By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

Unwinding The Taiwan Conundrum

Beijing accused Washington of “political manipulation” and attempting to change the status quo after the US state department quietly amended its website to remove a line stating it did not support Taiwanese independence. In a delicate geopolitical balancing act, the US has long acknowledged but not endorsed China’s claim to Taiwan under its version of the “one China principle.” However, experts say that policy has been eroded as Beijing has become more assertive.

In testimony to the Senate on Tuesday, the US director of national intelligence, Avril Haines, said China was seeking the military capability to conquer Taiwan, even if the US intervened. In an updated page on the state department’s online “fact sheet,” Washington removed some key lines from the 1979 US-PRC joint communique last week. It included a line saying, “the US recognized the government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, acknowledging the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China.”

The line saying the US “does not support Taiwan independence,” which appeared in a previous version published on 31 August 2018, has also been removed from the website. The new version said the US “continues to encourage the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait differences consistent with the wishes and best interests of the people of Taiwan.”It added: “The United States has a longstanding one-China policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three US-China joint communique, and the six assurances.”

As we have seen, China has also become increasingly frustrated with what it has considered a renegade province since the ruling Democratic Progressive Party was formed in 1986 as a center-left, nationalist organization. That frustration has grown sharply since 2016 with the (including the later re-) election of President Tsai Ing-wen.

US President Biden in mid-April reassured Taipei by sending his first delegation led by former Senator and personal friend of Biden, Chris Dodd, to Taipei. A meeting between Biden and Japan's prime minister, Suga Yoshihide, on April 17, then marked the first time since 1969 that the US and Japan had issued a joint statement mentioning Taiwan. When Senator Chris Dodd completed his three-day visit to Taiwan, it was done with a show of support from the Biden administration.

Biden’s strong start regarding the Taiwan issue comes against China's dramatically increasing military activity in the waters and air space near the island. Data released by Taiwan’s defense ministry shows that since the beginning of 2020, more than 650 PLA warplanes have entered Taiwan’s southwest air defense identification zone on their way to the Bashi Channel, the gateway to the western Pacific and the disputed South China Sea.

Wu said the island would defend itself "to the last day" if attacked by China. He said Taiwan-US relations are undergoing major adjustments. Japan reiterated that it seeks to counter Beijing’s growing assertiveness in the East and the South China Sea.

 

Why should Taiwan be seen as a part of China?

Taiwan was never involved with the Chinese tributary system; neither were the Chinese to any significant degree living in Taiwan until the Dutch imported them as laborers. On the contrary, the first emperor of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) wrote: "Overseas foreign countries… are separated from us by mountains and seas and far away in a corner. Their lands would not produce enough for us to maintain them; their people would not usefully serve us if incorporated."1 As a result, he said, China would observe a strict Maritime Prohibition (Haijin 海禁)2, a policy stipulating that all contact between China and overseas foreigners must occur in official embassies, known as tribute missions.3 No unofficial visits were to be tolerated. Nor were the Chinese allowed to sail abroad except, on tribute missions.

The Ming's reluctance to support overseas adventurers was not an anti-imperialist stance, as the Ming had an active imperialist history. The Qing Dynasty, too, restricted foreign trade until the late seventeenth century.4

Instead, the Dutch, who in the 1630s, realized that their port’s hinterlands could produce rice and sugar for export. Still, they could not persuade Taiwan’s aborigines to raise crops for sale; most were content to plant just enough for themselves and their families.5 The colonists considered importing European settlers, but their Dutch superiors rejected the idea. So they settled instead on a more unusual plan: to encourage Chinese immigration. The Dutch offered tax breaks and free land to Chinese colonists, using their powerful military to protect pioneers from aboriginal assault. They also outlawed guns; prohibited gambling (which they believed led to piracy); controlled drinking; prosecuted smugglers, pirates, and counterfeiters; regulated weights, measures, and exchange rates; enforced contracts; adjudicated disputes; built hospitals, churches, and orphanages; and provided policing and civil governance.6 In this way, the company, created a calculable economic and social environment, making Taiwan a safe place for the Chinese to move to and invest in, whether they were poor peasants or wealthy entrepreneurs.7 People from the province of Fujian, just across the Taiwan Strait, began pouring into the colony, which grew and prospered, becoming, in essence, a Chinese settlement under Dutch rule. The colony's revenues were drawn entirely from Chinese settlers through taxes, tolls, and licenses. As one Dutch governor put it, "The Chinese are the only bees on Formosa that give honey."8

Taiwan’s relative standing reflected that knowledge within the Qing government of Taiwan’s geography was so limited that it was not until the 1870s that serious efforts began to govern most of the terrain. Similarly, an official handbook for Fujian Province from 1871 presented a vague description of the location of Diaoyutai – today a hotly contested site that also often gets the label of “an integral part of Chinese territory since ancient times” and described it as a place where “over a thousand large ships” could berth.

