From Napoleon to a Prince from Bavaria
that Became the King of Belgium
On 6 November 1817, the 21-year-old
British Crown Princess Charlotte died in childbirth. If she had lived, the
course of history would have been different. Charlotte and her husband Leopold
of Saxe-Coburg, a shrewd and ambitious German prince, would have succeeded to
the British throne in 1830 and would have left their mark on a significant part
of 19th-century British history. What happened instead was that in 1831 the
International Powers installed Leopold L- on a throne in Brussels. He was
appointed King of Belgium, a newly created state one-and-a-half times the size
of Wales or New Jersey. Belgium - its name referred to Belgica, the Latin word
for the Netherlands - was an artificial state. It was inhabited by two
different peoples: Catholic Dutchmen, referred to as Flemings (after Flanders,
one of their historical regions) in the North, and French-speaking Walloons
in the South (Wallonia). What became Belgium, at the time was the easiest path
between France and Germany and the best avenue for entry of British goods to
the Continent.
Case Study: In search of a Kingdom
What became Belgium, at the time was the
easiest path between France and Germany and the best avenue for entry of
British goods to the Continent. Next to its central geographic location.
frequent invasions of what later became, Belgium territory were also a result
of its economic significance for the region.1 Thus, its French and Femish Provinces remained a persistent object of contention
between the French to the west and the Germans to the east, while both Spanish
and Austrian monarchs ruled the provinces from 1556 to 1792. The French however
remained the fiercest and most adamant claimants of Belgian’s Flemish
territories. They captured the Flemish Provinces in 1792, lost them the
following year, only to regain and annex them in 1794.2 In addition, the period
between 1776 and 1790 was characterized by instability and a series of
insurrections that broke out in different countries.3 This period of volatility
ended in 1814 with the disintegration of Napoleon's empire, which put the fate
of its Nordern French and Flemish provinces in the
hands of European diplomats. Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo and the loss of the
‚Belgic‘ Provinces, even though it caused heartache
for the French, did not discourage them from pursuing their dream of
re-annexation of Belgium.4 With the fall of Napoleon, the Holy Alliance
developed into a super-national league for the suppression of revolutions and the
upholding of the principle of monarchical legitimism.5
The actions taken by the Holy Alliance
almost erased the dividing line between international affairs and the domestic
affairs of a state. It was more than a question of recognition or
non-recognition. Rather, it was an imposition of a regime by external force, an
intervention in the internal affairs of a state in the most flagrant manner.
Some authors have asserted that the conclusion of the pious terms of the Holy
Alliance 6 in 1815 between Tsar, the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia
as well as the righteous resolutions adopted three years later by the Congress
of Aix-Ia Chapelle of 1818,7 with regards to the the sanctity of international treaties were a mere staged
show. According to their opinion, the emphasis on law and religion served
only to mask the real intention of the Powers. Throughout the years, their main
goal was to maintain the territorial status quo and to prevent democratic
tendencies from threatening the privileges of the governing classes and the
absolute rule of the princes. The central goal of European powers remained
buttressing the well-established balance of power system determined at Vienna
regardless ofthe cost that
effort entailed.8 The peace settlements reached at the Peace of Paris in 1814
and the Treaty of Vienna in 1815 clearly reflected the value of the state over
the nation. During this period territories were bartered among the
sovereigns.10
When one sovereign lost a contested
territory, he was compensated with another. The use of the terms
"souls" rather than "citizens" to describe the populations
a sovereign would receive in compensation symbolized the view that states existed
apart ftom their people. This is also evident in the
fact that dynastic claims of territory were favored over national claims by
newly liberated peoples throughout Europe. Between 1815 and 1848 intervention
was a device used by great powers to control and
assist the governments of weaker states.11 They however wanted to differentiate
between intervention and war and even though they did intervene on a number of occasions, none of those acts were preceded by a
declaration of war. There was a manifest determination amongst the great powers
to establish the principle that intervention by force in the internal affairs
of another state was a legitimate and legal act. Congresses, treaties and peace
acts, which were quite frequent during this period, were a way of establishing,
formalizing and confirming that legitimacy. The powers derived their legitimacy
from the shared assumption that they were guardians of the peace of Europe.
Maintenance of peace and stability was the moral obligation of the Great Powers
and their right and duty to ensure it was not disturbed by others. These rights
and obligations were based on accomplished facts and binding treaties. The
legitimacy of intervention was grounded in the rights, which belonged to the
great powers and the assumption that peace between states depended upon the
maintenance of order within states. This principle was evident in the words of
Austrian minister Klemens von Metternich who asserted: "when domestic
social unrest makes it impossible for a government to meet its treaty
obligations that bind it to other countries, the right to intervene belongs as
clearly and indisputably to every government which finds itself in danger of
being drawn into the revolutionary maelstrom, as it does to any individual who
must put out a fire in his neighbor's house if it is not to spread to its
own.“12
The right to intervention was presented
in a positive light, as Great Powers helping weaker states uphold their treaty
obligations, rather than Great Powers meddling into the affairs of other
states. This common policy and the way of thinking was undennined
in the 1820s and 1830s by disagreement amongst the great powers as to what
constituted disorder and whether turmoil in a particular country constituted a
threat to the peace of Europe. Fearing more revolutions and insurrections with
the exceptions of Great Britain and France, the Powers in November 1820 adhered
to the Troppau Protocol, which stated that: "States which have undergone a
change of Government due to revolution, the results of which threaten other
states, ipso facto cease to be members of the European Alliance, and remain
