Covering all issues
involved with the break-up of Yugoslavia is not an easy task as it has to take in
account the differing sides and ethnic communities of six republics involved in
Yugoslavia. It furthermore should clarify previously neglected details like for
example why among others, the World War II concentration camp Jasenovac in the
Independent State of Croatia (NDM, became a contested site for competing
memories between Serbs and Croats in Yugoslavia. At Jasenovac, the most
infamous camp in the NDH, Croatian Ustaga killed
thousands of Serbs. After the war the new communist leader, Josip Broz Tito,
decided to mask the ethnic dimensions of this tragedy. In the official
narrative of Jasenovac there was no mention of the targeted victims (Serbs,
Jews, and Gypsies). While the way to achieve justice and heal the wounds of
those injured would have been to memorialize the atrocities truthfully, Tito's
official narrative of World War II impeded reconciliation and healing. Tito's
decision to cover up WWII ethnic conflict had several consequences. Without
justice there is no healing and without healing it is more likely the violence
would eventually re-erupt, in a cycle of revenge. And while the underlying
economic and political conflicts that precipitated the violence remained
unresolved; with no commitment to discovering the truth about Jasenovac and
other mass atrocities during WWII, later national narratives appeared without
constraint, which only further inflamed the hatred between in this particular
example, the Serbs and Croats (Croatia started EU membership talks along with
Turkey in 2005 and may join the EU by the end of the decade). We
will in fact cover Jasenovac related issues in Belgium to
Kosovo P.4. But the
importance of studying the phenomenon of nationalism furthermore is to
understand its challenge to international peace, stability, and relations in
the growing number of violent conflicts described and justified in terms of
ethnicity, culture and religion. As the experience with Yugoslavia‘s six
republics, and the Balkans as a whole once more illustrates, nationalism can be
a potent divider of ethnic groups and a dangerous, even deadly tool driving
people into a civil war. Hence, it should not surprise that Nationalism is
often used as a scapegoat and a mask for real intentions or reasons behind a
conflict. It is oftentimes a tool for reaching political aims. This was for
example evident in Bosnia and Herzegovina in which after recognition Bosnian
Serbs pledged their allegiance to Republika Srpska
and Belgrade while Bosnian Croats did the same to Herzeg-Bosna and to Zagreb.
What we thus set out to examine with „From Belgium to Kosovo” is also,
the extent to which historical claims to statehood and/or memories of statehood
play a role in decision-making regarding whether an entity becomes a state and
whether it is recognized as such by the international community. Whether
historical memories and statehood have an impact on entities' drives and desires
to achieve statehood; whether historical memories or drive towards independence
play a role in the decision to grant recognition to an aspiring entity; the
role of nationalism and the extent to which it can be on the one hand a potent
force that unites ethnic groups and on the other a deadly, destructive
mechanism that can be manipulated to accentuate differences, promote hatred and
deepen a divide between ethnic groups. The working definition of a state for
the purposes of analyzing the upcoming three cases of Slovenia, Croatia and
Bosnia; is that it is the authoritative and legitimate political institution
that is sovereign over a recognized territory.1 Additional criteria that will
be considered are the general criteria outlined in the Montevideo Convention requiring each state to have a permanent population,
defined territory, government and ability of that government to enter into
relations with other states.
Slovenia
The Slovenes were
converted to Catholicism in the 10th century and fell under the dominion of the
Habsburg Empire in the 13th century. They remained a part of that empire until
the 20th century and as such their primary "other" for much of their
history was the Catholic Austrian and Hungarian Empires. As such, there was a
time wherein the Slovenes were somewhat separated from their heritage - as in
the Czech case. The reformation had some impact in Slovenia, but was quickly
quelled by the counterreformation. In addition, during the 19th century, as
Slovene identity began to strengthened, it did so in response to Hungarian and
Austrian identity. The presence of the Ottoman Turks was, however, always
apparent, and often disrupted Slovenian life. As a result, the religious
dimension never fully subsided. Once Slovenia was integrated into the Yugoslav
state, the Serbian efforts at dominance created tension within the Slovenian
community as it did in the Croat community. Ultimately this tension proved less
severe than the Serb-Croat tension. As a result, although there is no current
religious frontier for Slovenia, the frontier created by a Serb-dominated
Yugoslavia in the latter part of the 20th century did lead to Catholic ties to
Slovenian Nationalism. The main threat to Slovenian identity over the years has
come from Austrian and Hungarian dominance. This fact changed, however, in the
20th century with the creation of Yugoslavia. As a result of the multiple
religions within the Yugoslav state, a new emphasis was placed on Catholicism
in Slovenia. When Yugoslavia crumbled in the 1990s, Slovenia was the first to
move for independence - an act that led to a brief war between Slovenia and
Yugoslavia. The Slovenian victory allowed for a swifter transfer to independence
than was possible in Croatia or Bosnia. As a result, there was a clear threat
involved (a 10 day war was fought); however, the threat was less than in other
former Yugoslav states. The impact is clear. One could argue that the public
presence of the Catholic Church in Bosnia and Croatia, manifested in the
affirmation of the collective-national as a dominant social value, and the
failure of the Slovenian Catholic Church to have the same role and influence,
was shaped by the conditions of the wars in Bosnia and Croatia and the mainly
peaceful transition from communism to democracy in Slovenia. Therefore, the
religious frontier in Slovenia was less significant than in many of its
neighbor states, and when it was significant, the threat was relatively minimal.
