Negotiations between the United States and Russia have changed focus in the latter half of the year. Russia countered the U.S. moves into Eastern and Central Europe with its very public support for Iran, complicating U.S.-Iranian negotiations over Iraq. This is a major shift from the July meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President George W. Bush in Kennebunkport, Maine, when one of the more important items on the agenda was Kosovar independence. This issue has been on the table since 1999, when the United States and its NATO allies, angered over Serbian behavior in Kosovo, ignored Russian objections and waged a 60-day air war against Yugoslavia. Then on During a historic trip to Albania on June 9 this year (2007), U.S. President George W. Bush - the first American president to visit the Balkan country - calling for a final ruling on Kosovo's independence. The stop was one of many on Bush's tour of Europe following a tumultuous few days at the G-8 summit in Germany, at which Kosovo was a major topic of discussion.

Since then, Moscow has been outraged at the looming possibility of an independent Kosovo - not because it considers Serbia an ally, but because a successful effort by the West to impose its will on Serbia against Russian wishes would signal the end of Russia's influence in Europe. It also would signal that the West believes Russian objections can be easily swept under the rug. Yet Kosovo is threatening to declare independence next month, Dec. 10, a reason why we included it in our research project.

Though neither Russia nor the United States has mentioned Kosovo much of late, small items in the Serb and Kosovar media indicate that the issue is still very much alive inside the negotiations. Talks resumed between Pristina and Belgrade in Vienna this week, and Pristina went in with the assumption that a decision would be made, given that Dec. 10 is only six weeks away. But the talks only proved that the U.S., EU and Russian troika is staunchly divided. Moreover, they show that the U.S. and EU positions are fractured. Until this week, the United States and European Union were unified in their position that Kosovar independence not only was inevitable but also would be achieved this year. This has always been Kosovo's trump card against Russian and Serb opposition to independence. However, on Oct. 29, the United States suddenly proposed a new option of freezing Kosovar independence for another 12 years - much to Pristina's horror. On top of this, the next proposal to be considered at the troika meetings with Serbia and Kosovo is designed by none other than Russia - and of course, it would halt any moves for Kosovar independence.

Additionally, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates let it slip during an Oct. 27 press conference on Afghanistan that the United States is considering pulling its troops from the NATO coalition in Kosovo (KFOR). These announcements could mean one of two things: Either the United States simply has too much on its plate and needs to pull back somewhere, or Kosovo has just become another concession Washington is willing to give Moscow. As far as the first option, the United States does have its fingers in many pies with its obligations in Iraq and Afghanistan -- not to mention its growing concerns over Iran and Russia. In the 1990s, the United States stepped into the Kosovar crisis when the Europeans could not handle it. But that was back when the United States was not as busy. Pulling back diplomatically and/or militarily from Kosovo would leave the issue in the Europeans' lap, and geographically, they have a greater vested interest in a resolution in the Balkans.

But the timing of the announcement seems to point to the second option. The new proposal comes at a time of critical moves among the United States, Iran and Russia - and as rumors of U.S. concessions are leaking. Allowing the Europeans to handle the Kosovar issue pushes the United States out of the Russian line of fire. Also, it can be added to the tally of things Washington has set aside in order to keep its balance with Moscow as the game continues. But today we first will proceed with presenting an in depth case study of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including Croatia, of which it was a part.

 

Croatia/Bosnia

Of crucial importance in the history of Croatia, was when the Dalmatian chieftain Tomislav received papal blessing from Pope John X in 925 as he assumed the title of first King of Croatia. In 1102 then, Hungary established its dominance over the region and its king ruled Croatia, which was however allowed to maintain its own parliament known as Sabor.1 Its most turbulent period between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries however, was marked by the Ottoman invasion. The Austro-Croatian army managed to defeat the Ottomans. At the end of the seventeenth century the Austrian Habsburg monarchs assumed the crown of both Croatia and formed a military frontier known as “Krajina” which was a strip of landstretching around the border between Croatia and Bosnia. It was settled by Serbian immigrants fleeing from the Ottomans. In return for some of the privileges they enjoyed in Krajina, Serbs were obliged to provide military service to the Austro-Hungarian Empire.2 The Habsburg kings supported the Krajina Serbs in developing their own separate identity as a community of soldiers and fighters. Krajina served as a buttress against attempt of Croatia towards independence.3

The period that marked the beginning of modem Croatian nationalism however began in 1830s.4 It was mostly young intellectuals and students along with the growing middle class that led the movement. The main aim of the revivalists was to bring about the emotional change necessary for developing national pride and to translate those sentiments into political power.5 The nineteenth century was an important period in Croatia’s history as it marked the period when the idea of national independence surfaced. The Bishop of Djakovo, Josip Juraj Strossmayer established a National Party, which had as its main aim to reform the Habsburg monarchy through the creation of a federal state. Strossmayer supported the Yugoslav idea, building a common South Slavic culture and a “spiritual community”.6 In 1848, the Croatian intelligentsia began to formulate a specific Croatian identity. Intelligentsia of the well-educated Croats in the Istrian peninsula rediscovered the importance that the peninsula’s literature played in the cultural identity of the Croats.7 Unfortunately for the Croats, the Austrian Emperor, recognizing the possible re-emergence of Hungarian revolution, granted the Ausgleich of 1867 which granted Hungary equal status with Austria in the empire. To further promote tensions, many parts of Croatia fell under the authority of the Hungarians. A fierce policy of Magyarization then ensued, since Croatia had remained loyal to the Austrian Habsburgs during the Revolution of 1848.8 To escape the danger of Magyarization, two types of Croatian nationalism developed. One favored loyalty to the Austrian Empire and eventual equality within the empire. The other supported total autonomy from the empire. For more than 50 years the nationalist leaders quarreled over which path the developing nationality should take. These differences would separate the Croats, preventing a maturation of a national identity, which would unify the majority of the nation. The initial phase of the Croatian national revival was known as the Illyrian movement. It had two dimensions: Croatian and Slavic. The first one stood for national autonomy and for the integration of the Croatian lands. The Slavic dimension was primarily the result of Croatia’s weak political and economic position in the empire as well as the outcome of Croatian humanism and the contemporary Pan-Slavism. The movement was based on the conclusion that all Slavs were a single nation and should therefore live in one country.9

Some Serbs interpreted the Illyrian movement as an effort of the Roman Catholic Church against the Orthodox Church and the Serbian national identity.10 Slovenes looked at the Illyrian movement with suspicion and perceived it as a threat to their newly discovered national identity.11 Croatian nationalism was largely defensive in nature. It began in an era of intensive political struggle with the Hungarians, and it continued as one of the ways for their self preservation. However, Croatians never stopped hoping that when the opportune moment arrived they would have their own state. The First World War, sparked by the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo by a Bosnian Serb terrorist and the events which took place over the next four years played a significant role in the development of the idea of unification of all Slav peoples. The war in a sense presented an opportune moment for all Slav people to form their own state. In 1915, the Yugoslav Committee was set up in Paris to lobby the Entente Powers 12 for support for a new Yugoslav state. The agreement known as the Corfu Declaration was signed on 20 July 1917.13 In October 1918, during the last days of the war, a National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs led by Anton Korosec, its President, and Svetozar Pribicevic as Vice-President, was founded in Zagreb. On October 29, the Croatian Sabor declared the independence of the state of Croatia 14 from the Empire.15

In an official statement Sabor declared that it terminates its current relationship with Austria-Hungary and that it declares all political, legal and economic agreements void.16 According to the Sabor resolution also expressed the intention to join in a unified state of southern Slavs. On November 24,1918 at the meeting of the Central Committee of the National Council, the only vote against the decision for immediate unification was that of Stjepan Radic, leader of the small Croatian People’s Peasant Party. In an emotional speech, Radic warned against the decision to send the 28-member delegation to Belgrade, expressed opposition to kingship, and said that Croats would support only a federal republic. Radic pleaded with the delegates to consider the rights of the people, who would reject what the delegates were about to do because they had no authorization to speak in the people’s name.17 Radic demanded a “neutral peasant republic of Croatia”. And shortly after the unification proclamation, he came out decisively against union, insisting on Croatia’s right to self-determination. One day after the proclamation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on December 2, 1918, his party circulated copies of a proclamation calling for a movement against the Act of Union. This was almost immediately followed by demonstrations in which several people lost their lives.18 However the idea of a unified state did appeal to the intellectual circles in Zagreb which supported Yugoslavism and played an active role in the events which led to the creation of the United Kingdom.19 The new Constitution was proclaimed in 1918 on Vidovdan (St. Vitus Day), the anniversary of the battle of Kosovo, underlining the Serbian dominance in the new state.20

An interim national parliament was created in 1919. In 1934 King Aleksandar was assassinated in Marseilles by a terrorist from the Macedonian nationalist party VMRO (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization) acting on behalf of Croatian nationalist extremists led by Ante Pavelic. As the leader of the Croatian Party of Right, Pavelic had established a terrorist organization known as the Ustashe Croatian Revolutionary Organization (UHRO)21 in response to the establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The party’s aim was the creation of an independent state of Croatia outside Yugoslavia, free from rule by the Serbian king. The country was then ruled by a regent, Prince Paul, an anglophile educated in Oxford. He openly supported the Croatian cause and made propositions to the new leader of the Peasant Party, Vladko Macek. In the 1938 elections the Croatian Peasants’ Party polled 44 per cent of the vote. Prince Paul recognized that the integrity of the country was threatened by the rise of Hitler’s Germany and the collapse of the European status quo created at Versailles. Fearing that the Croats might side with the Germans to achieve independence through the dismemberment of Yugoslavia, the government could no longer resist demands for autonomy for Croatia. Macek and Dragisa Cvetkovic, the Serbian Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, negotiated a new constitution, which would provide for a federal state within which a new province of Croatia, known as the Banovina Hrvatska, would have relative autonomy.22 The agreement was known as Sporazum.23 Macek used the threat of foreign backing in the hope of forcing concessions from the cabinet and the crown. In an interview with the New York Times on August 1, 1939, he declared that if Croatia did not gain autonomy, it would secede from Yugoslavia, even though this would lead to civil war and Croatia might become a German protectorate.24

The new Constitution of 20 August 1939 destroyed the integrity of the State and the name Yugoslavia could not be used but simply “state union”. Additional instructions told  party members that in the central government they should always speak of Banovina 25 of Croatia as simply Croatia and refer to it as free and independent Croatia.26 The Banovina had its own parliament, the Croatian Sabor and its own government headed by a Ban appointed by the Sabor rather than the Yugoslav parliament.27 The Ban, who answered to Prince Paul, and the Sabor headed the Banovina whose government had eleven departments including internal affairs, education, judiciary, industry, trade and finances.28 The new Banovina incorporated Srijem and significant parts of Bosnia Herzegovina, 29 especially the region of Herzegovina traditionally populated by Bosnian Croats.30 The decision to form Croatian Banovina was never ratified nor implemented as its Parliament was dismantled after the start of WorId War Two. According to the plan that was drawn up by Cvetkovic and Macek, there was supposed to be a Serbian Banovina under the name of ‘Serbian states’ and formed under the same principle as its Croatian counterpart incorporating the remainder of Bosnia.