excluded from it until their situation gives guarantees for legal order and
stability. If owing to such alterations immediate danger threatens other
states, the powers bind themselves, by peaceful means, or if need be by army to bring back the guilty state into the bosom of
the Great Alliance."13 Intervention remained central to the 'Congress
System' and rather controversial as Great Britain strongly opposed the Powers
intervening into the affairs of other states.14
British Foreign Secretary Castlereagh
rejected the Protocol and the claim that intervention was the duty of the
Alliance and officially declared the text as a clear violation of international
law. 15 Castlereagh established the British position in a paper of May 5, 1820,
stating that the Quadruple Alliance was an alliance for the "liberation of
a great proportion of the Continent of Europe from the military dominion of
France...It never was, however intended as an Union for the Government of the
World or for the Superintendence of the Internal Affairs of other States.“16
Britain and France believed that the right to intervene rested solely on the
appeal of the government in distress for assistance. They adamantly rejected
the argument that a right of intervention belonged to the alliance of five
powers. Clearly they recognized two or more powers
could legitimately act together if they so wished, but
they could not claim to act in the name of the five. Howevert
some believe that the disagreement between the powers was more about the nature
and the purpose of the five-power alliance and the contest for its leadership
rather than a debate about the principle of intervention. 17
The great powers of Europe did not
consider the interests of smaller states, which increasingly rejected
absolutism and longed for constitutional guarantees. Establishment and
recognition of new states also fell into the realm of responsibility of the Great
Powers. The act of recognition was perceived as a stabilizer of security and a
tool for the maintenance of the
equilibrium among states. New entities were recognized as independent
states in order to either support the balance of power
system. Therefore, the great powers restored old rulers only where it suited them to do so, and their territorial arrangements
were designed primarily to satisfy strategic requirements, or to provide rough
justice by rewards, compensation or punishment. They were bound by no principle
of the self-determination of peoples or ethnic
groupings. Although nationalism was certainly used and discussed, its
expression and practice was strongly discouraged. For
the people and for their governments, the determination to return to peace was
far more compelling than liberal and nationalist ideas.18
In as far as the peacemakers of 1814 had any ideological motive, it was a
desire to establish peace under the system of balance of power, which meant
different things to different states. 19
The Buffer State
A French ambassador at the time of Louis
XIV commented that "The English will give the shirts off their backs to
prevent the French from penetrating into the Low Countries.“20
Similarly to the French, the British maintained a close interest in the fate of
the French and Flemish Provinces. The main reason behind this was Britain's
strong belief that their possession by France or any other country in Europe
would upset the balance of power and pose a threat to the British Isles. They
were fully aware of the danger implied by them shrewd comment made by Napoleon:
"Antwerp in the hands of a strong France was a pistol pointed at the heart
of England." 21 For military and economic reasons, the Northern
Netherlands also had a great stake in the fate of Belgium. These concerns were
the capstone governing the policies and conduct of foreign affairs of the great
European powers towards Belgium. Even though its size and military strength
seemed insignificant, due to its geographic location and strategic relevance
for the peace in Europe, Belgium's destiny was closely tied with the interests
of Great Britain, France and Germany. This country represented the focal point
on which the interests of the European powers converged. In turn due to the fact that most of its history is characterized by
foreign rule, Belgium depended on the great powers both militarily and diplomatically.In the 18th
century, long fortresses stretched along the border between the Habsburg-owned
Austrian Netherlands (Belgium) and France. Interestingly, even though the
fortresses were on Austrian soil, they were manned by Dutch garrisons in the
interest of Europe. The Austrian presence significantly impacted the balance of
power calculation as Austria was one of the four guarantors of the perpetual
union of the Austrian Netherlands with the united provinces to the north.22 It
was soon realized that fortification did not represent enough of a barrier to
stop the northward expansion of the French troops.23 Realizing this fact,
during the height of the allied offensive against Napoleon in the fall of 1813,
the stadtholder-in-exile, later King William I of the Netherlands, requested
the cession of all Belgium to Holland in order to build a new barrier against
French aggression.24
In fact this is
an example of the previously mentioned tendency of powers to make territorial
arrangements and designs in order to suit their needs.
The justification in granting William his wish was found in their 'duty' to
preserve peace in Europe and maintain the current order especially in the realm
of international security.The Kingdom of the
Netherlands which was created at the end of the Napoleonic Wars 25 was one of
the most deliberate and carefully motivated decisions of the Quadruple Alliance
of 1814.26 The United Netherlands consisted of Belgium Luxembourg and northern
Netherlands. This unhappy union was guaranteed by Austria, Prussia, Russia and
Britain. The British especially pushed for the rapid completion ofthe fortress building and made the most significant
investments in the project.27 The powers disposed of the Southern Netherlands
(meaning Flanders) first at the Peace of Paris on May 30, 1814, and by the
Final Act of the Vienna Congress on June 9, 1815 which stated: "In the
interests of European peace, and of the balance of power, the Southern
provinces were joined to the Northern Netherlands under the sovereignty of the
House of Orange-Nassau, in order to form together an indivisible state under
the constitution already existing in the North, altered to meet the
circumstances." William I was appointed as the new "legitimate"
king and accepted this disposition on July 21, 1814
and from March 16, 1815 commenced his rule of the
amalgamated kingdom.28
The primary goal of the Congress of
Vienna was to establish a new balance of power in Europe, which would prevent
imperialism within Europe, and maintain the peace between the great powers.