Nationalism in Slovenia is, as a result of the mixed circumstances listed
above, partially linked to religion and partially secularized. In terms of
demographics, the Slovenian people are largely Catholic - over 71 % in the 1990
census. Interestingly enough, in the ten years to follow, the rate of self identification dropped rather drastically to slightly
over 57%. It is no coincidence that the significantly higher figure occurred
during a time of national struggle for independence from a religiously differentiated
group - the Orthodox Serbs. This shift to secularism has continued, but it has
been accompanied by a continued emphasis on religious identity in society. For
instance, "In the period from September 2001 to February 2002, mass media
have participated in the perpetuation of the dominant perception of the Muslim
community and Islam as inherently alien to Slovenia. In addition, there is a
formal separation of religion and state, and this is reflected in policies such
as abortion (Slovenia allows abortion in most cases). Religion played an
important part in Slovenian nationalism for a relatively brief period of time.
The modem concepts of
nationalism did not develop among Slovenes until the eighteenth century largely
due to the fact that for many centuries they lived as part of a medieval
Europe. This is mainly because the Slovenes enjoyed the same rights as other ethnic
groups and felt no need to express their 'separateness'. In the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries most Slovene lands became a part of the Habsburg feudal
domain. Until 1918, the majority of Slovenes lived in the Austrian half of
Austria-Hungary.2This fact is essential in understanding many differences
between the Slovenes and the Serbs.3 The very first Slovene national program
was formulated in 1848 with a goal of unifying their administratively split
ethnic territory into one. Since the Slovenes did not have a medieval tradition
of statehood, their demands were based on the principle of natural law.4
Until the fall ofthe Dual monarchy, the demand for a unified Slovenia
remained the main goal of the Slovene national movement, which took on a mass
character in the second half of the nineteenth century.5 The period ftom the French Revolution to the Congress of Vienna, 1789
to 1815, drastically changed the lives of all Europeans, including the
Slovenes. For the intellectuals, French political thought combined concepts of
nationhood and homeland that will become a political entity at some point in
the future.5 Slovenes were significantly affected by two decades of war and
between 1809 and 1813 found themselves under French Imperial rule. During the
four-year lifespan of France's Illyrian provinces, its population was exposed
to an enlightened French administration. The French encouraged the use of the
local language, which they preferred to the use of German, the language of the
defeated Austria. Slovenes used the vernacular in schools, courts, newspapers
and text books. Some Slovenes even enjoyed the privilege of being part of the
French administration, which had its seat in its current capital, Ljubljana.
The liberties Slovenes enjoyed during this period in time had a significant
role in the development of a sense of unity and nationhood.
It thus was after
1815 the Slovenes embarked on the nationalistic road, passing the point of no
return.6 Slovenian nationalism did not have a proper opportunity to flourish
until the Habsburg rule which was validated by the Treaty of Vienna in 1815. As
in most historic cases of nationalism, it was the intellectuals and clergy that
shaped Slovene identity. The first political agenda for "United
Slovenia" was formulated in 1848 by a group of intellectuals who promoted
the joining of all Slovene inhabited lands within the Habsburg Empire and the
right of public use of Slovenian language in schools and administration.7 The
Slovenes who were for the most part satisfied with their rights and freedoms
within Austria, were not separatists, and practiced non-secessionist
"quiet nationalism.“8 This urge for the unification can only be
interpreted as a desire to preserve and further develop their culture and
preserve Slovene tradition. Slovene aspirations for statehood became pronounced
in the final stages of the Habsburg Empire in the 19th century as the Slovenes
for the first time began to think of themselves as being a nation. This drive
developed simultaneously with Slovenes becoming more aware of their uniqueness
and separateness from other peoples in Europe. This delay in expressing a
desire for a separate state was largely due to realpolitik thinking of the
pre-1914 era that favored the powerful nations like France and Germany, that
possessed large militaries and sound economies. The thinking of the time made it
clear that the small nations of central Europe were better served operating
under the umbrella of the Habsburg Empire. Its proclaimed raison d'etat was
protecting small national communities such as that of Slovenia of only one
million.9
It was evident that
the political climate at the time did not favor formation of small states which
likely played a role in the lack of aspirations for independence of small
entities. Hence, even if there was a secret desire among the Slovenes to form
their own entity, the idea would not have been supported by powerful Empires
and states which controlled the international arena. In their eyes, smaller
states were unable to defend themselves and would have only weakened the
stability in Europe. The first time Slovene socialists' made a
contribution to the idea of Yugoslav ism, was in the Tivoli Resolution of 1909.
