By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers
By mid-2003, the
center of gravity of global jihadist indoctrination shifted to Saudi Arabia, which
became a new epicenter of Salafi-Jihadism. The radicalization of a group of
younger Saudi Islamists, which challenged the older generations of Saudi
Wahhabism, gave way to increasingly vocal condemnations of the United States,
Western culture, and even the Saudi ruling family.107 The most striking figure
in this process was Sheikh Yousef al-Ayeri, a Saudi
scholar and commander of Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia killed in June 2003. Al-Ayeri, who is among the leading architects of the notion of
global jihad in Iraq, wrote an estimated 40 books and many more articles in the
three years before his death. In his writings, all of which were unsigned and
published on the Internet, al-Ayeri described the
future strategy of global jihad, which in large part hinged on the jihadists’
success in Iraq. In one of his books, The Crusader War Against Iraq, for
instance, al-Ayeri wrote that the Iraq war is not
important because “a brother Arab country is attacked by the United States,”
but because Iraq is the first link in a chain of attacks that are bound to
follow. Therefore, he continued, “if the Mujahidin do not resist in Iraq, they
are going to fail in the future aggressions.” Ayeri
also stressed the importance of jihadist volunteers from outside of Iraq, who
are a powerful source that will guarantee the success of the jihadist
resistance. As the reality of the war in Iraq suggests, Ayeri’s
recommendation has been implemented. Ayeri warned
that the main threat to Muslims today was the spread of secular democracy, and
cited this as the main reason why Muslims needed to resist the Americans in
Iraq.(Amir Taheri, "The World Watches as Iraq Becomes a Litmus Test of
Democratic Success," Times, London, 16 August 2005.) After 2005, and
especially in the aftermath of the July 7 London bombings, some cracks appeared
in the ideology of global jihad. Several ideologues of the older generation
increasingly criticized younger generations of Salafi-Jihadists of abandoning
the true jihad as envisioned by Abdullah Azzam for indiscriminate violence. Abu
Basir al-Tartusi, for example, a Syrian Jihadi
scholar residing in London and one of the key Salafi-Jihadist thinkers,
published a fatwa on his website in which he protested the London bombings as a
“disgraceful and shameful act, with no manhood, bravery, or morality.” Another
highly publicized internal dispute was one involving Maqdisi and his former
protégé, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. In 2005, Maqdisi criticized Zarqawi, saying that
the latter’s “indiscriminate attacks might distort the true Jihad.” (Reuven
Paz, "Islamic Legitimacy for the London Bombings," PRISM Occasional
Papers 3, no. 4, July 2 005, 1-2.)
An important
strategist of global jihad after 9/11, and the most important link between Al
Qaeda and the global jihad movement it inspired and helped create is Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, better known as Abu Musab al-Suri. Born in
Aleppo in 1958, al-Suri’s political socialization occurred while he was a
member of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Following President Hafiz Assad’s
violent suppression of the Brotherhood in the town of Hama in 1982, al-Suri
went first to Spain, and in 1987 to Afghanistan, where he met Abdullah Azzam
and participated in the war against the Red Army. In 1992, al-Suri joined Al
Qaeda, and he would spend much of the second half of the 1990s in London,
running an institution called Conflicts of the Islamic World. While in the
United Kingdom, he also served as the editor of an Arabic language newsletter,
Al-Ansar. Throughout these years, he maintained ties to bin Laden and other
senior figures in Al Qaeda. During al-Suri’s stay in London, he also helped
found the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA). In 1998, he moved back to
Afghanistan and pledged allegiance to Taliban leader Mullah Omar. Although he
rejoined Al Qaeda, however, he considered himself an independent operator. The
U.S. State Department believed that while in Afghanistan, al-Suri was running
two training camps, in Kabul and Jalalabad, where he allegedly trained the
mujahideen in toxic materials and chemical substances. He made his views on
unconventional weapon clear after the September 11 attacks, which he praised,
adding that it would have been far more useful had the planes been loaded with
weapons of mass destruction. He would later be linked to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
and to the train attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004, although he denied
charges of personal involvement. (Craig Whitlock, "Architect of NewWar on the West," Washington Post, 23 May 2006,
A1.)
After the U.S.
invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, al-Suri went into hiding and did not surface
until 2004, when he posted a massive, 1600-page book on the Internet titled The
Call of the International Islamic Resistance, a treatise that outlines future
strategies for the global jihad movement, placing terrorist attacks and
decentralized urban warfare at the forefront of methods that will guarantee
success to the global jihad movement.(Stephen Ulph, “Setmariam
Nasar: Background on Al-Qaeda’s Arrested Strategist,” Terrorism Focus 3, no.
12, 28 March 2006). Al-Suri, who was captured in Quetta in October 2005, saw
his role as that of educating the “third generation” of Muslim fighters, i.e.,
more dispersed mujahideen that did not receive systematic training in Afghan
camps. Among his recommendations to the new generation of mujahideen was his
call on Muslims to wage a decentralized global jihad against the United States
and other infidel countries. Links to the organization’s leadership cadre
should be kept at a minimum in order to evade enemy security advances. In
August 2005, after the London bombings, he encouraged sleeper cells around the
globe to launch a general front as part of a “global conflict” against the
entire West and its allies. In this decentralized war, al-Suri believed that
propaganda and jihadist indoctrination was of key importance. He recalled the
failure of the jihadist experience in Syria, blaming the defeat of the Muslim
Brotherhood on a lack of strategy and planning, a lack of ideological grounding,
a dearth of jihadist theory and weaknesses in the foundations of propaganda.
Al-Suri, whose writings are prominently featured on websites close to Al Qaeda
such as the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF), has become one of, and possibly
the prime theoretician of Al Qaeda after 9/11 who acts in systematic and
organized manner, and exhibits the patience of the first generation of Al Qaeda
that is often lacking in younger jihadists such as Zarqawi. According to Paz,
his 1600-page treatise is a “masterpiece of strategic thought.” (Reuven Paz,
“Al-Qaeda’s Search for New Fronts: Instructions for Jihadi Activity in Egypt
and Sinai,”PRISM Occasional Papers 3, no. 7, October
2005, 7.)