In March 1941 Cvetkovic’s foreign minister signed the Tripartite Pact with Nazi Germany under the threat of invasion. Almost immediately leading members of the Yugoslav armed forces, led by Dusan Simovic, staged a coup in Belgrade, with British support, and exiled Prince Paul to Greece. The coup was inspired by Serbian antagonism to the compromise that Prince Paul had reached with the Croats, and by the creation of the Croatian Banovina, as well as a desire to resist the antangelment with the Germans. The coup leaders, who were pro-Serb, were determined to destroy Prince Pauls’ politics of compromise with Croatia’s ambitions for autonomy within Yugoslavia, and to remake Yugoslavia along ethnic lines of the Greater Serbia project. The coup infuriated Hitler who launched an air attack on Belgrade on April 6, 1941, killing large numbers of civilians, and causing a wave of refugees to flee into the countryside. The air assault was followed by a massive invasion of Axis forces and a swift defeat of the Yugoslav army. In Zagreb, the press and popular opinion blamed the Serbs for starting a war with Germany. There was little resistance to the invasion and Macek, the leader of the Peasant party, decided not to oppose the Germans since many of his supporters were enthusiastic to see the end of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

Germans invited Macek to become the leader of a puppet government, which they sought to establish in Croatia, but he refused to do so. He did not desire a Croatia that would be dependent on Axis powers.31 Macek correctly calculated that the Germans would lose the war, but mistakenly predicted that the Croatian Peasant Party (Hrvatska Seljacka Stranka HSS) would be restored to power by the victorious Allies. The devastating consequence of his decision was that the Italians, who had been hosting the Ustashe rebels, brought the fascist leader Ante Pavelic32 to Zagreb where his collaborator Slavko Kvatemik, had proclaimed the creation of the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska – NDH). NDH which incorporated all of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was only independent in the eyes of Croats living on its territory. In reality, it was divided among an Italian zone of influence along the coastal areas, and a German zone covering Zagreb region, Slavonia and north-eastern Bosnia.33 The origins of the Ustashe34 movement dated to the very roots of the Croatian nation itself. Ustashe thought they represented the very essence of the Croatian people, religion and history.35 They claimed legitimacy by celebrating the Croat nation and its history, Roman Catholicism, and an overwhelming hatred of anything associated with the Serbs. The members of Ustashe saw themselves as the embodiment of all that Croatia was and should be.36 Ustashe believed that Croatia should exist only for Catholic Croats.

One obvious obstacle that stood in the way was over one million Serbs that lived in Croatia. Accordingly, the Ustashe mission was to correct this apparent problem by annihilating the Serbs in Croatia. The Ustashe believed in their ethnic uniqueness and based their policies on the fascist and Nazi movement in Italy and Germany. They were hostile toward the Serbian population of Croatia, whom they viewed as allies of the government in Belgrade. Another testament that NDH was designed as a purely Croatian state is a clause dealing with defense of the country which states that anyone who violates the interests of Croatian people will be punished by death.37 There is no mention in this proclamation of Serbs or any other minorities living on the territory of NDH.

Following the assassination of King Aleksandar, Ustashe leaders went to live in exile in Italy where they were imprisoned or promoted by Mussolini depending on the interests of Italian foreign policy. When the new state of Croatia was declared in 1941, and after Macek had refused to collaborate with the Gennans, the Italians sent the Ustashe emigres back to Zagreb from Italy and Germany to form a puppet fascist government in Croatia. On 10 April Ante Pavelic came to Zagreb and led the formation of the first Independent State of Croatia.38 Pavelic took the title of Poglavnik39 (Head) of the state, and became prime minister and foreign minister. Pavelic was welcomed by about 2,000 sworn Ustashe who have been working underground in the country. By May of 1941 there were 100,000 sworn Ustashe. This army of extremists had most of their sympathizers among the less educated classes, and in some poor regions of the Dinaric Mountains where Serbs and Croats lived in adjacent settlements. On the day after they had established their government the Ustashe proclaimed the Zakonska Odredba za Obranu Naroda I Drzave (Legal Provision of the Defense of the People and the State) the basis for their system of political terror, which included, the institution of concentration camps and the mass shooting of hostages. They introduced irregular as well as regular courts.40 Only one week after the proclamation of the Croatian state, a law was enacted with its declared purpose: “to defend the people and the state.” Severe punishment was introduced for all those who in any way offended “the honor and vital interests of the Croatian people” or who threatened the existence of the Croatian state.41 The main goal of this law was to provide the Ustashe with a legal framework broad enough to allow the encounter with all national “enemies” and revenge against the pre-war adversaries. Such laws were considered a natural element of the national state and a necessary precondition for its existence. Serbian Cyrillic alphabet was forbidden and only the Croatian Latin alphabet was allowed to be used.42 The right to political participation and citizenship in ISC was reserved exclusively for Croats. All power was in Ustashe hands, and the laws and legal system could be interpreted and applied in whatever way they desired.43

Although there was some initial enthusiasm for the new government there were resistance movements in the Serbian areas of the Dalmatian hinterland around Lika and Knin, organized by the communist-led Partisans who were building up their support in Croatia.44 Bribery and territorial changes made for political gains on the part of Croatian politicians were a common practice and an exemplary indicator of the lack of legitimacy in the Croatian ‘state’. Ante Pavelic, for example, granted most of the Dalmatian coast to the Italians in return for their support of the new government. There is evidence that the Ustashe were indeed controlled by the Italians in the 1930s and by the Germans in the 1940s. Pavelic in his book published in Germany in 1941 titled Die Kroatische Frage (The Croat Question) outlined the conflict between the Serbs and Croats and suggested that the “Croat Question” was in fact part of a carefully orchestrated plan on the part of the Germans and Italians which was unfolding as the Second World War was starting. Pavelic explained the long history of the Croat struggle for separation from the Serbs within the framework of a fascist dominated Europe. The Ustashe believed that the Croatian state had always been a legal entity, even when its incorporation in another state deprived it of international recognition. For them the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was illegal, because it had never been accepted by the majority of the Croatian people through democratic processes – neither elections, nor referenda. For the Ustashe, the purification of the nation and the creation of a homogeneous national state were supreme goals. They pursued this goal by organizing concentration camps and persecution of not only Serbs but also Jews,45 Gypsies and communists. Ustashe equated sovereignty with ethnic homogeneity. Some of the examples of this extreme belief were evident in the speeches given in Croatia at that time. Catholic priest Dionizije Jurcev proclaimed to his followers: “No people other than Croats may any longer live in this land, because this is Croatian land, and we will know what to do with anybody who is not willing to get converted. In those regions yonder, I arrange for everything to be cleared away everything from a chicken to an old man, and should that be necessary, I shall do so here, too, since it is not sinful nowadays to kill even a seven year old child, if it is standing in the way of our Ustashi order.“46

Pavelic and his close associates prepared their political programme as emigrants, and planned the most important laws, the form of administration while organizing the new political and state authorities. They established a new order which mirrored the contemporary Italian – German model and had the cult of the nation, the state and the leader as its centre. Their programme of June 1941 expressed the totalitarian idea: “In the Ustashe state, created by the poglavnik and his Ustashe, people must think like Ustashe, speak like Ustashe, and act like Ustashe. In a word, the entire life in the NDH must be Ustashe based.“47 Soon, the Ustashe Corps (Ustaska Vojnica) was formed, in which only members of the Ustashe movement could serve. The Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina, of whom at that time there were just over 700,000 were incorporated into the Croatian nation. A special policy of winning them over was initiated. They were called the “flower of the Croatian nation” and Bosnia was called the “heart of Croatia”.48

Pavelic promised Muslims full realization of their material and religious aspirations. Gave them opportunities to hold high civil and military positions in the state, permitted Muslim units in the Croatian army. Subsidized their schools, and even made them a huge mosque in the center of Zagreb.49 In the early summer of 1941 armed resistance broke out against the Ustashe authorities and foreign occupation. The main organizers were the Communists, but it was the Serbian population in central parts of Croatia and in other parts of the NDH that provided the main support. When Yugoslavia broke up in April 1941 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia issued a proclamation outlining the goals of the national liberation struggle as “liberation of the country from foreign rule and domination” and the establishment of a “new democratic Yugoslavia of free and equal peoples, with a free Croatia built on the basis of self-determination.“50 With these slogans anti-Fascist armed resistance gradually spread to Croatian regions. In the autumn of 1941 resistance fighters organized themselves into companies, battalions and detachments called ‘Partisans’.51 In liberated villages and small towns the partisans established Narodno Oslobodilacki Odbori (People’s Liberation Committees – NOD) which as well as providing services behind the lines for the partisan anny also became the civilian authorities.52 This was accompanied by grave economic troubles. The sudden appearance and steady growth of political and anned resistance to the Ustashe regime and foreign occupation were clear indicators of the political disposition of the Croatian and non-Croatian population in the NDH.53

Since 1928, the Yugoslav Communist Party had been led by a Croat, Josip Broz Tito. The Communists in recognition of the importance of the nationality question they established separate Communist Parties in Croatia and Slovenia, under the umbrella of the Yugoslav Communist Party. In the early years of the war, in particular, communications between the various branches of the Communist party were limited and the Croatian Party began to develop its own programme under the leadership of Andrija Hebrang, a Croat and a member of the Zagreb Party organization since the 1920s.54 Hebrang realized that the key to mobilizing support in Croatia was to appeal to the Croatian sense of independent statehood. He therefore argued in favor of a high degree of autonomy for the emerging socialist republic. The virtual government established within the liberated areas in Croatia was known as the Regional Anti-fascist National Liberation Council of Croatia (Zamaljsko Antifasisticko Vijece Narodnog Oslobodjenja Hrvatske ZA VNOH). ZA VNOH, placing emphasis on Croatian sovereignty, appealed to the soldiers in the Croatian militia force known as the Domobrani (Home Guard) by encouraging them to join the fight for the freedom and independence of Croatia and its homeland.“55