Along with political demands, the Tivoli document contained a comprehensive
cultural program, advocating cultural amalgamation. It called for the national
unification of all Southern Slavs, irrespective of name, religion, alphabet and
dialect or language.In the years before the First
World War, all three Slovene parties, the Catholic, Liberal, and Social
Democrat party together and introduced the Yugoslav idea. The dissolution of
Austria-Hungary which came with the end of the First World War in 19 presented
an opportune moment for the realization of unification goal which was achieved
on December 1, 1918 between the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs (SCS)10 and
the Kingdom of Serbia.11
The period between
the unification and the adoption of the constitution on June 1921 represented a
period during which provisional authorities were to accomplish the transitional
tasks of getting the state's boundaries recognized and signing the peace treaty.12
The borders of the Kingdom were established at the Versailles Peace Conference
which commenced on January 18, 1919.13 In order to ensure its political status,
peace, stability and borders SCS signed several international agreements.14 The
creation of SCS did not mean however that the South Slavs would befree of
foreign intrigues and hostilities. The defeated powers in World War I, as well
as Italy, made no secret of their hostility towards the new state, a hatred
that was to continue for the two decades of the First Yugoslavia's existence.
Italy, which was present at Versailles, strongly resisted the creation of SCS.
This was largely due to its interest in acquiring some of the SCS territories.
On September 12, 1919 Italy occupied the city of Rijeka. Pressured by the
Entente powers to sign the peace agreement with SCS, Italy returned Rijeka in
exchange for islands of Cres, Losinj, Lastovo and Paiagruza.15 The first Great Power to recognize
the new state was the United States in February 1919.16
The history of the
first Yugoslavia ended in collapse as Germany and Italy invaded a weak and
divided country on 6 April 1941. The Nazis were able to break the country up,
making Serbia a German Protectorate, annexing parts of Slovenia and Istria to
Italy, and creating a so-called Independent State of Croatia on the territory
of Croatia and Bosnia. After the Second World War on November 22, 1945,
Yugoslavia was united as a Socialist Federal Republic (SFRJ) by the Partisans
and it consisted of six republics and two autonomous provinces. The old
Yugoslavia was recreated as a federation in which each of the South Slav
peoples would have a framework for self-determination and a stake in the new
state. Slovenia was one of the six republics which in the SFRJ enjoyed great
economic prosperity and was allowed to develop politically while having equal
rights as the other republics. The root of Slovene nationalism was based on the
belief in the linguistic and cultural distinctness of the Slovene people. Since
the 19th century, Slovene intellectuals had standardized the language and used
it to create sophisticated literary writings. Intellectuals promoted belief
that the federal republic of Slovenia and its legislative and political
authority was the chief political instrument in the task of guarding its
cultural distinctness.17 This belief will remain a central argument for
Slovenian nationalism and quest for independence. Today's Slovene intellectuals
often consider themselves as successors to the creators of Slovene nationhood,
with a task of guarding its cultural and linguistic distinctness. From their
point of view the federal republic of Slovenia, and its legislative, economic
18 and political autonomy was the chief political instrument in this task.
