Bosnia-Herzegovina is a delicate country made up of three groups: Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs -- ingredients that religiously, ethnically and historically do not mix well. The country was one of the six federal units of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). When Bosnia-Herzegovina gained its independence in 1992, armed conflict -- and then a genocidal war that involved the whole former SFRY region -- erupted among all the groups. At the time, Bosnia-Herzegovina was largely controlled by the Serbian majority, which is now concentrated in the current Serb Republic. Eventually, the Bosniaks and Croats teamed up to create the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to counter The Serb Republic. The Serbian war ended and the current states formed when the international community, outraged by the genocidal war, called on the region's leaders to agree to the Dayton Accords. Under the Dayton Accords, the United Nations appointed an international administrator, called the high representative, to supervise Bosnia-Herzegovina. The country remains split between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and The Serb Republic. Each entity has its own president, parliament and constitution, though there is also a central government, comprising a president and parliament, for the country as a whole. As if this were not confusing enough, the central government's presidency has an eight-month rotation among the Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs, guaranteeing a sharing of power. The high representative ultimately has the final say in each government's decisions; essentially, if not for the high representative, there would be no unified Bosnia-Herzegovina. Currently, Bosnia is ruled by two entities: the Bosnian-Croat Federation in the west and south of the country, and the Republika Srpska, the Serb-majority region of the north and east. Under the Dayton Accords of 1995, during which this arrangement was hashed out, the two entities largely rule themselves, but within certain guidelines. Should either minigovernment take actions of which its internationally appointed high representative disapproves, the decision can simply be invalidated and the officials involved dismissed.This dual structure is drawing to a close, with the international community hoping to do away with it sometime in June 2007. The Oct. 1 2006 elections put nationalists in positions of power within the country's internationally imposed and operationally awkward triumvirate presidency. The Croat and Bosniak leaders want to toss Republika Srpska into history's trash bin, while the Serbs want to secede from Bosnia-Herzegovina outright and unite with their co-ethnics in Serbia. With such an unrealistic deadline (not to mention goal) ahead, a resurgence of violence in the region would hardly be a surprise. Second, there is no reason to expect that any Balkan unpleasantness would be contained within Bosnia-Herzegovina's borders. If Radicals are in charge, the possibility of renewed Serbian militancy in locales as diverse as Bosnia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia looms large.

Over a decade after the end of the Bosnian civil war, Mostar remains a divided city. The city has two sets of everything, from schools, hospitals and public transportation two waste disposal services.1 Mostar's university system is separated into two institutions: a Croat controlled 'University of Mostar' and a Bosniac dominated 'University Dzemal Bijedic'. Mostar's famous bridge built in 1566 connected the town's two halves, on opposite shores of the Neretva river. The arch, which stood as a symbol of unity was mercilessly destroyed on November 11, 1993 by Croat gunners. Even though the bridge has been reconstructed, the division among Croats and Muslims still remain.2 Bombed-out buildings stand abandoned, burned down houses in ruins and shelled religious institutions are a common sight. Sprayed signs with political messages of hatred remain as a constant reminder of the brutal civil war that took place almost a decade ago. One still hears of incidents of ethnically based violence, which is why the Croats feel safer on the western side and Muslim Bosniaks on the eastern side where they constitute a majority. Safety, next to a poor economic situation and unemployment of 45%, remains a primary concern among the population of 100,000.

Division and animosity between ethnic groups as exemplified by the recent resignation of the Serb Prime Minister, remains profound and the efforts of Paddy Ashdown, British politician, to integrate the two ethnic groups have failed. There is no laughter on the streets of Mostar; fear and suspicion float through the quiet air. Striking aspects of Mostar's partition consists of visual symbols that mark zones and boundaries of territorial control. The periphery of Muslim territory on the east bank, on the eastern edges of the Boulevard, is marked by a long line of slender minarets belonging to dzamije (mosques) erected since the war. Just across the Boulevard, the beginning of Croat turf is signaled by an enormous Catholic cathedral. The concept of shared space, belonging equally to all communities, which has been the key to coexistence in Bosnia for centuries, has been replaced by strict divisions. The Balkan peacemaker and a prominent US diplomat, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke3, after his last trip to the Balkans announced to a curious Washington audience that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a sound state and that significant progress has been made in the region. He concluded that there was no question about its survival as a unified entity.4 This may indeed be the perception of the overzealous designers of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement as well as the official statement of the government in Sarajevo whose main interest today is attracting foreign investment and improving poor economic conditions in the country. However, the reality on the ground is quite different and it points to the fact that even though violent outbursts of nationalism have subsided, they have not been eradicated. Just over  a year ago for example, in October 2006, a rocket was fired at a mosque in Mostar. But it was not only Serbs who killed Muslims, there is a possibility that a Croat fired that rocket at the mosque last year. In fact  the foundation of the past 10 years of peace in Bosnia has not so much been Dayton as the agreement between Croats and Bosniaks to share their chunk of the territory. If that agreement shows any serious signs of disintegration, all bets will be off. Another fact is that Serbs and Croats of Bosnia do not identify with the state and pledge their loyalties to Serbia and Croatia respectively. Some of the politicians who were instrumental to the process of recognition of the breakaway Yugoslavia republics are not raising their champagne glasses toasting to the optimistic claims of Ambassador Holbrooke. There is still a valid concern that the unresolved question of the status of Kosovo and Montenegro and their potential recognition as independent states, an idea that Ambassador Holbrooke wholeheartedly supports, may set in motion old nationalistic feelings and provoke both Serbs and Croats into reverting to arms again.5