Moreover, it hoped to prevent political revolutions such as French Revolution
and maintain status quo. The Treaty of Vienna never consulted the Belgians
about the decision to unite them with Holland in order to form a barrier
against any French expansion and to preserve peace in Europe.29 Belgians who
had a history of conquests of their territory and rule by other powers,
perceived themselves as voiceless and knowing the 'rules' of the balance of
power system, they acquiesced to the wishes of the powers. After all, the
skills of diplomats of the Belgic provinces in conducting foreign relations
were rather limited as they had no experience in conducting their own foreign affairs.On the surface, Holland
took an possible measures to guarantee that the
relationship between the south and north would be based on equality. Two capitals
were established in Brussels and at The Hague, and the Estates General was
appointed to sit in each alternately. No discrimination was allowed between the
two peoples, and there was to be an equal number of
Belgian (but only french-speaking) and Dutch
deputies, which was to ensure that no part of the country would have a chance
of oppressing the other. The Constitution guaranteed freedom of worship for
both groups.30 Based on the above, the creation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
should have been welcomed in Belgium. On the contrary, it was a source of
disappointment for the Belgians whose dissatisfaction and grievances only
increased exponentially over time.The
worsening situation only exacerbated the differences between two peoples. The
antipathy between the Belgian representativs and the
Dutch is founded on the diversity of commercial and agricultural interests
between the two parts of the kingdom as well as on the opposition between the
religious principles.31 With respect to economy the Dutch had the traditional
economy of trade and very open while Belgians had less developed local
industries. Hence, while the Dutch wanted free trade, the Belgians called for
the protection of tariffs. Religion and language also pointed towards
significant differences between the French speaking Roman Catholic south and
the Dutch speaking Protestant north. These differences were probably not
sufficient to cause a riot however the worsening situation within the Kingdom
and the oppression of the Belgian population in Brussel awakened nationalistic
feelings helping the them to develop a sense of national identity. Between 1818 and 1830,
the system was anything but relaxed. The Allies tried to establish a series of
military and strategic servitudes for the Kingdom of Netherlands. claiming the
right to occupy the country and use it as a base of operations. The Duke of
Wellington was appointed the commander in chief of the quadruple Alliance, in
charge of supervising the fortress system while seeing to it that the King of
the Netherlands carried out his duties. In addition to the funds made available
by the French indemnity, each of the allied powers regularly contributed funds
to finance the construction and maintenance of the barrier. The military
planners of the German Bund considered the Netherlands defense system almost an
integral part of the Bund' s own lines, centering on Luxembourg.32
On the surface, it appeared that the
necessary strategic and political steps have been taken to ensure the success
and realization of the Congress of Vienna.However,
the powers were soon to be faced with an irreversible crisis that threatened to
shake up the established balance. History has shown that even an unlikely union
between different groups can survive the test of time provided it has strong
leadership able to afford the necessary balance and accommodate diverse needs.
King William's rule provided no such leadership and proved to be a bitter
disappointment to the Belgian people. Many foreign diplomatic observers noted
that King William I did not have the capacity and leadership skills necessary
to keep the union together. He failed to understand the religious and cultural
sensitivities of the Belgians.33 In response to the threat posed by Napoleon's
return from Elba, William I appointed a select commission of Belgians and
Hollanders to consider codifying the Fundamental Law of the Kingdom. The commissioners
agreed on a government which placed all authority in the hands of the king.
Ministers were responsible only to William, the King appointed over half of the
Senate, and the Second Chamber could only reject or approve but not amend
legislative proposals. An obstacle was encountered regarding representation in
the Chamber. The Belgians whose region possessed 3,400,000 inhabitants compared
with Holland's 2,000,000 insisted that representation be proportionate to the
size of the population. 34
The Dutch, on the contrary, were adamant
about the idea of equal representation.36 Another point of contention and
Belgian frustration was the fact that they bore greater responsibility in
paying taxes. These disagreements led the Belgian notables to reject the
modified Fundamental Law. As the French bourgeoisie (the Flemish although
making up a majority of 60% didn’t count) of Belgium increased in economic
power, they demanded a greater role in solving political and social questions
related to their interests. William's failure to uphold the sections of the
Fundamental Law regarding the independence of judges and the freedom of the
press was a grave aggravation for the Belgians. Instead of trying to
accommodate the Belgian demand, William I disregarded their claim and
proclaimed the law as accepted. This incident was an indicator of not only the
nature of the relationship between the French language Belgium people of
Brussels and the King but also of the status of Belgium and apparent lack of
its power in decision-making regarding the future of the country. Despite
disagreement with William's ruling, the Catholic party defended the position
and authority of the Roman Catholic clergy while the Liberals, under the
influence of the principles of the French Revolution, demanded more toleration
and less clerical influence. Yet both Catholic and Liberals were Roman
Catholics, and in their Catholicism shared a dislike for living under
Protestant rule.37
By his poor judgment and bad policies,
William managed to unite Liberals and Catholics into a united opposition. On
November 8, 1828 a National Coalition of Catholics and
Liberals was fonned under the fitting name of the
Union of Opposites. It endured for 14 years.The
conflict and the gap between the King and the Belgians which began at the birth
of the united state only continued to grow and deepen. Moreover, the fact that
the Dutch always thought of Belgium as a territory annexed to Holland rather
than as equal part of the state did nothing to alleviate grievances of the
Belgians.38 Even as early as 1819, the animosity between the Belgium and the
Dutchman was difficult to ignore. A large number of
French songs appeared in Belgium attesting to this: 'I'm not a Dutchman, And I
don't want to be one.Yes, I
am a Belgian, And that's what I think is grand. And I
am proud, upon my word, Of the name of my Fatherland.'39
Failing to recognize the signs of
growing displeasure, King William made an attempt to
promote national feeling of unity by urging the acceptance of Dutch as the
national and official language. This caused not only an outrage but a problem
for Belgians who spoke French or Walloon, which included nearly all the leaders
of society who had been placed there by the Napoleonic regime before. Even
though some concessions were made in 1829, by then a majority
of the leading figures of the south, receiving considerable support both
in Flanders and in Wallonia, were calling for autonomy from Dutch rule.40 Deep
dissatisfaction of Belgian people, which has been growing over the years, has
reached its culminating point. The situation in the country was ripe for action
and it was only a matter of time when Belgian grievances led by former bureacrats under Napoleon, would turn into violent protest.