The most real and
tangible threat to Slovenenian uniqueness and
distinctness, as well as autonomy, was expressed in a Memorandum 19 of the
Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1986. This document, though never
officially published, was widely circulated. What caused the uproar was the
rather strong tone of certain chapters, which proclaimed that the entire
Serbian race was threatened by an anti-Serb conspiracy. It stated: "The
physical, political, legal and cultural genocide of the Serbian population in Kosovo
and Metohija is the worst defeat in its battle for liberation that the Serbs
have waged from 1804 until the revolution in 1941.“20 The Memorandum further
faulted Slovenia and Croatia for their economic development which far exceeded
that of Serbia and poorer republics mainly Kosovo and Metohija. It cites that
this economic superiority was achieved through political influence and
manipulation.21 The document also points out that the integrity of the republic
had been destroyed and that the "Serbian people cannot peacefully wait in
such a situation“22. This sentence left the Slovenes wondering as to what
action the Serbs might take to remedy it. Without a doubt the Memorandum was
written as a reaction to the realization on the part of Serbian elite that
their political and economic development was lagging behind that of Slovenia
and Croatia. Often unfounded accusations directed towards Slovenia were made
out of fear that Slovenia has reached the highest level of independence and
development and that it would soon result in their request for independence
from Yugoslavia. Slovenia defended the Albanians in Kosovo in part as it felt
threatened.23 However, it soon realized that their focus should be on guarding
their own sovereignty, which resulted in their abandonment of Kosovo. The
Memorandum was the key political tool which Slobodan Milosevic abused in order
to portray Serbs as victims and climb to power in 1987. He promised to make
Serbia 'whole' again by repairing the damage done by the 1974 Constitution and
ending autonomy for the provinces. Milosevic's campaign against the Albanians
in Kosovo and for the restoration of the province to the republic, using
'street democracy', frightened other Yugoslavs.
Partially in response
to the draft, in 1987 the editors of the Ljubljana based journal Nova Revija requested from a diverse group of Slovene
intellectuals their views on the Slovene national programme.
Several authors pointed to the absence of Slovenian armed forces and argued for
the need to assert Slovenia's sovereignty and the formation of its own military
force.24 The main concern for all the authors was finding the right road for
Slovenian independence in the future. In the early 1980s the first political
dissident groups emerged in Slovenia. Two prominent examples included the
Alternative movement comprised of Slovene youth (Mladina).25
Their true ambition was disassociation from the Balkan Southerners, mainly
Serbs, who according to this group lacked European culture.26 Milan Kucan, who
became a prominent politician and president of Slovenia, voiced his opposition
by saying: "Slovenes cannot regard as their own any state that does not
secure the use of their mother tongue and its equality and in which the
freedom, sovereignty and equality of the Slovene people is not guaranteed.“27
The first alternative political party, the Slovene Democratic Alliance was
formed and Nova Revija, became its platform for the
free expression of nationalistic sentiment. Founder of the new party, Dimitrij
Rupel was one of the contributors to the 1987 Nova Revija
issue arguing for Slovenia's political as well as cultural independence. Joze Pucnik, who was also a contributor for Nova Revija, formed the Slovene Democratic Alliance, committed
to the drafting of a new Slovenian constitution and institutionalizing the
republic's sovereignty.28
This encouraged the
establishment of more parties such as the Slovene Christian Democratic Party,
the Green Alliance and the Slovene Craftsmen's party, the Slovene Farmers'
Alliance, all of which having already worked together in the Committee for the
Defense of Human Rights, formed the opposition coalition bloc in January 1990
famously known by its Slovene acronym DEMOS. In September 1989, Milan Kucan
asserted Slovenia's right to secede from the Yugoslav federation.29 A series of
constitutional amendments was passed by the Assembly of the Republic of
Slovenia enabling the republic's organs to proclaim a state of emergency in the
republic and codifying the Slovenian state organs' duty to defend and protect
the republic against any federal organs.30 This represented the first in the
series of legislative moves asserting full Slovenian sovereignty over its
affairs. Another important development was the transformation of the Communist
party of Slovenia into a Slovene National Party. A member of the Committee memorably
claimed that in the process the Communist party 'highjacked' the national cause
from the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights for its own purposes. 31 The
Slovene Communist Party delegation walked out of the Fourteenth Extraordinary
Congress of the Communist party of Yugoslavia in January 1990, refusing to be
outvoted on its proposal to confederalize the
Yugoslav Communist party. It soon took drastic measures by abandoning Marxism,
changing its name, programme, flag and image and
adopting a new slogan 'Europe now', while presenting itself as a national party
of the Slovenes fighting for a sovereign state within a new confederal
Yugoslavia.32 While the opposition DEMOS parties differed greatly among
themselves in their ideological programmes, they were
united in their rejection of Yugoslavia as an 'exhausted concept'. In the
elections for the lower chamber of the Slovenian assembly in April 1990 the
communist Party of Democratic Renewal got 55 per cent of the vote; the
coalition formed the first post communist government