These opinions and depictions do not suggest that Taiwan and its environs rose to the level of integral territory for Qing-era Chinese. On the contrary, historians have shown that popular and official discussion of Taiwan as a part of China, and formal efforts to gain control of Taiwan by the government of the Republic of China (ROC) and its ruling Nationalist Party, originated in the 1930s and 1940s, within the context of anti-Japanese sentiment and war.

After being chastened by the Ming, the Dutch settled into a more docile role and were rewarded by the Chinese trade, which flowed to their Asian outposts.9 When the Ming dynasty was replaced by the Qing dynasty (1644–1911), the Dutch were the first Westerners to have an embassy in the imperial court. The Dutch ambassador raised no objections to kowtow. The Dutch even allied with the Qing, briefly, against the remnants of the Ming dynasty, a mutual enemy. Hence two more Dutch embassies were received in the court before 1700, each engaging in the standard rituals.10

At the same time, the Dutch ran an Asian court of their own in their colonial capital of Batavia (present-day Jakarta, Indonesia). They received delegates from throughout Asia and as far away as Africa, adopting Southeast and East Asian diplomacy practices and trappings, such as parasols and parades of elephants. As historian Leonard Blussé has noted, “the Batavian government found its place among Asian rulers and learned to play by the rules of what it then observed to be general Asian diplomatic etiquette and protocol. The Dutch colonizers had to invent ‘oriental’ rituals to stay in tune with existing conventions for carrying out foreign intercourse at a diplomatic level.”11

Thus before the 1600s, Taiwan was self-governing, although there was no central ruling authority. It was a colony of the Netherlands for about 40 years in the early to the mid-17th century and was subsequently independent again for nearly two decades. After which, not Han Chinese but the Manchu-led Qing sent an army led by general Shi Lang and annexed Taiwan in 1683. Qing rule over Taiwan then ended abruptly when Taiwan was ceded to Japan by the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895. There were more than a hundred rebellions during the Qing period. The frequency of revolutions, riots, and civil strife in Qing Taiwan led to this period being referred to by historians as “Every three years an uprising, every five years a rebellion.”

Previously, China sat comfortably at the center of a ring of tributary relationships with its neighboring countries. Its rulers had limited familiarity with any civilization outside of Asia. Their few contacts with Westerners made it clear that they expected the same deference from far-away leaders as those on their periphery. In this context, see also: Imagining the concept of Han in the context of the civilized center and the uncivilized lands on edge. Posted more than four years ago, wee concluded that the People's Republic of China today, though centered on Han Chinese, is a multinational state modeled more closely on the Manchu empire than on the Song or the Ming. Like the Manchu empire, its territory includes Manchuria, part of Mongolia, Eastern Turkestan, Tibet, Yunnan, and China Proper.

Nevertheless, elements of the earlier Song vision of the Chinese nation persist today. First and foremost, as mentioned, is the belief in the objective reality of a homogeneous Han people. The sense that Chinese civilization is fundamentally Han at its core has fueled the awkward relationship that continues to exist between the Chinese state and its fifty-five non-Han minority nationalities. One also recognizes in the twentieth century an enduring expectation of Han ethnic solidarity, whereby both early twentieth-century nationalists and the People's Republic of China have expected Han Chinese abroad (but not necessarily Uighurs or other minority nationalities) to exhibit loyalty to their motherland.

In the space of a little over a century, China suffered a long list of political, military, and cultural indignities.

Throughout the 19th century, China was riven by massive rebellions in which tens of millions of people died; these uprisings were frequently fanned by widespread opposition to the growing foreign presence and the imperial government’s acquiescence to foreign demands.

Independence movements in Tibet, Mongolia, and Xinjiang in the 1910s, 20s, and 30s further reduced China’s territory.

