By Eric Vandenbroeck and
co-workers
Osama bin Laden and suicide bombers
In our Global Jihad
study besides and in-depth historical overview, we also presented sufficient evidence to conclude
that Al Qaeda and its guiding ideology where the primary drivers of the
globalization of Suicide Jihadism. In addition we also inferred four issues
concerning Suicide Jihadism:
- No Mental Illness.
Suicide bombers are not mentally ill.
- No general profile
of suicide attackers could be established. Suicide attackers have been male and
female, younger and older, richer and poorer, single and married (some with
children), as well as employed and unemployed. Some suicide attackers have engaged
in petty crime, while others have not.Some appear to
have had a difficult childhood, while others have grown up under seemingly
solid circumstances.
-Suicide attackers
are not necessarily religious. While it is true that most suicide attackers,
kill and die in the name of Islam, many suicide bombers do not seem to have a
religious background per se. Though some have grown up in a religious
environment, most appear not to have led a pious lifestyle. Although their
transformation is akin to a conversion to a born-again-Muslim, complete with
profound changes in behavior and lifestyle.
-We have shown that
social bonds, including friendship and kinship ties, appear as one of the
dominant factors in the radicalization of suicide bombers, including the
decision of an individual to become a suicide bomber, and that social kinship
ties, are an important part of the process.
It remained unclear,
however, exactly how that crisis of identity translates into the desire to
become a suicide bomber, and we will shed light on this question.
We also, have argued
that individuals and groups - the two units without which a suicide attack
would not take place - are influenced by their external environment. An
analysis of the external environment is by definition complex, as the external
environment includes a wide range of possible factors that may affect the
preferences and choices of individuals and groups, including the economic,
political, social, cultural, historical, and/or religious context. In our
previous overview of Jihadism we also focused on the level of the
individual, the group, and the larger environment, yet in our next concluding
overview will particularly focus on the fourth and most important
aspect--the ideology. To be more precise, as we will see ideology helps the
suicide bomber articulate (a)the justification for his act; and (b) it helps
shape the mental framework of the attacker; and (c) it helps the suicide
attacker to morally disengage from his act and from the victim.
a. Justifying the
act: Ideology helps the suicide attacker justify the act by articulating why
this act is called for, and why every ‘true’ Muslim must participate in it. The
ideology describes - and statements by suicide bombers reflect - the need to defend
Islam from attack as an individual duty for each and every Muslim; the
participation in jihad as the ultimate proof of one’s worthiness as a Muslim;
and the failure to participate in jihad as an act of heresy.
b. Shaping the mental
framework of the attacker: Ideology shapes the mental framework of the suicide
attacker by constantly repeating the West’s real or perceived infractions
against Islam. This tend to employ conspiracy theories to further incite fear and
hatred of the West. These conspiracy theories may involve a gross exaggeration
of real infractions (f.ex. accusing the United States
of killing many more civilians in a military operation than have actually been
killed), or a fabrication of lies (f.ex., accusing
the White House or Mossad of being behind 9/11). These conspiracy theories are
often designed to deflect blame from Muslims (f.ex.
blaming the West, as opposed to Osama bin Laden, for 9/11), thus portraying
Muslims as victims. This ongoing victimization of Muslims - has created a siege
mentality among some Muslims, who have accepted the notion that they are under
consistent attack and humiliation.
c. Moral
disengagement. Ideology is a key tool used to morally disengage suicide
attackers from their deeds, as well as from their victims. Processes of moral
disengagement, for instance, often involve the creation of in-groups and
out-groups.
Salafi-Jihadist
ideology helps creating this dichotomy of good-vs-evil by dividing the world
into ‘true’ Muslims on one hand, and kuffar on the other. Dehumanization of the
enemy is another mechanism of moral disengagement. As we will demonstrate
Suicide-Jihadism often dehumanizes the enemy—whether it is the West,
Christians, Jews, or the Shia, the enemy is regarded as defiled, degenerate,
bereft of any sense of decency, unjust, and cruel.
Further we will also
show, that different suicide bombers are likely to be influenced by a
combination of motivations to conduct a suicide attack. Motivations are
distinct from ideology. An ideology is better understood as a tool that
provides mental preparation, support, and justification for suicide attackers
to perpetrate an attack. Ideology helps explain ‘how’ suicide bombers are able
to perpetrate attacks. Motivations, on the other hand, are those factors that
lead the attacker to kill and die. They are the reasons ‘why’ suicide bombers
kill and die. The cases studied here suggest that the following motivations are
particularly salient among globalized suicide attackers:
a. Revenge.
