An article in today's
British Guardian newspaper asks; Could Donald Trump refuse to accept defeat in
the US presidential election? adding that Trump
has repeatedly refused to commit to a peaceful transition of power –
uncertainty over the result will put that to the test.
Some go even a step
further and claims to reveal secret 'war game' planning amid fears of a legal
challenge after November's election.
Or as Quint
claims this could spark a situation where the US House of Representatives
and the Senate become involved in trying to declare a result. The matter could
also reach the Supreme Court, and some federal politicians and state
governments could join in along the way, says ABC News, predicting a “highly
fluid situation” ie, uncertainty.
The peaceful transfer
of power through elections is a defining feature of democracy. After votes are
freely cast and fairly counted, the losing candidate or party accepts the
results as legitimate and concedes to the winner. The United States has a long tradition
of public presidential concessions dating back to William Jennings Bryan’s
congratulatory telegram to William McKinley after the 1896 election. Al Gore
disputed the outcome of the 2000 election, but after the Supreme Court ruled to
halt a recount in Florida, he conceded defeat.
U.S. President Donald
Trump has threatened to upend this tradition. A reporter asked him in September
whether he would commit to a peaceful transfer of power after this month’s
election. Replied the president: “We’re going to have to see what happens.”
A disputed
presidential election would take the United States into uncharted territory.
Around the world, however, losing presidential candidates refuse to accept
electoral results on a fairly regular basis. Out of 178 elections in
presidential democracies between 1974 and 2012, 38, or 21 percent, were
disputed by runner-up candidates or parties. Disputed elections have set off
violent unrest, constitutional crises, and even civil wars. Given the enormous
potential risks, why are losing presidential candidates so often willing to
brush aside democratic tradition and reject unfavorable electoral
outcomes?
According to studies
by the political scientist's Todd
Eisenstadt and Andreas
Schedler, losing candidates often refuse to concede because they seek to
publicize flaws in an electoral system and thereby to press for reforms. They
may hope to overcome information asymmetries that allow incumbents to commit
electoral fraud, for example, and therefore push for independent election
commissions.
Such motives often
lie behind electoral disputes in authoritarian or semi-authoritarian countries,
where sham elections can be little more than coronation exercises. But disputes
are common in presidential democracies, too, even when independent observers
have certified election results as free and fair. Those who challenge election
results under such circumstances likely aim for something other than electoral
reform.
However, in these
cases, the objective is to build political leverage. Losers reject unfavorable
election outcomes in order to strengthen their post-election bargaining
positions and extract political concessions from the winners. I call this the
“blackmail strategy” of losing parties and candidates: losers threaten to upend
post-election stability unless they receive benefits, such as cabinet
appointments, parliamentary leadership positions, or passage of their party’s
legislative priorities. In fact, research shows that a losing presidential
candidate is especially likely to contest the outcome if his or her political
party does not have a majority in the lower house of parliament, and that the
probability of a disputed result increases as the losing party’s share of seats
in parliament decreases.
Take, for example,
the 2009 presidential election in Indonesia, which international observers
generally agreed was free and fair. Opposition leader Megawati Sukarnoputri
lost by a margin of more than 34 percent, a figure that matched the parallel
counts of independent polling institutes, and her Democratic Party of Struggle
won less than 17 percent of the seats in parliament. Megawati nonetheless
rejected the outcome and challenged the results before the constitutional
court. While the case was pending, her party engaged in closed-door
negotiations with the winning candidate, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono,
and managed to obtain his support for the election of Megawati’s husband as
speaker of parliament, among other concessions. The constitutional court
eventually dismissed Megawati’s challenge and upheld the election results, but
by then her party had secured electoral benefits it would not otherwise have
achieved.
For example, between
1974 and 2012, losing presidential candidates whose parties were in the
minority in parliament showed a greater tendency to dispute electoral results.
They did so no matter whether their system used direct popular elections or an
electoral college. Where there were differences, they accorded with the system
for electing not the president but the parliament. Parties that lost
presidential elections in countries with proportional representation in
parliament were likelier to accept unfavorable results than were those in
countries with first-past-the-post parliamentary elections, in which winners
take all and political power is more concentrated.
One might expect
these findings to have greater relevance to weak or recently established
democracies, where norms that push losers to graciously accept defeat are not
deeply rooted. But that is not the case. Even established democracies with
long-standing traditions are vulnerable to electoral disputes when presidential
elections are close, there are at least some irregularities, or the losing
party also stands to lose in parliament.
This finding ought to
serve as a warning to those who believe that their country’s long tradition of
peaceful, democratic transfers of power will dissuade Trump from rejecting
election results that do not favor him. On the contrary, the table is set for the
electoral blackmail strategy. Not only is the election likely to come down to a
few close swing states, but Trump has already seized on the issue of mail-in
ballots, claiming without evidence that there are “problems and discrepancies”
with this method of voting. Moreover, the president’s party is likely to remain
in the minority in the House of Representatives and could even lose control of
the Senate. Both houses use first-past-the-post electoral systems. In other
words, there is reason to fear that the president or members of his party might
hold the country’s political stability hostage in an attempt to extract
concessions from the Democrats.
What might Trump
squeeze out of his opponents through such a stunt? After all, it is difficult
to imagine a President Joe Biden appointing Trump’s allies to his cabinet. One
possibility would be a commitment from the Democrats to refrain from packing
the Supreme Court in response to Justice Amy Coney Barrett’s rushed
appointment. Such a concession would preserve an important part of Trump’s
legacy and ensure that the court remains ideologically conservative for years
to come. Republicans might also seek to lock in any number of regulatory or
policy changes from the Trump era. Even if the president’s primary motivation
for rejecting a loss at the polls is to preserve his image as a winner, those
around him could aid and abet his abrogation of democratic norms in order to
advance their aims or the aims of the Republican Party.
The United States has
a long tradition of peaceful and democratic transfers of power, but it is not
immune to electoral blackmail. If Trump loses, he may opt for the same
self-serving playbook that 21 percent of losing presidential candidates have
followed over the last four decades, sacrificing the country’s political
stability for his own political gain.
And in the unlikely
event that Trump, still refusing to accept his loss despite Biden having been
ruled the victor, barricades himself inside the White House and physically will
not leave office, it’s not immediately clear who would be in charge of removing
him.
Biden, back in June,
said the military would remove the by-now-former president. He told the Daily
Show: “I promise you, I’m absolutely convinced they will escort him from the
White House with great dispatch.”
The military seems to
have other ideas, however.
Gen Mark Milley, the
chairman of the joint chief of staff and the country’s top military officer,
has said service members would not get involved in the transfer of power. “In
the event of a dispute over some aspect of the elections, by law US courts and
the US Congress are required to resolve any disputes, not the US Military,”
Milley said. “We will not turn our backs on the constitution of the United
States.”
Clearly, Trump would
be removed somehow – at some point he surely would have to leave of his own
accord, but Americans will be hoping this hypothetical does not come to pass.
As Trump likes to
say: “We’ll see what happens.”
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