The millennia-old imperial system collapsed forever in 1911, leading to an extended period of further chaos. The new, nominally republican government could not control large swaths of China’s remaining territory.

The eight-year-long war against Japan (World War II) and the multi-decade Chinese civil war between the Chinese Communist (CCP) and Nationalist (KMT) Parties devastated the Chinese landscape and tore its people apart.

Meanwhile, within Taiwan itself, officials and elites expressed strong opposition to the act of incorporation into Japan’s empire. They launched several rhetorical, diplomatic, and military endeavors to prevent this colonial occupation. However, some attempted to avoid colonization only by Japan and were amenable to annexation by Britain or France instead. More significantly, at the end of two years in which, as stipulated by the Treaty of Shimonoseki that ended the war, all Qing subjects residing in Taiwan had the opportunity to decide if they would stay there or live in China; less than 10,000 out of roughly 2.5 million inhabitants had crossed over the Taiwan Strait. After that, although both violent and non-violent resistance to the Japanese colonial regime remained a recurring feature of Taiwan’s history, it was couched, preventing either encroachment into indigenous lands or dedicated social and religious practices, and rarely if ever, in the language of reunification with China. Taiwanese remained interested in China, of course, but as a source of inspiration for local cultural and political movements, an ancestral homeland to be visited, or a site for lucrative business activities. However, as the Taiwanese author, Wu Zhuoliu highlighted with the main character in his novel, “Orphan of Asia,” many Taiwanese who went to China felt unwelcome there and disconnected from it.

Several scholars, including myself, have demonstrated the creation of distinctive Taiwanese identities during the years of Japanese rule. Far from following the intentions of Japanese assimilation policies, residents of Taiwan drew upon their cultural heritage, new professional and labor associations, globally circulating ideas of self-determination and participatory politics, and modern cosmopolitanism to forge new identities. They displayed their new consciousness in calls for independence from Japan, drives for voting rights and an autonomous legislature for Taiwan within the Japanese Empire, and a wide range of social and cultural behaviors, from local politics to social work to religious festivals. Some inhabitants focused on nationalism and political independence, whereas others concentrated on ethnic communities within a pluralistic political entity. These behaviors distinguished them from the Japanese settlers and the colonial government attempting to transform them into loyal Japanese subjects. Instead, most of the population became Taiwanese, albeit in ways that excluded Taiwan’s indigenous peoples.

They had not remained Chinese, at least not as people and the government in China defined that term during the early 20th century. Became very clear to everyone on the scene soon after the end of World War II. Although the rhetoric of the ROC government stressed reunion and recovery and used the term “retrocession” (guāng fù 光复乡) to describe Taiwan’s incorporation into its territory, government officials looked upon the Taiwanese as people who had been tainted by Japanese influence and needed to be remade as Chinese citizens.

Those Taiwanese themselves displayed genuine enthusiasm for the end of Japanese rule and the arrival of Chinese civilian and military representatives in October 1945. Still, they quickly realized the vast distance between how they saw themselves and how the new governing regime perceived them. They had forged their identities in burgeoning modern metropolises and modern capitalist industries, and yet the Chinese government described them as backward. Those with roots in China had centered religious practices in their new identities to resist Japanese assimilation, and now the ROC government targeted those practices for suppression as pernicious traditions. Even though many Taiwanese learned the new national language of Chinese, as they had Japanese before, they felt no connection to the national struggles and heroes they were now told to embrace.

These markers of separation were evident before 1947 when the divergence between Taiwanese and Chinese came into high relief during the 2-28 Uprising. During the February 28 massacre, the number of deaths was estimated to be between 18,000 and 28,000 and was a critical impetus for the Taiwan independence movement. The White Terror began soon after that when political opposition to the Nationalist Party and pro-independence sentiment went underground or overseas. However, sharp divisions continued to exist between indigenous and non-indigenous populations; by the 1990s, many defined “Taiwanese” to include both groups. Decades of single-party rule under martial law by Chiang Kai-shek’s regime did not effectively instill most Taiwan’s residents with a new sense of Chinese national identity. Indeed, most of the roughly 1 million people who left China for Taiwan, and their descendants, came to identify themselves with Taiwan, not China.

