By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

How the Ukrainian Battlefield Redefines the World

The war in Ukraine is a humanitarian tragedy, to be sure, but that’s not why it has commanded the world’s attention. 

After all, there are humanitarian crises taking place in Yemen, Syria, and other countries as we write this. From a geopolitical perspective, the war is potentially a watershed moment – that is, if European politico-military unity endures, creating a new model of Europe and redefining the functioning of the global system. A secondary issue is whether China’s view of the world will change too as it either seeks a new understanding with the United States or becomes more estranged from it.

The Russians have fought a surprisingly poor war so far in Ukraine, especially when you consider their goals: to secure Ukraine as a buffer from the West and demonstrates Russian power as a force to be reckoned with. So far, the war has done the opposite. In some cases, this is surmountable: In Afghanistan, Iraq and Vietnam, for example, the United States failed to impose its will and was seen by some as a power in decline. The difference is that those countries were not essential to American security. Ukraine is vital to Russia.

So now Russia is looking for reinforcements from Syria, Belarus, the Wagner Group, and so on. Even if Moscow finds willing participants, it takes time to transport troops, familiarize them with the battlefield, and insert them in the combat structure. And even if Moscow succeeds in doing all these things, it still portends a long and drawn-out conflict. 

To many observers, the need to recruit foreign troops indicate a failure of Russian commanders, a weakness in training and motivating troops, and logistical problems.

If Russia wanted to create a sense in Europe that it could invade at will – something it likely would not have done, but something that would have potentially caused Europe to find an accommodation with Moscow or reconsider its relationship with the U.S., just in case – it has failed. For now, at least, it has brought the United States and Europe closer than before. The continued combat and the brutality that Russia now seems to think are required to defeat Ukraine only galvanizes it more. It’s hard to think of an outcome for Russia, short of using weapons of mass destruction, that leaves the West worried about Russia as as a significant threat.

And that’s not just because of Russia’s poor performance on the battlefield. Great power status is partly military and partly economic. Russia’s gross domestic product in 2001 was $1.6 trillion, ranked 11th globally, just behind South Korea. Since then, Russia has limped from volatile energy prices, the 2008 financial crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and now crippling sanctions in response to its invasion. In other words, it can no longer be considered an economic power. And this changed our understanding of the world, where Russia was considered a great power due to its military force, accepting a weak economy. 

Weeks before the war began, China sought an alliance with Russia because it needed friends because of the massive U.S. alliance structure running from Japan to India. As we have mentioned, China has no significant allies save Pakistan. China knew it could not provide economic support to Russia – it had its problems to manage – but at the very least, China needed some relief, which it hoped to achieve by harnessing Russian military power to force the United States and Europe to recalculate the threat that sanctions against it poses.

Aside from the military aspect, Russia benefitted from the possibility of financial support from China, or at least the impression to lenders that China was backing the Russian economy. Russia’s ability to contribute significant force to a Chinese battlefield was limited, as was China’s willingness to adopt a weak Russian economy. The alliance had the power to instill fears in those they wanted to be afraid.

The alliance is still rhetorically there, but the possibility of actual support is not. Russia has already been damaged by economic actions from the United States and its allies. China cannot afford to be caught in Russia’s trap at this economic juncture. Any military support would run afoul of sanctions. Put simply, Russia is a liability to China.

Beijing’s decision to announce its alliance with Russia, we suspect, was based on knowledge of Russia’s invasion. This made an alliance attractive to China when it believed Russia was capable of a quick and easy victory, one that would, in theory, force the West to reconsider How the Ukrainian Battlefield Redefines the World er their position on a China that could, maybe, replicate the Russian strategy. 

Russia’s incompetence has forced China to do everything it can to recoup, and thus it needs to reconsider its relationship with the U.S. It is in a severe economic downturn. Its alliance with Russia hasn’t borne any fruit, nor is it likely to. The United States and Europe have developed a model of economic warfare that would seem highly damaging if applied to China. China’s short-term strategy, then, is to appear confident, maintaining its rhetorical support for Russia and criticizing the U.S. while it considers its next move. 

Notably, Taiwan isn’t the next move. China has seen firsthand that wars can go wrong and thus that an invasion of Taiwan is something to avoid now. 

Suppose we think about the world’s great powers, normally list the United States, Europe, and Russia. Russia will have a problem claiming something like that unless it does something startlingly effective. Europe is a great power if it sticks together militarily and economically. It is doing that now, but old tensions will emerge as fear of Russia dissipates. China is still a great power, albeit with an untested military and a troubled economy. For now, the United States alone remains great economically and militarily.

 

America’s Broken Supply Chains

 

Shipping backlogs, labor shortages, and low inventories are persistent issues.

More than two years after the world first learned of COVID-19, U.S. (and other) supply chains are still experiencing severe problems. Prolonged public health interventions, repeatedly loosened and then tightened with each subsequent a variant of the virus, disrupted the movement of finished goods and raw materials, seriously hampering manufacturing.

With production slowing significantly, many experts expected demand would also decline. Instead, demand for services shifted toward durable goods like motor vehicles, recreational equipment and furniture. This overwhelmed the U.S. ports and strained the availability of shipping containers, driving up freight rates.

Shifting demand patterns also stretched the labor market to its limits. Lingering fears about the virus, inflation and heightened economic uncertainty, a bump in early retirements, disruptions to family life, frustration, and fatigue among many in the hospitality sector, and myriad other factors combined to slow the economic recovery.

 

 

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