Towards the end of the war the Partisans reached an agreement with Ivan Subasic, the former Ban of Croatia and leader of the royal government in exile, who was also a leading member of the Croatian Peasant party. An agreement was signed on 16 June 1944 on the Croatian island of Vis, which was occupied by the British, and where the partisans had by then set up their headquarters. A further detailed agreement on 1 November established that the Partisans would take the lead in forming a new government at the end of the war with the participation of three members of the government-in-exile.56 At its third session in May 1944, the ZA VNOH was constituted as the supreme representative legislative and executive body, and thus the highest body of state authority, in democratic Croatia. This was the first stage of creating the new federal Croatia in the’ second’ Yugoslavi Josip Broz Tito became Premier in the new post-war provisional government established in March 1945. In November a Constitutional Assembly abolished the monarchy and proclaimed the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia. The new state was established as a federation of six republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia.57

In contrast to the pre-war Banovina, Croatia lost a substantial amount of territory including Srijem to region of Vojvodina, Herzegovina to Bosnia, and the Bay of Kotor to Montenegro. Part of Istria around Trieste was also disputed with the Italians. In the 1960s, the development of the post Yugoslav economy had two significan effects in Croatia. The first was the development of the tourist industry. This enabled the Croatian hotel industry to earn a large amount of foreign exchange which had to be surrendered to the federal authorities in Belgrade. This caused resentment and demands from Croatian interest groups for a change in policy. Criticism began to emerge that the federal government in Belgrade was exploiting Croatia, and that Croatia should be allowed to retain more of her foreign exchange earnings.58 The reform movement became more serious when it gained the backing of three leading politicians from the Croatian League of Communists: Miko Tripalo, Savka Dabcev-Kucar and Pero Pirker. These reform-minded communists saw an opportunity to achieve a full partnership within the federation.59 Their campaign developed into a mass movement (the Masovni Pokret – or Maspok) calling for greater autonomy for Croatia within Yugoslavia. The culmination of the Maspok took place in autumn 1971 when students at Zagreb and other universities staged a mass strike in support of the liberals. The Matica Hrvatska 60 published the Hrvatski Tjednik (Croatian Weekly) which became the public platform for the non-Communist intellectuals of the ‘Croatian Spring’.61

They demanded greater autonomy for Croatia and wanted to retain a greater share of its foreign currency export earnings. The strike was eventually broken by police action and by the threat of army intervention.62 This meant as a warning of the possible future consequences of attempts towards independence of Croatia. Despite the suppression of the Croatian autonomy movement, Tito quickly implemented measures that met most of their demands. Croatia was allowed to keep a greater share of its foreign currency earnings. Constitutional amendments were introduced in the period between 1967 and 1971, followed by a new and revised Constitution, which was established in 1974 giving extensive autonomy to the republics and the autonomous provinces. The new Constitution provided for a greater degree of self-government of the Croatian Republic, while Serbia was deprived of its control over the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. In the 1971 Constitution sovereignty for the Croat leadership was “national”. In both 1971 and the 1974 Constitution, sovereignty was defined within the nomenclature of “self-management”. In other words the question was not addressed in terms of the sovereignty of national republics within Yugoslavia but of socialist entities operating in a framework ofself-management.63 In 1979, economic difficulties were emerging not just in Croatia but throughout Yugoslavia. The most serious of these was the abrupt cessation of economic growth while the social product stagnated at the beginning of the 1980s.64 Tito’s death in 1980 represented the start of not only devastating economic decline but also an opportune moment for the awakening and full expression of strong nationalistic feelings which have been suppressed under his presidency. From the moment the 1974 constitution was passed, there was dissatisfaction with it especially because of the excessive competencies given to the autonomous provinces, which became practically independent from the republic of Serbia’s jurisdiction. While Slovenia and Croatia remained neutral with respect to the new Constitution,65 the Serbs later complained that Kosovo and Vojvodina had been given all the attributes of states, which they were not. Albanians, worried that their status may be revoked, responded to Serb’s complaint by staging demonstrations in the spring of 1981, demanding greater autonomy within the republic of Serbia, and even calling for their own independent republic. After the Kosovo demonstrations, views on Serbia’s unsatisfactory position in Yugoslavia came into the open, being first aired at a session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia at the end of 1981. In November 1984 the Serbian Central Committee again demanded tighter internal integration of the republic and a better position in the federation. They sensed that strong processes of disintegration were taking place in Yugoslavia, and for the first time submitted a ‘Platform for Reintegration’. Although no one publicly challenged the 1974 Constitution, it was obvious that Serbian nationalist demands were increasing.66

The period that followed was marked by a series of amendments to both Serbia’s and Kosovo’s constitutions forced through by the Milosevic regime. The dissatisfaction of Slovenia and Croatia was overwhelming and it was clear that crisis was looming as Yugoslavia embarked on a road to dissolution. In June 1989, Franjo Tudjman formally established the Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica – HDZ).67 He was a former general in the Partisan army in the Second World War, but later a nationalist dissident active in the Croatian Spring. Tudjman was a revisionist historian of European history, and reflected his national policies and beliefs in his work Nationalism in Contemporary Europe. Tudjman referred to his interpretation of history and events to glorify the struggle of the Croats for an independent state.68 His election campaign focused on the natural right of self-determination for the Croatian people, the end of communist rule, and placing firmer controls on the Serb minority in Croatia.69

His appeal was for ‘national reconciliation’ between the various elements of Croatian society, in particular between the left and right wing, between the ideological descendants of the communist Partisans on the one hand, and the fascist Ustashe on the other. According to his programme the privileged position of Serbs in the upper layers of power that threatened to cause polarization of Croatian society on ethnic lines was to be eliminated. Tudjman further claimed the Bosnia Muslims were Islamicized Croats so that the event of the break-up of Yugoslavia. Bosnia Herzegovina would be incorporated into an independent Croatian state. This expansionistic idea was justified by his claim of two regions being linked throughout their histories. He affirmed that only by their working together would they be able to overcome their common enemy, the Serbs.70 Tudjman blamed the Croatian economic decline on its unfair economic responsibilities towards Belgrade. Due to a heavy share of funding from Croatian diasporas, Tudjman was able to secure victory in the elections. The HDZ gained support from the anti-communist Croatian diaspora in Canada and the United States. One of Tudjman’s key supporters was Gojko Susak. A Croat I from Toronto. Who later became Defense Minister. Other individuals from the Croatian Spring joined the Party. They included Stipe Mesic.71 a former mayor of Orahovica in Slavonia and future Prime Minister and President. Who had been dismissed for his nationalist beliefs in the early 1970s. In May 1990 in the first multiparty elections in Yugoslavia since the end of WorId War II. The HDZ won 205 of the 356 seats. Beating the communist party which took 75 seats.72

That same month. The first meeting of the Sabor took place and Franjo Tudjman was elected President of the republic, and Stipe Mesic won the seat of the Prime Minister. One of the first acts of the new Sabor was to introduce amendments to the republic’s own Constitution which removed the word ‘socialist’ from its name. The new constitution declared Croatia to be the homeland of the Croatian nation, while excluding the Serbs and other minorities from their previous position of civic equality.73 A preliminary section of the constitution, entitled Izvorisne Osnove (“Basic Sources”) claimed a “thousand year national independence and state continuity of the Croatian nation” and the “historical right of the Croatian nation to full state sovereignty” as manifested by a series of states from the Croatian kingdom of the seventh century through the conclusions of the Joint Anti-Fascist Council in 1943 and the existence of the Socialist Republic of Croatia from 1947-1990. After referring to the “inalienable right of the Croatian nation to self-determination and state sovereignty,” the Republic of Croatia was “established as the national state of the Croatian nation and the state of the members of other nations and minorities that live within it.” In all of these passages, “Croatian nation” (Hrvatski narod) has an raj rather than political connotation and purposely excluded those not ethnically Croat. Formally symbolic rather than legally binding since they are in the preamble to the constitution, these statements are accompanied by the symbolism of the republic’s ethnically Croat coat of arms and flag (art. 11),74 and the specification that the official language and script of Croatia are “the Croatian language and Latin script” (art. 12) thus excluding the Serbian dialects and the Cyrillic alphabet customarily used to write them.75

The 1990 Constitution further proclaimed the republic’s sovereignty and its right to secede from the Yugoslav federation. It established the new bicameral parliament with a lower house known as the House of Representatives and an upper house known as the House ofCounties.76 A new controversial law controversially allowed ethnic Croats who lived in Herzegovina region of Bosnia and abroad to apply for Croatian citizenship. These new citizens were allowed to vote in Croatian elections even though they were not residing in Croatia.77 Immediately after coming to power, Tudjman reinstated Sahovnica, a white and red checkered shield, on the Croatian national flag.78 This shield had been the traditional sign of the Ustashe and it was a symbol of the medieval Croat rulers and of Croat history and national identity. The Sahovnica’s reintroduction on the Croat flag was interpreted by the Serbs as a clear sign that the Ustashe had returned and that Serbs were no longer welcome in Croatia.79

Political parties in Croatia were not able to form an agreement between Serbs and Croats in the process of gaining independence. The fact that there was no Serb-Croat coalition as in the pre-First World War tradition of Pribicevic and Supito, or in the wartime regime of Hebrang, encouraged Croatian separatism and Serb alienation. Later on, Stipe Mesic was to say that one of the greatest mistakes of the new Croatian government was its failure to immediately make an alliance with the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), which responded by boycotting the meetings of the Sabor.80 This ‘oversight’ on part of the new government only exacerbated Serb dissatisfaction. In turn, on 1 July 1990, Milan Babic, deputy in the SDS, declared a union of local councils in Lika and Northern Dalmatia, taking the first steps towards creating an autonomous Krajina region.81 A Serbian National Council was proclaimed at a mass meeting of Serbs in the village of Serb.82 An unofficial referendum was carried out in the Krajina, and Milan Babic declared the ‘Autonomous Province of Serb Krajina’ in August 1990.Roadblocks were set up around Knin, and rail traffic was disrupted, making travel between Zagreb and the Dalmatian coast extremely difficult. The growing rebellion was spurred on by the activities of agents of Serbia’s secret police, the SOB, acting under the instructions of Slobodan Milosevic who sought to protect the Serbs of Croatia and incorporate them into “Greater Serbia”. In case Croatia was to declare independence, government in Belgrade planned on incorporating the Serb populated part of Croatia into Serbia. 83