 

From Ukraine toTaiwan

Beyond Europe, the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is being felt most keenly 5,000 miles away, on the island of Taiwan. Many Taiwanese worries that they might be the next to suffer an invasion by a more powerful neighbor. Those fears are not unreasonable. At the same time, Ukraine and Taiwan differ in many ways; as relatively young democracies living alongside larger authoritarian neighbors with long-standing designs on their territory, the two face strikingly similar strategic predicaments.

Today, similar to how Putin has described restoring the “historical unity” between Russia and Ukraine as a kind of spiritual mission, Chinese President Xi Jinping believes that reuniting mainland China with what he views as its lost province of Taiwan will help cement his place in history. Xi speaks of Taiwan in much the same way Putin talks about Ukraine, highlighting blood ties and arguing that China and Taiwan are one family. Whereas Putin has recently challenged the traditional understanding of state sovereignty to suggest that Ukraine does not deserve it, Xi (like his predecessors) denies Taiwan’s sovereignty altogether.

These similarities notwithstanding, it would be a mistake to assume that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will hasten China’s desire to achieve unification with Taiwan. Fundamentally, Chinese leaders’ calculations about whether to use force against Taiwan are political decisions that Moscow’s actions will not influence. Moreover, Chinese officials are well aware that attacking Taiwan now would likely fuel Western fears that Beijing and Moscow are forming an authoritarian axis and beginning to act in concert, thereby increasing the likelihood of direct intervention by the United States and its allies.

Xi and the leadership of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) are closely monitoring events in Ukraine, looking for lessons that might be useful in the event of a conflict with Taiwan. Russia’s struggles will not shake China’s determination to bring Taiwan under its control. China’s war in Ukraine is a realistic preview of the costs China would incur if it resorted to war. Chinese leaders will examine Russia’s failures and adapt their operational plans to avoid similar mistakes.

Therefore, Taiwan and the United States would be well advised to do the same and scrutinize each stage of the war in Ukraine from the perspective of a Chinese official. By doing so, they may be able to identify facts or patterns that may already be giving Chinese officials pause and capabilities that Taiwan should adopt to buttress deterrence. Although it would be a mistake to assume that Moscow’s actions have any direct influence on Beijing’s decisions, identifying the kind of evidence that could convince China that Putin’s decision to attack Ukraine was a colossal strategic blunder could also help Taiwanese and U.S. strategists deter China from a catastrophic attack on Taiwan.  

 

The more dangerous era

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine confirms Chinese leaders’ belief that they are entering a more dangerous era and that they must prepare for a greater likelihood of war. In his call with U.S. President Joe Biden after the war began, Xi noted that “the prevailing trend of peace and development is facing serious challenges” and “the world is neither tranquil nor stable.” Xi’s words strongly suggest that China will continue to increase its defense spending, which remains focused on developing the capabilities the PLA would need to conquer Taiwan.

As the United States has built a coalition of countries, including many of the world’s top economies, to impose severe sanctions on Russia, China has been examining these efforts for evidence of declining U.S. influence. From Beijing’s perspective, any cracks in the coalition are heartening news. It has indeed been noted that some close U.S. partners, such as India, have not sanctioned Russia or forcefully condemned its invasion of Ukraine, even after reports emerged of alleged Russian war crimes. China likely assumes that global support for Taiwan will be more muted than support for Ukraine; a few countries maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and many lack unofficial solid ties with the island. Moreover, Russia has successfully leveraged its economic relationship with some countries to keep them on the sidelines, which has likely reassured China that far greater economic might would prevent many countries from supporting Taiwan.

China will also study the sanctions applied to Russia and take steps to decrease its vulnerability to similar actions. As a first measure, Beijing will accelerate its “dual circulation” strategy, seeking to promote exports while simultaneously encouraging more robust domestic demand, in a bid to increase other countries’ economic dependence on China and reduce its reliance on others. This strategy would serve two purposes: insulating China’s economy from sanctions and making any sanctions that Western countries apply to Beijing to deter or punish an invasion of Taiwan hurt the West more than China. China will also attempt to produce critical technologies such as semiconductors domestically, reduce its reliance on the U.S. financial system and the dollar, and support an alternative to SWIFT, the dollar-based international payments system. Regardless of how much progress China makes on this front, its leaders are likely confident that U.S. allies would be far more reticent to impose wide-ranging sanctions against China, given its centrality to global supply chains.