While King William wrongly assumed that the patriotic lyrics of an opera could
not cause a disturbance, he saw no apparent reason to ban the performance of
the French Opera, La Muette de Partici in Brussels on August 25, 1830, even though it had
previously been prohibited.41However, it was precisely these lines of
sacrifice, bravery and righteousness that moved the audience at the Brussels
Opera house that evening and emboldened their feelings. The news of the Paris
July Revolution echoed and provided a further source of encouragement for the
Belgian bourgosie. At the beginning it was not clear
whether the revolt was aimed at the Great Netherlands state, Protestantism, and
constitution, the system of government, the government itself, or the Dutch
dynasty. One thing was indisputable; this was an attack on Holland.42 Grievance
and dissatisfaction under Dutch rule of the French speaking bureaucrats were
revived in an instant.Even though William's
overconfident temperament and political ideology played an important part in
the causes of the revolution, they provide insufficient explanation of the
events which unfolded.What became a minor
Revolution, occurred for more profound reasons.Frequently,
language, religion, and economics have been viewed as the underlying causes of
the revolt. Interestingly enough, British diplomats,
pointed to these factors as potential problem areas as early as 1814.43 The
basic causes of the eruption of 1830 were the deep beliefs of each people that
they were different, and that their uniqueness would be violated by the other
half.44
The Bruxellois
did not at first think about demanding a complete separation from Holland.198
An assembly of notables met three days after the outbreak and sent a delegation
to ask the King to consider their grievances and to discuss them with the
States General. A Committee of Public Safety was formed of which the majority
were moderates. Revolutionary groupings did call for a
provisional government but until September 20, it was all in vain. On the day
the by now both French and Flemish speaking masses
in the city, stormed the Brussels Hotel de Ville, the Committee of Public
Safety was disbanded as was the citizens' guard that had policed the city. This
clearly signified that the hold of the moderates was shattered.45 Thus, Berlin,
London, Vienna and St. Petersburg now, were confronted with the decision of
whether to lead armed aid to Holland in maintaining the status quo or whether a
different course was to be followed.46 Each of them individually considered
what was in the best interest for their countries. Tsar Nicholas I of Russia
was interested in the success of the Netherlands for
military, dynastic, and economic reasons and he profoundly feared French
expansion.47
The foreign minister of the new French
government, Count Mole, faced a dilemma regarding the issue of whether France
should allow the dispatch of British and Prussian troops to Belgium to restore
order or whether the proper policy should be to give aid to the insurrection.
Another option for the French was to stay neutral in this matter and leave
things up to the other European powers. During the rebellion, the British
seemed to support the Belgian efforts to challenge the existing order and break
into the European system. At first, London's reaction to the riots was
nonchalant. The British Foreign office was convinced that the Brussels affair
centered on local grievances. The Tory Prime Minister at the time of the
revolt, the Duke of Wellington, regretted the disruption of the Vienna system,
however at the time he did not want to pledge British military aid to King
William I, partly because he regarded him as a weak ruler and partly because
Britain was rather militarily weak. England's interests necessitated stable
relations with France, and when Mole indicated that France wished arrangement
of the Belgian matter, the Duke was willing to
cooperate. Mole took initiative by telling the Prussian ambassador in Paris,
Werther, that France would retrain from any
intervention in any country on her borders, as long as
no other major European state intervened first. By announcing this, France
proclaimed that any entry of Prussian troops into Belgium would be followed
immediately by the involvement of the French anny as
well.204 This decision was rejected by the European powers and only the British
cabinet expressed conditional agreement. Other powers were more willing to get
involved. The Prussians had mobilized at once and were prepared to march into
Belgium.
In October,
1830 King William I finally made an appeal for
help to end the insurrection although by then it was to late becouse Belgium
already declared itself as independent. The Dutch monarch based his appeal on
the Treaty of the Eight Articles, which has made the victorious powers
guarantors of his dominions. The French government was the first to take the
initiative. It appointed an experienced diplomat Talleyrand as the new
ambassador to the Court ofSt. James. His task was to
persuade the British government to call a conference of all the interested
powers to resolve the issue. William's ability to end the revolt was
questionable. However even attempting to do so might
have caused the French to move in and aid the Belgians. The Orange monarch
certainly could not risk a war against France without European support. In the meantime the fighting continued and
a large volunteer force arrived ftom Wallonia to
defend Brussels against the Dutch anny. Belgians
fought fiercely and defeated the Dutch in a battle that lasted for three days
outside the Brussels palace. On September 27 the Dutch withdrew. The Belgians
rather quickly formed a provisional government, which declared independence on
October 4, 1830. On November 3, a National Congress was fonned
by an electorate of 30,000 men. The same month, the issue of declaration of
independence was debated. On November 18, the following resolution was passed
unanimously: "The National Congress of Belgium proclaims the Independence
of the Belgian People on November 18, 1830, respecting at the same time the
relations of Luxembourg with the Germanic Confederation.“
Shortly thereafter the Conference of
London opened on November 4 1830 and was crucial in
determining the future of Belgium. The Great Powers, rather than Belgium and
Holland, occupied themselves with establishing the arrangements to
"combine the future independence of Belgium with the stipulations of the
Treaties with the interests and security of other Powers, and with the
preservation of European equilibrium.“ These phrases were the key to the final
resolution pertaining to the faith of Belgium, for they acknowledged that
Europe would recognize Belgium as an independent state. The Powers believed
that they possessed the authority, based upon the treaties and protocols of
1815 and 1818, to resolve Belgian affairs. The plenipotentiaries of Great
Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia and France declared at its first session that
it had been the intent of the great powers in 1815 to reestablish the peace of
Europe and create ajust equilibrium. The Conference
of London made an official declaration that in its judgment, it would not even
be possible to reunite the two countries without war.
In evaluating the conference, the
English historian Boulger~ who is considered anauthority
on Belgian history, commented:"The London
Conference has been cited as a proof of the concord of Europe; no one who reads
its sixty-three Protocols from end to end will find in its record proof of
anything but discord, -- the latent strife, the keen rivalry, of the five
Powers which then constituted Europe. The Conference that nominally dealt with
the fate of Belgium was concerned least of all with its interests. It wanted to
avert a general war, to maintain the balance of powers, to prevent Belpum falling to France, and to save Holland from being
too much weakened.“The
rivalry was mainly between England and France and both
took the initiative in determining the future of Belgium. It was Lord
Palmerston, one of the ablest Foreign Secretaries England ever had and the
French Ambassador Prince Talleyrand, the most prominent figure in European
diplomacy of that time, who gave Belgium her status among the European nations,
naturally to suit their own countries' purposes.On
its first day, the Conference issued the first of its seventy protocols. It
ordered the establishment of an armistice and the evacuation by both parties of
all areas, which had not formed a part of their respective territories prior to
May 30, 1814.213 The first protocol declared:
"The troops of both parties shall
withdraw behind the line which before the treaty of May 30, 1814
separated the territory of the Sovereign Ruler of the United Netherlands from
the provinces added to his dominions to form the Kingdom of the
Netherlands."
