By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

The speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament made a vibrant plea Yesterday for his country to be named a candidate for European Union membership, a move that would bring the war-torn nation closer to the EU without guaranteeing its admittance.

Ruslan Stefanchuk, chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, told EU lawmakers that failing to give Ukraine a sign of an open door would be a clear signal to Russian President Vladimir Putin that “he can be totally going forward without any punishment.”

Below Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian parliament) Ruslan Stefanchuk, center, delivers a speech at the European Parliament, Wednesday, June 8, 2022, in Strasbourg, eastern France;

Hence this summer, the 27 member states of the European Union will have to make a historic decision: how to formulate their answer to Ukraine’s application in February to become a member of the bloc. Although they’ve been less in the spotlight, Moldova and Georgia also knock on the EU’s door. Like Kyiv, Chisinau and Tbilisi hope to finally get an unequivocal statement from Brussels about their path to EU membership.

The European Commission is on the applicants’ side—especially Ukraine’s. In February, commission President Ursula von der Leyen famously pronounced that Ukraine is “one of us, and we want them in the European Union.” While most power in the EU isn’t located in Brussels—it’s the national capitals and their representatives in the European Council that make the critical decisions—the commission is expected to recommend an official membership perspective for the three applicants. What sounds like a bureaucratic formality with an uncertain outcome is highly consequential. In Ukraine’s case, an official designation as an EU candidate—or even the second-class status of a potential candidate—would send a strong message of support; open a path to eventual membership in the bloc, however distant; and make abundantly clear to Moscow that the EU has no intention of giving in to the Kremlin’s claims to control Ukraine.

That said, there is no realistic path for the trio to become members, no matter what the commission decides quickly. Even an actual candidacy for membership with its formulated path for accession—in essence, a long to-do list for various reforms that align a candidate’s laws, economy, and governance with EU norms—would not guarantee anything except a long transition period, as Turkey’s candidate status since 1999 can attest. The upgrade to so-called potential candidate status currently seems most realistic for Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia.

That full-fledged candidate status isn’t in the cards was first disclosed by Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi, who said in late May that most of the more prominent European Union members are against such a fast track to membership negotiations. “The status of EU candidate for Ukraine is objected to by almost all the major states of the union,” Draghi said. “I would say all of them, excluding Italy.” But while the category of only a potential candidate falls short of formal candidacy, even having lesser status would open the door to negotiations in the not-too-distant future. It is also a step up from their current designation as associated partners—in essence, friendly neighbors that enjoy unique relations with the EU.

At first glance, the status of potential EU candidacy may not sound like much. It would put the three countries on par with Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Kosovo, which are not exactly on a fast track to membership. It would be less than Ukraine and its supporters in the commission want, placing it behind current membership candidates Turkey and Serbia, which has been an EU candidate since 2012. The latter two countries’ paths away from the EU’s democratic norms over the last 20 years mean that their membership aspirations may never materialize.

Notwithstanding these uncertainties, even potential candidate status would mean much for Ukraine and the other two aspirants. It would formally ratify their European aspirations, which the European Commission and Parliament have publicly and repeatedly acknowledged. In March, the European Council, where member states make their decisions, released a statement that Ukraine belonged to “our European family.” However, it failed to say whether that implies future membership. The shift of Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova from mere “associated” countries—a status reserved for the EU’s partners around the world—to potential accession states and its various formal mechanisms of alignment with the bloc has not only symbolic significance but also geopolitical, legal, economic, and psychological significance. It would give the three aspirants a direction for domestic reforms and geopolitical alignment.

The three countries’ status as potential or even proper EU candidates would shift the geopolitics of Eastern Europe. The current gray zone between the West and Russia (with its satellites, Belarus and Armenia) would become a little less gray. To be sure, only the entire EU and NATO membership would secure the Eastern European geopolitical space. But by giving the three aspirants an official membership perspective, the EU would send a strong signal of where the train is headed.

A membership path would also provide important carrots and sticks with which the West can speed up Eastern Europe’s transition and ensure the region’s future stability. That’s because membership is conditioned on compliance with EU standards, including regulations, legal rights, trade in goods and services, transparency, and democratic governance. Future accession is thus an effective instrument for Brussels—and for reform-minded leaders in the three countries—to overcome local resistance by vested interests, immobile bureaucrats, and other opponents of reform.

The recent experience of integrating other Eastern European countries—the bulk of which only joined the EU in 2004—would set the agenda for the coming years, including knowledge transfers, institutional support, and financial assistance. Several institutions and mechanisms created by Brussels to prepare the Western Balkan countries for accessions, such as the Center for Security Cooperation and the Center of Excellence in Finance, could easily be expanded to include Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova.

 

 

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