By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers
Keep Ukraine Safe Without NATO
Membership
In the weeks since
July’s NATO summit in Vilnius, the Western debate about Ukraine’s long-term security
arrangements has fallen into three categories. The country’s bullish backers
want it to become a NATO member and enjoy the alliance’s protection, even
though Kyiv was not formally invited to join at the summit. Their critics
respond that admitting Ukraine into NATO will only up the ante and risk an
all-out war with Russia and that the West should persuade Kyiv to settle the
conflict. Seeking a middle ground, a third group proposes that the West
continue providing Ukraine with arms and training its soldiers for the long
haul but refrain from formally committing to defend it against future Russian
attacks.
But these are not the
only options available to Ukraine’s friends and supporters once the current war
ends. At least one other choice: the West could give Ukraine a formal security
guarantee without admitting it to NATO. Crucially, that guarantee would not
come from the alliance or involve the United States in any way. Instead, a
coalition of European countries, particularly some of Ukraine’s neighbors,
would pledge to defend it from future Russian aggression. Their commitment
would help deter Russia and increase the chances of a diplomatic settlement to
the conflict by addressing Moscow’s opposition to Ukrainian NATO membership.
In, Out, Or In Between
Ukraine’s brave and
determined fight against Russian aggression has inspired many Western backers
to demand the country’s formal inclusion in NATO. They portray Ukrainians’
resistance to Russia as an instance of the larger struggle between democracy
and authoritarianism, a clash in which cardinal values are at stake. As they
see it, the ramifications of denying Ukraine membership in the alliance would
reach far beyond its borders. Democrats everywhere would be demoralized and
authoritarians, particularly Russian President Vladimir Putin, emboldened. Many
in this camp contend that Putin’s ambitions extend beyond Ukraine to, at a
minimum, Poland and the three Baltic states. And they point to Ukraine’s
wartime success as proof that Kyiv will strengthen the
alliance rather than become a burden. Unsurprisingly,
Ukrainian leaders present an identical brief.
Critics of this
argument are legion. Many fear that Ukraine’s membership in the alliance would
cause more problems than it would solve. They insist that inducting it into
NATO would demonstrate a dangerous disregard for Russia’s repeated warnings
that NATO membership is intolerable, pointing out that Putin has described the
alliance's expansion along Russia’s borders as a “direct threat.” Ignoring this
Russian redline would, they insist, place NATO and the Kremlin on a collision
course and possibly risk nuclear war. The people who hold this view are not
just wary of provoking Moscow; they also don’t think that Ukraine warrants such
a commitment. The country is not, they contend, important enough to the United
States' national security to justify such risks, mainly because Americans, not
their NATO allies, would end up doing the bulk of the fighting and dying
required to defend Kyiv.
Those seeking a
middle ground propose what effectively amounts to armed
neutrality. Ukraine
would continue to receive Western arms and military training, with no time
limit and regardless of whether the country comes under attack. But it would
not be admitted to NATO or receive alternative security guarantees. Many
advocates of this arrangement doubt that Ukraine will ever enter NATO, no
matter what was said at Vilnius, because its borders with Russia will remain
hotly disputed. Some also think Ukraine is unimportant enough to merit NATO
admission (and the accompanying risks). But those supporting this third way
believe that continuous Western support would protect Ukraine’s security
because Kyiv has proved that it has the grit and guile to resist Russian
aggression—it just needs a more muscular, advanced military. This middle
solution, known as the Israel model, would mimic that state’s template of
building a highly trained armed force enabled by a continuing inflow of
American armaments and defense technology, even without the treaty-based
promise of protection.
Coalition Of The Willing
Given what they have
endured, Ukrainians are entirely within their rights to seek protection from
future Russian aggression. And given that Ukrainians have been attacked by
Russia twice in the last ten years, they can be forgiven for believing that
Moscow will be deterred only if Kyiv secures an explicit Western commitment to
defend it. Some believe that Russia will not attempt another invasion after the
bitter lessons it will have learned from this one. Still, Ukraine’s leaders are
understandably unwilling to make that wager: the consequences of being wrong
could prove catastrophic. That reasoning explains Ukrainians’ outrage at those
who call for excluding them from NATO.
At the same time,
Ukrainians are wary of armed neutrality. During my three trips to wartime
Ukraine, I did not hear one good word about this option; Ukrainians see it as a
mere consolation prize for failing to gain NATO membership. They do not believe
their admission would make Europe and the United States less safe. Instead,
they argue that Article V has been erroneously interpreted as a commitment to
collective defense using military force. According to these Ukrainians, the
article lets individual alliance members decide how they will respond to an
attack—it is not a switch that, once flipped, triggers a military rescue
operation. This understanding of the provision helps explain Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky’s insistence, repeated at the Vilnius summit, that
Ukraine cannot settle for anything less than membership.