Al Qaeda’s Adaptive Strategy
In early 2006, Al
Qaeda’s top operational priorities, according to the U.S. National
Counterterrorism Center, were attacks on the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests
overseas, as well as on U.S. allies, in that order. (Statement by the Director
of National Intelligence, John D. Negroponte, to the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, 2 February 2006.) The strategy to achieve these aims, however,
was subject to a number of adaptations. For one, the preferred targets after
9/11, and especially after March 2003, tended to be ‘softer’ civilian targets
that were not necessarily symbols of Western, especially American, economic and
military powers as most targets up until that time had been. After 9/11, and
especially after 2003, attacks against purely civilian targets such as dance
clubs, restaurants, shopping malls, wedding ceremonies, and even funerals
increased relative to attacks against more symbolic installations such as
embassies, military bases, or financial centers. SAs planned and executed by
jihadist groups in places like Bali, Riyadh, Morocco, and Iraq left no doubt
that civilians now became fair game.
A second element of
the new strategy was the deliberate attempt by Al Qaeda and the global jihad
movement to erode popular support for the United States by targeting mostly
Western countries in what, per Al Qaeda’s calculation, would result in a chasm
between the United States and its traditional allies. Several books published
in 2003 and early 2004 appealed to jihadist cells to adopt just such a
strategy. One of these books was titled Iraqi Jihad: Hopes and Risks, and was
published on an Islamist website by The Information Institute in Support of the
Iraqi People, The Center of Services for the Mujahideen. On 8 pages of the
book, the author made a case that Spanish troops present in Iraq should be
attacked because Spain was the “weakest link” of support for the United States.
Attacking Spanish forces, the author/s argued, would be a useful starting point
in a domino effect by which Al Qaeda would gradually erode Western support of
the United States by undermining relationships between Western countries and the
United States, thus isolating Washington. On December 8, 2003, the Global
Islamic Media Front (GIMF) published a more explicit threat, hinting at the
possibility of attacks against Spain outside of Iraq. Indeed, on March 11,
2004, three days before Spanish elections, Madrid was shaken by bombings on
four commuter trains that killed 191 people. (Richard Bernstein, "Tape,
Probably Bin Laden's, Offers 'Truce' to Europe," New York Times, 16 April
2004, 3.) The strategy to drive a wedge between the United States and its
allies was part of what appeared to be a growing political sophistication among
the leadership of Al Qaeda. The SAs in Istanbul, which coincided with a
Bush-Blair summit in London, and the Madrid attack’s timing, which coincided
with the Spanish elections, led some analysts to believe that Al Qaeda, by
exploiting the political calendar in the West for its own purposes, became a
more pragmatic actor. Al Qaeda’s growing political activity was also apparent
in April 2004, when bin Laden offered a ‘truce’ to European countries, albeit
not to the United States, an offer widely regarded as an attempt to cause
disagreements between the United States and its allies in the West. (Richard
Bernstein, "Tape, Probably Bin Laden's, Offers 'Truce' to Europe,"
New York Times, 16 April 2004, 3.)
Norwegian terrorism
analysts Lia and Hegghammer showed that Al Qaeda’s
growing political sophistication was reflected in the publication of a new
genre of “jihadi strategic studies,” writings that draw on Western
secular-rationalist sources, identify and analyze weaknesses of both parties,
consider political, economic, and cultural factors in the conflict, and
recommend realistic strategies. The writers of these tracts, which included
such strategists as Yusuf al-Ayeri and Abu Musab
al-Suri, oftentimes refrain from long religious justifications of the need to
fight the West based on the Quran and the Sunna, and instead focus on practical
strategies and tactics of how to wage that struggle. Lia and Hegghammer added that these strategic thinkers adopted an
academic approach, constructing arguments in a rational and organized fashion,
while extensively drawing fromWestern media and
academic sources. (Brynjar Lia and Thomas Hegghammer,
"Jihadi Strategic Studies: The Alleged Al Qaida Policy StudyPreceding
the Madrid Bombings," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27, no. 5,
September-October 2004).
The third adaptation
of its strategy, and one that mushroomed after 9/11, was the jihad movement’s
growing presence on and exploitation of the Internet, a phenomenon Peter Bergen
called “Al Qaeda 2.0.” (Quoted in Anonymous, Imperial Hubris, 78.) For Al Qaeda,
this medium was the perfect tool for what has been traditionally its most
important priority, namely to spread the spirit of jihad in as many countries
and to as many people as possible. On April 28, 2003, a forum of 225 Islamist
clerics, scholars, and businessmen opened a web site at the URL www.maac.ws in
both Arabic and English. The Secretary General of this virtual body was Dr.
Safar al-Hawali, a man regarded as a key mentor of
Osama bin Laden. (Reuven Paz, "The 'Global Campaign against Aggression':
The Supreme Council of Global Jihad," PRISM Occasional Papers 1, no. 6,
May 2003).October 2005 saw the inaugural broadcast of Sawt al-Khilafa (Voice of the Caliphate), a television program
announced as the new weekly Al Qaeda news broadcast to appear on the Internet.
A masked newsreader presented the week’s news from a Salafi-Jihadist
standpoint, sitting next to a machine gun and a copy of the Quran. (Stephen
Ulph, "Al-Qaeda Tv, Via the Web," Terrorism Focus 2, no. 18, 4
October 2005; and Yassin Musharbash, "Al-Qaida Startet
Terror-Tv," Spiegel Online, 7 October 2005.) In September 2006, a group of
Salafi-Jihadists launched a new website called Electronic Jihad
(www.al-jinan.org). The purpose: to help organize electronic jihad against
websites that insult Islam. Their move was sparked by comments uttered by Pope
Benedict which the jihadist website developers had found offensive. (Abdul
Hameed Bakier, "New Website Incites Electronic
Jihad," Terrorism Focus 3, no. 38, 3 October 2006).
The above are just
three examples of the role the Internet plays in the indoctrination and
incitement of Salafi-Jihadist terrorism today. Writing in mid-2005, Scott Atran
suggests that since 2000, the number of active jihadist websites rose from 14
to over 4000. (Atran, "The 'Virtual Hand' of Jihad," Terrorism
Monitor 3, no. 10.) The Internet provides a whole range of instructions for how
jihadists and potential jihadists can wreak havoc on ‘infidels’ and ‘apostates’
thanks to openly available online manuals and encyclopedias that provide
information on a whole range of activities needed to stage successful attacks.