A change of British governments did not
work in favor of the Dutch as even before Palmerston replaced Wellington, the
Belgians made a gain when the conference proposed an armistice based on the
borders given Holland by the Treaty of Paris of 1814. The protocol further
benefited the Belgians by referring to them not as rebels but as recognized
belligerents which significantly promoted their cause in further
negotiations. Some of the main problems that arose at the conference
were related to the questions of boundaries, the division of the national debt,
the navigation of the rivers and canals. The international aspects included a
buffer between France and state to the northeast and the problem of the balance
of power and general security. There was a uniform belief among the European
Powers that a monarchy rather than a republic would be a preferred form of
government for Belgium. A republic could not have been acceptable to Palmerston
and would never have been tolerated by the Conservative Powers. Some politicians
went as far as claiming that if Belgium proclaimed itself a republic, it would
start a new revolution. Russia, Austria and Prussia were opposed to Belgian
independence. The simultaneous outbreak of revolution in Poland prevented a Russian-Austrian-Prussian military intervention in support
of William I against the rebellious Provinces. However, Lord Palmerston's new
government wholeheartedly supported recognition. It was precisely the
Franco-British coalition that imposed a reversal on the London Conference
affording Belgium its official independence in January 1831.218 The initiative and formal motion which initiated the process
of recognition was introduced by Lord Palmerston and seconded by Prince
Talleyrand on December 18, 1830. The text of the proposal indicated the
following: "In having provided by the treaties of 1814 and 1815, for the
union of Belgium and Holland, the powers...intended to create ajust balance of power in Europe and to assure the
maintenance of general peace. The events of the last four months have
unfortunately demonstrated that 'this perfect amalgamation' had not been
obtained and will be impossible of attainment, so that very objective of the unionof Belgium and Holland is destroyed and therefore it
is now indispensable that other arrangements be found to accomplish these
intentions...United to Holland, and being an integral part of the Kingdom of
the Netherlands, Belgium fulfilled its role in the European duties of the
Kingdom and the obligations laid upon it by the treaties. Its separation ftom Holland must not ftee it ftom this portion of its duties and obligations. The
Conference will occupy itself subsequently with discussing and agreeing on new
and proper arrangements to combine the future independence of Belgium with the
stipulations of the treaties, with the security interests of the other powers
and with the preservation of the balance of powers."
William protested also against a new
disposal by the Powers of Belgian provinces by claiming the following:
"Having once for all determined the fate ofthe
Belgian provinces, you have not according to intemationallaw,
the right to rescind your decision: to sever the ties binding Holland and
Belgium, is outside the sphere of your competency, the more so as this increase
of Dutch territory was granted on certain burdensome conditions.. .At the expense of several colonies and considerable
financial sacrifices. The Conference of London, it is true, met at my request,
but this circumstance does not give it the right to give to its intervention an
effect, diametrically opposed to the purpose for this it was requested.“ The
conditions, limitations and qualifications to full national sovereignty, which
the Conference pointed to in its seventh protocol, were the main subject of
deliberations during the month of January 1831. In two key protocols, the
so-called "Bases of Separation" of Belgium from Holland or the Eighteen
Articles are defined, and the main points of contention between the two
entities were addressed, not to everyone's satisfaction. First, the Conference
prefaced the fixing of the borders and the division of the public debt with
another declaration concerning the European obligations of the two nations. It
further pointed out to Brussels that any future arrangements would be
subordinated to the rights of the Conference members. Finally, the
plenipotentiaries made it clear to the Belgian authorities that no new Belgian
conquests or territorial aggrandizements were to be made at the expense of
Holland. The plenipotentiaries also added a condition that was to be achieved
with Belgian independence: "Belgium, within the limits described above. .
. will be constituted into a perpetually neutral state. The five powers will
guarantee it this perpetual neutrality, as well as the integrity and
inviolability of its territory, within the limits mentioned. By a just
reciprocity, Belgium will be constrained to observe the same neutrality toward
all other states, and not to disturb in any way their internal or external
tranquility.“ One week later, the conference issued anther
protocol which stated that:"Belgium assumes
16/31 of the total public debt of the former Kingdom of the Netherlands; that
while the final debt settlement was worked out by bilateral negotiations,
Belgium pay its share of the service charges; that Belgium should enjoy free
and unhampered trading privileges with the Dutch colonies." (Protocol No.
22 Annex B. January 18, 1831 (BFSP, XVIII)
The provisional Belgian government
rejected the territorial and the financial "Bases of Separation" and
refused to ratify these proposals. Rather than showing itself more
conciliatory, it seemed that Belgians gained new confidence and started increasing
their demands. London warned that in the event of Belgian failure to accept the
separation plan the powers would break off relations with Belgium and refuse to
recognize her independence. The choice of the new King was also a subject of
great debate. From the outset the Belgians decided that a prince of the House
of Orange-Nassau would under no circumstances be acceptable to them. By the
same token it was clear that if the French prince took the new Belgian throne,
French influence would have been so dominant in the new kingdom that its
annexation by France would only be a question of time. Lord Palmerston took
measures to prevent such a possibility by introducing a proposal according to
which no prince of the ruling houses represented at the conference would be
eligible for the Belgian throne. After a couple of eliminations, the British
Cabinet obtained on June 4, 1831 the election of its
own protege, Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, who had been married to
the late Princess Charlotte of Great Britain and Ireland and was known to
contemplate a second marriage with Louise of Orleans, daughter of the King of
the French.
