By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

Wagner Group

Will His Supporters View Him As A Martyr?

Prigozhin - a former criminal associated with organized crime in the 1980s and spent several years in prison - is a creation of the Kremlin and owes his enormous wealth to President Vladimir Putin.

Since he formed the Wagner mercenary group in 2014, he has become a key tool of Putin's desire to reimpose Russian global influence. From the shadows, his forces - made up of hardened former Russian special forces - have propped up Mr Putin's ally Bashar Al-Assad in Syria and helped roll back and replace French influence in Mali.

Until last year, Prigozhin consistently denied mounting evidence that he controlled the group, launching lawsuits in British courts against Bellingcat journalist Elliot Higgins, who accused him of running the private militia.

The deniable nature of his group's operations has made him popular with Putin and allowed him to build up his power base over the last year, coming to rival the military and security elite that rule Russia.

A man at ease with violence, corruption, and ambition - his rise is emblematic of the modern state built by President Vladimir Putin over the past 24 years.

But despite his increasing power, he has remained an outsider among Mr Putin's small inner circle of advisers, unafraid to criticize officials in Moscow he sees as corrupt, lazy, or both.

And he has reserved a particular hatred for the head of the military, Valery Gerasimov, and the Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu - a fellow outsider - for years.

 

Prigozhin Was An Angry Man Who Was Not Easy To Deal With.

Will His Supporters View Him As A Martyr?

Even those who believed in Prigozhin will view what happened to him as a warning to anyone who tries to repeat what he did. People will be scared, especially those who stayed by Prigozhin’s side until now. Just imagine: they must think they’re next.

What does Prigozhin’s death mean for the Wagner forces who had been in Ukraine?

Wagner is now settled in Belarus, and its forces can continue some activities in Africa and Syria. But the doors to Ukraine are closed. Some commanders in Wagner hoped that in a couple of months, Putin would call them back and say, “Sorry, I was wrong about you. We need you. Please come back.” That was wishful thinking.

What will you look out for in the coming days as the dust settles?

I would watch how Russian TV covers the situation. Their tone about Prigozhin and his legacy will indicate how the Kremlin is trying to shape public opinion. What history will it preserve, and what history will it rewrite regarding the role that Wagner and Prigozhin played in the war? I would also look at how the official investigation develops—whether it presents some palatable version of events or downplays the importance of what happened.

I would also follow how the patriotic conservative camp reacts to what happened on Telegram channels. Those who criticize the Ministry of Defense: How will they react? Will we see some level of emotional indignation about what happened? Will they be angry with Putin? Will they feel lost? Seeing their sentiments and how the Kremlin deals with them will be interesting. We can also follow the posts of ordinary Russians—whether they consider what happened to be an essential event and how they relate to it. And, of course, we must watch what happens to Wagner in Belarus closely.

The mounting stressors on Vladimir Putin’s regime—in particular, was the short-lived mutiny led by Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of the Wagner private military company. The rebellion was “the product of Putin’s inaction,” she wrote, and the leniency afforded to Prigozhin afterward made the Russian president look “less powerful.” On Wednesday, Putin may have gotten his payback after all: Prigozhin was listed among the fatalities of a private jet that crashed outside Moscow. Executive Editor Stuart Reid spoke with Stanovaya the same day. Their conversation has been edited for clarity and length.

Knowing what we know, how likely is it that the crash was intentional?

We have good reason to believe that Putin is interested in such a crash. But even if it was an accident, Russian elites and senior officials will see it as retaliation. The Kremlin and Putin personally will be interested in fueling such suspicions. Putin had called Prigozhin a “traitor,” so many conservatives in Russia’s political class were shocked at how soft Putin was toward him after the mutiny. Prigozhin circulated freely between Belarus and Russia. Putin met him in the Kremlin. He allowed him to live his life like nothing had happened. Those shocked today can say, “Now we see Putin’s logic.” Putin doesn’t seem weak. He looks like he’s retaking control.

Please talk about the fate Putin has promised those who challenge him.

On several occasions in previous years, Putin said that traitors must die. He said their death must be cruel, and they must suffer. But Prigozhin is not a classic traitor. Yes, Putin said after the mutiny that this was someone who dared challenge the state at a time when it was facing external aggression. But Putin also said that people lose their minds during war. His approach toward Prigozhin was a bit softer than it would be for someone who deliberately betrayed the motherland.

But in the end, I didn’t see what value Prigozhin had to Putin after the mutiny. Some people suggested that Prigozhin had a kompromat on Putin, and that was why Putin didn’t dare get rid of him. I was skeptical of that. So what was the sense in keeping him around? Putin would only tolerate Prigozhin because he had some military merit in Ukraine and Syria. But was that enough to forgive him? Before what happened to Prigozhin, I was pretty sure that Putin would find a way to get rid of him. Maybe not physically: I wasn’t sure Putin would be okay with that. Instead, I thought the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the GRU, the FSB—whoever—would, with time, find a way to take away everything Prigozhin had. But then, physically, we see what we see.

Who benefits from Prigozhin’s removal from the scene?

Many people. For those who consider Prigozhin a threat to the state, his death represents justice. This should have happened for the military, general staff, siloviki, security services, conservatives, and hawks—for all those who believed that Prigozhin went too far. So I don’t think Putin and the Kremlin will make much of an effort to convince the public otherwise.

Where does the Wagner group go from here?

On Russian Telegram, some people have suggested that if Prigozhin’s killing was not accidental, it was a somewhat risky move by the state. It could spark discontent, irritation, and an adverse reaction from Prigozhin’s supporters. In my opinion, we won’t see any significant response. Those who sympathized with Prigozhin before the mutiny were disappointed when he decided to challenge the state. They believed that one should not rock the boat during such hard times. We could see it in polls: before the mutiny, Prigozhin had gained a lot of sympathy, but after the uprising, it collapsed. Many Russians turned their backs on Prigozhin because they decided, “You can fight against corruption in the Defense Ministry, you can criticize the military on your Telegram channel, but you can’t rise against the state.” So I don’t expect a severe upheaval against the Kremlin or something pro-Prigozhin, pro-Wagner. There might be some minor episodes, but nothing big.

 

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