In the Al Qaeda online periodical Muaskar al-Battar (‘The Al-Battar Training
Camp’), for example, two senior Al Qaeda operatives describe how to pre-examine
targets for attacks, remain vigilant during the planning phases, organize
small, compartmentalized cells, mislead the enemy, and conduct surprise
attacks. (Stephen Ulph, "Al-Qaeda's Online Publications," Terrorism
Focus 1, no. 5, 1 October 2004). Technical aspects of training found on
websites cover the range of instructions on artillery and range-finding, the
production of poison and chemical and biological weapons, suicide explosive
belts, anti-armor shells, and even rockets. In mid-2005, for example, Islamist
websites featured a 26-minute long video containing detailed guides on how
potential suicide bombers can produce suicide belts that are difficult to
detect. (Hala Jaber, "Middle-Class Bombers Find Diy
'Martyr Belt' Online," Times Online, 17 July 2005.)
The Internet is also
used for the recruitment of jihadis, including suicide bombers. Gabriel Weimann
observed, for instance, that “Iraqi insurgents and their sympathizers are
monitoring users of their sites, then contacting those who seem the most sympathetic
to killing American soldiers, Iraqi military and others.” (Jonathan Curiel,
“Terror.Com,” San Francisco Chronicle, 10 July 2005, A1.) In other cases, small
cells have formed among strangers who met on the Internet, or where personal
connections made in real life have been nurtured in cyberspace. (Steve Coll and
Susan B. Glasser, “Terrorists Turn to the Web as Base of Operations,”
Washington Post, 7 August 2005, A1.) The Internet has also become a popular
fundraising tool for terrorist organizations. Given its global use, the
Internet provides a sheer unlimited pool of potential recruits and financiers.
Organizations openly raise funds on their websites, sometimes even using the
popular online payment service Paypal. (Eben Kaplan,
"Terrorists and the Internet," Council on Foreign Relations
Backgrounder, 12 May 2006.) Next we will proceed by conduct an in-depth
examination of the environmental context of Salafi-Jihadism in Jordan and Iraq,
before we proceed to intermediate conclusions and policy recommendations.The
November 2005 bombings in Amman were hardly the first time that
Salafi-Jihadists had planned to attack the Hashemite Kingdom with
self-described ‘martyrs.’ In 2004, Fahd Nouman Suweilem
al-Faqihi, a Saudi national, attempted to blow
himself up on the Saudi-Jordanian border.1 In July 2005, a cell of five Iraqis,
a Libyan, and a Saudi were involved in a plot to conduct SAs against Jordan’s
Queen Aliya International Airport, as well as hotels in the Dead Sea and the
Red Sea resort of Aqaba. Four of them were arrested in February 2006. According
to the charge sheet, some of the suspects rented apartments in Zarqa and Jabal
Hussein, and they said they chose the hotels because they were frequented by
Americans and Israelis. They said they acted on behalf of Al Qaeda in Iraq.
Authorities had also seized roughly 7 pounds of PE-4A heavy explosives, which
one of the suspects had concealed in a children’s game in a rented Amman
apartment.2
Mainstream Salafism
has existed in Jordan at least since the 1960s, when young students who studied
in neighboring Arab countries introduced the stream to the Hashemite Kingdom.Their chief exponent in the 1970s was a Syrian
scholar named Nasr al-Din al-Albani, who moved to Jordan in 1979 and helped
create an informal network that continued to exist.3 Albani’s branch of
Salafism, sometimes referred to as traditionalist Salafism, rejected violence
and political activism alike. Many jihadists from Jordan, like those from other
Arab countries, were radicalized during the 1980s, when a few hundred of them
joined the mujahideen in Afghanistan in their war to oust the Soviet Army from
their lands. One of the key figures who helped organize the arrival of foreign Arab
fighters, the so-called Afghan Arabs, was Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden’s
mentor and the founder of Makhtab al-Khidamat, the precursor of Al Qaeda. Azzam himself was a
Jordanian of Palestinian origin. The Jordanians who went to Afghanistan to
participate in the jihad against the ‘godless Soviets’ were poorly educated.
Eager to rid itself from problematic elements within its territory, the
Jordanian regime encouraged the Jordanian contingent of the Afghan Arabs to
leave for Afghanistan. One of them was a young man by the name of Ahmad Fadhil
Nazzal al-Khalaileh, better known as Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi. When these Jihadists returned to Jordan from Afghanistan in the
early 1990s, the GID kept a close watch over them, knowing that they had
received ideological indoctrination that could eventually help turn the
returnees against their home state.4 The return of the Jordanian ‘Afghans’ came
shortly after the influx of some 250,000 Palestinians who had arrived from
Kuwait, which had expelled them for their support of Saddam Hussein during
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Of the quarter million immigrants from Kuwait, an
estimated two thirds settled in Zarqa,a poor town
east of Amman that in subsequent years became a breeding ground for Salafists,
including many individuals that would later affiliate themselves with Zarqawi.5
Others settled in the city of Salt (and fewer in Irbid). Originally a place
ravaged by problems of alcoholism and drug abuse, after the 1990s Salt
witnessed a religious resurgence and subsequently produced many Jordanian
suicide bombers and insurgents in Iraq.6 It was in this city where in March
2005, the family of a suicide bomber reportedly celebrated the ‘martyrdom’ of
their son in Iraq in a SA in Hilla, in which 125 Shii
civilians died, thus temporarily causing a rift in Jordanian-Iraqi relations.