What is the reasoning behind the creation and functioning of the Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosna, which began forming immediately following the 'dissolution' of Yugoslavia? There are at least two theories in circulation. The first explanation is that the creation of Herzeg-Bosna was a direct reaction to the Serb aggression. According to this view the Croats living in Bosnia and Herzegovina were forced to find a way to secure their territory and defend themselves. In that sense, this entity was just a temporary 'creature' with a temporary purpose. The second theory supports the view that the creation of this entity was initiated and encouraged by President Tudjman and his HDZ party (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica) in Zagreb for the purpose of incorporating Herzegovina into a future 'Greater Croatia' state. According to the late president of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Alija Izetbegovic,Herceg-Bosna was a result of the expansionist politics of the late president of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudjman and his Croatian Democratic Union Party or HDZ.6

In Izetbegovic's opinion, the main reason behind the creation of this controversial mono-ethnic entity on Bosnian territory was the revival of the old Croatian borders ftom the 10th century during the reign of King Tomislav and during the Second World War when its borders encompassed most of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its creation was justified and promoted by using historic grievances of Croatian people, while its foundation was established by HDZ nationalism directed by Mr. Tudjman's government in Zagreb.Dr. Ciril Ribicic, president of the Slovenian Constitutional Court and a prominent politician and jurist claims that Herceg-Bosna was created because a historic opportunity presented itself at the time of the dissolution of Yugoslavia.7 This entity was further founded based on an assumption and calculation that Bosnia would not survive Serbian aggression and Belgrade's desire to create a 'Greater Serbia‘.8 Ribicic asserts that Tudjman perceived this situation as a unique opportunity to ally with Milosevic and together they planned a division of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Indeed, two leaders met in the town of Karadjordjevo on March 25, 1991. According to Stipe Mesic at that meeting Tudjman and Milosevic decided to divide up Bosnia. Tudjman told Mesic: "I made a deal with Milosevic, Croatia got Croatian Banovina".9 Tudjman further explained that Milosevic 'gave' him Cazin, Kjadusa and Bihac, the areas of the so-called 'Turkish Croatia' because "he did not need them".10 Even though the exact content of the talks has not been published, it is indisputable that Tudjman proposed the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a solution for avoiding conflict with the Serbs.11 The Agreement envisaged the Muslims left with a small portion of Bosnia acting as a buffer zone between Croatia and Serbia.12 This plan was an actual realization of Tudjman's and Milosevic's goals of creating Greater Croatia and Greater Serbia.

From its creation, the Bosnian HDZ was under a very strong influence of the Zagreb-based Herzegovinian lobby led by Gojko Susak, the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Croatia. This group owed much of its ideology to ultra-nationalist groups among the large Croat diaspora, which cultivated nostalgia for the fascist Independent State of Croatia, NDH of World War IT and a pronounced hatred of Serbs. With the rise to power of Franjo Tudjman, these radical elements came to control the extensive funds arriving from the diasporas to support the new Croatian state and its fight for independence. They diverted these funds, together with large sums from the Croatian defense budget, into building the political, military and intelligence structures of HercegBosna which were needed for the war. Their goal was the union of ethnically-cleansed parts of Bosnia with Croatia. To these aims, they established concentration camps, engaged in brutal ethnic cleansing, and relied on criminals such as Mladen Naletilic ("Tuta"), the leader of the infamous Convicts' Brigade, to rid their territories of Muslims and Serbs and spread fear among moderate Croats.13

After the formation of Herzeg-Bosna in September of 1991, in a meeting with a delegation ftom the HDZ of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 27 December 1991, Tudjman claimed that the Croatians had a 'historic opportunity' to create an internationally recognized Croatian state. He affirmed: "it is time to use this opportunity and gather and unify Croatian citizens in maximum possible way.“14 There was only one problem that stood in the way to the realization of that plan - Bosnian Muslims. Realizing this fact, Tudjman attempted to resolve it peacefully by approaching Izetbegovic with the claim that Muslims are historically Croatian and that they should become part of the formation of Greater Croatia.15 Izetbegovic was appalled by the audacity of that remark and defended the Muslims by claiming they are a separate ethnic group with a unique history and will never assimilate with the Croats.