Sponsored by the Conference, Leopold had
been engaged in weeks of negotiations with a Belgian deputation in London, the
essence of which was to negotiate the acquisition of Luxembourg for the choice
of Leopold as king and the acceptance of the remaining articles of the Basis of
Separation. Leopold's intimate adviser, Baron Stockmar,
confirmed that the powers were willing to accept this deal since they were
desperate by June for some sort of Belgian settlement, After the Treaty of
Eighteen Articles was announced on June 26, 1831, the Belgian National Congress
not only speedily elected Leopold King, but on July 12, 1831 accepted the
Eighteen Articles.229 It seemed that the armistice was finally achieved and
that the Europe was on its way to a solution to the Belgium problem. However,
King William flatly refused to even consider these terms. On August 2, 1831 Dutch troops invaded Belgium. As soon as Paris learned
of the events, especially of King Williams' refusal of the agreement, the Army
of the North comprised of 50,000 soldiers, under the command of Marshal Gerard,
marched into Belgium. The French decision was taken unilaterally, without
consultation with the Conference, in response to an urgent appeal from King
Leopold, whose army was loosing
the battle. At that point, rather than risking an engagement with the French
troops, the Dutch commander rapidly withdrew his forces. By August 14, 1831,
Belgium had been completely evacuated by the Dutch. As soon as the armistice
had been reestablished the plenipotentiaries returned to finding a final
settlement acceptable to both parties. It was becoming apparent that there was
no hope that Holland would accept the Eighteen Articles, nor could the status
quo be permitted to last indefinitely, as Belgium or Holland would recommence
hostilities, particularly over the bitter Luxembourg question. Threatening
Holland with a naval blockade to prevent further hostilities, the powers
extended the treaty draft on November 14, 1831 to a
definite and in-evocable instrument, to be adhered to not only by the two main
parties, but also by the conference powers themselves. Through this means, the
final and definite separation of the two countries was to be made binding on
all the major powers, who became the guarantors of the an-angement.
This was the famous Treaty ofthe Twenty.Four Articles, which
despite a seven year.delay
was destined to be the final arrangement establishing the independence of
Belgium, defining the borders and regulating the relations between not only
Belgium and Holland but also of Belgium and the rest of Europe. The territorial
extent of Belgium was fixed as in the two previous proposals, with some
exceptions. The second major provision dealt with mutual transit, navigation
rights and the partition of debt. In contrast to their earlier position, the
plenipotentiaries now ruled that the Belgian share of the joint debt would
amount to 8,400,000 florins of total annual charges, with Belgium being freed
from any payments pending the creation of the machinery for transferring the
money. The remaining fund of the Kingdom of Netherlands was to be divided
equitably through a bilateral agreement. In addition, not only was the
territory and the neutrality of Belgium guaranteed, but the financial, transit
and miscellaneous articles were placed under the protection of the conference
as well. While the Belgian government declared its readiness to ratify almost
immediately, The Hague refused. Berlin, Vienna or St.Petersburg seemed just as disinterested
and London and Paris did not exchange ratifications with Belgium either.The Article of Separation
of Holland and Belgium (article VII) read: "Belgium..
.shall form an independent and perpetually neutral
state. It shall be bound to observe such neutrality toward all other states.“Neutrality as an
institution of international law was then not without a precedent as in 1815
the Swiss confederation had been declared a perpetually neutral state.
Neutrality implied two types of obligations. Firstly, the Powers were not to
interfere in Belgium's internal affairs or to pursue against her any
annexationist policy. Secondly, Belgium was not to depart iTom
a strict impartiality in her relations with other countries. By extending to
Belgium the regime granted to Switzerland in 1815, the Conference confirmed
Belgian position as the "keystone of Europe" and in the eyes of the
Powers the Conference created a solid guarantee for the maintenance of peace.
The fruitless and tiresome negotiations
continued during the summer of 1832. Both the Belgian and Dutch governments
agreed to further talks, even though they both doubted their outcome. Both
parties continued to express their readiness to make concessions. However,
Belgium specified that before any agreement could be reached,the Dutch would have to evacuate the citadel
of Antwerp, which they had continued to occupy since the revolution. The Dutch
adamantly refused to do this until after agreement on the reserved articles had
been reached. Meanwhile Dutch warships and the batteries of the citadel
continued to obstruct the fteedom of navigation on
the river. Immediately after the French troops were safely pulled out of
Belgium, Britain and France reopened negotiations with the Dutch government.
Their ultimate aim was the full acceptance of the
Twenty-Four Articles by the Hague, but having as a
minimum objective the conclusion of some sort of a
provisional arrangement, pending the conclusion of a mutually acceptable final
treaty. On December 31, 1832, Palmerston and Talleyrand proposed to the Dutch
an interim agreement which provided for: "evacuation of all territory
still occupied by each party in defiance of the borders drawn by the treaty,
opening of navigation on the Meuse and the Schedlt,
the granting of amnesties and the exchange of prisoners, the opening of the Sittard trade route to Germany, mutual anns
reductions, to be followed by raising the blockade and embargo still in effect
against Dutch trade.“Britain and France demanded an
unlimited armistice and full Dutch recognition of Belgian neutrality. On March
9, 1833, a treaty was concluded at Berlin in which it was provided: ''that the
London Conference should be reconstituted after the cessation of all coercion
measures; that the Twenty-Four Articles should be the basis of an entirely new
negotiations, in which the Belgian and Dutch governments should participate as
equals; that the consent of the German Bund to the Luxembourg-Limburg
arrangements of the treaty of November 15, 1831 was an essential condition; and
the three monarchs agreed that any new arrangement could not put more onerous
conditions on Holland than those already agreed to" The new negotiations
would be broken off if a new attempt at coercing Holland was to be made.
Finally, the three rulers pledged to assist Holland if her territory were
attacked or if Britain and France were to act contrary to these stipulations.
The Conference reopened in London and
during the summer and fall of 1833 attempted to work out a new treaty that
would satisfy the wishes of the Dutch in the disputed transit and navigation
clauses ofthe Twenty-Four Articles. The demands of
Holland clearly indicated that they had no wish for a final treaty and the
negotiations made no progress. Finally, in November of 1833, Palmerston
demanded from the new Dutch plenipotentiary, whether the King had taken any
measures to obtain the consent of the German Bund to the proposed division of
Luxembourg and Limburg. Upon learning that William had not done so, Palmerston
declared the conference suspended until The Hague would give
evidence of being ready to accept the Twenty-Four Articles,
or show some positive desire to negotiate.