When the Kuwaiti
immigrants first arrived, however, their relative prosperity exacerbated
existing social cleavages between the rich and poor in Jordan. The returning
‘Afghans’ weredisillusioned at the sight of these
Palestinians, and wondered whether this is why they had been fighting a holy
war.7. They also faced a generally high rate of unemployment in Jordan, and
were disappointed by the result of the 1991 Gulf War and the normalization of ties
between Jordan and Israel. Many faced problems integrating into Jordanian
society, went to Europe and became part of the European Muslim diaspora. Others
went underground to organize themselves for the struggle against the ‘apostate’
Hashemite regime.The immigrants from Kuwait also
included Salafi-Jihadist preachers such as Issam Muhammad Taher al-Barqawi, better known as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, a key
Salafi figure who would later become the religious mentor of Zarqawi. Maqdisi
was primarily responsible for spawning the violent, Salafi-Jihadist stream
which grew out of a rejection of the traditional, nonviolent Salafism
associated with al-Albani.8 Once Maqdisi settled in Jordan in 1992, he
travelled around the country to preach. Together with his protégé Zarqawi, he
formed a group called Al Tawhid (Unity of God) in 1993, which later became
Bayat al-Imam. The group’s aim was to mobilize the Jordanian returnees from
Afghanistan.9 After forming Bayat al-Imam and as a response to it, Maqdisi and
Zarqawi were arrested and moved around a number of prisons, eventually ending
up at Suwaqa prison south of Amman. Maqdisi became
the emir of the imprisoned jihadists and published a number of books while
behind bars. Zarqawi, meanwhile, deepened his religious education and increased
the number of his followers. Many would die years later under his command in
Fallujah and other places in Iraq.10
In 1997, Zarqawi and
Maqdisi were transferred to a prison in Salt and established an informal
recruitment network using mostly petty criminals who went in and out of prison.
Zarqawi and Maqdisi were eventually moved to another prison, and released in
1999 as part of a general amnesty declared by the newly crowned King Abdullah.
Zarqawi left Jordan, first to Pakistan and later to Afghanistan. After his
departure, and especially after 2004, Maqdisi began to criticize Zarqawi,
warning him not to use violence as an end in itself.11 As in other parts of the
world, religion is resurgent in Jordan. Fuad Husayn points out that whereas 30
years ago, people in mosques were mostly in their 50s, today’s mosque-goers are
very young. “Religion resonates with young people these days,” the Zarqawi
biographer adds.12 Many have turned to violence. There are an estimated
180 Salafi-Jihadists in Jordan, most of them in Jwaideh
prison. The prisons have proven to be a hotbed of Islamist extremism, and in
the last year have witnessed a number of riots that have revealed the
remarkable organizational power of the Salafi-Jihadist movement in Jordan. In
April 2006, rioting broke out in Qafqafa prison,
about an hour north of Amman. A month earlier, a riot erupted first at Jweideh prison and spread to Swaqa
and Qafqafa prisons in what was a well
organized mutiny in which inmates in the three prisons coordinated their
actions through a sophisticated system that included cell phones, internet
communications, and messages passed along to visiting relatives.13 The prison
riots, which Jordanian analysts say have been staged by Jayousi,
coincided with a mutiny in an Afghan prison, suggesting transnational links
among the Salafi-Jihadists. Prisons used to be a main recruiting ground, but
now Jordanians keep the prisoners in one larger cell, as a result of which
recruiting and inspiring others has become more difficult.14
Which factors led to
the Amman bombings and what motivated the bombers and other Jordanians who have
opted to martyr themselves for the sake of Islam? Concerning the suicide
attackers of Amman, little information is available. From what is known, it
appears that Sajida al-Rishawi, the failed woman
bomber, acted out of revenge, given that four of her family members of her have
died fighting U.S. troops in Iraq. The reciting of Quranic verses before her
failed bombing does not necessarily prove that she was very religious. The
citing of farewell videos, including the reading of Quaranic
verses, is a common procedure for suicide attackers used for propaganda
purposes, and to psychologically commit the bomber to carrying out his act.
From this point, the martyr reaches what Ariel Merari has called a “point of no
return,” when the volunteer for martyrdom becomes a “living martyr.”15 Given
the dearth of biographical information about the Amman bombers, we can learn
more about individual motivations of Jordanian suicide bombers from the
biographies of six Jordanian jihadists who travelled to Iraq mentioned above.
The backgrounds of these martyrs should disabuse us from the commonly held
belief that suicide bombers have a single profile, that of a young, single, unemployed,
and religious individual. Abu Hammam, the first martyr, was married with a
daughter and had a job at a factory. Anas Jamal al-Ashkar was an electronics
student, and Safwan al-Abadi a lawyer. The martyrs did not necessarily come
from a religious background. Safwan was not religious, but turned increasingly
so following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, while Abu al-Waleed was a
Christian convert. Another striking characteristic is that several of the six
Jordanians described in the document were trying to join the Jihad elsewhere,
before ending up in Iraq. Abu Yihye tried to join
jihadist groups in Chechnya, and Safwan al-Abadi desperately tried to fight in
Afghanistan and Chechnya, but failed to reach these countries. Hence, we can
assume that although Iraq is likely to have intensified Muslim notions of
victimization and the subsequent decision to join the jihad, jihadists regard
their program as a global initiative. As the biographies suggest, many young
Muslims are not only enticed to join the jihad when they perceive an aggression
to Muslims, but also when they sense success. Raed Mansoor al-Bana, for
example, is said to have been influenced to join the jihad after the 9/11
bombings, which he may have sensed as a moment of empowerment for Muslims. Five
of the six martyrs mentioned expressed an interest in volunteering for suicide
operations when they reached Iraq which, together with the desperate attempt of
some of them to fight the jihad wherever they could, suggests that these
Jordanian martyrs, and possibly a large part of today’s globalized jihadists,
are intensely committed to sacrificing their own lives for their cause. At the
group level, the reason for the Salafi-Jihadists’ attacks against Jordan, the
particular target selection, and the choice of modus operandi can be more
easily grasped. The Salafi-Jihadist movement has long focused on Jordan, and
some of the leading contemporary exponents of Salafi-Jihadism were Jordanians,
including Abdullah Azzam, Maqdisi, and Zarqawi. Stephen Ulph suggests that
another reason for Al Qaeda in Iraq’s selection of Jordan as a target can be
found in part in the rising pressure of U.S. forces on insurgents active in
Iraq’s Anbar province.16 From a practical point of view, Zarqawi openly admits
to employ suicide operations for their obvious tactical benefits, “in order to
hit the targets with accuracy and cause the maximal number of deaths.”17
Clearly, suicide attacks are also used for their ability to cause economic harm
to Jordan, and indeed many Jordanians believe that one or two additional
attacks like the November 2005 bombings will cause economic harm on a
catastrophic scale to Jordan.18 Fuad Husayn believes that SAs may also be
a way for Zarqawi to examine the extent of commitment of a volunteer for jihad,
and identify possible infiltrators into his organization. Those who come to
Zarqawi and ask to contribute to jihad may be asked to give their life in a
martyrdom operation.Those who do not agree may be
regarded as spies.19
The attacks in Jordan
are also consistent with the ideology of Al Qaeda, including that of its Iraq
branch, and with Salafi-Jihadism in general. In statements attributed to
Zarqawi and Al Qaeda in Iraq, there are a number of recurrent themes. First and
foremost is the notion that Islam is under attack by a Crusader Zionist
coalition that enjoys support from Jordan and other ‘apostate regimes.’ Real
Muslims, the ‘defenders of the faith’ must act in defence
of Islam, and help reverse the ongoing humiliation of its men, the pillaging of
its cities, and the raping of its women. Indeed, communiqués issued by Al Qaeda
in Iraq are replete with calls to uphold the honour
of Muslim men and women. The overthrow of Jordan and other ‘apostate regimes’
is at the top of the Salafi-Jihadists’ agenda because the ongoing control of
Muslims by Western countries and Western institutions such as the UN, the World
Bank, and NATO is perceived to be possible only thanks to the collaboration of
these ‘treacherous’ regimes who have sold out to the United States and Israel.