The most crucial lesson China has learned from the war in Ukraine is that the United States will not contemplate direct military intervention against a nuclear-armed opponent. Before Russia invaded Ukraine, the United States took direct military intervention off the table, with Biden warning that “confrontation between NATO and Russia is World War III.” Chinese analysts and policymakers have likely concluded that Russia’s nuclear arsenal deterred the United States from intervening and that atomic weapons create more room for conventional operations. Chinese strategists probably believe that this validates the country’s decision to invest heavily in increasing its nuclear arsenal, which the U.S. Department of Defense recently estimated will reach at least 1,000 warheads within the decade. Moreover, having witnessed Putin’s atomic saber-rattling, China may conclude that it could deter U.S. intervention on Taiwan’s behalf by raising its atomic alert level or conducting nuclear tests at the outset of a conflict.

Russia’s military blunders will help the PLA hone its plans and improve its chances of conquering Taiwan. Russia has failed to achieve air superiority over Ukraine, keep its forces supplied with fuel, food, and munitions, and effectively conduct combined arms operations. The PLA’s leadership was likely shocked that Russia’s military, with extensive recent operational experience, failed to secure a decisive victory. For the PLA, this vindicates the difficult military reforms it began in 2015, which focused on joint operations and logistics and incorporated lessons learned from watching the United States conduct complex joint operations. At the same time, the PLA fields a significant amount of Russian military equipment and has sought to integrate elements of Russia’s military reforms; therefore, Russia’s struggles could prompt the PLA to question its readiness to conduct the operations necessary for a fight with Taiwan. This worry is likely compounded by the PLA assuming the United States will come to Taiwan’s defense. The United States has sold Taiwan many of the same weapons Ukraine uses to significant effect. The PLA will likely redouble its focus on integrating its land, sea, and air power in the longer term and improving its joint warfighting capabilities.

President Volodymyr Zelensky’s ability to rally the Ukrainian people and international public opinion has shown Chinese leaders the importance of eliminating Taiwan’s political and military leadership early in a conflict and breaking the Taiwanese people’s determination to resist. In practice, this would, at a minimum, entail attempting to assassinate Taiwanese leaders to demoralize the population, inhibit command and control, and prevent the emergence of a rallying figure. But China would likely pursue even more expansive operations ahead of any assault, including sowing divisions within Taiwanese society, spreading disinformation, and severing Taiwan’s communications with the outside world. China has already established essential platforms within Taiwan for spreading pro-China messages through investments in media outlets and recruitment of intelligence assets. It will undoubtedly continue to refine this non-kinetic element of warfare.

 

Ukraine inspired Taiwan

Since China will be using Russia’s war in Ukraine as an opportunity to improve its planning for a Taiwan conflict, Taiwan must do the same. There are already encouraging signs. After Ukraine’s early successes against Russia, many Taiwanese took to the streets to celebrate, and activists and commentators argued that Ukraine’s ability to repel a militarily superior foe had inspired the Taiwanese to believe they could do the same. Taiwan’s defense minister has established a working group to study Ukraine’s tactics and raised the prospect of extending compulsory military service, which now has the support of over three-quarters of those polled. Interest in learning first-aid and disaster response has surged.

But this alone is not enough. Taiwan must urgently accelerate its adoption of an asymmetric defense strategy. It should focus on fielding many of the same capabilities Ukraine is using to significant effect, including portable air defense systems, drones (which Taiwan has already indicated it is prioritizing in the wake of Russia’s invasion), and anti-tank missiles. In addition, Taiwan should ramp up anti-ship missile and sea mine production. Its military must decentralize command and control and develop systems to empower smaller military units to analyze and adapt to rapidly evolving circumstances on the ground.

Taiwan must also create a more trained and ready reserve force, establish new territorial defense forces, and more broadly plan for mobilizing its entire society. Ordinary Ukrainians’ ability to withstand bombardment and, in many cases, take up arms has shown the Taiwanese something of the resilience they would need to demonstrate to withstand a Chinese assault. Should China attack Taiwan, its objective would be to rule 24 million people indefinitely, and it would be up to the Taiwanese people to make that impossible.