Statements and wills of the bombers examined here reflect an intense desire to
exact revenge upon the enemy by inflicting upon him the same pain that he has
allegedly inflicted on the bomber’s brethren. Revenge is perhaps the single
most important motive for a person to become a suicide bomber.
b. Restoring honor
and manhood. As statements across the board suggest, suicide bombers appear to
sense that they need to perpetrate a suicide attack in order to restore their
honor and, by extension, the honor of an Islam that has been subjected to repeated
humiliation by the West over centuries and up to the present time. Related to
this, many bombers seem to believe that perpetrating a suicide bombing is a
manly deed - a belief that is exploited by the leadership of the various
groups, which often appeal to Muslims to be “real men” and defend the honor of
Islam.
c. Commitment: A
strong commitment to the cell or larger group appears as a frequent motive for
suicide attackers. Commitment to one’s kin, a small social group, or larger
community - which in some cases may be explained by primordial bonds - is
intensified, in the case of globalized suicide attacks, by a shared sense of
victimization. The Internet plays a crucial role in providing a sense of
brotherhood, a sense of solidarity, belonging, pride, and empowerment to
suicide bombers. It is partly as a result of the Internet that the new pattern
of globalized suicide attacks exhibits a large number of cases where grievances
are visceral, rather than personally experienced. Occupation, therefore, must
not have been personally experienced by a suicide bomber in order for him or
her to feel humiliated enough to seek a drastic action.
d. Martyr’s benefits.
Statements and wills we have examined strongly suggest that suicide bombers
believe that by becoming a martyr, they will reap a number of benefits. They
firmly believe that the act of martyrdom is a service to God, and pleasing to Him.
Because of their willingness to sacrifice their lives in the service of God,
they believe that God rewards the martyr by washing away all of the martyr’s
sins. Furthermore, the martyr enjoys the benefits of paradise, a reservation
for scores of his or her family members in heaven, and a wedding to the huris (black-eyed virgins) of paradise. Although the
possibility of sexual motivations driving male suicide attackers is sometimes
dismissed by researchers, statements made by the bombers, as evidenced here,
are replete with references to the women of paradise.
While this fact, in itself, does not prove that suicide bombers die and kill
for sexual pleasure, it is nevertheless clear that sponsoring groups
continuously promise these rewards to would-be-bombers. And yet, it is fair to
assume that these groups would not consistently preach the rewards of paradise
if they would not believe that these promises would not resonate at some level
with would-be-bombers. That said, there is no evidence suggesting that the
benefits of sexual pleasures are either a necessary or a sufficient factor for
a person to become a suicide bomber.
Also, on hand of the
evidence examined, we will be able to proof following six:
1) Varying Degrees of
Ties to Al Qaeda. The extent of the various groups’ ties to the Al Qaeda core
leadership varies from case to case. That said, however, all groups examined
here appear to be influenced by the strategic message relayed by Al Qaeda’s core
leadership (especially Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri). This is in
contrast to groups such as the LTTE, PKK, Hizballah, and the various
Palestinian organizations - groups that have been categorized as traditional
groups - who do not seem to be directly influenced or inspired by Al Qaeda’s
strategic message.
2) Fluid
organizational attachments. Increasingly, it appears that the attachment of
suicide bombers to their organizations is fluid, when compared to the 1990s.
Increasingly, suicide bombers are not recruited by an organization, but often
reach the decision to become human bombs themselves, and then seek out a link
to a sponsor who can enable them to do this. The identity of the group may be
less important for some volunteers than the group’s ability to help the
volunteer realize his dream of being a suicide bomber. Increasingly, however,
these groups are Salafi-Jihadist in nature.