in Yugoslavia with the prime minister Lojze Peterle. In the second round of
voting, Milan Kucan won the presidential election. Even though they held
different political views, former dissidents were in the Government, united by
a common goal of Slovenia's independence and secession from Yugoslavia. The new
Slovene government accelerated preparations for Slovenia's independence, by now
supported by an overwhelming majority of Slovenes. At a referendum held in
December 1990,88.2 per cent voted for independence.33
The Struggle
Serbia and its
satellites within the Collective Presidency of the SFRY decided to block the
automatic rotation to the office of President of the Presidency that is,
nominal head of the SFRY, to the Croatian representative, Stipe Mesic. The
Serbian bloc did so to create conditions for a 'state of emergency' in which
the army would declare martial law. Although Serbian representative to the
Collective Presidency Borisav Jovic had discussed this possibility with army
chief General Veljko Kadijevic, it did not emerge as Kadijevic opted to act cautiously and, in his own
terms-constitutionally. 34 From this point the SFRY, already crippled by the
inter-republican quarrels, ceased de facto to function. Mesic argued that the
purpose of this was to end Yugoslavia.35 The leaders of the national parties
anticipating that the Jugoslav National Army (JNA) would provide resistance to
their quest for independence started forming their own armed forces. While
Slovenes were opening champagne bottles and celebrating on the streets of
Ljubljana, the new government was preparing for a military confrontation.26
Slovenia utilized its intelligence network in the Yugoslav army's headquarters,
and discovered the army's plans to counter the Slovenian take-over of Yugoslav
federal institutions in Slovenia.27
The Yugoslav army
high command viewed Slovenia's planned secession as part of a foreign,
primarily German, plot to partition federal Yugoslavia and thus to weaken its
armed forces. The JNA saw it as their constitutional duty to preserve and
protect the territorial integrity of the country and prevent any partition. By
seeking to instigate military confrontation, the Slovene government hoped to
achieve not only unity in Slovenia but European intervention and an
international recognition of its independence. The major obstacle to their
independence was the refusal of the US and the EC to recognize any unilateral
secession of Yugoslav republics.28 However, Slovenia made one of its wisest
diplomatic decisions by establishing contacts in Austria, Germany and other
European countries and making the argument for European security. The Slovenes
claimed that the conflict would not only be a threat to Slovenian security but
also a threat to Europe as a whole. Placed in the context of European security,
the conflict in Yugoslavia attained a new dimension.29
One of the main
tactics of the Slovene defense ministry was its clandestinely imported weaponry
to be used for a show of force that hardly anyone in Belgrade anticipated. On
25 June 1991, the day of the proclamation of independence, the initial Slovene
operations moved forward by taking over the international border crossings in
Slovenia and erecting a border crossing with the federal republic of Croatia.
By using the intelligence from the Yugoslav federal army's headquarters, the
Slovenian forces were initially able to stop almost all of the Yugoslav army's
armed units as they moved out of their barracks in Slovenia to regain control
over borders crossings.30 The Slovenian resistance took many by surprise. Many
believed that the JNA miscalculated in Slovenia. On 27 June 1991 the JNA
assumed that the Slovenia's Territorial Defense Force (TO Slovenska
Teritorialna Obramba) would
give up its efforts based on a mere show of force by the JNA. The JNA also
presumed that its efforts would be supported by the international community,
which at this point stood on the sidelines watching the events unfold.31 The
short 'Ten Day War' ended rather swiftly with Slovenian victory. The main
purpose of the war was to demonstrate to the Slovene population the alleged
hostility of the Yugoslav federal government and remove any remaining
allegiance to the Yugoslav state.32 The process was portrayed as national
liberation, which in many ways strengthened Slovenian patriotic feelings and
reinforced citizens' allegiance to Slovenia. Additional reason for its
perception as a success was a minimal number of casualties. Only 8 Slovene and
39 JNA soldiers died and 111 Slovene and 163 JNA troops were wounded, while
more than 2,500 JNA conscripts were taken prisoner.33
The Slovenian
government, immediately upon the outbreak of the conflict, asked the EC and the
Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to intervene.34 In May
1991 the EC troika35 consisting of the foreign affairs ministers of the
Netherlands, Luxembourg and Italy, diplomatically intervened into the Slovenian
war, while contributing to war's end.36 Both organizations promptly obliged
within two days of the outbreak of the conflict. The EC sent its troika to
negotiate in Belgrade and the CSCE entrusted the EC with its peacekeeping
mission in Slovenia. The first cease-fire negotiation by the troika broke down
almost immediately and the troika returned to the island of Brioni on July 8,
1991 to negotiate a peace agreement, which defacto
recognized Slovenia's independence. The Brioni Declaration endorsed by all six
republics and the federal presidency required the Yugoslav army and federal
government to hand over the international border crossings. The Slovenian
government was to lift the blockade of the army's units, deactivate its defense
forces and, together with the Croatian government, proclaim a three-month
moratorium on its declaration of independence. The EC, acting on behalf of the
CSCE, also sent an observer mission of unarmed officials, which was to monitor
the cease-fire and the compliance with the military aspects of the agreement.