A referendum on independence for Croatia was held in May 19, 1991 on the question “Do you agree that the Republic of Croatia as a sovereign and independent state, which guarantees cultural autonomy and all civil rights to Serbs and members of other nationalities in Croatia, may enter into an alliance with other republics?” The referendum was approved by 93 percent of the 83,6 percent of the electorate. This represented a total of 79 percent.84 Serbs of the rajina autonomous region boycotted the referendum expressing their desire to join the republic of Serbia and remain part of Yugoslavia. Croatia declared its independence on 25 June 1991, with the ‘Proclamation of the Sovereign and Independent Republic of Croatia’.85 Following intervention by the EU and US Secretary of State James Baker, the Slovenes and the Croats were persuaded to postpone their plans for independence for three months to allow for negotiations to take place. However, almost immediately, the Yugoslav Air Force, backed up by the JNA, moved in on the breakaway republic of Slovenia. The JNA “defeated“86 by the Slovenes in a short ten-day conflict agreed to sign a cease-fire and withdraw. This effectively marked the end of the Yugoslav state. In fact it later turned out that Milosevic backed up by Boris Jovic and Veljko Kadijevic as the commander of the JNA, had no intention of engaging in serious fighting to retain Slovenia within Yugoslavia, since the republic formed no part of their plans to create a Greater Serbia. It became known that a deal was struck in January 1991 between Serbia and Slovenia. Miloseivic signaled to Kucan that the Slovenes were free to leave Yugoslavia so long as they did not oppose Serbia’s plans for the rest of country.87 Boris Jovic speaking in the Serb Parliament, also later claimed that “we the Serbs couldn’t care less if Slovenia left.“89

Croatia was a very different case from Slovenia. There were significant number of Serbs in the breakaway Krajina and eastern Slavonia, and Milosevic’s policy was designed to incorporate these regions into a new Greater Serbian state. To achieve this, Croatia would have to be broken up, and its armed forces had to be defeated. As the crisis grew, Tudjman created a government of national unity, which included his communist adversaries. The two sides were becoming polarized, and both Serbian and Croatian extremists fed on each other’s fears. On 11 August, the Sabor announced the creation of the new army, the Croatian National Guard. One month after that a major offensive was launched by the JNA in eastern Slavonia.

The Domovinski Rat (Homeland War) for Croatian independence began by the bombing of the Zagreb airport by the Yugoslav air force followed by offensive operations across Croatia. The UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo on all the republics of Yugoslavia on September 25.90 The fiercest battle of the war was fought for the city of Vukovar in eastern Slavonia. Following the fall of Vukovar, the JNA moved on towards Osijek. It seemed as if the whole of Croatia would fall to the far greater strength of the JNA. However, before that could happen, Milosevic and Tudjman, under pressure from the EU which had convened a peace conference at The Hague, came to an agreement to end the war. In an emergency meeting on 3 October 1991 Yugoslav minister of defense, General Kadijevic, Presidents Tudjman and Milosevic and EC representatives van den Broek and Lord Carrington accepted in principal a peace plan that took as its starting point confederation and presumed the eventual independence of all republics that desired it.91 Croatia would be recognized, the Yugoslav army would withdraw, and the breakaway Serbian regions of the Krajina and Slavonia would demilitarized and patrolled by the UN peacekeepers.92 Croatia officially applied to the Community for recognition on December 19, 1991. The cease-fire agreement was brokered on November 23, 1991 and was finalized on January 2, 1992. It was signed at Sarajevo by military representatives of Croatia and Yugoslavia. The UN Protection Forces of 14, 000 began to arrive on March 8, 1992.

It is clear that the Croatian case differs from that of Slovenia which we also investigated, mostly in the pronounced Croatian desire for independence throughout its history which is filled with attempts to achieve autonomy and independence from the European powers and then from Yugoslavia. Croatia’s decision to join the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was more a desire to end Austria-Hungary domination than a wish to be part of the Kingdom. Its opportunity to form its own state came with the German aggression against Yugoslavia at the start of the Second World War. No price was too high to be paid for the Croatian elite and politicians who saw an opportunity in cooperation with the Nazi Germany. The Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatskal NDH) was an illegitimate, illegal entity and a product of the circumstances of the world war. The Ustashe hoped to use the war circumstances to achieve the national ideal with the help of Italy, Germany, Austria, and Hungary, the only outside powers that had been ready to support their struggle. The paradox was that all these countries, especially Italy, had traditional expansionist demands on Croatian lands. The Ustashe movement was indeed supported by Italy but at a very high price. According to the Pact of Rome signed on 18 March 1941, in return for Italian recognition of him as Poglavnik, Pavelic was compelled to abandon to Italy nearly all Croatian islands, almost all of Dalmatia and a substantial portion of Rijeka.

Even though Germany and Italy helped create the Independent State of Croatia, they were never concerned about the interests of Croatian people nor did they intend to grant it real independence. Italy was mostly concerned with acquiring Croatian territory while Germany wanted a satellite in the Balkans which was very far from the idea of state independence. Croatia never had an independent foreign policy. In joint operations with the German army the Ustashe military units were always under German command. German military commanders and German diplomatic representatives in Zagreb frequently interfered in the internal affairs of the NDH, even appointing local civil authorities. There were also tensions and clashes between the Italian forces and the Ustashe. Furthermore, neither the Italian nor the German military and political circles believed that their Croatian ally was capable of surviving on its own. With the end of the Second World War and capitulation of Germany, NDH disappeared. However, the idea of an independent Croatia persisted. After joining the second Yugoslavia under Josip Broz Tito, Croatia had its own republic and enjoyed equal rights with the other republics. Croatia always had desires and demands for independence. Tito’s death and the fall of communism presented another opportune moment for Croatia to seek greater freedoms and more autonomy for its republic. Political circumstances at the time included the election of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia who revoked the Constitution of 1974 which gave the right to self-determination to all ‘narodi’ (people). The election of Franjo Tudjman in Croatia who was extremely nationalistic and wanted independence for Croatia contributed to the dissolution of Yugoslavia and helped Croatia gain independence. Throughout his presidency, Tudjman tried to mobilize support among Croatian people as well as from other European states especially Germany and Austria. He often referred to struggles of Croatian people to achieve independence and have their own state. He took pride that Croatia had had its own independent state, the NDH. Through the NDH inclusion of Bosnia and Herzegovina he was determined to create a ‘Greater Croatia’ which would include at least Herzegovina, mostly populated by Croatians, if not the whole of Bosnia. This case study clearly shows that historical memories of statehood, legitimate or illegitimate, play an important part in mobilizing people and re-awakening old nationalistic feelings. This is why Tudjman was able to establish himself as a strong leader fighting for the self-determination of all Croats. Without the support of all Croatians, who at the referendum expressed their desire for a Croatian state, it is questionable whether Croatia would have been able to declare independence and gain recognition by other states. Case of Bosnia Bosnian history is mostly characterized by foreign conquests interspersed with periods of independence. There were two forms of state organization in medieval Bosnia: banovina until 1377 and kingdom until 1463. Bosnia was an independent state during both forms, headed by a Ban and a King. Medieval Bosnian state functioned in accordance with the standards of customary law and state protocols typical of the time.

Bosnian law was not encoded in a statue. However, Bosnian customary law was binding for leaders and nobility.93 If they took the throne, the first thing to do was to issue a charter confirming all the rights established by their predecessors. Written sources include international contracts, landowners’ charters and inscription on tombstones.94 Historic sources confirm the existence of “a state apparatus in Bosnia” during the rule of Ban Kulin (1180-1204), as well as the existence of “a court chamber”, “very high income”, and “a considerable cultural development” of the country.95 The famous charter for the people of Dubrovnik from 1189 confirmed Bosnia as an independent state guaranteeing freedom of passage and trade for merchants from Dubrovnik in its territory. During the ban’s rule in Bosnia, the best sources to confirm Bosnia’s status as that of an independent state rather than a dominion were the Pope’s letters to rulers and neighboring countries as well as charters issued by the bans of Bosnia to merchants.96

In 1376, King Tvrtko I (1353-1434) came to power and aided by the Ottoman Turks, he expanded his rule into western Serbia and took most of the Adriatic coast. With respect to his political plans, he aimed to develop Bosnia into an ethnically united entity.97 At the time of Tvrtko, there were two legal and political bodies in Bosnia: the court and the rule or state council with equal powers in decision-making in legal matters.98 After supporting the uprising of Croatian and Dalmatian leaders against the Hungarian Empire in 1389, Tvrtko became the ruler of Croatia and Dalmatia in 1390. In 1414. There was a military and political disruption of the balance of power created by the Ottoman Turks, who proclaimed Tvrtko II as rightful King of Bosnia, and sent a large military force to Bosnia. The Hungarian anny was defeated and the Ottoman Empire would have an influence rivaling that of Hungary over Bosnian affairs.99 Tvrtko II held on to power until his death in 1443 while Stephen Vukcic, the lord of Hum, continued to obtain more power. At first Viukcic refused to recognize Tvrtko’s successor, Stephen Tomas, and several years of civil war followed. To emphasize his own independent status, Vukcic gave himself a new title in 1448 as the ‘Herzeg (Duke) of Hum and the Coast’ which he later changed to ‘Herceg (Duke) of Sava’. In the early 1450s he faced a war against Ragusa and a civil war with his eldest son. The conflict in the family only intensified and in 1462 the son sought help from the Turks and encouraged them to include Herzegovina, along with Bosnia, in their plans for a massive assault in 1463.100

That same year Turkish army under Mehmet II marched into Bosnia which was defeated rather easily due to internal disagreements over religion.101 During the Turkish rule, Bosnia went through the process of islamization.102 In 1580, the Ottomans decided to make Bosnia into one elayet or province, which meant that it would be ruled by the highest rank of pasha or beglerbeg, the lord of lords. The Bosnian entity included the whole of modem Bosnia and Herzegovina, plus some neighboring parts of Slavonia. Croatia. Dalmatia and Serbia. The elayet was to serve as a barrier against further expansion and defense against Austria and Venice. During the Ottoman rule Bosnia enjoyed a special status as a distinct entity. While the old kingdom of Serbia was to remain divided into a number of smaller units. Bosnia retained a unique status for the rest of the Ottoman period. The main authorities for the Ottoman legal system were the sharia law and the state (sultan) law or kanun which was imposed in Bosnia.103 State laws were published in special orders (ferman) and later in characters hatishari. State law regulated relations not covered or partly covered by sharia law. Such as administration. Hierarchy and taxes. Some of the weaknesses that were apparent in the structure of the Ottoman Empire aided the growth of power and autonomy in the hands of local semi-independent Muslim lords.104 This period was characterized by frequent clashes among different religions. However this was not the main reason for the fall of Ottoman rule and Austrian intervention. In the summer of 1875 there was a growing discontent among the Christian peasants in Herzegovina. Who had to pay very high taxes.105 The basic cause of dissatisfaction was agrarian but also due to the fact that the Orthodox population publicly declared its loyalty to the Serbian state.106 The Bosnian governor assembled an army in Herzegovina. Which acted with brutality during the autumn and winter of 1875-6. By mid-1876. The local crisis became international and in July, Serbia and Montenegro declared war on the Ottoman Empire.107