In October of 1991, allegedly as a response to the creation of Serbian Autonomous Regions (SAO), the process of the creation of Croatian regions began at a rapid speed. The President of the HDZ party in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Stjepan Kljuic, made the official statement regarding the project. In an interview for the Novi List newspaper, he pointed out: "After everything that has happened, the division of Bosnia is the only way out and I believe that the Serbs must separate their territories and their people. We will suggest to the Muslims to stay in Bosnia and Herzegovina so that we remain as one entity, so that we may form a confederation with Slovenia and Croatia. If they do not accept that, then we will ask for our own entity".16 The first community created on 12 November 1991, by the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina was "Croatian Community Bosanska Posavina". It consisted of eight political districts or opcinas.17

The minutes of some of the initial meetings held with respect to the creation of the above community, refer to a series of separate meetings between representatives of different regional entities and President Tudjman during which they made a unanimous decision to engage in more aggressive politics towards the realization of their dream of a "unified Croatian state".18 The document describes this as a "historic opportunity to create a sovereign Croatian state in accordance with its ethnic and historic borders".19

Only a few days later on November 18, the official decision was made to create a Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna.20 Even before this entity was officially proclaimed, its citizens were granted dual citizenship in Croatia as well as the right to vote in Croatian elections. Its local authorities started using Croatian educational cumcula, currency as well as state symbols, police uniforms and car registration plates.21

Public state enterprises were fonned in the sectors of agriculture, forestry and mining, the Post Telegram and Telephone Service (PIT) and publishing.22 Serbs living on its territory were without a doubt getting the message that they were not welcome anymore and that they should move from the 'Croatian' territory.23 The community formed its own Presidency, which held executive powers. In time, its structure became more complex and exhibited some of the main characteristics of an independent state. According to the Preamble the community was created by the will of the Bosnian Croats living on this territory with a purpose of defending the historically Croat territories and its people.24

Mate Boban, the first president of the Croatian Community Herceg-Bosna replaced the less nationalistic leader of HDZ, Stjepan Kljuic. Boban pointed out that "HZ Herceg-Bosna (Hrvatska Zajednica, Croatian Community) represents the geopolitical, cultural and economic entity and is a result of historical 'banovinas', territories on which the Croatian people lived at the start of the Second World War... Mostar was chosen as the seat of the 'community' because this city represents the cultural, geopolitical and economic center of the Croatian people in this part of the Republic.“25 With some delay, on January 27, 1992, Croatian Community of Middle Bosnia (Hrvatska ZajedniSrednja Bosna) was formed comprised of four political districts.26 This was the last remaining Croatian community that was added to Herzeg-Bosna.27

The choice of opcinas incorporated into its territory was based on the historical Croatian territories during the period of Banovina Hrvatska from 1939(28) and the territories that Croatians had lost as a result of the Second World War.29 Without a doubt, many of Croats in Bosnia were pursuing their dream of enlarging the territory of Croatia by incorporating territories, which they historically possessed and claimed the right to. Not too long after its formation in 1991, the Croatian community realized that it would not be able to preserve its new territory without a military operating independently of Sarajevo. This decision came after the Croats realized that Izetbegovic' s government was either incapable or unwilling to take decisive defensive measure against the expected attack by the Serbs.30 It soon began organizing their own military units to preserve and defend its newly formed territory.

The Croats in Bosnia consisted of two groups. One-third of the Bosnian Croats lived in western Herzegovina known for extreme right-wing nationalist agendas and a uniformly Croat population. Many of the Croatians in this area fought in the Yugoslav Croatian war in 1992 and returned to Bosnia ready to defend Herzegovina. There were also Bosnian Croats that lived in central and northern Bosnia, in towns and communities where all three nationalities were present. These central Bosnian Croats were, by tradition much less nationalistic and much more inclined to live in a multi ethnic Bosnian state than to seek its partition into ethnically pure units. When the war broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Croats of Herzegovina were already organized militarily with the help of Zagreb. In fact, after the formation of Herceg-Bosna, the first significant resistance that the Serb-JNA encountered was in Herzegovina where for three months, Serbs and Croats faced each other across the Neretva River. The Serbs occupied the east bank, the Croats the west, thus partitioning the city of Mostar. On June 17, the Bosnian Croats, after the partial withdrawal of the JNA, pushed the Serbs out of Mostar and captured the Herzegovinian territory along the east bank of the river. It was the first serious defeat the Serbs had suffered since the war began.31

From early 1991 until the end of the year, Alija Izetbegovic's government in Sarajevo struggled to get organized and form an effective military force to defend the country against the Serbs. From the start of the war, Izetbegovic blamed the Serbs and the JNA for the war and claimed that the purpose of it was to destroy Bosnia and create 'Greater Serbia, 32 The JNA at the time had six corps and the 80,000 to 120,000 men in the paramilitary forces of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), the main Bosnian Serb political party.33 On April 8, 1992, the same day the HVO (Hrvatsko Vijece Obrambe or the Croatian Defense Council) was formed, the presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina declared that a "state of imminent threat of war" existed and moved to create a new Territorial Defense (TO) organization comprised of both Croats and Muslims.34 During that time it was efficient for the Muslim dominated central government to cooperate with the Bosnian Croats against their common enemy. Initially, Bosnia and Herzegovina's Territorial Defense forces included both Croats and Muslims but as the government in Sarajevo began to emphasize its Islamic character, Croat members either left to join the HVO or were expelled. The Croats focused on defending the Croat populated territories in Bosnia.35 The Croatian Defense Council, HVO's (Hrvatsko Vijece Odbrane) military element, formally came into existence with the establishment of the HVO Department of Defense.36 In April 1992, organization and training activities were accelerated and the local HVO crisis staffs were re-designated as Municipal HVO Commands and subordinated to the HVO Main Staffin Mostar.37 The lead in organizing Bosnian Muslims for defense was taken by private citizens and Muslim-led patriotic organizations.38

