By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

Ukraine nuclear strike aimed at shock?

Already in February, Putin implied a nuclear attack if the West interfered in Ukraine, whereby today, analysts believe Russia may wish to inflict significant material damage on its adversaries; secondly, the nuclear strikes are aimed at inducing an element of psychological shock.

Ramzan Kadyrov, the Moscow-backed leader of the Russian region of Chechnya, said in a Telegram post, calling for a change in strategy. Ukraine's military chief, Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, there is a "direct threat" that Russia could resort to using tactical nuclear weapons, which could drag other powers into a "limited" nuclear conflict that could expand into "World War III." Would Russia go nuclear in response to setbacks on the battlefield?

Gerhard Mangott, a University of Innsbruck professor of international relations who focuses on U.S.-Russian relations, said this isn't the first time Putin has made such threats. Whereby indeed, Russia on Tuesday told the UN that they could end up using nuclear weapons in response to “direct aggression” by western countries.

Speaking last week, US president Joe Biden said any use by Putin of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Ukraine – for example, by exploding a low-yield, tactical nuclear warhead – would “change the face of war.” Russia would become “more of a pariah in the world than they ever have been,” he said.

 

Yet even as he warned the US response would be “consequential,” Biden refused to say whether it would involve commensurate US or Nato military action. His remarks suggested he had not personally raised the nuclear issue with Russia’s leader. This renewed angst about WMD reflected Putin's trap for the west when he launched his invasion. By placing Russia’s nuclear forces on high alert, deploying nuclear-capable missiles closer to Nato states, and targeting Chornobyl and then the giant Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, he and flunkeys such as Dmitry Medvedev deliberately played up fears of Armageddon. They hoped to weaken backing for Kyiv and deter direct Nato intervention.

It has worked so far. The US and Nato walked into the trap from the get-go. While supplying Ukraine with ever-increasing amounts of arms and materiel, Biden and his allies continue to limit the power, range, and quality of such weapons to ensure Putin’s position is not so weakened that he turns to extreme measures.

There has been endless speculation that Russia might use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. That concern is justified because Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly mentioned their use. Since saying something can indicate intent or simply be a bluff, there is a reason for scrutiny. Either way, a discussion of nuclear weapons is in order.

The first task is to define the two essential classes of nuclear weapons: the strategic and the tactical. They differ in size, of course, although this is not as significant as it might appear. There are tactical nuclear weapons with power more significant than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. There are others whose yield is not much more significant than a large artillery round.

The real distinction is the mission. Strategic weapons are designed to render the opposing nation unable or unwilling to resist by destroying its critical infrastructure and at least significant elements of its population. Tactical nuclear weapons are designed to add additional force to battles limited in scope and fought for limited intents. A strategic nuclear attack on Ukraine would involve nuclear strikes on major cities, production facilities, and transport. It would intend to render Ukraine unable to function rapidly. A tactical nuclear attack would destroy Ukrainian forces engaged in battle with conventional Russian forces. Both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons are intended to defeat the enemy. Still, strategic weapons intend definitive destruction of the enemy nation, while tactical weapons intend to defeat more limited forces and hope to compel capitulation on a particular battlefield. The size of the nuclear weapon required for this could vary and might be larger than the Hiroshima bomb, yet it still could be considered a tactical nuclear weapon. Again, it is not the weapon’s size but its mission that draws the line.

The United States developed tactical nuclear weapons in the 1960s. They aimed to deter or defeat a potential Soviet armored thrust into West Germany. The theory was that U.S. forces would withdraw from the front for several miles, and then the large-scale Soviet thrust would be annihilated by a tactical nuke. Since tactical nuclear weapons were expected to have limited fallout, U.S. armor could move forward through the gap(s).

Of course, massed artillery at the same distance could achieve the same end. The tactical nuclear weapon problem was intended to solve the inevitable inaccuracy of conventional weapons. An artillery piece had to know the precise location of its target as it fired and then be able to hit it. This is difficult enough on its own, but the time between firing and impact complicated the mission, as the target could avoid the strike simply in the context of normal maneuvering. Moreover, Soviet counter-battery fire would likely descend, requiring rapid redeployment and making a second round impossible.

Tactical nuclear weapons overcame this problem by having a wider radius of destruction, though not too large, or it would put the firing platform at risk. Other shortcomings include the blinding effect of a nuclear detonation on both sides, the (limited) radiation zone, and the coming world of hurt as enemy aircraft came in to destroy the atomic launcher. Tactical nuclear weapons would paint a target for the Soviets in solving one problem.

The development of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) made the tactical nuclear weapon even less helpful. During Desert Storm, a Tomahawk cruise missile fired from a U.S. ship could hit a Baghdad building’s third floor, the second building from the right. (This happened.) Initial guidance came from GPS, then TERCOM (or terrain contour matching). A picture of the ground and terminal point would be fed into the missile’s computer along with directional instructions, allowing it to eliminate the accuracy problems that tactical nukes were trying to solve and to do so without necessarily creating a threat to its troops.

PGMs, both in artillery shells and longer-range missiles, meant that fire could be laid down as needed without a saturation attack. And the range they could achieve meant that the launch mechanism was not necessarily in danger after firing. In Ukraine, PGMs of various sorts are being used by both sides. In the early part of the war, anti-tank missiles destroyed Russian tanks. The Ukrainians were more widely dispersed, and even a tactical nuclear weapon would have had minimal effect. As that is now changing, the use of tactical nuclear weapons is conceivable, but the Russians have other means to achieve similar outcomes.

The need for an area kill weapon has made the tactical nuke much less compelling, with frequent collateral damage on its side. It has never been used in many wars since the tactical nuclear weapon was introduced. This is due not to sentiment but utility. The utility of large strategic nuclear weapons seems to be intact, but there are more effective ways to destroy targets without saturating the area. Of course, there is also the psychological effect of using them. But the tactical use of nuclear weapons always has political costs and raises questions about how the United States, always unpredictable, would react.

 

 

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