3) Bottom-up and
Virtual Recruitment. Related to the above point, the case studies examined
confirm that recruitment occurs increasingly from the bottom up, rather than
from the top down. Several individuals have attempted to, and some have
succeeded in, joining jihad elsewhere, before ending up as a suicide bomber in
Iraq. This strongly suggests that these individuals regard jihad as an
initiative that transcends national borders, but also that these individuals
are willing, and in many cases eager, to die. Kinship and friendship ties, as
has been seen, also plays a role in the recruitment and radicalization of
suicide bombers. The predominant bottom-up nature of today’s recruitment for
globalized suicide attacks, however, does not suggest that the group (as
opposed to the individual) is irrelevant in the mobilization towards suicide
attacks. On the contrary, most videotapes examined here serve as recruitment
tools by portraying suicide bombers as heroes and the sponsoring group as
fearless and powerful, and hence as an entity to be respected, emulated, and
supported. The Internet has helped spread such recruitment videos instantly to
individuals all over the world.
4) Small-group
characteristics. In addition to the larger, sponsoring group or organization,
the dynamics within the small group or cell are of key importance. Individuals
in cells undergo a process of intensive radicalization that, as is most clearly
evident in the case of the London bombers, provides emotional benefits to its
members, including a sense of belonging, purpose, and shared destiny.
Preparation in cells - especially when consisting of friends - appears to
strengthen the resolve to carry out suicide attacks. Suicide bombers are rarely
alone in their last moments, but surrounded by friends, who provide
psychological support until shortly before the attack.
5) Growing Role of
the Internet. The role of the Internet as a tool for the organization in
casing, information-gathering and sharing, planning, recruiting,
indoctrinating, training, and fundraising terrorist operations has become
critical, and is likely to continue to grow in importance.
6) Tactical and
Strategic Aspects of Suicide Attacks. Information examined suggests that the
reasons why groups employ suicide attacks can be usefully divided into tactical
and strategic aspects.
a. Tactical
Advantages. The tactical advantages of suicide attacks is one of the most
striking continuities in the employment of suicide attacks since 1981. Suicide
operations are cost-effective, highly lethal, and the most accurate weapons
available.
Their use requires
little planning, yet suicide attacks are among the most shocking and
awe-inspiring tactics possible. Hence, the ratio between benefits and costs of
suicide attacks is enormous. In addition, suicide attacks help present the
group as fearless and determined. They draw attention to the group’s cause
because this modus operandi compounds the media effect. In sum, these
straightforward tactical benefits of suicide attacks are one of the main
reasons why groups employ SAs.
b. Strategic Reasons.
Suicide attacks, like other tactics, are employed for various strategic
reasons. In the cases under examination here, these reasons included punishment
and intimidation of a country for certain policies; isolation of an enemy;
attempts to drive a wedge between a regime and its population; creating
economic harm to a country; delegitimizing a new political order; but also an
ideological belief in the necessity to wage war against a demonized enemy.
Suicide attacks are particularly useful as a weapon intended to send strategic
signals to a number of audiences because of the devastation it wreaks, and
because its targets often appear helpless in their attempts to defend against
this weapon.
7) Indoctrination and
Incitement. Ideology again, enables individuals to perpetratethe
act of killing and dying by helping to articulate the justification for the
act; by shaping the mental framework of the attacker; and by helping the
suicide attacker to morally disengage from his act and from the victim. In
supplying this ideology and otherwise strengthening the resolve of the suicide
attacker - i.e., through indoctrination and incitement - the group plays a
crucial part in the process of readying the individual for the attack.
Finally then, we also
will discuss implications and policy recommendations.
For those who have
read our overview presented in World Jihad, it comes as no surprise that
the global rise of suicide attacks has been on a steady rise. Based on a
dataset compiled by the National Security Studies Center (NSSC) of the
University of Haifa, Arie Perliger and Ami Pedahzur
concluded that a total of 986 SAs have been perpetrated between 1981 and
2005. In the first decade after the first SA against the Iraqi embassy in
Beirut in December 1981, 51 suicide attacks were conducted - the majority in Lebanon
and Sri Lanka. Over the next five years, the average yearly number of SAs
doubled, with nearly the same number of attacks (53) perpetrated in only half
the number of years, from 1991 to 1995.Beginning in 2001 and until 2005, the
number of SAs per year increased consistently. 65 attacks were carried out in
2001 and 71 in 2002. Beginning in 2003, SAs in Iraq would substantially
increase the number of these attacks per year. 89 attacks were carried out in
2003 and 166 in 2004. The number more than doubled in 2005, with at least 375
suicide attacks, the vast majority of which were carried out in Iraq. As a
result of the rising number of attacks, the number of people killed by SAs has
risen sharply between 1981 and 2005. Significantly, every year since 2002, the
fatalities have risen by a larger percentage - by 71% between 2002 and 2003,
84% between 2003 and 2004, and by 89% between 2004 and 2005. Of the 986 suicide
attacks between 1981 and 2005, nearly half were carried out in Iraq. Where
Israel is the second most frequently targeted country, with 178 attacks
since1981.47 attacks were carried out in Lebanon, mostly against Israeli
targets, and 37 attacks took place in Russia. (Source: Suicide Terrorism
Database, NSSC, Haifa University)
It must be assumed
that not all suicide attacks that occur in Iraq are reported in the press,
which tends to report mostly on attacks occurring in the larger cities.