37
Many Slovenes were
dissatisfied with this outcome. For them the moratorium and the renewed
negotiations among the six republics meant that Slovenia was being forced, by
the EC, to remain within Yugoslavia against its will. While refraining from
granting Slovenia independence, in agreeing to the Brioni Declaration, the
Yugoslav federal government in effect gave up its jurisdiction in the
republic.38 This decision was followed by the action of the Yugoslav state
presidency, under the chairmanship of the Croat representative, which decided
on 18 July, to withdraw unilaterally all army units from the republic. Serbia
accepted the Brioni Declaration because Slovenia's secession was unavoidable.
The idea of federal Yugoslavia was already been dead. This reality left very
little leverage to Milosevic and his government in Belgrade. In the following
five months Slovenia prepared for independence, it solidified its own
government in Ljubljana which by now operated independently trom
Belgrade. Slovenia officially requested recognition from the European Community
on December 19, 1991.
Thus this case study
so far has slown, that Slovenia does not have a clear
historic record of independent statehood. In the period prior to World War I,
Slovenia was part of the, Habsburg Empire under which it enjoyed certain
privileges and had the opportunity to develop its own culture and identity.
Under Yugoslavia, Slovenia continued to develop its own language, culture and
distinct mentality different from that of other Yugoslav republics. It
developed solid political and economic ties with its Western neighbors such as
Germany, Austria and Italy. Even though there is no record of a strategy on the
part of Slovenes to secede from Yugoslavia, the steps that were taken prior to
1989 made the process of independence much easier to obtain. The Slovenian republic
was to a large extent mono-ethnic, it had a potential to become economically
independent; it had its own culture and identity, its own education system and
a language distinct from that of other republics. Economically Slovenes were
much more developed than the rest of Yugoslavia. This fact was always a source
of grievance for the Slovenes. This "separateness" evident in their
language and economy helped mobilize Slovenes in their quest for independence.
The Slovenian case
indicates that the prior existence or a historical record of statehood is not a
requirement in order for an entity to develop an aspiration towards statehood
or to be recognized by the international community. Slovenia used a clever strategy
and developed strong ties to Austria, Germany and Switzerland and lobbied for
their support in recognizing its independence. The deciding factors had to do
with the circumstances, its geographic location, and its distinctness as well
as willingness of the government in Belgrade to allow Slovenia to leave the
Federation. In the long run Slovenian secession and early promises of
recognition had a domino effect. It started an irreversible spiral. At the
time, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman stated that if Slovenia declared
independence, Croatia will immediately follow with the same course of action.
Slobodan Milosevic decided to "let Slovenia go" because there were
hardly any Serbs living on its territory which meant Serbia couldn't make any
claims for its territory. But his focus was on Croatia and Bosnia, Macedonia
and creating greater Serbia. The fact that Slovenia gained independence did not
disrupt his plans.
Slovenia satisfied
the general criteria for statehood. It had a defined territory as it had clear
and undisputed borders; it had a permanent population consisting mostly of
Slovenes; it had a government in Ljubljana which had full capacity to conduct
international relations and had already developed sound relations with other
countries especially Austria, Germany and Italy. In addition to the basic,
general criteria, Slovenia had legitimate government that exercised full
control over its population, it had enacted laws and its constitution which
guaranteed protection of minorities, it developed its own army and by the time
of independence, Slovenia was by far the most advanced economically of all the
other republics. The case of Croatia however was a lot more complicated as its
independence and recognition involved many unresolved and disputed issues.
1 Adeed
Dawisha and I. William Zartman, Beyond Coercion, pp.
6-7.
2 The census of 1910
indicated that the 1,253,148 Slovenes represented 4.48 per cent of the citizens
of this western half of the monarchy. See Fran Zwitter,
Nacionalni Problemi v Habsburski Monarhiji, p. 224 392
Due to their close relationship with Austria, the Slovenes over the years
always claimed that they were part of the West and tried to disassociate
themselves from the 'Balkans' and the Serbs. In addition, their relationship
with the West also explains the difference in mentalities as well as a deep gap
in economic conditions and development.
3 The term natural
law refers to a type of moral theory, as well as to a type of legal theory,
despite the fact that the core claims of the two kinds of theory are logically
independent. According to natural law in ethical theory, the moral standards
that govern human behavior are objective, derived from the nature of human
beings. According to natural law in legal theory, the authority of at least
some legal standards necessarily derives from considerations having to do with
the moral merit of those standards. There are a number of different kinds of
natural law theories of law, differing from each other with respect to the role
that morality plays in determining the authority of legal norms.