A critical weakness that Taiwan must address is the difficulty of resupplying its population and military during a conflict. Ukraine borders NATO member states, allowing arms and humanitarian supplies into the country even after Russia’s invasion, but supplying Taiwan in an attack, let alone a potential blockade, will be brutal. Supplying even essential goods such as food and medicine will be challenging, as commercial ships and aircraft cannot be expected to risk the lives of their crews to continue delivering goods. Supplying Taiwan’s military, especially if the United States intervened on Taiwan’s behalf, would be infinitely more so.

Since China has noted Ukraine’s reliance on resupply by Western countries, even as the war rages, China would likely prioritize cutting off Taiwan as quickly as possible during a conflict. Taiwan should anticipate this and prepare now by stocking reserves of munitions, oil, food, and other critical materials and dispersing these supplies throughout the island. Essentially, everything Taiwan will need to fight the PLA for a sustained period while keeping its population fed and healthy enough to put up a resistance must already be on the island when a conflict erupts.

The United States must also hone its playbook to deter a Chinese assault against Taiwan and respond to Chinese aggression. It cannot rely on the threat of sanctions alone to change Xi’s calculus. When the United States publicly warned Putin of the enormous economic consequences he would bear if he invaded Ukraine, he did so anyway. And given China’s centrality to the global economy, imposing broad sanctions on the country will be far more complex.

The United States should coordinate a sanctions package with its allies and partners during peacetime and investigate ways to reduce its economic dependence on China. The biggest weakness of the sanctions imposed on Russia is the carveout for Russian energy, deemed necessary (at least for the first two months of the conflict) given Europe’s reliance on Russian oil and gas. The United States should make a concerted effort to develop alternative sources of materials such as rare earth minerals, which the world depends mainly on China to supply.

There is a danger that one of China’s takeaways from the conflict in Ukraine is that the United States will be unwilling to intervene militarily on Taiwan’s behalf. Thus, the United States needs to introduce a policy of strategic clarity that makes explicit it would directly come to Taiwan’s defense. Having a credible military option is essential, which will mean continuing to view Taiwan as the Department of Defense’s pacing scenario and resourcing it accordingly. The United States must also work more closely with Taiwan, establishing a robust bilateral training program to bolster Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities. It should also help Taiwan develop an asymmetric defense strategy and prioritize weapons deliveries to the island.

The U.S. intelligence community distinguished itself during the Ukraine crisis by revealing Putin’s moves before he made them and sharing this intelligence with U.S. allies, which deprived Putin of strategic surprise and helped a coalition coalesce around strong sanctions and military support. The United States should be prepared to gather and preemptively share intelligence about Chinese plans. It must act now to ensure that it understands early indicators of PLA preparations for an attack on Taiwan and be ready to share these indicators with its partners to plan a unified response before the war begins.

Given the increasing alignment between Russia and China, the United States cannot rule out that Russia would offer significant assistance to China during a conflict over Taiwan, including arms, energy, food, and intelligence. The United States should also assume Russia would seek to distract it from any fight against China by conducting cyberattacks or seeking to destabilize Europe. In their remarkable February 4 joint statement that established a “no limits” friendship, China and Russia reaffirmed “their strong mutual support for the protection of their core interests,” and Russia agreed that “Taiwan is an inalienable part of China.” China, which has backed Russia throughout the war in Ukraine, will expect to be repaid during a Taiwan conflict.

The steps that Washington and Taipei should take to bolster deterrence must be carried out carefully to avoid inadvertently sparking the conflict they seek to prevent. For starters, any stepped-up coordination with Taiwan should be done quietly and kept out of the public eye. The United States and Taiwan should focus on how to increase Taiwan’s warfighting capabilities and eschew symbolism. Privately, the United States should emphasize to China that these moves are consistent with the U.S. one-China policy and respond to the eroding balance of power in the Taiwan Strait caused by China’s military build-up. The United States should underscore that it does not support Taiwan's independence and its overriding interest is in maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.

The unfolding war in Ukraine offers important lessons for China, Taiwan, and the United States. Whichever side adapts more deftly will do much to determine whether deterrence holds or a conflict that would fundamentally alter the world arrives.

Yesterday it was even debated to move Okinawa’s unwanted US military bases to Taiwan.

 

1. Quoted in Chang Pin-tsun, "Chinese Maritime Trade: The Case of Sixteenth-Century Fu-Chien" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1983), 14.

