By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

How Trump and Xi Can Pull Back From the Brink

Eric Rosenbach, who served as a former assistant Defense Secretary and Chief of Staff at the Defense Department, said that he believes the U.S.-China conflict is at a tipping point as President Trump prepares to meet with Chinese President Xi. Imagery captured by the European Space Agency's Sentinel-2 satellites on October 8, 2025, shows the Zhurihe Training Base in China's northern region of Inner Mongolia, where the Chinese military has constructed a mock-up of key Taiwan government buildings found in Taipei. How Trump and Xi Can Pull Back From the Brink.

Unfortunately, Washington and Taipei have moved in the opposite direction, walking back long-standing assurances designed to prevent conflict. Over the past five years, the United States has weakened aspects of its “one China” policy, under which Washington recognizes Beijing’s government as the sole legal representative of China and acknowledges, and does not challenge, Beijing’s position that there is one China of which Taiwan is a part. In its final year, the first Trump administration scrapped restrictions on executive branch contacts with Taiwanese counterparts and sent Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar to Taipei, the highest-level visit by a cabinet official in decades. These moves diminished the United States’ commitment—articulated in the U.S.-Chinese joint communiqués issued in 1972, 1979, and 1982—to forgo official relations with Taiwan. (The Biden administration reinstated the earlier contact guidelines in loosened form.)

Then, as president, Joe Biden twice said that the people of Taiwan should decide whether to be independent. Moreover, on four occasions he declared that he would use military force to defend the island against a Chinese attack, contradicting the customary ambiguity that his predecessors maintained. Although the White House continually affirmed that U.S. policy had not changed, Biden undercut U.S. efforts to deter Taiwan from unilateral moves toward independence. Tensions came to a head in August 2022, when Nancy Pelosi became the first sitting House speaker in a quarter century to visit the island, where she met with President Tsai Ing-wen. Predictably, the visit backfired. Beijing intensified military exercises around Taiwan and began to send ever more planes and ships across the median line of the strait.

After that episode, the Biden administration tried to stabilize relations by reaffirming Washington’s commitment to the “one China” policy and giving private verbal assurances to Xi. And since returning to the office, Trump has consistently declined to specify how the United States would respond to an attack on Taiwan. Yet damage has been done: Beijing is understandably concerned that the United States might resume degrading cross-strait understandings, whether under Trump or a successor.

Meanwhile, Taipei has not helped matters. Since becoming president of Taiwan last May, Lai has asserted Taiwan’s separateness from the mainland and muted his predecessor’s efforts to reassure Beijing. Although Tsai hailed from the pro-sovereignty Democratic Progressive Party, she also affirmed that she would conduct cross-strait affairs in accordance with the Republic of China constitution and the 1992 act governing relations with the mainland, both of which treat China and Taiwan as part of a single entity. By contrast, Lai has avoided implying that there exists one China that includes Taiwan. He has cast China as a stark threat that aims not only to “annex Taiwan” but also to achieve “international hegemony.” Last March, he designated China as an “external/foreign hostile force” as he launched a series of measures to combat Chinese infiltration within Taiwan, including the reinstatement of military tribunals to try espionage cases against active-duty personnel.

Lai’s moves produced no better results than Pelosi’s visit did. Directly following three of Lai’s major addresses, in which he characterized the political systems in Taipei and Beijing as “not subordinate to each other,” the Chinese military staged blockade-style exercises encircling Taiwan. Conversely, after Lai used less antagonistic language toward China in speeches this May and October, China declined to hold large military drills. In the short term, Taipei’s envelope-pushing pronouncements clearly precipitate greater Chinese coercion. In the longer term, they increase the odds that Beijing could decide to compel unification by force.

Lai may believe that China is coming for Taiwan no matter what, and he has domestic political incentives to remain assertive in cross-strait affairs. Although his recent rhetorical climbdowns are encouraging, he is more likely to sustain his flexibility if the United States reinforces its interest in lowering the temperature. To reduce the risk of war, then, Washington must not only assuage Beijing’s anxieties about U.S. intentions but also restrain Taipei from triggering further escalation.