4 Jill Benderly and Even Kraft, Independent Slovenia p. 27
5 Fran Zwitter, "Narodnost in
Politika pri Siovencih
(Nationality and Politics Among the Slovenes) Zgodoviski Casopis
I, in Jill Benderaly and Evan Kraft, Independent
Slovenia; Origins. Movements, Prospects 1944 pp. 6-7.
6 Carole Roogel, The Slovenes and Yugoslavism,
/890-/9/4 New York: East European Monographs in Jill Benderly
and Evan Kraft Independent Slovenia Origins. Movements Prospects pp. 7-8.
7 Dejan Djokic, Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea 1918-1992, p. 84
8 Jill Benderly, Evan Kraft. Independent Slovenia: Origins,
Movements, Prospects 1994 p.13
9 Carole Rogel, In
the Beginning the Slovenes trom the Seventh Century
to 1945, in Jill Benderly and Evan Kraft, Independent
Slovenia: Origins, Movements, Prospects p. 3
10 The Kingdom of
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was renamed Yugoslavia in 1929 after a troubled
first decade.
11 For the record of
official documentation regarding the formation of SCS see Dr. Orner Ibrahimagic, Politicki Sistem Bosne i
Herzegovine. pp. 157-192.
12 In most parts of
the new kingdom, the cabinet faced near chaotic conditions
-legal-administrative, economic, social and psychological. Prior to unification
there had been six legal units, and despite the early creation ofa special ministry for the purpose of bringing about
equalization of the law and a modicum of legal uniformity, progress was rather
slow. In Alex N. Dragnich, The First Yugoslavia:
Search for a Viable Political System, p. 14.
13 Dr. Mustafa
Imamovic, Historija Drzave
I Provo Bosne I Herzegovine.
p. 296.
14 First peace
agreement was with Austria on September 10, 1919; second was the peace
agreement with Bulgaria on November 27,1919 which enlarged Serbia by two
provinces - Dimitrovgradski and Bosiljgradski;
third peace agreement was with Hungary on June 4, 1920; fourth peace agreement
was signed with Turkey on August 10, 1920. in Dr. Mustafa lmamovic,
Historija Drzave I Prava,
p. 297.
15 Ibid.
16 Alex N. Dragnich, The First Yugoslavia: Search for a Viable
Political System, p.ll.
17 Alexandar Pavkovic, p.92
18 In the late 1980s,
Slovenia, with 8 per cent of the whole population, produced 22 per cent of
Yugoslavia's public revenues, 30 per cent of Yugoslavia's export in general.
See Viktor Meier, Zakaj je Razpadla
Jugoslavija, Ljubljana, 1996 p. 171.
19 The Memorandum of
the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (SANU), released in 1986, is a well organized list of complaints and criticisms against
the Yugoslav system as it existed at the time. The main theme of the argument
in the Memorandum is that Serbia was wrongfully taken advantage of and weakened
under 1974 constitution of Yugoslavia, and that as a result, Serbians are the
victims of genocide (in Kosovo) among other things. The Memorandum is written
in such a way that it acts as a call to arms for the Serbian people, and
justifies any actions taken that will insure the security of threatened Serbia.
20 "The Memorandum", cited in B. Covic, ed., Roots of Serbian
Aggression, Zagreb, 1993 p. 324.
21 "The
Memorandum" cited in H. Sarkinovic, Bosnjaci od Nacertanija do Memoranduma, Muslimansko Nacionalno Vijece Sandzaka, Podgorica, 1997, Podgorica, 1997, pp. 287-406
22 Nase Teme, Vol. 33
Nos 1-2, Zagreb, 1989 p. 162.
23 This statement was
part of a speech in defense of the Albanian position on Kosovo by Slovenian
President Milan Kucan which was used by Dusan Mitevic,
Milosevic's man at Radio Television Serbia, to stir Serbian opinion against the
Slovenian leadership. For a detailed account see Death of Yugoslavia.
24 See, I. Urgancic, 'Jugoslavenska "Nacionalisticka Kriza" in Slovenei
v Perspektivi Konea Naeija'. p. 56 and F. Bucar, 'Pravni
ueditev polozaja Slovence kot naroda'.
p. 159 in Nova Revija (1987); Alexandar Pakovic, p. 109.
25 A. Bibic, 'The Emergence of Pluralism in Slovenia,' Communist
and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 26, no. 4 (1993) 370-1. In Alexander Pavkovic, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and
wars in the Balkans. p. 109
26 This was the time
when both dissident groups took on a more active role in voicing their agendas.
