By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

Xi Jinping's strategic predicament and the view from Washington

Earlier, we discussed how the unfolding war in Ukraine offers essential lessons for China, Taiwan, and the United States. Whichever side adapts more deftly will do much to determine whether deterrence holds or a conflict that would fundamentally alter the world arrives.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has created a strategic predicament for his country’s response to the Russian war on Ukraine. This is not simply a matter of his personal policy choices as supreme leader. It is an outcome of an increasingly autocratic political system: Policy of any sort must serve the interests of the Chinese Communist Party, and the party’s interests are now defined and dominated by the concentrated power of the general secretary. The political logic of this regime has produced what an eminent Chinese scholar of international relations at Tsinghua University, Yan Xuetong, has recently described as “a strategic predicament for China.”

However, Yan would likely reject this Xi-centric framing. His recent Foreign Affairs article never mentions Xi and offers only thin and oblique references to domestic Chinese politics. Nonetheless, in both what he writes and, more importantly, what he does not write, Yan reveals how China’s vexed reaction to Russia’s invasion results from Xi’s outsized presence in the political system.

Yan presents the Xi-approved official version of events: The United States provoked the Russian attack by pressing NATO expansion, Washington is now escalating and prolonging the conflict with massive arms transfers to weaken both Russia and China, and the United States is so deeply committed to containment of Chinese power that it would likely not alter that stance even if Beijing cooperated against Moscow. There is no mention of China’s long-held commitment to opposing violations of any state’s territorial sovereignty. So much for the 2013 Sino-Ukraine Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.

In Yan’s account, China has pursued a careful “balancing strategy,” trying not to antagonize either the United States or Russia. Although costly, economically and diplomatically, there is, for Yan, really no alternative to this “middle path.” The implication here is that more significant strategic dynamics are at work—an inexorable international balance of power requiring China to resist coming down against Russian aggression, regardless of the negative ramifications. This is in keeping with Yan’s self-identification as an international relations realist. He believes China has attained great-power status sometimes necessitates specific actions, regardless of short-term costs. Beijing cannot support Ukraine because it must keep Moscow as at least a junior partner to counter Washington’s power globally.

To illustrate the exigencies of international power balancing, Yan invokes Mao Zedong’s foreign policy from 1958 to 1971. After the Sino-Soviet split, China faced serious threats from both the Soviet Union and the United States. Mao responded Yan writes, with the Third Front policy, defensively shifting industrial production to inland areas away from possible attack. Yan notes that this decision was an economic disaster, “causing severe commodity shortages and widespread poverty.” However, the lesson he draws from it is that China should not get “sandwiched between Washington and Moscow once again,” suggesting that the root of Maoist economic failure was an adverse global strategic environment.

 

There are at least two problems with this argument.

First, the Sino-Soviet split and attendant dual threat of both the United States and the Soviet Union were not inevitable and uncontrollable forces imposed upon China. Instead, they resulted from Mao’s ideologically motivated policy choices and party leadership. From at least 1957 onward, following the successful Sputnik launch that he saw as a sign of advanced Soviet power, Mao called for a more aggressive posture against the United States. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was more circumspect, looking the maintain “peaceful coexistence” with the West. When Mao pressed the issue in the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis, Khrushchev lost faith in Mao’s foreign-policy judgment, and the subsequent deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations ensued. The critical point here is that China was not forced to move away from the Soviet Union; Mao and the party leadership chose to do so. They decided to radicalize foreign policy and ignore the potential dangers of nuclear conflict.

A second problem with Yan’s essay is neglecting the full extent of Maoist leadership failures. The turn against the Soviet Union was co-occurring with the emergence of the horrific Great Leap Forward. The massive human-made starvation that resulted was driven by a fanatical ideology enacted by a highly centralized Leninist party dominated by Mao. While this was perhaps not his initial intention, Mao was made aware of the unfolding humanitarian disaster, but he stayed the course and let millions of people die. He paid a political price later when other party leaders finally put an end to the suffering. Still, he destroyed that same party leadership during the Cultural Revolution. From 1958-to 1971, the Third Front policy was the least of China’s problems. Much greater suffering was inflicted on the country by Mao, using the full force of the autocratic state.