 

Mutually Assured Stability

Fortunately, the United States can achieve both of these goals at once—while obtaining concessions from China. The Trump administration should seek to exchange public assurances with Beijing that move each party away from the other’s red lines. Ideally, the United States and China would do so in a new joint communiqué, adding to the three original statements that continue to form the foundation for diplomatic relations between the countries. A joint communiqué would create sticky commitments, not easily walked back, although the document could be extremely difficult to negotiate, especially if it addressed broader aspects of a fraught bilateral relationship. Even if Trump and Xi ended up issuing individual statements in parallel, that would be a worthwhile fallback; what matters most is to address in substance the central concerns of each side.

Washington should offer to make several key statements. For one, it should affirm that the United States does not and will not support Taiwan independence, and will continue to oppose any unilateral change to the status quo by either side, whether toward independence or unification. The future tense here is the novelty; unlike previous formulations, this one adds “will not support,” thereby extending the U.S. commitment indefinitely and deterring Taipei from declaring independence in the hope that Washington would accede to a fait accompli. Going forward, any American president tempted to support Taiwan’s independence, or even to adopt the permissive attitude that Biden occasionally expressed, would have to more starkly contradict an explicit U.S. pledge. Beijing would be relieved that the United States is no longer muddying and, in fact, strengthening its non-support for independence. And Taipei would be warned that any effort to push toward independence would only push the United States away.

At the same time, the United States would concede little by proffering a future-oriented assurance. Like other elements of the “one China” policy, not supporting independence would remain implicitly conditioned on China not resorting to force. Furthermore, the United States need not go so far as to oppose Taiwan independence outright, as The Wall Street Journal reported that Xi is seeking from Trump. Opposing independence exceeds not supporting it, and would foreclose the possibility, however improbable, that both sides might one day amicably part ways. Instead, the United States should continue to take no position on the outcome of cross-strait differences, insisting only on a peaceable process.

To deter Taiwan from pursuing permanent separation from China short of independence, the United States should offer a second assurance: that it has an abiding interest in peace and stability across the strait and welcomes any resolution of cross-strait differences, whether involving unification or any other outcome, provided that it is reached by peaceful means, free from coercion, in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides. Crucially, for the first time in a formal, high-level statement, the United States would specify peaceful unification as one of the outcomes it would accept.

This shift should assuage Beijing’s concern that the United States seeks to make Taiwan’s self-rule permanent and emboldens Taipei to take every step toward total separation short of declaring independence. By the same token, the assurance would encourage Taipei to avoid unqualified assertions of separation from the mainland. U.S. officials could reinforce this message by expressing support for renewed cross-strait dialogue, as the Biden administration did in January 2024, and by privately suggesting that Lai, like Tsai, vow to handle the issue in accordance with the Republic of China constitution and Taiwan’s 1992 act.

Still, this new assurance would alter rhetoric alone; the United States’ underlying position, of welcoming any peaceful resolution, would not change. Accordingly, Trump should reject Xi’s request to support “peaceful reunification.” Washington should not back only one particular outcome, and the term “reunification” would implicitly endorse Beijing’s legal and historical claim on Taiwan. Adopting China’s position in this way would be a blunder, diminishing Taiwan’s resolve to resist Chinese aggression and coercion.

In return, Beijing ought to offer equally significant measures. Building on Xi’s statement to Biden in 2023 that he had no timeline for invading Taiwan, China should publicly state that it has no deadline for achieving reunification with Taiwan and will make every effort to pursue reunification through peaceful means. This would constitute the first official, public statement that Beijing lacks a certain date for resolving the Taiwan issue.

China’s no-deadline pledge would advance Taiwan’s interests. If Xi subsequently ordered an attack, he would look two-faced and aggressive, making countries in East and Southeast Asia more likely to rally behind Taiwan. To legitimize its war, China would try to point to provocations by Taipei and Washington, which is why the no-deadline pledge would incentivize them to refrain from acts that Beijing could hold up as compelling casus belli. In this roundabout way, the pledge would redound to China’s benefit, too, as long as Beijing truly does not wish to use force to annex Taiwan.

In parallel with the exchange of assurances, China should agree to reduce its military activities around Taiwan. It should restore the median line of the strait as a tacit buffer, ending its incursions that began in 2019 and ramped up after Pelosi’s visit in 2022. Returning to the status quo ante would signal that Beijing seeks to relax cross-strait tensions and will escalate only in response to new provocations. China should also agree to hold fewer and smaller military exercises around Taiwan and stop intruding into Taiwan’s contiguous zone, which extends 24 nautical miles around the island. The United States could consider offering reciprocal measures, such as retracting the Typhon missile system it placed last year in the Philippines. But even if China made military concessions whereas the United States did not, this would be a fair deal: political pressure from Washington stands a better chance of restraining Taiwan than China’s military intimidation tactics do.