2. For a detailed look at the intention of the maritime prohibition and its rules, see Bodo Wiethoff, Die chinesische Seeverbotspolitik und der private Überseehandel von 1368 bis 1567 (Hamburg: Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens, 1963), esp. 27–50.

3. Much ink has been spilled on the question of the Ming tribute system. An excellent early work is Wang Gung-wu's "Early Ming Relations with Southeast Asia: A Background Essay," in The Chinese World Order, ed. John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), 34–62. See the essays in The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644, Part 1, ed. Frederick W. Mote and Denis Twitchett, vol. 7 of The Cambridge History of China, ed. Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and William Atwell, "Ming China and the Emerging World Economy, c. 1470–1650," in The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644, Part 2, ed. Frederick W. Mote and Denis Twitchett, vol. 8 of The Cambridge History of China, 376–416. I have found especially useful Chang Pin-tsun's "Chinese Maritime Trade: The Case of Sixteenth-Century Fu-Chien"; and Bodo Wiethoff Die chinesische Seeverbotspolitik. J. K. Fairbank and S. Y. Teng's classic work on the Qing tribute system also contains essential information about the Ming system: J. K. Fairbank and S.Y. Teng, "On the Ch'ing Tributary System," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 6, no. 2 (1941): 135–246. An interesting article about overseas Chinese who accompanied tribute missions to China is Chan Hok-Lam, "The ‘Chinese Barbarian Officials' in the Foreign Tributary Missions to China during the Ming Dynasty," Journal of the American Oriental Society 88, no. 3 (1968): 411–18. For an argument about the effects of these prohibitions on southeastern China's economy, see William G. Skinner, "Presidential Address: The Structure of Chinese History," The Journal of Asian Studies 44, no. 2 (1985): 271–92. Skinner perhaps overemphasizes the role of Portuguese traders in reinvigorating the region's trade.

4. The Qing decision to open the seas came in 1683, after the capture of Taiwan from the Zheng regime. It was a momentous policy, causing changes throughout East and Southeast Asia.

5. This appears to have been less accurate of cultures in the far south of Taiwan and the northeast, around today's Yilan (宜蘭), where sizeable rice surpluses were produced.

6. An overview of the legal and administrative structure of the Dutch colony can be found in a brilliant article by a young Taiwanese scholar: Cheng Wei-chung 鄭維中. “Lüe lun Helan shidai Taiwan fazhi shi yu shehui zhixu” 略論荷蘭時代台灣法制史與社會秩序, Taiwan Fengwu 臺灣風物, 52(1) [2002]: 11–40. See also C. C. de Reus, "Geschichtlicher Überblick der rechtlichen Entwicklung der Niederl. Ostind. Compagnie," in Verhandelingen van het Bataviaasch Genootschap der Kunsten en Wetenschappen (Batavia: Egbert Heemen, 1894).

7. The concept "calculability" is at the heart of Max Weber's important work General Economic History, trans. Frank H. Knight (New York: Greenberg, 1927). The much-discussed Protestant Ethic is only a minor part of Weber's general theory of capitalism, which focuses on institutions and practices that impede or foster calculability.

8. Governor Nicolaes Verburch to Batavia, letter, VOC 1172: 466–91, quote at 472; cited in De Dagregisters van het Kasteel Zeelandia, Taiwan, 1629–1662 [The journals of Zeelandia Castle, Taiwan, 1629–1662], ed. Leonard Blussé, Nathalie Everts, W. E. Milde, and Ts'ao Yung-ho, 4 vols. (The Hague: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 1986–2001), 3:96–97.

9. Leonard Blussé, “No Boats to China. The Dutch East India Company and the Changing Pattern of the China Sea Trade, 1635–1690,” Modern Asian Studies 30 (1) (1996): 51–76; Leonard Blussé, “Chinese Trade to Batavia during the days of the V.O.C,” Archipel 18 (1979): 195–213. 

10. Young-tsu Wong, China's Conquest of Taiwan in the Seventeenth Century: Victory at Full Moon, 2017, pp. 111–113.

11. Leonard Blussé, “Queen among Kings: Diplomatic Ritual at Batavia,” in K. Grijns and P.J.M. Nas, eds., Jakarta-Batavia: Socio-Cultural Essays (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2000), 25–41, p. 27.

 

 

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