It is impossible to come to an adequate understanding of the Sino-Soviet split, or other elements of Maoist-era foreign policy, without placing them in the context of domestic politics. Analysts should not make the same mistake now over China’s response to the Russian war on Ukraine.

Although there are many differences from the Maoist era, Chinese politics have, in the Xi era, become more centralized around the general secretary and more repressive of society in general. Declining economic growth and increasing social pluralism pose problems for the political legitimacy of authoritarian rule. Xi takes nothing for granted and pours money into domestic “stability maintenance,” policing internet censorship, and extreme subjugation of Uyghurs and Tibetans.

 

The view from Washington

The United States views Russia’s war on Ukraine as a pivotal episode in a global contest that pits Washington not only against Moscow but against a group of active adversaries. The two top intelligence agency heads, civilian and military, put China atop a list of four countries they viewed as effectively joined in an anti-Western crusade. China was followed by Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

“All four governments have demonstrated the capacity and intend to promote their interests … that cut against the US and allied interests,” Avril Haines, who oversees US intelligence agencies in President Joe Biden’s administration, said.

 

Director of US intelligence Avril Haines speaking before a Senate committee:

Lieutenant General Scott Berrier, director of the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency, highlighted threats that he said emanated from each country: China’s threats against Taiwan, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Iran’s proxy warfare in the Middle East, and North Korea’s presumed dangers to the Western Pacific and western American mainland.

Add to that the still-sputtering talks between Washington and Tehran, which could see sanctions reprieves for Iran returning to the Obama-era nuclear deal. There are clear signs of a faltering friendship, potentially rewriting the region’s geopolitics.

Major democratic countries have yet to take sides. Avril Haines singled out India, Indonesia, Nigeria, South Africa, and some unnamed “Global South” countries as laggards.

“Much of the world is still not with us,” said Scott Berrier. “They may not be with Russia, but they are not subscribing to our call for a global coalition of democracies.” He added, “The US still has amicable relations with them, but we have not been able to get them to join the Ukrainian cause.”

Avril Haines noted that Russia and China are trying to woo authoritarian, oil-rich United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia away from longstanding, close relations with the United States. The UAE is eyeing expanded energy and technology trade with China. As Joe Biden moved to open US strategic oil reserves, his two biggest oil-producing allies have kept their tanks firmly shut. The UAE and Saudi Arabia continue to rebuff the US president as he attempts to counter soaring oil prices prompted by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. And both countries have been unusually frank about their refusal to step in.

The intelligence chiefs expressed optimism that China would make no moves in the short term. Haines surmised that the Ukraine war might give China “less confidence” in a military outcome should Beijing invade Taiwan. Beijing “obviously will be looking at the unified allied approaches to Ukraine, including an array of economic sanctions,” Beijing “obviously will be looking at in the context of Taiwan,” she added. “The intelligence agencies have not assessed that the Russia-Ukraine crisis is accelerating their plan vis-a-vis Taiwan,” Haines concluded.

Senators pressed Haines and Berrier to lay out their expectations about the future course of the Ukraine war, which is almost three months old. The Biden administration had predicted it would end with a Russian victory within a few weeks. That made some lawmakers skeptical about official predictions. Berrier said the war had reached a stalemate. Haines said the conflict would become more and more “unpredictable” but played down the likelihood that Putin would order the use of nuclear weapons to crush resistance.

The future depends on Russia’s immediate strategy, Berrier said. “If Russia doesn’t declare war and mobilize, the stalemate will continue for a while,” he said. On the other hand, if Russia intensifies its ground assault, “That would bring thousands more soldiers … and a whole lot more ammunition to the fight.”

From the testimony, it was unclear who has more to fear from the outcome: the West, if Ukraine is defeated, or China, if its nominal ally Russia is routed. And much less did anyone probe how China might react if Russia should find itself in danger of defeat or whether Beijing would help if Moscow requested weapon supplies to fill depleted stocks.

China’s top diplomat, Yang Jiechi, yesterday warned US national security adviser Jake Sullivan on Wednesday that the United States was “on the wrong path” regarding Taiwan and that its moves could lead to “dangerous situations.”

 

 

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