In light of the above, Al Qaeda in Iraq staged the SAs in Amman in part for the
purpose of strategic signalling to a number of
audiences. Terrorist groups intend to create a state of extreme fear in the
larger population, which is intended to signal to the various audiences of
terrorism that the group’s threats are credible and that it is determined to
use any means to achieve its goal. By creating fear and horror among its target
audience, terrorist groups also display the potential for future violence. By
raising the spectre of additional attacks, terrorist
groups hope to intimidate the targeted state to cave in to the terrorists’
demands and to influence the larger population to exert additional pressure on
its government to seek ways to address the terrorist group’s grievances. In the
case of the Amman bombings, the attacks had multiple audiences. To its own
audience, fellow Salafi-Jihadists and Muslims that it hopes to recruit to the
cause, the attacks were meant to signal the empowerment of the group and help
convince Muslims who are indifferent about the group to join the battle on the
winning side, so to speak.
To the West, the
attacks were intended to send the message that ‘true Muslims’ cannot be
placated and will fight to the death to achieve their notion of justice. The
attacks also sent a message to Jordanians and other Arab countries, namely to
refrain from any collaboration with the United States and Israel, lest they
will pay a high price. Finally, the attacks were meant as a warning to Israel
that the circle around it is closing, and that soon the ‘Zionist entity’ itself
will be targeted.From an environmental-level point of
view, the attacks, and the emergence of Jordanian martyrs in general, must also
be seen in the context of the socio-economic hardships in Jordan and Iraq. In
interviews this author conducted in Jordan in June 2006, every interviewee cited
the socio-economic difficulties as a factor, though not necessarily the
dominant one, in the pull of Salafi-Jihadism. Of perhaps even greater
importance is the frontal clash between tradition on the one hand, and
modernity on the other. Zarqawi’s denouncement of “fornication and debauchery”
in Jordan is reflective of this tension, and embodies a call to adhere to more
traditional values such as modesty and submission to God, as well as a
patriarchal social and family structure in which the roles of man and woman,
husband and wife, and father and children are clearly defined. The suicide
attacks in Jordan of November 2005, which were carried out by Iraqis, and the
Jordanian martyrs who volunteered for Jihad in Iraq exemplify the transnational
movement so typical of today’s globalization of martyrdom. In the past, the
Hashemite Kingdom’s internal stability was challenged mostly by domestic
elements. The “Iraqi nightmare,” however, as one Jordanian official termed
it,20 led to a change in the constitution of the threat to Jordan, and
non-Jordanians are just as likely to strike the regime of King Abdullah, and
perhaps more so, than Jordanians themselves. It is true that part of the reason
why Jordanians are not believed to be involved in the Amman attacks is due to
the tight grip that Jordan’s feared General Intelligence Directorate (GID) has
on home-grown Jordanian Islamists and Salafi-Jihadists. Yet, the export of the
jihad from Iraq to Jordan embodies more than merely operational expediency.
Global jihad is by definition transnational, and the movement of jihadists goes
in both directions. Fuad Husayn, for example, believes that as of June 2006,
some 300 Jordanian fighters cross the border to Iraq each month.21 It appears
that the bulk of the Jordanian jihadis would be willing to sacrifice themselves
for what they call a martyrdom operation. In fact, it increasingly appears that
the distinction between a suicide bomber and a jihadist has become blurred.
Martyrdom operations appear to be the preferred tactic today for most
individuals seeking to join the jihad.
Iraq
Most suicide attacks
in Iraq are perpetrated by groups that adhere to a strict Salafi-Jihadist
doctrine of Islam. These include Ansar al-Islam, Ansar al-Sunnah Army, the
Victorious Sect, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jamaah
Army, and the Conquest Army, among others. The quintessential Salafi-Jihadist
group active in Iraq is Al Qaeda in Iraq, which is part of a larger
Salafi-Jihadist umbrella organization, the Mujahideen Shura Council. The goals
of Al Qaeda in Iraq, which are paradigmatic for those of other Salafi-Jihadist
organizations, were summarized in an online magazine in March 2005 by a
commander of the group, Abu Maysara. Al Qaeda in
Iraq’s goals include the renewal of pure monotheism; waging jihad for the sake
of Allah; coming to the aid of the Muslims wherever they are; reclaiming Muslim
dignity; and finally, “to re-establish the Rightly-Guided Caliphate in
accordance with the Prophet’s example, because ‘whoever dies without having
sworn allegiance to a Muslim ruler dies as an unbeliever.’22 While the war in
Iraq has done much to intensify Salafi-Jihadism in Iraq, Salafi-Jihadist
networks in Iraq had existed prior to the 2003 invasion of the country. In the
course of the 1990s, these networks came to existence partially in response to
the military and economic crisis brought by the first Gulf War. In the
aftermath of 9/11 and Operation Enduring Freedom, when Salafi-Jihadists lost
Afghanistan as a safe haven, additional Salafi-Jihadists entered Iraq, where
they were joined by members of Salafi-Jihadist networks from places like
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon,North Africa, Saudi Arabia,
Syria, Yemen, and Europe.23
In the course of the
insurgency, the rhetoric especially of groups that perpetrate SAs, but also of
those that do not, gradually adopted elements of Salafism. According to a 2006
report by the International Crisis Group (ICG), the insurgency has “converged
around more unified practices and discourse, and predominantly Sunni Arab
identity… For now, virtually all adhere publicly to a blend of Salafism and
patriotism.”24 While many websites depicted the insurgency as patriotic and
nationalistic, for example, “the rhetoric from the groups most visibly active
on the ground was of an increasingly religious and, more precisely, salafist bent.”25 More insurgent groups, for example, began
referring to their struggle as one against Crusaders, and an increasing number
began making an explicit link between the war in Iraq and a broader struggle on
behalf of Muslims.26This convergence around Salafi-Jihadist themes came in
spite of the internecine fighting that plagued the insurgency in the first half
of 2005. Rather than leading to a permanent fragmentation of the insurgency,
the infighting helped create a more unified discourse centered around Salafist
themes. Thus, for instance, insurgent groups turned to Salafist ulama in
increasing numbers for moral and juridical justification for jihad and for
specific forms of violence. The strengthening of Salafi-Jihadism has also
become evident in the growing support that an increasing number of Islamist
clerics have voiced for tactics favored by Salafi-Jihadists such as SAs and beheadings.