Amazingly, no such signals were given for the next five years
which ensured suspension of the conference over those
years. After reaffirming their opposition to compelling any settlement from the
Dutch and any changes in European public law due to revolutionary activity, the
three eastern absolute monarchs on September 20, 1833
began a long period of regarding Belgium as a public outcast. Britain and
France, on the other hand, immediately established full diplomatic relations
with Brussels and continued to conduct friendly diplomatic relations over the
course of the following five years. Eastern Europe opted for a different course
of action. Russia refused to recognize Leopold I and had no diplomatic
relations with Brussels. Berlin and VielUla showed
their displeasure with the new state by merely accrediting charges to Leopold.
In addition constant friction existed between Belgium
and Prussia over border issues, over the uneasy state of
affairs in Luxembourg, and over alleged Belgian's involvement in the
early Kulturkampfin the Prussian Rhineland, which
reached serious proportions in 1838.
The Final Settlement
In the period between 1833 and 1838
Belgium enjoyed the advantage of the interim arrangements. Those included full
control of all Luxembourg and Limburg, and furthermore no required payments on
the Belgian share of the debt. This state of affairs
became increasingly bothersome to unyielding William I who in March 1838,
suddenly declared his readiness to accept the Twenty-Four Articles, and
demanded immediate Belgian evacuation of the teritories
to be given to Holland. Now it was time for the Belgians, to protest
against the Twenty-Four Articles and to demand their alteration,
especially the financial and teritorial clauses. The terititorial exchanges were mostly to be made based on
languages spoken in the teITitories. The London
Conference found itself in full session again. By summer of 1838 the Conference
had come to a general agreement that while the Belgian share of the debt with
total annual charges of 8,400,000 florins, should be reduced in favor of
Belgium, the territorial division must be left unchanged. Naturally, Belgium
was outraged. It immediately reverted to the one technique that had worked in
the past. Volunteers gathered around the flags, ministries fell, Belgians armed
themselves and the demand for war echoed throughout the country. Leopold I
openly declared that Belgium would never acquiesce to such an agreement. This
opposition to the decisions of London continued during the
most of 1838. Finally, on December 6, 1838, the Conference presented
Brussels with an ultimatum in which the final terms were stipulated. Belgium
was to evacuate the disputed areas and in turn her share of the debt would be
reduced to 5,200,000 florins, and she would be freed from having to pay any of
the arrears, which had been accumulating since 1831.
Initially, France refused to accept and abide by the
ultimatum, which encouraged the Belgians to hold out for two more months.
However, after the unconditional Frence agreement
reached London, late in January 1839, the government of Leopold I was left with
no alternative. Confronted by unanimous determination of the Conference to
impose the final settlement on Brussels, the government indicated its
willingness to abide by the December 6, 1838 protocol.
The revised Twenty-Four Articles were signed by Belgium in May and ratified
early in June, 1839. The concert of Europe was
satisfied as it yet again managed to solve a crisis and preserve the balance of
power. It further assured the security of the powers and the new state through
unconditional Belgian independence and perpetual neutrality. Belgium paid the
price for its independence, for after all, it had been created to serve a clear
purpose. Europe had invested considerable money in building fortifications
designed for containing France. At the time it was unquestionable that
Belgium's independence heavily depended on the approval of Europe. Independence
was not something that Belgium could proclaim on its own and expect Europe to
easily grant it.
Leopold furthermore stated his view
that: "without comparative security by means of well regulated measures of defense, at the least, no
country, be it great or small, can be considered as possessing national
independence" The defense measures were taken by the Belgians both to
prepare for an attack and to gain recognition from the powers. In the minds of
the Brussels statesmen, the stronger the state became, the more likely it was
that the powers would show increased consideration for the Belgian point of view.
The small country seemed to want to make clear to the rest of Europe that it
had the courage to go against he
wishes of a larger power. Military development was undertaken not only for
defense, but also as a method of gaining the respect of other powers. Since
such activities would be expected of a great power, it seemed remarkable that a
newborn state would have the audacity and boldness to undertake such course of
action. Belgium, due to Holland's attitude, had reasons to act as it did.
However, without Leopold's insistence on military strength, the fortifications
would likely never have been considered.
There are a number of
reasons that explain Belgium's success. Palmerston' s willingness to come to
aid of the Belgian diplomats was essential. Coupled with this approach was a
tactic of claiming far more than Belgium could expect to get in hopes that more
might be won in the final settlement than if she only made modest demands. It
might be argued that this tactic reflected unrealistic hopes and even though at
times this was so, frequently it evidenced shrewd bargaining. Like the
diplomats of many new nations, the Belgians showed audacity, sometimes in their
bluff-calling tactics, at times in persistence and finally in their willingness
to include military action as their negotiations tool. The stubbornness of her
diplomacy reflected not only the diplomatic style of a small state working for
recognition but also that of a new revolutionary state determined to make a
mark on the world. Belgium's birth by violence in a time when order and
stability were watchwords created one of her greatest obstacles, however it
seemed that this approach worked in her favor in obtaining independence and
recognition. Having already gained independence by use of arms, Belgians were
too eager to resort to them as a solution to the negotiation stalemates. Their
strategy was to demonstrate their feelings and desires clearly and violently
with a threat of the use of force in hope that the powers would give way. Such
tactics may have been the mark of independence, but they of course aggravated
the powers that were trying to protect their established system. To a new state
in the 1830s as in the 1950s and 1960s, power seemed equated with military
force and independence with the fteedom to act as
one's wishes dictated. It was only in time that the Belgians became aware that
power possessed more than military attributes and that their own interests were
ftequently best served if they did not push their
rights as an independent nation to the extreme.Moreover,
it cannot be said that the recognition of Belgium's independence was the result
of the political sense and diplomatic skill of the Brussels leaders. How did
Belgium gain recognition? It was the consequence of an extremely simple
situation that had nothing to do with the Belgians, but that had an
irresistible influence on the powers meeting in London. Nobody, as things
stood, wanted another war. France did not want one because Louis Philippe knew
he would be risking his throne. Prussia did not want a war because she would be
beaten if she were not supported by England and Russia, and
would probably lose the Rhineland. Austria was against war because it was at
peace and knew that a war would be a jump into the unknown. The English
particularly feared ageneral war, because they knew
it would be detrimental for their interests. Even though they would have
preferred to see the restoration ofthe Kingdom of the
Netherlands they had created in 1815, the British knew that in a general
conflict, whoever won whether France or Russia, would gain the leadership of
Europe. The British were satisfied with the status they had in Europe and
feared that a war would weaken their power. If the coalition were victorious,
Russia would be powerful enough to seize Constantinople and the eastern
Mediterranean and thus to threaten English hegemony in India. By the same
token, if France won, she would annex the left bank of the Rhine and would then
be in a position to resume her struggle against
England. Therefore the British diplomats realized from
the beginning that the Belgian incident must be taken seriously and that it
could only be brought to an end by a compromise, and
they perceived only two possible solutions to ensure peace. The first option
was the status quo, consisting of the recognition of Belgian independence, and
turning over Limbourg and Luxemburg to Holland as compensation. This was the
easier solution, since everybody would keep what he had, and it would give some
measure of satisfaction to Prussia, while Belgian independence was in itself a victory, or at least an advantage for France and
England.