The civilian element of the Croatian Defense Council of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna was established on April 8, 1992, with a task of coordinating the work of the local municipal Bosnian Croat military forces. This was envisioned as the highest executive and administrative authority of the HZ H-B's territory.39 Bosnian Croat political leader and the president of the H-B, Mate Boban later claimed that the HVO was formed because thirteen Croatian villages in the municipality of Trebinje were destroyed and the Bosnian government did nothing to remedy the situation or fight back the Serbs. In reality, Croats did not trust the Muslims and would never depend on them for defending Croatian territories. Historically the Croats saw themselves as superior and would not let any other ethnic group have the upper hand in any matters that involved security and their future. When Alija Izetbegovic met with General Slobodan Prljak, Commander of the Croat army to discuss the situation in Herzegovina, Prljak said to him "it is no secret that the Croats in Southern Bosnia would be happiest if they were part of Croatia".40

The international community formally recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina on April 6, 1992. At the time of its recognition this new state did not have an effective national armed force to protect its newly acquired independence.41 According to its president Izetbegovic, the fighting between different ethnic groups in Bosnia started on the day of the recognition.42 Evidence of how seriously this decision was perceived by the Serbs and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina is shown in a meeting which took place on May 6, 1992. Mate Boban met with the Serb Radovan Karadzic in Graz, Austria to discuss the future of Bosnia. The remark of Karadzic after that meeting was "the border of Serbia must be the Neretva river (located in Mostar)". This statement clearly indicates that Republika Srpska intended to join Serbia. Mate Boban in an interview claimed: "the idea of a Croat state in Bosnia has been around for years.“43 Interestingly, there was no mention of the Muslims.

The influx of Muslim refugees running ftom the Serb militaries further exacerbated tension. Mate Boban as well as other politicians feared that the newly created Croatian areas would be 'flooded' with Muslims. Unsurprisingly, by the end of the 1992 the relations between the Croats and Bosnian Muslims deteriorated. Radical Muslims in central Bosnia, frustrated by the Serbs but encouraged by the growing strength of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and reinforced by Muslim refugees ftom fighting in the Krajina and eastern Bosnia as well as by fanatical mujahadeen from abroad, were planning an open attack on Bosnian Croats. On October 25 a bitter conflict in the central Bosnian town of Prozor started as a dispute between rival criminals over who should take delivery of a consignment of gasoline.44 It soon turned into an ethnic dispute and each of the two armies came in aid of their people. In only a few days the center of Prozor was burned down and the conflict spread to the north in the city of No vi Travnik. These events triggered a military disaster. The cooperation between the HVO and the Bosnian army turned into intense mutual suspicion. Armies started to desert their positions at the town of Jajce. Surrounded by the Serbs since the beginning of the war, Jajce was an easy victory and fell on October 29, as a result of the breakdown in the Bosnian and Croat defenses. As soon as the Serbs entered Jajce, 40,000 Muslim and Croat packed their belongings and fled.45

The civil war between the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims lasted from November 1992 until March 1994. For both sides, it was a war of survival fought out of fear of the other ethnic group taking over. BIH army's aggressive actions can be seen as a legitimate effort by the central government in Sarajevo to control its national territory, to suppress separatist groups, and to secure vital industrial facilities and lines of communication.46 The Croats were also trying to preserve their territories and defend their population. Soldiers of both the Army of BiH and the HVO committed murder, rape, heartless destruction, as well as unlawfully detaining and torturing.47 In the city of Travnik, the HVO demanded that the Bosnian Army disarm and disband. It argued that the Vance-Owen Plan, which the Croat and Bosnian sides had by now both agreed to, placed Travnik in a Croatian province, and required the withdrawal of all non-Croat forces from the province. Even though the Vance-Owen Plan was not the cause of the Muslim-Croat territorial demands, it did provide a "stamp of legitimacy" for the two ethnic groups.48 The Vance-Owen Plan was rejected by the Bosnian Serbs who claimed they would be forced to live in isolated pockets of territory with no secure landlink with Serbia or other Serb areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

On August 28, 1993, the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna proclaimed itself the Republic of Herceg-Bosna with a seat in Mostar.49 The Preamble of the document regarding the formation of Herceg-Bosna states that this entity was formed by the decision of the Croatians of Bosnia and Herzegovina and by the official government representatives of Croatian people. It outlined the main reason for the creation of this entity as the aggression ofthe Jugoslav army and Cetniks50 toward Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian Republic, aimed at the destruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its legally elected institutions.51 Therefore its purpose was the defense of the Croatian ethnic community and its historical territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina. From this document, one could infer that this entity was formed solely for the protection of Croatian people, the inhabitants of the 30 opcinas, rather than all people living on the territory of this new entity. 52