Reuven Paz points out that prior to the war in Iraq, for example, Islamic
clerics debated the legitimacy of SAs. In the course of the Iraq war, however,
many Islamist clerics condoned suicide operations. To the extent that there has
been a debate over what constitutes legitimate tactics, it was largely over
other issues, such as the legality of beheadings, kidnapping, the killing of
Muslims, or the question of whether terrorist acts can be perpetrated outside
of Iraq.28
One of the reasons
why Salafi rhetoric has been able to dominate the discourse is likely due to
the strong Internet presence and more effective use of Internet resources by
Salafi-Jihadist groups. Online researchers at ICG reported that the groups most
closely affiliated with transnational, Salafi-Jihadist networks were the first
to implement a “genuine internet-based communication strategy.” To that end,
Salafi-Jihadist groups established links between Salafi Iraqi preachers
(especially from Fallujah) and like-minded Salafi ulama abroad. These contacts
are likely to have facilitated subsequent contacts among jihadist groups.29
Salafi-Jihadist groups in Iraq are not merely interested in ending the
occupation and are unlikely to rest their activities if and when the occupation
will eventually end. As Zarqawi has made clear before his death, his group was
“not fighting to chase the occupier out or preserve national unity or keep
borders delineated by the infidel intact. We are fighting because it is a religious
duty, just as it is a duty to take Shariah law to the government and create an
Islamic state.”30 Everyone who stands in the way of the establishment of the
future Caliphate is a heretic, a kaffir, and must be fought. Hence,
Salafi-Jihadists target not only the occupiers, but all those who resist the
attempt to create an Islamist super-state ruled in accordance with the
strictest Salafi-Jihadist tenets. To quote Zarqawi again, We do not fight for a
fistful of dust or illusory boundaries drawn by ‘Sykes-Pikot.’
We are not fighting so that a Western evil would replace an Arab evil. Ours is
a higher and more sublime fight. We are fighting so that Allah’s word becomes
supreme and religion is all for Allah. Anyone who opposes this goal or stands
in the way of this aim is our enemy and will be a target for our swords,
regardless of their name or lineage.31
Since 2003, Iraq has
increasingly assumed a central place in the strategy of Al Qaeda. One key
Salafi-Jihadist scholar, Yussuf al-Ayeri, argued in
several influential writings posted on the Internet that Muslims have much at
stake in Iraq. Muslims were required to resist the occupation in Iraq not only
because of the need to defend an Arab country, but because Iraq was one link in
the chain of attacks by the infidel West that would follow. Thus, if mujahideen
failed to achieve victory in Iraq, they would also fail in future
aggressions.32 Iraq also began to be mentioned as the ideal birthplace for the
longed-for caliphate. In a letter written by Al Qaeda deputy leader Zawahiri to
Zarqawi intercepted in July 2005, Zawahiri laid out the strategy clearly. Following
the expulsion of the American forces from Iraq, in the second stage the
mujahideen should “establish an Islamic authority or amirate, then develop it
and support it until it achieves the level of a caliphate- over as much
territory as you can to spread its power in Iraq…” In the following stages, the
caliphate should be extended to “secular countries neighboring Iraq,” followed
by the fourth stage, namely “the clash with Israel.”33
This transnational
goal that supersedes limited, local objectives such as to oust an occupation
force, is reflected in the rhetoric of all Salafi-Jihadist groups. As a
commander of the Salafi-Jihadist Ansar al-Sunna army, for example, said, “the
task [of jihad] is great and the issue momentous and concerns the fate of a
nation and the aim does not end with the expulsion of the occupier and
weakening him with inflicted wounds, but with the establishment of Allah’s
religion and the imposition of Muslim law to govern this Muslim land.”34
Salafi-Jihadist groups thus entertain absolutist goals that are immensely
difficult to realize. The uncompromising nature of these goals also affects
these groups’ choices of tactics, including SAs. In the case of Iraq, the adoption
of this modus operandi seems more of an imported than a ‘homegrown’ problem.