However it was not until Russia became involved and declared war on the Ottoman Empire in 1877 that the Turks perceived the threat seriously. There had already been much negotiation between the Russians and the Austrians to carve out the Balkan lands. By early 1878 with Russian troops approaching Istanbul, Russia dictated a settlement under the Treaty of San Stefano. Under the Treaty, Bosnia was to remain Ottoman territory, but various reforms were introduced.108 Bosnia was provided with more freedoms and was able to have its own administration, however it did not possess full sovereignty over its territory and was still under the Ottoman Empire. Finally the question of whether to assign Bosnia to Austria or Hungary was resolved by making it a Crown land, which meant that it was ruled by neither and at the same time by both.109

From the legal perspective, the Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be divided into two periods. The first one was from 1878 to the 1908 annexation, when its rule was interim, under the mandate of the international community, while the sultan still held formal sovereignty over Bosnia. The second lasted from 1908 until 1918 when Bosnia was annexed and transformed into a colony of Austro-Hungarian Empire, with its full sovereignty held by the Empire, but with certain forms of political authority exercised with participation of the local populations under the control and authorization of the central authority in Yienna.110 Even though significant elements of military rule and limited civil rights were present throughout Austrian rule, Bosnia and Herzegovina was never an integral part of the Austro-Hungarian state structure. When the great powers of Europe met at the Congress of Berlin in July 1878 to rewrite the settlement made at San Stefano, they were concerned about Russia’s influence in the Balkans and its drive to the Mediterranean. The main legal documents determining the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina after 1878 were Article XXY111 of the Berlin Treaty and the Istanbul Convention of 1879. The Congress of Berlin announced that Bosnia and Herzegovina, while still in theory under Ottoman suzerainty, would be occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary.112

This was exemplary of the way the fate of small countries was decided.
The Dual Monarchy did not bring the promised changes to Bosnia.113 The main effect of the annexation on Bosnia’s internal life was beneficial. The man in charge of Bosnia from 1882 to 1903 was uncrowned king Benjamin Kallay, an Austro-Hungarian diplomat and a historian and author of History of Serbian People.114 He was put to power with a mission to protect Austro-Hungarian interests. Interestingly in 1883 a Croatian Ban was chosen who was also a Hungarian, Lord Kuen. Both of them ruled Bosnia and Croatia with a clear goal to prevent any attempt on the part of Serbia and Croatia to enter into a coalition against Hungary.115

The legal position of Bosnia and Herzegovina after the occupation was an anomaly in comparison with the then legal norm. The sultan was the legitimate sovereign ruler but the real power rested with the Austro-Hungarians. This made the position of Bosnia rather unclear. Theoretically the sultan held sovereignty, but in reality it was a legal illusion with no significance in actions. On the other hand Bosnia and Herzegovina was not an integral part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but rather an annexed territory, thanks to the will of Europe and the agreement by Turkey.116 The Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina was limited by three factors arising from the Berlin Treaty: I) objectives of the European mandate to introduce peace and order; 2) continuous sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire in Bosnia, obliging the Austro-Hungarian administration to submit all its laws to the sultan for approval; 3) provisions of the basic international contracts, showing that the administration was interim. However since the real intentions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire were to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina permanently as a strategic access to Dalmatia and Istria, with an intention of further expansion and gaining access to the sea, it was not possible to reconcile the sultan’s sovereign rights in Bosnia and historical realities. The Austro-Hungarian Empire held only the right to internal sovereignty in Bosnia and Hezegovina.117

As the Ottomans began to weaken and withdraw from Central Europe, the Habsburg Monarchy also began to weaken, since there was no longer a need to gather different countries to fight the Ottoman threat. The Monarchy’s economic policy in Bosnia was colonial. After the 1908 annexation, Bosnia formally became an Austro Hungarian colony, since that was the end of the European mandate, and the sultan sold his sovereignty to the Austro-Hungarian Empire for two and a half pounds sterling, thus extending the legitimacy of its rule in Bosnia.118 Since 1910 when the emperor sanctioned the constitution of Bosnia, laws proposed by the newly established Bosnian Parliament within their competence started to appear as new legal authorities. 119

By the spring of 1913 relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia were extremely tense. Serbia’s conquests had already almost doubled the size of its territories. Austria-Hungary knew that if Serbia acquired Albanian coastland that it would pose a strategic threat to the Austro-Hungarians in the Adriatic.120 The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Habsburg throne, ignited the First World War after Austria-Hungary declared a war on Serbia.121 Muslims formed a powerful organization under the name of “Yugoslav Muslim Organization founded in Sarajevo in February 1919.122 Dr. Mehmed Spaho123, a savvy politician argued that Bosnia should seek to preserve its identity as an autonomous unit within the Yugoslav State,124, Military defeats of the Axis Forces allowed political parties and groups to publish their memoranda in Zagreb on September 1918 stating that they no longer recognized the royal Austro-Hungarian rule, and denying its right to represent them at peace negotiations. The National Council of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was established on October 6 while the exclusion of South Slavic lands from the Austro-Hungarian Empire and their declaration of independence took place on October 29-1918.125 Establishment of the National Council of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes- and establishment of the national governments of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Dalmatia and Croatia, was accompanied by the creation of a new State of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, covering the territory of South Slavic lands previously under the Austro-Hungarian rule. The Yugoslav Communist Party rejected any idea that a set of people defined by their religion could have a political or national identity.126 In 1936 a Communist intellectual- the Slovene Edvard Kardelj, wrote “We cannot speak of Muslims as a nation, but ...as a special ethnic group.”S6S An ‘open letter’ written by Communists in Bosnia in 1939 said that the Muslims had always been a separate entity (posebna cjelina).127 In March 1941 a young activist, Alija Izetbegovic, and his supporters tried to found a young Muslims’ Association and to register it on basis of the regulations in force. The organization was to represent an opposition to fascism and communism. Its official registration was interrupted by the invasion of the Germans. As Izetbegovic recalls, after the war, the organization continued its activities which imprisoned him for three years.

After the start of the Second World War, on 6 April 1941 the German forces invaded Yugoslavia. In September 1943, after Italy surrendered and the victory of allied forces became clear, preparations were launched for the establishment of central authority in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This took place on November 25, 1943 as the State’s Anti-Fascist Council of People’s Liberation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Zemaljsko Anti-Fasisticko Vece Bosne I Herzegovine, ZA VNOBIH) held its first session. This date was considered the date of renewal of Bosnia’s statehood and establishment of the new Bosnian state on principles of democracy and respect for human and civil rightS.128 The political basis for the renewal of Bosnia’s statehood was mass determination of all three peoples of Bosnia in favor of political autonomy of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the democratic and federal Yugoslavia as a separate federal unit. The historical basis was the medieval Bosnian state and the existence of a single Bosnian nation which preserved an awareness of its political and cultural identity and its statehood with political particularities preserved by generations ofBosnians.129 At its Second Session on November 29, 1943, The Anti-Fascist Council of People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) issued a Decision on establishment of Yugoslavia following a federal principle determining the position of ZA VNOBIH as the holder of legal and state functions of the federal unit of Bosnia and Herzegovina.130 The Partisans liberated Sarajevo on 6 April 1945 and within a few weeks the whole territory of Bosnia was under their full control. A ‘Peoples Government’ for Bosnia was appointed on 28 April and instead of being incorporated into Croatia (the Ustasha solution) or absorbed into Serbia (the Cetnik plan), Muslims were offered a federal solution in which Bosnia would continue to exist as an equal entity within Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Federal Constitution proclaimed in January 1946 in which it proclaimed that Yugoslavia would maintain the freedom of belief and the separation of Church and state. The conditions of religious life in Yugoslavia did improve after 1954, when a new law was passed guaranteeing freedom of religion while placing the Churches under direct state control.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina Muslim national ideologies developed in two different forms. One was an officially sanctioned non-religious ideology; the other was a pan Islamist national ideology. The former explained the recognition of the Muslim nation as  the sixth constituent nation in Yugoslavia in 1968 and the latter continued the tradition of the religious and political movement Young Muslims (Mladi Muslimani) formed in March 1941 in Sarajevo.131 According to the officially sanctioned ideology, the Muslims affirmed their socio-ethnic identity through “spiritual traditions and new spiritual, literary, political and cultural features.“132 The process of affirmation culminated in communist Yugoslavia with the recognition of Muslims, first through the introduction, in 1948, of the census category of’ Muslims of undeclared nationality’, which was transformed into the 1971 census category of ‘Muslims’ under the ‘stated nationality’ rubric. Without the support of the Yugoslav Communist Party, the official account implied, the Muslims of Yugoslavia would not have achieved either nationhood or the recognition.133

The pan-Islamist version of Muslim nationalism regarded Islam as the essence of Muslim national and political identity. From 1941 the Islamic ideology emphasized the education of Muslims in the correct Islamic spirit, the creation of a true Islamic society and the liberation and unification of the Islamic world. While the communist authorities were able to suppress the organization in the late 1940s by imprisoning and even executing some of its members, Alija Izetbegovic134 emerged in the late 1960s leading a discussion group consisting mainly of students of Muslim medresas or seminaries (theological schools). Izetbegovic wrote a book Islam Between East and West (Islam Izmedju Istoka I Zapada) which dealt with finding a place for Islam between East and West. Even though he wrote the book before his imprisonment in 1946. Manuscript remained hidden for over 20 years. In 1984 while he was serving his prison sentence. The book was issued by an American publisher. 135

At the First Party Congress after the end of the war it was stated that: “Bosnia cannot be divided between Serbia and Croatia. Not only because Serbs and Croats live mixed together on the whole territory but because the territory is inhabited by Muslims who have not yet decided on their national identity136 Historically. Muslim affiliation and association with Serb or Croat was a reflection of the political life in Bosnia at the time. It was clear though that Muslims were not prepared to give up their nationality.137

In spring of 1965 during the Fourth Congress of the League of Communists of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Muslim population was given the right to national self determinations138 providing them with a nation as well as a religious form of identity. In 1970 Alija Izetbegovic wrote and circulated a short Treatise entitled “The Islamic Declaration: A programme of the Islamisation of Muslims and Muslim peoples”. 139 This program had as a goal liberation of the Muslim peoples from communist and capitalist influence through a revival of an authentic Islamic consciousness. The Declaration promoted the idea that only Islam can reawaken the imagination of the Muslim masses and enable them to engage in determining their own history.140 The Treatise condemned authoritarian regimes, proposed more expenditure on education and advocated a new position for women, non-violence and the rights of minorities. Islam was at the heart of the solution as it offered a comprehensive and distinct model of individual, social and political life. The program identified three ‘republican’ principles of political order that were of utmost importance: the electability of the head of state, the accountability of the head of state to the people and the obligation of solving communally general and social issues.141