 

Modest Risks, Major Upside

To be sure, this effort could backfire. Xi might pocket U.S. assurances and continue to coerce Taiwan as vigorously as before. But the United States can mitigate the risk by consistently encouraging vigilance about China’s threat to Taiwan. Rather than oversell the assurances as a new dawn of peace, Trump should explain that China’s words must be backed with action, which his administration will monitor closely. Meanwhile, the United States should continue to improve its posture in the Indo-Pacific and help Taiwan strengthen its military capabilities.

Taiwan, too, should keep enhancing its civil and military defenses while restraining its assertions of sovereignty in cross-strait affairs. If Chinese forces keep conducting large exercises and frequent incursions despite Taipei’s restraint, they will further alienate the people of Taiwan and beget greater U.S. support for Taiwan. That would be unfortunate, but it might simply return cross-strait relations to their current state while clarifying Beijing’s intentions. In the worst case, if Xi orders an attack, Taipei and Washington could at least hold up the violated assurances to demonstrate Beijing’s bellicosity and bad faith, helping to attract international support for Taiwan. This is no small benefit: the conflict could turn on the alignment of other countries in the region and beyond.

Because U.S.-Chinese assurances risk alarming Taiwan, Washington should consult with Taipei before and during negotiations to explain its intentions, solicit advice on the concessions it should seek, and make clear what it will not trade away. Keeping Taiwan, Japan, and other allies apprised of U.S. intentions will also counteract China’s attempts to sow doubt about the United States’ reliability as a partner throughout the process.

A final risk is that, as occurred with prior joint communiqués, Congress might push back against the president by strengthening support for Taiwan. Congressional activism could take counterproductive forms, such as a U.S. defense commitment to the island. To avoid this scenario, Trump should work to persuade members of Congress that the deal is beneficial and that his administration will continue supporting Taiwan.

Exchanging assurances with China is perhaps the single most significant action that the United States can take right now to make great-power war less likely. Without conceding much, Washington could stop cross-strait antagonisms from descending further and create room for a better trajectory to emerge. If diplomatic assurances succeed in inducing mutual restraint, and 2027 passes without incident, then a new stability in the western Pacific could take hold, anchoring the security and prosperity of a vital and dynamic region. The moment is right to test a worthy proposition.

When U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping meet on Thursday, November 30, they should take bold action to reduce the risk of war over Taiwan. That risk has reached alarming heights in recent years. China, the most dangerous party, has militarized the strait, launching large military drills simulating blockades of the island and daily incursions across the median line. Taiwan, under President Lai Ching-te, has asserted its sovereignty in new and destabilizing ways, casting its political system as separate from and threatened by the mainland. And the United States has been increasingly one-sided in backing Taiwan, chipping away at previous understandings reached with Beijing on cross-strait issues.

That worsening tensions could spiral into cataclysmic war is now all too imaginable. To address this danger, Washington has sought to strengthen military deterrence. Improving Taiwan’s defenses, and the United States’ regional posture, makes sense, but this alone will not restore stability in the strait. In fact, military buildups without diplomatic assurances are prone to be interpreted by China’s leadership as confirmations of hostile intent. The best way to reverse this dynamic and achieve a substantial reduction in military activities around Taiwan is for both Washington and Beijing to show greater respect for each other’s core positions.

Trump and Xi have an opportunity to do just that. At their meeting, they should initiate working-level talks to formulate a new U.S.-Chinese joint communiqué or, failing that, a pair of parallel statements. The wording would need to be carefully negotiated, but the core bargain should be simple: Washington will not support Taiwan’s independence or rule out peaceful unification with the mainland, and in return, Beijing will avoid the use of force and ease its military intimidation of Taiwan. If done right, these assurances would improve Taiwan’s prospects of preserving self-rule while restraining its leadership from making political statements that upset the status quo.

 

Spiraling Tensions

Under Xi, China has ramped up pressure on Taiwan in all domains—military, economic, diplomatic, and informational—leading some observers to fear that it might invade or blockade the island as soon as 2027. Still, it remains far from clear that China is bent on mounting a risky attack in any time. What is clear is that China might well resort to force should it conclude that Taiwan is becoming independent or permanently severed from the mainland. The United States and Taiwan retain a profound interest in keeping China from reaching such a conclusion.

 

 

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