Hence, the most plausible ‘structural’ explanations are not conditions that are
endemic to Iraqi society, but are rather found in the radical Salafi-Jihadist
ideology that has developed in Iraq in the mid-1990s, and especially after the
U.S. invasion of Iraq.As argued before,
Salafi-Jihadist ideology is particularly prone to violence, and in its most
extreme form even legitimizes the killing of Muslims if it serves a larger
goal. In May 2005, an audiotape believed to be from Zarqawi appeared in which
the terrorist mastermind defended the killing of Muslims. “The shedding of
Muslim blood… is allowed in order to avoid the greater evil of disrupting
jihad,” the voice said. In the tape, the speaker also defended the use of SAs,
saying that “killing of infidels by any method including martyrdom operations
has been sanctified by many scholars even if it meant killing innocent
Muslims.”35
Salafi-Jihadist
ideology also has an endemic religious quarrel with Shiites, most strikingly expressed
by members of Al Qaeda in Iraq, especially when it was led by Zarqawi. In
mid-January 2004, American officials obtained a detailed proposal believed to
be from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, directed at senior leaders of Al Qaeda. In the
17-page letter, found on a CD seized in a Baghdad safehouse, Zarqawi asked the
Al Qaeda leadership for help in waging a “sectarian war” in Iraq. Zarqawi said
the extremists failed to mobilize sufficient support inside Iraq, and failed in
routing the U.S. forces. The document suggested that a counter-attack be waged
against the Shia community in Iraq, a step that would rally Sunni Arabs to the
religious extremists. “The solution, and only God knows, is that we need to
bring the Shia into the battle,” the letter read. “It is the only way to
prolong the duration of the fight between the infidels and us. If we succeed in
dragging them into a sectarian war, this will awaken the sleepy Sunnis who are
fearful of destruction and death” at the hands of Shiites.36 Zarqawi offered to
the Al Qaeda leaders that “if you agree with it, and are convinced of the idea
of killing the perverse sects, we stand ready as an army for you to work under
your guidance and yield to your command.”33 In future letters, Zarqawi
confirmed his repugnance for the Shias. In a letter to bin Laden dated June 15,
2004, for instance, Zarqawi referred to Shias as “the lurking serpent, the
cunning and vicious scorpion, the waylaying enemy, and the deadly poison.”37
Given this high level of dehumanization, the extent of violence, including SAs,
aimed at the Shias is hardly surprising.38 While anti-Shia violence in Iraq is
certainly in part instrumental, in the sense that it is designed to frighten
Sunnis into adopting Salafi-Jihadists tenets,39 the origin of the hatred
between the Sunni Salafi-Jihadists and Shiites has deeper, doctrinal
foundations. Shiism, which was borne out of the succession crisis that followed
the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632, implies a challenge to the idea that
there can be one Sunni caliphate—a core tenet of Salafism. It is for that
reasons that Salafi-Jihadists, which are Sunnis, regard Shias as infidels.
Which strategies do Salafi-Jihadist groups endorse to achieve their goal of
establishing a caliphate, beginning in Iraq?
The strategy consists
not only of fighting the occupation forces and targeting foreigners and
Shiites, but also of delegitimizing the existing order by weakening the new
Iraqi government financially, attacking construction workers and others
involved in the rebuilding of Iraq, creating insecurity among the public,
provoking ethnic strife, and weakening the infrastructure. As the system
imposed by the United States crumbles, Salafi-Jihadists expect to be able to
portray themselves as the only movement able to provide protection for the
Sunnis. SAs are part and parcel of this strategy of delegitimation.
One of the reasons why the Salafi-Jihadist movement manages to attract a
growing number of individuals to its side is that these groups have managed to
influence many young Muslims that the United States invasion is an attack on
Islam. Under the principle of fard ayn, any attack on Islam must be repelled by waging a
defensive jihad against the aggressor. This defensive jihad requires the
individual participation of each and every Muslim in the struggle.
Rhetorically, Salafi-Jihadists connect the invasion of Iraq with other
perceived attacks against Muslims, including in Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir,
Bosnia, and other places. The influence of Salafism also extends to groups that
do not formally identify themselves as Salafists. Insurgency videos, for
instance, often show the mujahideen in traditional Salafi dress code, such as Sarawil pants, which had virtually disappeared in Iraq.
Moreover, Salafis reportedly played an inspirational role in the initial phase
of the insurgency by posing as early Muslim warriors, duplicating their garbs
and religious practices and using traditional, quasi-martial values into the
insurgents. Insurgents have produced a lengthy, powerful video on this theme,
which mixes contemporary footage of combat in Iraq with pictures from classical
movies on the early ages of Islam.39 Most importantly perhaps, Salafi-Jihadism
resonates because it provides relatively easy answers to complex questions. It
also offers guidelines and recommendations that are relatively straightforward
and can be followed by anyone who so wishes. It is thus a potentially inclusive
ideology, if one is willing to pay the price. As a report on the insurgency
suggests, Salafism benefits from the strength of weak ties, i.e., from its
ability to bind together people who may share little else:On
the one hand, requirements for being a ‘good Muslim’ (and the best of Muslims)
are simple and easily met, since fighting a jihad satisfies the obligations of
a pious life. On the other hand, because the focus is on duplicating the
personal behaviour and moral code of early Muslims,
Salafism is an essentially apolitical doctrine and therefore avoids potentially
divisive issues.
Since their first use
in late March 2003, SAs in Iraq have shown no signs of abating. On the
contrary, one week in late September 2006 saw the highest level of SAs of any
given week.40 From studies cited in this chapter, it can be concluded that
suicide attackers who have perpetrated attacks in Iraq are largely foreigners,
and of those, most appear to be Saudis. Iraqis form a minority of suicide
attackers, but there are some indications that their number is rising.
Biographies of suicide bombers and a review of published accounts show that
suicide bombers in Iraq come from a variety of backgrounds. Suicide bombers are
both male and female and some come from poorer backgrounds, while others left
promising careers to join the jihad. Some were single, while others were
married with children. As far as individual motivations are concerned, the
relatively few biographies examined here suggest that suicide attackers act in
the name of the defence of Islam in the face of what
is clearly perceived as a U.S.-led attack on their religion. SAs create a
balance of terror that lets the United States swallow its own medicine. They
are a mechanism that helps undo what is frequently cited as the humiliating
subjugation of Muslims on the part of the United States, and the West in
general. The struggle against this humiliation restores honour
and dignity to the suicide bomber and his larger community and avenges those
members of the community who sense an injustice that is not necessarily
personally, but may be viscerally, experienced. The attempt to restore honour may be coupled with more personal motivations,
especially the desire to purify oneself from real or perceived sins that the
suicide bomber has committed. In some cases, the suicide attacker appears
influenced by a desire to reap additional benefits in paradise.
Of the groups that have perpetrated SAs, the majority
are clearly Salafi-Jihadist in character. Organizational motivations and goals
to engage in SAs, which are distinct from individual motivations, include the
tactical benefits of this modus operandi that allow the terrorists and
insurgents to achieve maximum effectiveness at a relatively low cost. In the
case of Salafi-Jihadist groups, SAs are also employed because martyrdom for the
sake of God is elevated as the ultimate sacrifice a Muslim can make for the
sake of the umma. SAs are also believed to be the best means to bring about the
goal of ending the occupation and establishing the caliphate.They
are an integral part of the main strategy to bring about this aim, which
involves the delegitimization of the Iraqi government (installed with American
help) and the creation of ethnic tensions in Iraq that will portray
Salafi-Jihadists as the only movement able to bring about security. And
furthermore in the context of the Iraqi insurgency as we have seen, Salafi-Jihadism
has been able to dominate other ideologies due to several factors.