The attainment of the Islamic order, according to the program, was considered to be a sacred goal and could not be overridden by any vote. This meant that while the ‘republican’ principles were not applicable in an Islamic state, the ultimate goal of establishing such a state was not subject to a democratic procedure but rather the institution of an Islamic state was a divinely proclaimed historical goal. Izetbegovic argued that an Islamic movement can take over political power only when it is morally and numerically sufficiently strong not only to overthrow the existing non-Islamic authority but also to build a new Islamic one.142 Since Islam is a supranational religion, an Islamic state would not be a national state. Yet it is to be established in any country in which Muslims form a majority.143 In 1970 in Bosnia Herzegovina Muslims formed a relative but not an absolute majority of slightly less than 40 per cent of the population. At that time two distinct trends developed, one was a movement of secular ‘Muslim nationalism’ and the other was a separate revival of Islamic religious belief.144 Izetbegovic’s programme made a successful connection between Muslim national identity and politics in a rather simple way. He argued that their Muslim religion defined their national identity and in that also determined their political preferences. A Muslim’s true allegiance was to an Islamic movement, which aimed at the affirmation of Muslim religious and moral conceptions in all aspects of life including politics. The year 1989, two years after Izetbegovic’s release from prison, marked the beginning of the Islamic movement. The main goals of the Izetbegovic’s Party of Democratic Action (Stranka Demokratske Akcije – SDA) which won the elections in the Parliament and enabled Izetbegovic to be the elected President of the republic’s collective presidency, were centered around the spiritual regeneration of the Muslim nation, its political and social organization and the takeover of positions of power in all Muslim populated areas.146 Tudjman made one last attempt to sidetrade Izetbegovic’ s agenda and incorporate Muslims into Croatia. Izetbegovic in his autobiography recalled meeting Franjo Tudjman who tried to educate Izetbegovic by saying: “Mr. Izetbegovic, don’t create some Muslim party, it’s quite wrong, for the Croats and the Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina are one people.147 The Muslims are Croats and that’s what they feel themselves to be”. Izetbegovic replied that Tudjman was fooling himself and that the Muslims felt themselves to be Muslims, who liked and respected the Croats but were not Croats.148 Negotiations between the republics and Serbia broke down in early 1991. On December 20, 1991 the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina requested recognition for the CommWlity. On February 28 and March 1, 1992, a vote was held which the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) under Radovan Kardzic boycotted. In an almost unanimous decision by the 66 percent of the electorate who voted, the republic chose to separate from Yugoslavia.149 In a SDS plebiscite held before this official referendum about 90% of the Serbs agreed to remain within the nation.150 On April 7, 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina was internationally recognized as politically independent and sovereign state.

 

Conclusion

Bosnia and Herzegovina has a Wlique and rich history mostly characterized by conquest and annexations by foreign Empires. In the period when it was ruled by a Ban and then a King, Bosnia and Herzegovina was an independent entity. Other than those two medieval periods its fate was determined initially by Empires and then European powers. Bosnia and Herzegovina often fOWld itself and its future in the hands of either Austria-Hungary or the Ottoman Empire. It rarely had a voice or an opportunity to express its desires with respect to the nature of its political system. The Yugoslav Communist Party rejected any idea of that a set of people defined by their religion could have a political or national identity. Therefore Muslims were always viewed as only a religious group without any prospects of existing within their own state. During the existence of the Independent State of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina was incorporated into the territory of NDH. Alija Izetbegovic played a crucial role in promoting the idea of an Islamic Bosnian state. He believed that the attainment of the Islamic order was the ultimate, sacred goal of all Bosnians. The main problem was that Bosnia and Herzegovina was not a mono(ethnic) state. The Serbs living in Bosnia were Orthodox and owed their allegiance to Belgrade, while Croats were of Roman Catholic faith and they looked up to Zagreb. Neither Croats nor Serbs would have ever agreed to live in an Islamic, Muslim state and owe allegiance to such a Bosnian Government. Both Belgrade and Zagreb have over the years tried to incorporate Muslims into their states and have even tried to persuade Muslims that they were historically Serbs or Croats. This is the main reason why the Bosnian statehood was so difficult to achieve, why it caused so many human lives to be divided and why as we can see from the recent resignation of its Serbian Prime Minister, remains divided.

From Belgium to Kosovo P.1.

From Belgium to Kosovo P.2.

From Belgium to Kosovo P.3.

From Belgium to Kosovo P.5.

From Belgium to Kosovo P.6.

From Belgium to Kosovo P.7.

 

1 The medieval Sabor is held to have continued the tradition of Croat statehood by freely electing kings other than the rulers of Hungary. The thousand year long history of the Sabor is within this myth portrayed as a protracted political struggle for the preservation of old historical rights of the Croatian state against the encroachments of the Austrian Hapsburgs and later, the Hungarian parliament - both of which were aimed at assimilating Croats and Croatian lands. This protracted struggle, according to this myth, continued in the Yugoslav state in which the Serbs, like the Austrians and Hungarians, denied the Croats their distinct national identity, as well as sovereignty and political independence. The ultimate goal of this mythical struggle is clearly a sovereign and independent Croatian state, the very state which was created in 1991 by Croatia's disassociation from the Yugoslav federation. In Alexandar Pavkovic, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia, p.8.

2 The Krajina region was established as a military region or a buffer zone and the Serbian population enjoyed some special privileges. For example, they were able to have their social organization called zadruga, their orthodox religious institutions and most importantly they remained independent from the Croatian feudal system.

3 William Bartlett, Croatia: Between Europe and the Balkans, p.8.

4 Ante Cuvalo, The Croatian National Movement 1966-1972, East European Monographs, Columbia University Press, New York, 1990 p. 9.

5 Alvin Z. Rubenstein "Whither Yugoslavia" Current History, Vol. 64 No. 38 May 1973, p. 204.

6 Such ideas of independence were revived in 1905 when Ante Trurnbic, the leader of the Croatian Party of Right in Dalmatia, and Franjo Supilo a journalist Itom Rijeka issued the Rijeka Dee/aration of 1905 calling for the unification of Dalmatia with mainland Croatia. Mirjana Gross "Croatian National Integrational Ideologies From the End of Illyrism to the Creation of Yugoslavia" Austrian History Yearbook Vol. 15-16, 1979-1980 p. 4.

7 Ante Kadic, "lstria in Croatian Literature," Journal o/Croatian Studies 20, 1979, p. 37.

8 Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch, Die Habsburgermonarchie: Verwaltung and Rechtsswesen Band II (Vienna: Der Osterreichishcen Akademie der Wissensschaften 1974) p. 481.

9 The Croatian Pan-Slavists never advocated a unified state of all the Slavs. In order to make the Illyrian movement more attractive to other South Slavs, the Croatian national revivalists were willing to compromise in some aspects of their cultural heritage, but they believed that each Southern Slavic national groups should keep its name and identity. The response of the Serbians, Slovenes, and Bulgarians to the Croatian initiatives was limited and often even negative.

10 Cynthia W. Frey, "Yugoslav Nationalism and the Doctrine of Limited Sovereignty" Party 11, East European Quarterly, Vol. 11 No.1, 1977 p. 102.

12 Ante Cuvalo, The Croatian National Movement 1966-1972, p. 10.

13 Great Britain, France and Russia.

14 Corfu Declaration establishing the Kingdom of Serbs Croats and Slovenes, text available in Dr. Orner Ibrahimagic, Politicki Sistem Bosne I Herzegovine, p. 159.

15 The state at that time was comprised of 'civil' Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, together with Medjumorje and Rijeka.

16 Boban Ljubo, Croatian Borders /9/8-/993, p. 14

17 Izjasnjavanje Narodnih Predstavnika za Ujedinjenje, Sabor Hrvatske, Slavonije I Dalmacije u svom zakljucku of 29 Oktobra 1918, Officialni Document. Pliticki Sistem Bosne I Herzegovine, p. 161.

18 Radic told the delegates that the people, especially the Croats, would realize that they did not represent the people and would turn against them at the first elections. "You are roaming like a goose in the fog,"..."We are three brothers, Croats, Slovenes, Serbs, but we are not one. It is necessary to ask each brother...the greatest sin and the greatest political mistake is to place one's own before an accomplished fact". He ended his speech with "Long live the republic, "Long live Croatia." The national Council did not regard Radic highly and asked his party to name someone else in his place. Ferdinand Sisic, Biskup Strosmajer I Jusnoslovenska misao (Bishop Strosmajer and the Yugoslav Idea) p. 279.

19 Alex N. Dragnich, The First Yugoslavia, p. 17

20 Ante Cuvalo, The Croatian National Movement /966-/972, p. 15.

21 William Bartlet, Croatia: Between Europe and the Balkans, p. 18.

22 Tanner, M. Croatia: A Nation Forged in War. p.125.

23 William Bartlett, Croatia: Between Europe and the Balkans p. 18

24 For a more detailed account See Orner Ibrahimagic, Karakter Rata u Bosni I Herzegovini 1992-1995, E.9.

25Alex N. Dragnicb, Serbs and Croats: The Struggle in Yugoslavia, p. 91.

26 Banovina was a region within Croatia ruled by the Ban.

27 Alex N. Dragnich. Serbs and Croats: The Struggle in Yugoslavia, p. 96.

28 The Sabor had authority over internal affairs, justice, public education, social policy, agriculture, forestry and mining, fmance, construction and health. Foreign affairs, national defense, communications and transport were to remain under the control of the central government as were the hated gendarmerie.

29 lvo Goldstein, Croatia: A History, p. 129.

30 Banovina included 13 Bosnian areas: Brcko, Gradacac, Drventa, Travnik, Fojnica, Bugojno, Stolac, Mostar, Ljubuski, Livno, Konjic, Duvno and Prozor.

31 Autonomous Croatia had a population of 4.4 million, of which 77 per cent were Croat. It contained about 30 per cent of the population and territory of the entire country. Ivan Subasic was appointed as the first Ban of the new autonomous province, and Vladko Macek became Vice-Premier of Yugoslavia.

32 Ivo Goldstein. Croatia: A History, p. 130; See also Fred Singleton, A Short History of the Yugoslav Peoples pp. 174-179.