In early 1988, Mladina boldly 'attacked' the Yugoslav
federation army by exposing its arms sales to impoverished Third World
countries and revealing its corruption activities. That same year, as the paper
was preparing to publish transcripts of military meetings discussing the arrest
of Slovene dissidents, the Yugoslav federal army made an arrest of three of Mladina 's joumaJists and a
Slovene sergeant -major who provided the documents for them. As one of the
arrested individuals was Janez Jansa, prominent
activist of the Alternative movement's peace branch, the movement responded by
founding the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights consisting of dissidents
ftom the Mladina and ftom the Slovenian Society of Writers. Supported by the
Slovene Communist Party, the media and the Roman Catholic church, the committee
organized a widespread campaign of protests against the arrest of the so-called
'Ljubljana four'. The decision to conduct the proceedings in Serbo-Croatian,
which the constitutional court ruled to be constitutional, marked the high
point in the Slovene dissatisfaction. The trial and sentencing prison terms
escalated what was already considered a volatile situation in Slovenia. People
were mobilized by their grievances and started protesting paving a way to a
clear road to independence.
M. Bakic-Hayden and R. M. Hayden. 'Orientalist Variations on the Theme
"Balkans": Symbolic Geography in Recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics',
Slavic Review, vol. 51 no 1 (1992) pp. 1-16.
27 S.P. Ramet,
Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991, 2nd ed. (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1992) p.211.
28 Alexander Pavkovic, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and
wars in the Balkans.p.110
29 S.P. Ramet,
Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991, 2nd ed. (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1992) p.211.
20 These amendments
as well as constitutional changes by Serbia and other republics were
subsequently declared unconstitutional by the Yugoslav Constitutional Court. R.
M. Hayden, The Beginning of the End of Federal Yugoslavia: The Slovenian
Amendment Crisis of 1989 (Pittsburgh: The Center for Russian and East European
Studies, The Carl Back papers, 1992) pp. 11-20.
21 T. Mastnak, p.312
22 Aleandar Pavkovic, The
Fragmentation of Yugoslavia, p.lll
23 The turnout at the
elections was 93.2 per cent. Dejan Djokic (ed.) Yugoslavism:
Historie~; of a Failed Idea 1918 -1992. p. 97.
24 See The Death of
Yugoslavia, Programme 2 for Jovic's account and
military intelligence film of the crucial meeting.
25 Susan Woodward,
June 27, 2005.
26 J.Jansha, The Making of the Slovenian State 1988-1992 (Ljubljana:Mladinska Knjiga 1994)
pp. 101-113 4
27 Alexandar Pavkovic, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia, pp. 135-135
28 See B. Bucar 'The
International Recognition of Slovenia' in D. Fink Hafuer
and J. R. Robbins (eds) Making New Nation: The Formation of Slovenia, (Adershot: Darmouth, 1997)
29 For Slovenian
planning and requests for mediation see D. Rupel 'Slovenia's Shift from the
Balkans to Central Europe' in J. Benderly and E.
Kraft (eds.) Independent Slovenia: Origins. Movements. Prospects (London:
Macmillan, 1994) pp. 190-191.
30 Alexandar Pavkovic, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia, p 137
31 James Gow and
Cathi Carmichael, Slovenia and the Slovenes: A Small State and the New Europe,
p. 177.
32 J. Robbins,
'Epilogue the Attainment of Viability' in Making a New Nation the Formation of
Slovenia, E.287.
33 Christopher
Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse: Causes. Course and Consequences, p. 159.
34 Ruper, op. Cit.
191.
35 The Troika
comprised the past, present and coming foreign ministers of the Presidency of
the European Council of Ministers. In June they were Gianni de Michelis
(Italy), Jacques Poos (Luxebourg) and Hans van den
Broek (the Netherlands).
36 Some authors
claimed that the direct European intervention in the conflict began in May 1991
with the clandestine delivery of several thousand infantry weapons as well as
communications equipment to the Slovenian defense forces trom
an unnamed European country. See J. Jansa, The Making of the Slovenian State
1988-1992 pp. 101-113.
37 Susan Woodward in
Balkan Tragedy argues that the fate of Slovenia and Croatia were already
resolved at Brioni. She pointed out that the meeting which took place paved the
way to eventual recognition of both countries. James Gow in The Triumph of the
Lack of Will points out that at Brioni the troika managed to establish peace in
Sloveni and create conditions for peaceful
negotiations. p. 52.
38 This included its
control over the international borders and the collection of customs duties.
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