Salafi-Jihadist strategists and adherents have turned out to be far more
Internet-savvy than their Baathist or tribal counterparts. Second, doctrinally,
the U.S. invasion of Iraq neatly fits the principle of fard
ayn. Salafi-Jihadists had a relatively easy time
presenting the American occupation of Iraq as an attack on Islam, making the
defense of Islam a rallying cry that was answered by Muslims in many countries.
Finally, Salafi-Jihadism is an inherently attractive ideology to disillusioned
young Muslims (and increasingly to converts to Islam) who appear to seek a
sense of purpose in life as well as a sense of belonging. Salafi-Jihadism
offers easy answers based on a simplistic, parsimonious division of the world
into good and evil. In extolling jihad for the sake of God, it offers a sense
of purpose. In appealing to contribute to the well-being of the ummah, it
offers a sense of belonging to a larger, imagined community.
1. Murad Al-Shishani,
"Salafi-Jihadists in Jordan: From Prison Riots to Suicide Operation
Cells," Terrorism Focus 3, no. 9 (7 March 2006).
2. Rana Husseini,
"Jordan Charges Five Iraqis, Two Others with Terror Conspiracy,"
Jordan Times, 7 June 2006.
3. Nir Rosen,
"Thinking Like a Jihadist: Iraq's Jordanian Connection," World Policy
Journal 23, no. 1 (Spring 2006), 4. "Jordan's 9/11: Dealing with Jihadi
Islamism," in ICG Middle East Report No. 47 (Amman/Brussels: International
Crisis Group, 2005), 5.
4. "Jordan's
9/11: Dealing with Jihadi Islamism," 3.
5. Ibid. , 5.
6. Ibid. , 8.
7. Abdullah Abu
Rumman, interview with International Crisis Group. In Ibid. , 4.
8. Ibid. , 5.
9. Husayn,
Al-Zarqawi: The Second Generation of Al-Qa'ida , Part
1.
10. Ibid.
11. See Maqdisi’s
testimony in Ibid. , parts 6-7. See also Paz, "Islamic Legitimacy for the
London Bombings," PRISM, July 2005.
12. Fuad Husayn,
interview with the author, Amman, Jordan, 7 June 2006.
13. Chris Zambelis, "Radical Networks in Middle East
Prisons," Terrorism Monitor 4, no. 9 (4 May 2006). See also Al-Shishani,
"Salafi-Jihadists in Jordan: From Prison Riots to Suicide Operation
Cells," Terrorism Focus 3, no. 9.
14. Nawaf Tell, interview
with the author, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, Amman,
Jordan, 6 June 2006.
15. Moghadam,
"Fletcher Hosts Ariel Merari, Israeli Expert on Suicide Terrorism,".
16. Ulph,
"Al-Qaeda in Iraq Takes Credit for the Amman Bombings," Terrorism
Focus 2, no. 21.
17. "Al-Qaeda
Explains Amman Bombings," MEMRI, 8 December 2005.
18. Nawaf Tell,
interview with the author, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan,
Amman, Jordan, 6 June 2006.
19. Fuad Husayn,
interview with the author, Amman, Jordan, 7 June 2006.
20. Bisher al-Khasawneh, interview with the author, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Amman, Jordan, 7 June 2006.
21. Fuad Husayn,
interview with the author, Amman, Jordan, 7 June 2006.
22. "Jaish Ansar
Al-Sunnah Insurgency Group in Iraq Releases Detailed Communiqué and Video on
Their Attack against the Us Base in Mosul," SITE Institute [Undated].
23. The article was
translated by the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI). See "The
Iraqi Al-Qa’ida Organization: A Self-Portrait,"
MEMRI Special Dispatch Series No. 884 (24 March 2005).
24. Hafez,
"Suicide Terrorism in Iraq," 596.
25. International
Crisis Group, "In Their Own Words," i.
26. Ibid. , 7.
27. Ibid. , 10.
28. Paz, "The
Impact of the War in Iraq on the Global Jihad," , 44.
29. International
Crisis Group, "In Their Own Words," 7, fn
49.
30. Quoted in Ulph,
"Al-Zarqawi as Master Strategist in Iraq, Rising Leader of the Global
Jihad," Terrorism Focus 2, No. 20.
31. Murad
Al-Shishani, "Al-Zarqawi's Rise to Power: Analyzing Tactics and
Targets," Terrorism Monitor 3,no. 22 (17 November 2005).
32. Paz, "The
Impact of the War in Iraq on Islamist Groups and the Culture of Global
Jihad" Current Trends in Islamic Ideology 1 (2005).
33. Although some
scholars doubt the authenticity of the letter, the U.S. government believes
that the letter is accurate, and the letter has been posted on the website of
the U.S. Director of National Intelligence. For the original Arabic version and
a translated copy of the letter, which is dated July 9, 2005, see
http://www.dni.gov/release_letter_101105.html, last accessed 24 November 2005.
34. Quoted in Hafez,
"Suicide Terrorism in Iraq," 596-97.
35. "Tape
Justifies Killing Innocent Muslims," available at
http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/05/18/iraq.main, last accessed 18 October
2006.
36. Dexter Filkins,
"U.S. Says Files Seek Qaeda Aid in Iraq Conflict," New York Times, 9
February 2004, 1.
37. Ibid.
38. Quoted in Michael
Scheuer, "Coalition Warfare, Part Ii: How
Zarqawi Fits into Bin Laden's World Front," Terrorism Focus 2, no. 8 (28
April 2005).
39. International
Crisis Group, "In Their Own Words," 11.
40. On September 17,
for instance, at least ten suicide attacks occurred in a single day "U.S.:
Iraq Suicide Attacks Rising During Ramadan," CNN.com, 27 September 2006;
Al-Ansary and Adeeb, "Most Tribes in Anbar Agree to Unite against Insurgents,"
New York Times, 18 September 2006.
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