No matter how hard
Zelensky tries, Ukraine’s desire to join NATO may never pass. But even if it
doesn’t, there is still a way to provide Kyiv with the explicit security
guarantee it seeks. A subset of NATO members—those that have been the most
vocal in insisting that Ukraine be admitted to the alliance—could jointly
provide Kyiv the equivalent of an Article V commitment. Poland and the Baltic
states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—are the obvious candidates, but others,
including Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, could also participate.
A coalition of this
sort with Ukraine—which would operate separately from NATO and therefore not
include the United States—could raise the risks and costs to Russia of another
invasion. (The United States could still train, modernize, and equip Ukraine’s
armed forces.) The coalition of guarantors, all of whom would be NATO
countries, would promise not to invoke Article V if forced to fight Russia to
defend Ukraine. But NATO’s joint defense provision would become operative if
Russia directly attacked territory belonging to the coalition’s NATO members.
The risk of triggering Article V could narrow Russia’s military options and
limit the geographic ambit of the war. It could also strengthen the deterrence
provided by Ukraine’s guarantors. Moscow, after all, would not want to do
anything that could trigger a direct conflict with Washington.
Coming To Terms
Of course, no
Ukrainian official or military expert would see such a coalition-based
guarantee as an acceptable substitute for the protection provided by NATO’s
Article V. Kyiv will understandably continue its fight for NATO membership. But
no matter how badly they might want to join, Ukrainians should begin to
consider alternatives at least. At Vilnius, NATO specified that Kyiv must meet
all the benchmarks required for membership and reiterated that, to join, it
needs to win the approval of all its members. Since some have been wary of
allowing Ukraine into the alliance, Kyiv may be no closer to joining NATO than
it was after the 2008 Bucharest summit, when the door to membership was first
opened. In the run-up to Vilnius, even the United States said it opposed
providing Ukraine with a formal invitation, let alone a firm commitment and
timeline for accession. As a friend who advises the Ukrainian government
remarked, the result was a summit declaration that said, “Ukraine will join
NATO when it joins NATO.”
To Ukrainians, this
was, quite naturally, disappointing. But if Kyiv mulls over alternatives, it
might decide that accepting a different security arrangement could prove
helpful. At some point, Russia might conclude that victory is impossible.
Public support for the war within the country is already withering, and
protests have become common. Sanctions, once manageable, are beginning to bite.
Suppose these trends continue and Ukraine’s troops find more battlefield
success, albeit not decisive. In that case, Putin might consider a peace
agreement that gives Ukraine back most of the territory it took after February
2022. Under these circumstances, however, the Kremlin would demand a concession
that Putin could present to Russia’s citizens as proof that the war was worth
it. A promise by Ukraine not to join NATO could be such a concession.
To safeguard its
security, Kyiv could then sign a security pact with some of NATO’s members.
This option could also become attractive if Ukraine faces pressure to settle
from the West—a distinct possibility. Despite heroic efforts and hundreds of
billions of dollars in military aid, Ukraine has not achieved an army result
that its leaders deem minimally acceptable. Western defense industries are
increasingly hard-pressed to meet Ukraine’s incessant military needs. American
officials worry that U.S. military readiness could fall below the levels the
president’s military advisers consider safe. In the United States and Europe,
public support for pressing on, previously solid, has begun to wane, and NATO’s
once remarkable unity has also started to fray. Western states also know they
will have to spend tremendous money to rebuild Ukraine: a March 2023 World
Bank report pegged the cost at $1 trillion. They might
want Ukraine to compromise on its NATO aspirations.
Could The Unacceptable Become Acceptable?
Ukraine could, of
course, fight on regardless of what its partners want. But with victory elusive
and Western support uncertain, even Kyiv might decide that it is better to seek
a negotiated and imperfect peace than to continue the war. A coalition-based
guarantee would then provide Ukrainians with the assured external protection
they need to feel safe rather than requiring that Kyiv gamble on armed
neutrality.
NATO’s European
members will doubtless be reluctant to create a new coalition to protect
Ukraine. Yet, if doing so could end the war, these countries might decide it is
worth it. NATO’s European members have a self-evident interest in keeping their
continent free of upheaval and war, a stake that the United Kingdom shares with
its centuries of relations with the continent. Moreover, given their wealth and
technological advancement, European countries cannot credibly claim that they
lack the resources to backstop Ukraine’s security, particularly given that
Ukraine will emerge from the war as one of Europe’s major military powers.
Indeed, Kyiv will become even stronger because it will receive open-ended
Western military assistance. And the coalition’s NATO members could take
comfort in the fact that if Russia decides to attack them, the United States
will still have to defend itself.
A coalition-based
security guarantee may be far from what Ukrainians yearn for. But given the
war’s current trajectory and the fact that Ukraine cannot be particular about
NATO membership, its leaders may have to accept what they now deem
unacceptable. And if Kyiv cannot achieve its ideal military outcome, this
coalition could be the best, most feasible way of ensuring that Russia never
again tries to extinguish Ukrainian sovereignty.
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