It is debatable whether the Croatian community H-B is a type of the inter-regional cooperation prescribed and permitted by the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1974 allows by law the formation of regional entities as a separate socio-political entities that will take on some responsibilities of the state.53 Furthermore, Amendment XLII from 1989 allows the joining together of regional entities for the purpose of more rational and efficient realization of common interests and needs of the working citizens and the improvement of the socio-economic development. However, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ustavni Sud Bosne I Herzegovine) proclaimed the formation of HB unconstitutional.54 In a meeting held on September 14, 1992, the Court annulled the articles of the formation of HZ HB concluding that its creation was illegitimate and against the interests of Bosnia and Herzegovina and all its citizens including the Croatian people in the Republic.55 According to its opinion, the Croatian Community of Herzeg Bosna was not created based on an agreement between governing bodies of different opcinas, as is prescribed by the Constitution. In addition, the Constitution does not permit the creation of mono-ethnic entities.56 The Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosna continued its operations as if the above decision was never made.

From its inception HZ H-B was formed as a mono-ethnic community, in which non-Croatians were not guaranteed any special individual or collective rights. In addition there has never been a referendum or a plebiscite held regarding its formation nor were there elections held for its bodies and institutions. The mono-ethnic character of HZ H-B was evident not only in its population but also in its presidency and the top echelon of the government, which was composed of Croatian nationals only. According to Article 7 of the decision regarding formation of HZ H-B, the presidency of the community is composed of representatives of Croatian people from governing bodies of opcinas, either those that hold seniority or are presidents of the committees of the HDZ party in different opcinas.57 In this sense, the community was not only mono-ethnic but also mono-party, as the representatives to the government were not elected by the people, but rather chosen and appointed among the members of the HDZ.58 From the document about the formation of HZ H-B, one can conclude that this community was not only formed by, but also strictly represented the Croats and the HDZ party. It was not until March 1994 and the Washington agreement that the HB allowed representation of other ethnicities.59 The only mention of other ethnic groups until then appeared in the description of the purpose of the Defense Community of H-B (Hrvatsko Vijece Obrane HVO) 60 formed in 1992. It outlined its purpose stating that its goal was "protection of the sovereignty of CZ H-B and protection of the Croatian people as well as other people living on its territory against attacks by any aggressor".61

According to the decision made by the Presidency of the HZ H-B, Article 21 of July 3, 1992, the armed forces of the HZ H-B are established to protect the sovereignty of HZ H-B and defend its territorial entity.62 This decision indicates that the HZ H-B acted as if an independent sovereign state which has separated itself from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and as far as the armed forces are concerned, it has cooperated closely with the republic of Croatia and has set a firm ground for aiding Croatian HVO. Moreover, the decision about creation of HZ H-B and the Preamble did not at any point mention the Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina nor its laws and regulations, nor did it determine to what extent its law and regulations will be applied on the territory of HB.63

From the normative perspective (de jure), HZ H-B satisfied all the classical Montevideo criteria of an entity. Based on the documents regarding its creation, one could conclude that it was an entity even before it declared itself a state. Herceg-Bosna was never acknowledged yet HZ as a whole was de facto independent from the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. As far as aspirations of HR H-B are concerned, as Slovenian professor Ribicic has said Herzeg-Bosna had different objectives during its existence. First of all it was meant to be a temporary institution formed as a reaction to the aggression with a purpose of defending itself from that aggression and solving problems that incurred as a direct result of the war. Its second goal was to gain independence from Bosnia and Herzegovina and its third goal was joining a confederal Bosnia and Herzegovina. 64

A very important factor which encouraged the decision to proclaim the community a republic was the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan of July 30, 1993. This plan satisfied interests of Serbs and Croatians by recognizing territories that were gained through military aggression and etnic cleansing. It went further than Vance-Owen because it envisioned three strictly separated entities within Bosnia divided along ethnic lines as opposed to a large number of kantons under central government. According to the plan, Herzeg-Bosna would eventually make official its de facto incorporation into Croatia. The Republic of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina proclaimed by Bosnian Serbs would join Serbia and Montenegro while Muslims would be left with a tiny Muslim state. This was unacceptable to Izetbegovic as it was obvious that this new bizarrely shaped and geographically disjointed state would have a slim chance of survival. On August 30, 1993 the Bosnian government rejected the plan.65

With respect to the aspirations of HZ H-B, there is evidence of continuity between HZ H-B and HR H-B. A new name of the community maintained the same territory while adding a Constitution.66 In terms of political aspirations, of the H-B President Tudjman commented in an interview for the Croatian television on December 22, 1991: "If there are any tendencies for separation of the Serbian part from Bosnia and Herzegovina, then it's understandable that the Croatian territories must join Croatia, because it would be impossible to leave those areas at the mercy of the terror which we have witnessed thus far.“67

