after January 20, 2025, it will be critical
for Ukraine to get further funds and weapons in the remaining weeks of this
year. If Trump does try to talk to Putin, Ukraine will need to be in the
strongest position possible on the battlefield. Ukrainians know that it won’t
be easy to ensure Washington’s continued support. But nothing has been easy up
to this point, either.
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