33 Ante Pavehe was a doctor from Zagreb. He was known as a" Croat nationalist who hated the Serbs. In 1929 Pavehe and his organization known as Frankovci proclaimed openly violent opposition to Kin Alexander and the Serb government George Cesarich, Croatia and Serbia: Why is Their Peaceful Separation a European Necessity, p. 25.

34 William Bartlett, Croatia: Between Europe and the Balkans, p. 20.

35 The name Ustashe is derived ftom the word 'ustati' which means to stand up, therefore Ustashe which is a plural form means "insurgents".

36 Ante Pavelic, Die Kroatische Frage, p. 23.

37 Edmond Paris, Genocide in Satellite Croatia 1941-1944 , p. 20.

38 Zakonska Odredba za Odbranu Naroda I Drzave, Nardone Novine, 7 April 1941.

39 Narodne Novine 11, April 1941, F. Culinovic n.d. p. 387.

40 Pavelic was called Poglavnik of NDH, a term similar to Fuehrer in Germany or Duce in Italy.

41 Ibid pp. 135-136.

42 Narodne Novine, Zagreb, 18 April 1941; Zakodindh: Zakonske Odredge i Naredbe, vol. 12 Zagreb, 1941, p. 86.

43 Narodne Novine, 28 April 1941.

44 On 2 June 1941, in a speech given at Nova Gradiska, Milovan Zanic, the Minister of Justice and author of many legal decrees, revealed anti-Serbian attitude: "This state, our country, is only for Croats and for no one else. There are no methods and means which we, Croats, will not use to make our country truly ours, and to clean it of all Orthodox Serbs. All those who came into our country 300 years ago must disappear... It is the policy of our state, and during its realization we shall do nothing else than follow the grinciples of Ustashe." Novi List, Zagreb, 3 June 1941.

45 Pavehc and the NDH gave Italy almost the entire Croatian Adriatic coast, all the islands except Pag, Brac and Hvar and all the major towns and ports except Dubrovnik. They also granted Medjumurje and Baranja to Hungary. William Bartlet, Croatia: Between Europe and the Balkans, p. 21.

46 On 9 October 1941 a decree was issued declaring the nationalization of Jewish enterprises and possessions. Article One of this decree stipulated: " The State Direction for reconstruction is authorized, in view of reconstruction and national economy, to nationalize all Jewish enterprises and possessions whatsoever for the benefit of the Independent State of Croatia," Zbornik Zakona I Naredba NDH 1941 Zagreb, 1941, p. 126. The persecution of Jews was especially severe in Bosnia where only one fifth of the Jewish population survived the war. The official version offered by the post war communist government was that 600,000 Serbs, Jews, Gypsies and communists were killed. Zagreb State Archive, fund 252

47 Ustashe police. Jewish department) box, 1,45,49,53.

48 Gregory Copley, "Hiding Genocide: The Balkan Conflict; The Psychological Strategy Aspects", Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policies, December 31, 1992 p. 7

49 Ivo Goldstein, Croatia: A History, p. 135.

50 Ibid.

51 Zagreb State Archive, fund 249, kut. 7, 23, 37, 39; Ante Pavelic, Dzamija Poglavnik Ante Pavelica Madrid, 1988. p. 67, 70.

52 Ibid.

53 Partisans fought Germans and those who were for Germany which included Ustashe and Chetniks. Ivo Goldstein, Croatia: A History, p. 142.

54 Partisans fought Germans and those who were for Germany which included Ustashe and Chetniks. Ivo Goldstein, Croatia: A History, pp. 143-144.

55 Ivo Goldstein, Croatia: A History, p. 134.

56 WiIliam Bartlet, Croatia: Between Europe and the Balkans, p. 23

57 Irvine, Jill A. The Croat Question: Partisan Politics in the Formulation of the Yugoslav Socialist State.

58 Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Twentieth Century, Vol. 2, p. 295.

59 William Bartlet, Croatia: Between Europe and the Balkans, p. 25

60 The feeling of being exploited was exacerbated by a perception that Belgrade was suppressing Croatian culture. The Croatian Writers Union protested a new Serbo-Croat dictionary which appeared to them to clearly downplay the difference between the Serbian and Croatian language, stressing the primacy of the former. A Declaration (Deklaracija) was issued in 1967, which insisted on the distinctiveness of the Croatian language as a language separate from Serbian rather than just a dialect. In turn Croatian language newspapers began to publish articles of the federal government and calling for yet greater autonomy for Croatia. The cultural organization Matica Hrvatska became outspoken in support of Croatian autonomy, and eventually began demanding Croatia's independence. The organization was influenced by Croatian emigres, which were eager to see autonomy or even independence for Croatia. William Bartlet, Croatia: Between Europe and the Balkans, p. 29.

61 Dusko Doder, The Yugoslavs, p. 37.

62 Literally, the 'Croatian Bee'. This society was founded to promote culture and education, and in some cases to raise political questions.

63 The paper addressed various aspects of democratic development and Croatian national issues, and emphasized the indivisible sovereignty of the Croatian nation in Croatia.

64 The three party leaders at the head of the movement were dismissed. A fierce repression followed which brought to an end the liberal, but also nationalist, dreams of the Croatian Spring. The potential seriousness of the situation was underlined by reports that Serbs in the Kordun region had begun to arm themselves out of fear of a resurgent Croatian 'ethnofascism'. William Bartlet, Croatia, Between Europe and the Balkans, p.30.

65 Banac, Why Bosnia p.143.

66 It became clear that economic growth in the previous decade had been fueled by an enormous build-up in foreign debt. By the end of 1970s, the repayments on the debt became impossible, and the government was forced to introduce measures to restrict borrowing while cutting back on imports. The currency was devalued in an unsuccessful attempt to boost exports, which only fueled a more rapid inflation. Real incomes began to fall, causing dissatisfaction first with the government and then with the socialist economic system as a whole. The economic crisis led to a wider political crisis and to increasingly bitter disputes between the republics. Lydall, Harold Yugoslavia in Crisis, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1989.

67 At the time when the 1974 Constitution was passed, Slovenia and Croatia were neutral at best. It was evident that both republics, through their trade and educational programs supported democratic changes in Kosovo. Many capable academics from Kosovo have received their doctorates from University of Zagreb and University of Ljubljana.

68 Ivo Goldstein, Croatia: A History, p. 198-199

69 Franjo Tudjrnan born 1922, fought in the national liberation struggle during the Second World War and until the late 1950s had lived in Belgrade, where he had a great military career, becoming a general at thirty-eight.

70 Franjo Tudjman, Nationalism in Contemporary Europe, p. 15.

71 Robert M. Hayden, "Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics," Slavic Review 51 (4) (Winter 1992): p. 655.

72 Cohen, Broken Bonds, p. 97.

73 Mesic had been a leader of the Croatian Spring events in 1971 and imprisoned for a year in the Stara Gradiska prison. In 1990 he became secretary of the HDZ and the Prime Minister of Croatia following the elections of that year. He was nominated by the Sabor to be the Croatian representative on the Yugoslav collective Presidency, and briefly became President of Yugoslavia in 1991, until his resignation No 5 December. After the 1992 elections he became speaker of the Croatian parliament (Sabor). He resigned from the government and the HDZ in 1994.

74 Cohen, Broken Bonds, p. 98.

75 Narodne Novine broj 56; 22 December 1990. Constitution of Croatian Republic cited in Dr. Andjelko Milardovic, Dokumenti Drzavnosti Republike Hrvatske (Documents Pertaining to Statehood of Croatian Republic), pp. 44-67.

76 Whether by calculated design or simply stwming insensitivity to the sensibilities of the Serbs of Croatia, the forms of the flag and coat of arms instituted by the CDU government in June 1990 were very similar to those used by the fascist "Independent State of Croatia" during World War II, under which hundreds of thousands of Serbs were killed.

77 Narodne Novine broj 56; 22 December 1990 Constitution of Croatian Republic cited in Dr. Andjelko Milardovic, p. 47.

78 Narodne Novine, broj 56; 22 December 1990. Constitution of Croatian Republic, Art. 70 p.56.

79 On the other hand, non-ethnic Croats who wished to apply for citizenship, or prove their citizenship,
were required to have been resident in Croatia for five years immediately prior to their application, and to rove that they had a proficiency in the Croatian language.

80 Glas Javnosti, Tanjug, Zagreb 25 July 1990.

81 Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging, p.27.

82 William Bartlett, Croatia: Between Europe and the Balkans, p.37

83 Ivo Goldstein, Croatia: A History, p. 219

84 Serb is a city in Lika, Croatia.

85 William Bartlett, Croatia: Between Europe and the Balkans, p. 38

86 For a detailed account of the elections see Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 143.

87 Narodne novine broj 31, 25 June 1991, Deklaracija of Proglasenju Suverene i Samostalne Republike Hrvatske (Declaration of Sovereign and Independent Croatian Republic).

88 JNA was not defeated in an armed conflict Rather, by the time the contlict occurred JNA has already dissolved. Many Slovene and Croatian generals have left JNA in order to protect their republic. Further Slovene and Croatian soldiers deserted the Yugoslav military and have left in order to form their own units within their republics. This automatically transformed JNA into a Serb army.

89 Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth and Destruction of Yugoslavia, p. 173.

90 Discover Channel Series, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, 1995.

91 UN Security Council Resolution 713 of 25 September 1991.

92 The three conditions established for recognition were: 1) guarantee of minority rights, including special status to certain regions; 2) no unilateral change of borders; and 3) participation in negotiations within the peace conference over creation of an alliance of independent or sovereign state. (that is that independence of individual states be recognized only in the ftamework of a general agreement).

93 William Bartlett, Croatia: Between Europe and the Balkans, p. 39-40

94 For a record of written Old Bosnian Texts see Dr. Orner Ibrahimagic, Politicki Sistem Bosne i Herzegovina, pp. 95-132

95 Orner Ibrahimagic, Drzavno-Pravni Razvitak Bosne i Herzegovine, p. 9.

96 Dinic, Historija Naroda Jugos/avije I, pp. 562-563.

97 For example, in his Charter nom 1234, ban Ninoslav guaranteed needom of passage for the merchants nom Dubrovnik, exempted them hom taxation, and offered them protection in cases of war with the ruler of Raska, i.e. Serbia. Srednjevjekovna Bosna p. 160.

98 Tvrtko I chose the name Stjepan, selecting martyr Stephen as the protector of his order. After that period all the rulers were to bear the narne Sjepan before their own. His ancestors had family ties with the Nemanjic dynasty, which ended with the death of Emperor Uros in 1371. By his grandmother Jclisaveta, Tvrtko held the right to succession for the crown of Serbia. At the time, his signature read: "Stefan Tvrtko V Hrista Boga Kral Srbljem I Obsne I Primorju". (Stefan Tvrtko, the King of Serbia, Bosnia and lands by the sea, before Christ) Nada Klajic, Srednjevjekovna Bosna pp. 262-264.