Furthermore, between 1981 and 1994, there were usually between one or two
countries attacked in any given year, but never more than four. In 1995, there
was a spike to 7 countries attacked by suicide attacks. Between 1996 and 1999,
relatively few countries - between three and six - suffered from SAs. Beginning
in 2000, the number of countries in which SAs occurred has risen sharply to at
least 9 countries (in 2000 and 2002) attacked per year to 15 countries attacked
in 2004 and 2005.Attacks in a given country, however, are not necessarily
directed against targets of that country. As of 2005, SAs have been carried out
in 39 countries on five continents. This modus operandi literally spans nearly
the entire globe. The global spread of SAs lies in two related and mutually
reinforcing phenomena, namely the rise of Al Qaeda and the rise of its guiding
ideology - Salafi-Jihadism.
As we have seen, Al
Qaeda’s establishment is connected to the nine-year long Afghan war against the
Soviet Union. The idea of Al Qaeda was conceived around 1988, partly due to the
desire to organize the records of foreign Muslim, mostly Arab, fighters who
joined the Afghan mujahideen’s battle against the Red Army. These foreign
fighters would be known as ‘Afghan Arabs.’ The idea to turn Al Qaeda into a
base for future jihad was raised after the Soviet withdrawal in 1988, with the
publication of The Solid Base, an article by Abdullah Azzam, the co-founder of
Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden’s mentor. In that article, Azzam laid out his
vision to establish Al Qaeda as a vanguard for the new Islamic society he
envisioned. (“The Solid Base,” as quoted in Reuven Paz, "The Brotherhood
of Global Jihad," Project for the Research of Islamist Movement, PRISM,
October 2001). See also:
Salafism in turn, or salafiyya, is an Islamic trend that developed in the late
19th century as a movement that strove to reform Islam and help it meet the
challenge of Western colonization. Early Salafis were not opposed to modernity,
and instead attempted to reconcile what modernity had to offer with the
traditions of Islam. Following World War II, and under the influence of Saudi
Wahhabism and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the reformist outlook that had
shaped early Salafism was increasingly sidelined by a Salafism more concerned
with the struggle against colonialism.
At present, a variety
of Salafi groups exist, each claiming to be the only true heirs of Allah’s program,
as conveyed by his messenger, Muhammad, and as practiced by him and his
messengers - known as the ‘ancient ones,’ or salaf.
Salafis adopt a strict implementation of Islamic religious law, and their
doctrine centers around a far more literal understanding of the concept of
tawhid (the unity of God) than does that of ordinary Muslims. For Salafis, the
unity of God - a concept which all Muslims believe in - extends to the belief
that all man-made laws must be rejected as an interference with the word and
will of God. Salafis therefore reject the division of religion and state, which
would suggest that man-made laws are supreme to those of Islam. In order to
abide by and protect tawhid, Salafis believe that Muslims must strictly follow
the Quran and emulate the model of the prophet Muhammad, who, as the Muslim
exemplar, embodied the perfection of tawhid. Salafis believe that only the salaf - the Prophet himself and his ancient companions -
led a lifestyle that was in accordance with God’s will and hence pleasing to
him. Only by emulating that lifestyle can Muslims reverse the decline of Islam.
While ordinary Salafis believe that God’s word should be spread by da’wa alone
- the non-violent call to Islam by proselytizing - Salafi-Jihadists, a
sub-category of Salafis - advocate waging violent jihad. There are four main
points of contention between Salafis and Salafi-jihadists.