The aspirations of Franjo Tujdman to annex 'Croatian' regions of Bosnia persisted throughout the conflict. On 6 May 1995, during a dinner at which he was sitting beside Mr. Paddy Ashdown, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party in the United Kingdom and today the United Nations High Commissioner in Bosnia, President Tudjman clearly indicated that Croatia had aspirations towards territory in Bosnia. Tudjman sketched a rough map of the former Yugoslavia on the back of a dinner menu showing the situation in ten years time. He explained to Ashdown that one part of Bosnia would belong to Croatia and the other part to Serbia. The Croatian leader also said that there would no longer be a Muslim region within the former Yugoslavia, that it would constitute only a "small element of the Croat State". Tudjman was convinced that the Serbs would ultimately exchange Banja Luka for Tuzla and he, in turn, intended to retake Knin and the Krajina region which he eventually proceeded to do.68

From an analysis of the enactments adopted by HZ H-B organs, it cannot be concluded that those organs officially opted for integration with Croatia. But from those documents it clearly follows that they were committed to the defense of Croats and Croatian historical territories, establishments of their own statehood and to the regulation of internal affairs in the HZ H-B, outside the state organs of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It must be added that the President of the HZ H-B Mate Boban, concluded an agreement with Radovan Karadzic at the time when the need of Bosnia and Herzegovina for support was greatest and when some political circles in Croatia were proposing a military alliance between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to counter the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina.69

The establishment of the HZ H-B and the Boban-Karadzic agreement on the demarcation of territory precipitated the outbreak of Croat-Muslim hostilities, especially because it was interpreted within the context of the belief that Milosevic and Tudjman in Karadjordjevo discussed the possibility of dividing Bosnia and Herzegovina at the expense of Bosnian Muslims.70 The HZ H-B Presidency authorized Tudjman to represent the interests of the HZ H-B in international and other negotiations. The problem is not that the HZ H-B was established and functioned as a state entity rather the fundamental problems is its treatment of the organs and regulations of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the non-Croatian population and national minorities, who were systematically ignored in the enactments. The war between Croats and Muslims which lasted from 1992 to 1994 ended with the Washington agreement of cease fire. The goals sought by both sides in the conflict were ultimately political in nature, having to do with the shape of the newly independent Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina and who was to rule what part of it. When political solutions to the central questions were not forthcoming, the Bosnian Muslims and Croats resorted to force as a means of deciding them. Yet, in the end they were forced to return to political means to resolve what had become an intolerable conflict that threatened to destroy the new republic.

The formation of the fragile Muslim-Croat Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina signed on March 2, 1994 under the pressure from the United States, did nothing to resolve the key issues over which the two sides were fighting. This is precisely why the division between the entities and ethnic groups still exists. Even though the Federation is internationally recognized as a Croat-Muslim entity, the Muslims and Croats of Bosnia never recognized it as such. On the ground, the two continue to be two separate entities. The flows of money from Croatia continued after the Dayton Agreement, allowing Herzeg-Bosna to develop and prosper. Football stadiums, marble shopping centers and other prestige building projects sprang up in formerly poor Herzegovinian towns.

Jadranko Prilic, Prime Minister of the HB, testified to the fact that the promotion of Croat-Muslim Federation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was a mere proclamation. In an interview given to the "Slobodna Dalmacija" daily newspaper of 18 December 1995, answering the question about the functions of the Minister of Defense in the Government of the Federation and the Republic, Prilic, who initialed the Dayton Agreement on behalf of the Croat-Muslim Federation, replied as follows: "It should be said that all the time two states and two armies were in existence. But, there was a certain form of coordination and a result was achieved, primarily thanks to the support of the Croat army and Croat state".71 Asked how long the HB would function, he replied that no date has been set and that it would continue until all the rights of the Croat people have been ensured and when the Federation becomes capable of taking over those functions.72

However, the political project of promotion of Muslim-Croat federation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, incorporated in the Washington Agreement, has not materialized. Muslim and Croat state entities continued to function after the agreement as de facto states, which only from time to time enter into a sort of political and military co-ordination for the sake of pragmatic political aims. With respect to the question of whether HZ H-B existed for the protection of Croatians in Bosnia and whether it was supported by Croatia, a lot of the information was revealed by Stjepan Mesic at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia at the Hague. He pointed out that even though Croatian politics always supported a unified Bosnia and Croatia was the first to recognize independent Bosnia, in reality Croatia followed Serbian footsteps. He confirmed that after Tudjman's meeting in Karadjordjevo with Milosevic, Tudjman came back and claimed that Bosnia will not be able to 'survive' and that the Croats would be able to obtain the territories of old Banovina Croatia.73 With respect to Herzeg-Bosna, Mesic explained that the HDZ in Bosnia and Herzegovina was under leadership of HVO and controlled from Zagreb where  all decisions were made. Mesic also confirmed that Mate Boban was only executing the wishes of Franjo Tudjrnan and that he acted on the orders that came from Zagreb.