99 Vladimir Corovic, Bosna i Herzegovina, p. 8.

100 There were also sanctions and threats for those who violated their oath. Nada Klajic, Srednjevjekovna Bosna, p.21S.

101 Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, p. 21.

102 Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, p. 23.

103 Ibid.

104 Although Muslims ruled Bosnia, it was not considered a Muslim state. The main concern of the Turks was to keep Bosnia under its control and to extract money from it, as well as men and feudal incomes for the needs of the Empire.

105 The Hanefian law tradition, called after Abu Hanefi, was followed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Sharia law was in wide application only in relations among MusJims. In cases where there was no solution found in the Qoran or the khadises, fatwas were used. Farwas were issued by muftis in kadiJuks, but there was also a grand mufti for the entire Empire. Certain elements of sharia law were preserved in Bosnia and Herzegovina until 1945, especially in family and inheritance rights of the Moslems. In addition to sharia, laws of other reJigious communities (millets) was also applied, as well as occasionally the customary law. Orner Ibrahimagic, Constitutional Development of Bosnia and Herzegovina pp. 80-82.

106 Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, p. 119.

107 Evans, Through Bosnia, pp. 337-338.

108 Cubrilovic, Bosanski Ustanak, pp. 61-67.

109 They agreed between them that Serbia would annex Bosnia and Herzegovina. Montenegro had some success however Serbia suffered great losses. Russia came to aid Serbia and forced the Turks to agree to an armistice in November. The attack only worsened the already tense relationship between the Turks to agree to an armistice in November. The attack only worsened the already tense relationship between the Turks and the Serb population.

110 One of the reforms in Art. 14 stated that Bosnian own revenues were to be used only for Bosnian purposes for three years. Abtheilung fuer Kriegsgeschichte, Die Occupation Bosniens, p. 41.

111 A joint commission was set up under the Common Ministry of Finance; in theory the chief authority in Bosnia was the military governor, responsible directly to the Crown, but it was the Common Minister of Finance who made the policy decision. In theory too Bosnia was under military law, but a proclamation at the end of 1878 announced that all Ottoman laws in Bosnia would remain in force until further notice, and these were only gradually replaced by Austro-Hungarian laws and by new laws specially designed for Bosnia. Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, p. 138.

112 Orner Ibrahimagic, Constitutional Development of Bosnia and Herzegovina, p. 83.

113 The article read: "Austro-Hungarian Empire will occupy the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and will govern them as the Austro-Hungarian Government does not want to assume governance over the Novi Pazar, Sandzak, on the south-east between Serbia and Montenegro, as far as Mitrovica (Kosovo), Turkish rule will be maintained. However, to ensure a new political state of affairs on one hand, and freedom and safety of roads on the other, the Austro-Hungarian Empire maintains the right to hold its troops throughout the territory of the former Bosnian vila yet, and to control its military and trade roads. The AustroHungarian and the Turkish governments maintain the right to agree on the details of this matter." Original Document available in Omer Ibrahimagic, Constitutional Development of Bosnia and Herzegovina, p. 83.

114 Austria-Hungary was not eager to rule Bosnia and there were many concerns they had about this decision. One was the nature of the Dual Monarchy and the decision about who would rule Bosnia-Austria or Hungary. There were also some concerns regarding Croatia and whether Bosnia and Croatia would be united. Some even wanted Croatia to be elevated and become equal member with Hungary and Austria Trialist idea. Another suggestion was independent Croatia and development of South Slav State. Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, p. 134.

115 The main cause for resentment against Austria-Hungary among the Christian peasants was that the great land reform which they expected never took place.

116 Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, p. 147.

117 Vladimir Corovic. Politicke Prilike U Bosni I Herzegovtnt, p.17.

118 Orner Ibrahimagic, Constitutional Development of Bosnia and Herzegovina, p. 85

119 Zivojin Perle, 0 pravnom polozaju Bosanaca i Hercegovaca u stranim drzavama. Belgrade 1906, p. 31; M. Immamovic, Pravni Polozaj I Unutrasnjopoliticki Razvitak BiN od 1878 do 1914 pp. 5,15,17-24

120 Zivojin Perle, 0 pravnom polozaju Bosanaca I Hercegovaca u stranim drzavama. Belgrade 1906, p. 31; M. Immamovic, Pravni polozaj I unutrasnjopoliticki razvitak BiH od /878 do /914 pp. 5, 15, 17-24.

121 Zakoni 0 Ustavnim odredbama za Bosnu I Hercegovinu Odboreni Previsnjim Rjesenjem of 17 February 1910, Zamaljski Ustav (statut) za Bosnu I Hercegovinu, Constitution for Bosnia, 17 February 1910. available in Dr. Orner Ibrahimagic, Politicki Sistem Bosne I Herzegovine, pp. 146-156.

122 With the war between the two powers becoming imminent, the military governor of Bosnia, General Potiorek declared a state of emergency on 2 May, dissolved parliament and suspended the civil courts, closed down many Serb associations and took the administration of all Bosnian schools into his own hands. '59 Throughout the war, Muslims in Bosnia had generally been regarded as loyal to the government. Muslims had also served along with Croats and some Serbs in the Schutzkorps, the local defense units whieh had executed the government's anti-Serb policies in eastern Bosnia, sometimes with cruel brutality. Ivo Banac, National Question, p. 367

123 Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, p. 163.

124 Spaho's primary goal was the preservation of the regional-administrative identity of Bosnia in the constituent assembly. However, against his will he had to support the centralist constitution imposed by the Serbs, known as the Vidovdan Constitution adopted on June 29. The reorganization of Yugoslav territory formed thirty-three 'oblasti' or provinces and while the outline of Croatia disappeared from the map, the outline of Bosnia was preserved which helped Bosnia retain its identity. Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, p. 165

125 At the time of the elections which included the whole of Yugoslavia in November 1920, his party won almost all Muslim votes in Bosnia-Herzegovina and acquiring 24 seats in the National Assembly. Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, p. 160-170.

126 On November I, 1918 the ruler of Bosnia and Herzegovina surrendered powers to the National Council. Orner Ibrahimagic, Constitutional Development of Bosnia and Herzegovina. p.89

127 However after 1935, the Communists began introducing quasi-federal proposals for a country formed out of seven distinct territorial units, one of which was Bosnia. This included dealing with the rival claims that Bosnia was actually Croatian or Serbian, and obliged the Communists to pay more attention to the unique identity of the Muslims. Ibid.

128 Z. T. Irwin, 'The Islamic Revival and the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina', East European Quarterly, vol. 17 (1984), pp.437-58.

129 At the Party Congress held in 1940 Milovan Djilas who was in charge of nationalities policy excluded Muslims from the list of Yugoslav nations. Ibid.

130 Vojnoistorijski institute, Belgrade, Fond NDH, No. 85-38/14-1; Zbornik NOR-a, Vol. IV, book 12, p.330; Arhiv Saveza komunista BIH, Vol. III, Istorijsko odeljenje CK SK BiB, Sarajevo 1952 p. 12

131 With an exception in the second half of XIX century, under the influences of political propaganda and church authorities, Bosnian Catholics developed national feelings as Croats, and Bosnian Orthodox did so as Serbs.

132 Article 3 of Decision read: "It is in accordance with the federal development of Yugoslavia that the already existing bodies of people's authority in some peoples in Yugoslavia are represented by national liberation boards and anti-fascist councils of peoples' liberation." Prvo i Drugo Zasjedanje A VNOJ-a pp. 208, 231-242.

133 This second form was banned after its leaders were imprisoned in 1980s. Alexandar Pavokovic, Fragmentation in Yugoslavia: Nationalism and war in the Balkans, p. 94

133 A. Pirivatra, 'On the National Phenomenon of the Moslems of Bosnia-Herzegovina' in Nations and Nationalities of Yugoslavia (Belgrade: Medjunarodna Politika, 1974) p.311 in Alexandar Pavkovic, Fragmentation in Yugoslavia, pp. 94-95

134 Ibid.

135 Alija Izetbegovic was born in 1925 in Bosanski Samac in Bosnia-Herzegovina, he joined the Young Muslims during World War II. In 1946 he was sentenced to three years in prison for his participation in this nationalist movement. After his release from prison, he completed a law degree and worked as a lawyer for state fmns. In 1983 he was arrested for nationalist dissident activity (including the writing ofhis Islamic Declaration) and with a group offellow Muslims sentenced, on appeal, to six years in prison (of which he served four). His Islam between East and West, was originally published in Serbo-Croatian in Belgrade in 1984. In 1989 he founded the first opposition party in Bosnia- Herzegovina, the Party of Democratic Action, and in 1990 was elected president of the presidency of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

136 Alija Izctbegovic, Inescapable Questions, p. 25-28 m Hoepken, 'Die Kommunisten und die Muslime'. p. 194.

137 In the 1948 census the Muslims had three options: they could call themselves Muslim Serbs. Muslim Croats or 'Muslims, nationality undeclared'. This gave the Bosnian Muslims a chance to demonstrate just how reluctant they were to be either Serb of Croat: 72,000 declared themselves as Serbs and 25,000 as Croats, but 778,000 registered as 'undeclared'. In Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, p. 198.

138 Frederik W. Hondius, The Yugoslav Community of Nations (The Hague: Mouton, 1968), pp. 247-48.

139 In Serbo-Croatian: Islamska Dekjaracija: Jedan Program Islamizacije Muslimana I Muslimanskih Naroda, 2nd eOO. (Sarajevo: Bosna, 1990)

140 Alija Izetbegovic, Inescapable Questions, pp. 25-26

141 Ibid. p. 29

142 Alexandar Pavkovic, Fragmentation in Yugoslavia, p. 96.

143 Ibid. p.37

144 A. Popovic, Islamische Bewegungen, p. 281.

145 Alexandar Pavkovic, Fragmentation in Yugoslavia, p. 97

146 Alija lzetbcgovic, Inescapable Questions. p. 84.

147 Ibid.

148 Anna Cataldi, Letters From Sarajevo: Voices of a Besieged City (Dorset: Shaftesbury, 1994), p. 11.

149 Anna Cataldi, Letters From Sarajevo: Voices of a Besieged City (Dorset: Shaftesbury, 1994), p. 11.

150 Anna Cataldi, Letters From Sarajevo: Voices of a Besieged City (Dorset: Shaftesbury, 1994), p. 11.
 
 

 

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