First, unlike
Salafis, Salafi-Jihadists give priority to jihad, elevating it to the same
level as the five pillars of Islam. Second, Salafi-Jihadists engage in takfir,
the process of labelling fellow Muslims infidels (kufr), thus justifying
violence against them. Third, Salafi-Jihadists justify the targeting of
civilians, and fourth, they justify the use of suicide operations. Even though
theological justifications for SAs are largely absent from the Salafi-Jihadist
discourse, Salafi-Jihadists nevertheless believe that suicide operations
against infidels and apostates - shorthand for non-Muslim infidels and
nominally Muslim traitors—are the ultimate form of devotion to God and the best
way to wage jihad. They present jihad and self-sacrifice as the antithesis to
everything that the West stands for, and hence repeat the mantra that “the West
loves life, while true Muslims love death.” In the words of Abu Ayman
al-Hilali, a key interpreter of bin Laden’s ideas on Salafi-Jihadist web sites:
“First we have to acknowledge a basic fact, proved by experience and reality,
already acknowledged by the enemy, which is that the vital contradiction to the
Zionist and American enemy is the doctrine of Jihad and Martyrdom (Istishhad).”As will be seen, Salafi-Jihadist preachers such
as Abu Hamza al-Mazri or Omar Bakri Muhammad help
inspire thousands of Muslim youth to develop a cult-like relationship to
martyrdom in mosques. Other preachers are active on the Internet, such as
Yussuf al-Ayeri, a key strategist of the mujahideen
in Iraq, who died in a shootout in Saudi Arabia in 2003. References to the
benefits presumably awaiting the martyr in paradise are cited systematically.
Since Islam forbids the taking of one’s own life, Salafi-Jihadists draw a
conceptual distinction between suicide and ‘martyrdom,’ arguing that ordinary
suicides kill themselves for personal reasons, such as distress or depression,
while true martyrs die for the sake of God and the Muslim community.
Thus, Salafi-Jihadism
is not a religion per se, but rather an ideology. It is composed of an
internally coherent system of beliefs, prescribes strict codes of behavior,
presents a clear diagnosis of the causes responsible for the predicaments of
its adherents, identifies its enemies, and prescribes clear steps to be taken
to remedy the problem. Like other ideologies, it is an outgrowth of modernity -
a negative effect of the industrialization that has swept through Europe
beginning in the 19th century. It is intimately linked to the dislocating and
turbulent effects of globalization, as rapid changes in the social, political,
and economic realms of life are turning established and rooted notions of
identity provided by traditional social structures upside down. Like other
ideologies such as fascism or communism, Salafi-Jihadism gives individuals a
new sense of identity by offering individuals a membership to a supranational
entity. A new sense of belonging to a new community is provided to individuals
who are confused by modernization. That community is the umma, the Muslim
community of believers, which embodies and provides a sense of comfort,
dignity, security, and identity to the downtrodden Muslim.
As Jason Burke has
noted, the real power of bin Laden’s discourse is that, like Marxism, it
explains a personal experience by reference to a convincing general theory and
then provides a comprehensible programme of action.”
( Burke, Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam , 286.) Many Muslim youth
protest the Islam of their parents, and adopt a more radical Islamic lifestyle
as a form of protest. Meanwhile, Salafi-Jihadist preachers exploit the
dislocating effects of the youth’s breach with the parents andtraditional
religion. Immigration of many Muslims to Europe - and the failure to integrate
them properly - has created ghettoes on
the margins of Western societies populated in large part by unemployed youth.
These neighborhoods allow youth to rationalize a sense of marginalization and
loss of identity. Islam offers an alternative identity to them as well as a
chance to earn respect among their peers. Muslims from various walks of life
find a new comfort, community, and discipline in the Salafi movement.
Converts feel alone,
writes French sociologist Farhad Khosrokhavar, but by
converting to Islam, they join a new humanity that provides them with
obligations and rights. Converts can now feel actively committed to an extended
community of over a billion Muslim men and women. (Khosrokhavar,
Suicide Bombers, 208.) Converts to Islam are particularly prone to adopt
violence because of an inverse racism, Khosrokhavar
adds. Not fully accepted among Muslims, they are overzealous, attempting to
prove to themselves and others that they truly belong to the Muslim ummah.
“Showing your willingness to die for Islam is a good way to prove that.”
(Ibid., 211.)
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