 

Repubjika Srpska: State within a State

The Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) of Bosnia-Herzegovina was founded on 12 July 1990, in anticipation of the first multi-party elections to be held in BosniaHerzegovina.74 Radovan Karadzic, a poet and psychologist turned politician, presided over and addressed the founding assembly, which elected him President ofthe party.75 In his opening speech, Karadzic criticized the alleged unfavorable political position of the Serbian nation and recalled the “genocide” to which the Serbs had been subjected during World War II.76 The SDS assembly adopted a 24-point program of “principles and goals” focusing on values such as multi-party democracy, peace and cooperation and a state based on law, as well as specifically Serbian concerns such as the status of Kosovo within Serbia and the position of the Serbian Orthodox Church.76 With Karadzic as its leader, the party articulated a program of “protection of the national interests” of the Serbs in BH by maintaining the federal character of BH in SFRY and the unity of all Serbs in a common state. The key point of the SDS programme was the insistence on Bosnia and Herzegovina remaining in a federal Yugoslav state, “on the basis of the historical and political necessity of the unity of all ethnic Serbs.“77 In the context of the SFRY’s disintegration during 1990-1992, this goal was shared with Serbs in Croatia78 and echoed by the platform and policies of the Serbian leadership in Belgrade, which the SCS Bffi explicitly supported. In an interview given shortly after the SDS’s founding assembly, Karadzic was categorical in his opposition to any effort to separate BH, or the Serbs in Croatia, from their mother country of Serbia and spoke of disorder and bloodshed if such an attempt were made.79

In the period between its founding in July and the November 1990 elections, the SDS was a weak party with no established infrastructure, few resources and uncertain chances, competing for votes and power against the entrenched BH Communists and other newly founded parties. Still, the SDS appealed to and clearly had ambitions to represent all Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the run-up to the 18 November 1990 elections, the SDS Main Board issued instructions on the manner of voting actually addressed “to every Serbian house and family,” explaining the basic voting process and exhorting people to vote for the SDS. Party branches were quickly set up in cities, municipalities and local communities throughout BH in the summer and autumn in anticipation of the elections. Regional party organizations were also founded throughout BH. Eventually, SDS municipal organizations were apparently set up in 99 of Bosnia’s 109 municipalities, including the ten municipalities comprising the City of Sarajevo, where a separate City Board was established representing the capital.80 The SDS municipal organizations covered practically the entire country, and encompassed all areas of BH in which Serbs lived in appreciable numbers. The SDS won 72 seats in the BH Assembly at the November 1990 elections, with deputies in the Chamber of Municipalities elected from their home municipalities, and 34 deputies in the Camber of Citizens elected from larger geographical multi-member units. After the elections, the SDS took power at the central level along with two other ethnically based parties, the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) and Bosnian Muslim Party of Democratic Action (SDA). The three chief nationalist parties formed a governing coalition and distributed political and administrative positions, down to the municipal levels along party lines.81 The SDS also won absolute victories in 37 municipalities and a share of power in many more. The SDS thus assumed all privileges that went with the election victory and a power-sharing agreement. From its formation, the SDS and particularly the top Bosnian Serb leadership, regarded itself as the legitimate representative of the entire Serbian people in BH and the SDS victory in the November 1990 election cemented this conviction.82 Radovan Karadzic held no public office in SR BiH, remaining only party President until spring 1992 when he began to acquire various top leadership positions in the nascent Bosnian Serb republic. On November 1990, Momcilo Krajisnik was elected to the Chamber of Citizens of the Assembly of SRBiH as an SDS deputy from the Sarajevo electoral unit and later became President of the Assembly according to an inter-party agreement as well as President of the Assembly’s Commission for Constitutional Issues. He also became the chief policy maker of the SDS and was recognized as such by Belgrade and Milosevic. A meeting of SDS officials was held in Pale on 7 September 1991 that involved municipal, regional and republic organs of the SDS, discussing the party’s drive for regionalization.83 The meeting adopted a “Decision on the Proclamation of Autonomous Regions as Inseparable Parts of the Federative Yugoslavia and Integral Parts of the Federal Units Bosnia and Herzegovina”, as well as the “Separation of Populated Places from One Municipality and Their Incorporation into another.”84

On November 1990, Momcilo Krajisnik was elected to the Chamber of Citizens of the Assembly of SRBiH as an SDS deputy from the Sarajevo electoral unit and later became President of the Assembly according to an inter-party agreement as well as President of the Assembly’s Commission for Constitutional Issues. He also became the chief policy maker of the SDS and was recognized as such by Belgrade and Milosevic. A meeting of SDS officials was held in Pale on 7 September 1991 that involved municipal, regional and republic organs of the SDS, discussing the party’s drive for regionalization.85 The meeting adopted a “Decision on the Proclamation of Autonomous Regions as Inseparable Parts of the Federative Yugoslavia and Integral Parts of the Federal Units Bosnia and Herzegovina”, as well as the “Separation of Populated Places from One Municipality and Their Incorporation into another.”86 Soon after this meeting, and continuing into the fall of 1991, several self-declared “Serbian Autonomous Districts” (rpske autonomne oblasti) and one Serbian-controlled “autonomous region”(SAO) were established. On 12 September 1991, the Assembly of the Community of Municipalities of Eastern and Old Herzegovina declared formation of SAO Herzegovina.87 The number of SA Os did not remain stable over the following months, nor did their names. On 21 November 1991 the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina “verified” the Autonomous Region of Krajina, the Serbian Autonomous District of Herzegovina, the Serbian Autonomous District of Romanija, the Serbian Autonomous District of Semberija and the Serbian Autonomous District of Northern Bosnia.88