The second option was partition, which
would be inevitable if no compromise could be reached, and
would be the only way of avoiding war. This option would have involved giving
Brussels and Ghent to the Dutch, Liege and Luxemburg to the Prussians, and the
rest of Wallonia to France. Everybody would thus get something and there would
no longer be any point in fighting a war as the balance of Europe would be
maintained. All statesmen present in London were in reality
only seeking a means of keeping the balance and power in Europe to
preserve the peace. As Belgian barrister, Pierre Graux,
remarked: "the five great powers were to use their right of recognition
only with the utmost rigor. The Belgian revolution threatened to ruin the
edifice so painfully established by the diplomacy of 1814 and 1815 for the
maintenance of European peace". The Kingdom of the Netherlands, on which
so many hopes had been placed, was no longer in existence, and Belgium brought
back some concerns which were thought resolved. Thus, the five Powers at London
in their desire to assign to Belgium an inoffensive and peaceful place in
European politics, in their own interest and not in order to
grant a favor to the new state, established the perpetual neutrality as a
condition of their recognition. Belgian opinion was but scantily informed of
the realities of diplomacy.
The easy victory of September 1830 had
gone to the country's head and there was opposition to the idea of giving up
Maastricht and Luxemburg. Many of the insurgents would have preferred a general
war and they even believed they would be able to take France into it with them.
European powers knew better.Lauterpacht
justified the Belgian case on grounds of "collective intervention,“
but the parties themselves seemed to have acted as much upon the assumption of
a continuing right to enforce and regulate terms of the Congress of Vienna. Lauterpacht explained that the European powers acted
together in order to preserve the balance of power on
the continent. In this case it is obvious that political interests and balance
of power had great impact on the progress and decision-making behind
recognition of Belgium. The country gained independence and resigned itself to
accepting neutrality as a condition to be achieved by that independence against
her will; it was for her the price of independence, the ransom of her liberty.
Hedley Bull argues that "after the American and French revolutions the
prevailing principle of international legitimacy ceased to be dynastic and
became national or popular. It came to be generally held that questions of this
sort should be settled not by reference to the rights of rulers, but by
reference to the rights of the nation or the people. The dynastic marriage, as
the means whereby acquisition of territory was made internationally
respectable, gave place to the plebiscite; the
patrimonial principle to the principle of national self-determination. In the
case of Belgium, this claim applied only to a limited extent. National
self-determination and international legitimacy were factors in the recognition
of Belgium, but only as long as those principles did not stand in the way of
the goals and ambitions ofthe Great Powers. Having
provided a detailed analysis of the Belgian secession from the Kingdom of
Netherlands and the actions taken by the Great Powers, it is questionable
whether this study is about state recognition or if it is a case of
intervention. Even though the Kingdom was created to serve the interests of the
powers, it was still an independent, sovereign and legitimate entity operating
independently of other powers. There was never a contract that was signed in
which the Kingdom acquiesced to the power to handle its internal or foreign
affairs. The Great Powers did more than merely recognize Belgium as an
independent state. They intervened into the affairs of The Netherlands, ensured
cessation of fighting and determined the future of Belgium. The great powers however followed the activities inside the Kingdom
rather closely and commenced to meddle into its
affairs at the first sign of problems. Immediately after the Belgians declared
their independence, the powers intervened by organizing the London conference
to 'diagnose' the situation and provide clear solutions that would be strictly
in their interest. The legitimacy or the right of such intervention on the part
of the great powers was never questioned. The great powers appointed themselves
as the guarantors of the peace in Europe, a title
which seemed to have afforded them unlimited powers
making them the final arbiter of the fate of all other countries. Recognition
was extended to Belgium after the realization that it would be impossible to
unite the divided Kingdom. The deliberation at the conference was not about
whether the recognition should be extended, about its timing, appropriateness
nor regarding any type of statehood criteria which may have been required for
Belgium to satisfy prior to being recognized into the community of nations.
Rather, it was strictly about ensuring the preservation of the balance of power
system and about the future of Belgium as a buffer state serving the interests
of the great powers and maintaining the peace in Europe. Belgium gained
recognition based on the general criteria of statehood which included having
its own government, territory, permanent population and ability to conduct
foreign relations. However this criterion was combined with specific interests
of the great powers, most of which were strategic in nature, which also played
a significant role in Belgium's recognition.
Thus where Belgium was a clear example of collective
intervention, this was also the case with former Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Kosovo,
where the powers intervened and recognized the nascent republics against the
wishes of the mother state. However, even with the consent of the mother
country, the recognition of Belgium was a case of intervention. The great
powers decided that the crisis could not be resolved and that they needed to
decide the fate of Belgium.Therefore intervention
through recognition was a self-imposed right and prerogative of great powers
that were only acting in their self-interest which coincided with the goal of
preserving peace.
Case Study: Conquering the Kingdom
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