The central institutions of the Bosnian Serb republic emerged slowly over period of more than a year starting in October 1991. These institutions, such as the Assembly, Government and Presidency, were created at different times, beginning with the Assembly, and each of them evolved over time as well, a process which was completed with the formation of the Presidency in December 1992. In the course of this process, the Bosnian Serb leadership transformed itself from basing its power primarily on a political party to office holders in an aspiring state. The Bosnian Serb leadership’s goal from mid-October 1991 became the assertion of de facto authority in those territories regarded as Serbian in order to determine the frontiers of the Serbian lands in SRBiH.89 Between its establishment on 24 October 1991 and the founding of the Bosnian Serb Republic on 9 January 1992, the new Assembly prepared the means and conditions for the establishment of entirely separate structures for “the Serbian people of BH,” and ultimately a separate Republic. The Assembly immediately elected Krajisnik as its President and gave itself Temporary Rules of Procedure.90 It proceeded to create legislation, which was considered valid for only the Serbs in BH, and created the basis for segregation. The vast majority of the deputies were from the SDS. Not surprisingly, the Assembly received direct guidance from the Main 91 and Executive Boards.92 Therefore, the Assembly was not only the creation but also the creature of the SDS. The question of the plebiscite is of particular interest. Through this plebiscite, the SDS intended to create legitimacy for its claim that ‘’the Serbs in BH” did not wish BH to secede from Yugoslavia, and equally importantly intended to create credibility for the party’s claim that the SDS and its Assembly were the only legitimate representative of the Serbian People in BH and would act on behalf of all Serbs in BH in any negotiations. On 18 October 1991, the plebiscite was discussed and decided upon.93 On 24 October 1991, at its very first session, the Assembly made the necessary practical arrangements to hold a “Plebiscite of the Serbian People“94 to confirm their declaration of the ‘’will of the Serbian people in BH to remain within Yugoslavia”. The plebiscite was held on 9 and 10 November 1991, and the results clearly favored the republic’s remaining within Yugoslavia.

Based on the results of the plebiscite, on 21 November 1991, the Assembly laid out the SDS’s territorial claims, when it passed the “Decision on the Territories of Municipalities, Local Communities and Populated Places in BH Which Are Considered Territory of the Federal State of Yugoslavia.“95 In this document, the Assembly of the Serbian People proclaimed as part of the territory of the federal Yugoslav state all those municipalities. Local communities and populated places in which over 50 % of the people of Serbian nationality had voted to remain in that state during the November 9/10 plebiscite, as well as those places where citizens of other nationalities had expressed themselves in favor of remaining in Yugoslavia.

The Assembly adopted the “Declaration on the Proclamation of the Republic of the Serbian People of Bosnia and Herzegovina” on 9 January 1992, a date that marks the final step in the gradual build-up of a separate state entity within BH.96 On 27 March 1992 Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Serbian Democratic Party, proclaimed at a ceremony in Sarajevo ‘the Serbian Republic in Bosnia-Hercegovina’ (Srpska Demokratske Bosne i Hercegovine, SD-BiH), with Banja Luka as its temporary capital, and declared that the loyalty of the SC-BiH was to the “all-Serbian State of Yugoslavia”.97 A Constitution was issued as Karadzic declared he was ‘laying the foundation of the fourth Serbian State in Yugoslavia’. The SC-BiH Assembly consisted of about 70 deputies, who claimed legality as they had been duly and properly elected in the December 1990 election.

On 7 April 1992. The self-proclaimed Serbian Assembly of Bosnia, elected members of the Bosnian Assembly, met at Banja Luka, with a goal of determining the future plan of action, especially in the military field. At a previous meeting this Assembly had agreed to form a separate Serbian National Guard and a police force. It was decided that these projects should be regularized and Bosnian Serbs serving in Bosnian security forces should be pressured to join them, and that as many ex-JNA members as possible should be recruited.

The SC-BiH Assembly decreed that its new state would lie between the rivers Una, Sava, Drina and Neretva, and claimed its troops already occupied some 70 per cent of Bosnia, but that it envisaged the SD-BiH would eventually only consist of about 60 per cent of it.98 On December 1992, the Assembly elected Radovan Karadzic as President of Republika Srpska and Biljana Plavsic and Nikola Koljevic as Vice-Presidents. The goals articulated at the 16^th Assembly Session shaped the events in Bosnia and Herzegovina from May 1992. The establishment of the Army of the Republika Srpska (VRS) was articulated by General Lieutenant Colonel Ratko Mladic at the Assembly Session. He noted that command was to be exercised from the President through the Main Staff to subordinate units. He also stated that general mobilization and a state of war should be announced. In terms of the actual transformation, the VRS was formed from the remnants of the former JNA, which remained in Bosnia-Herzegovina following the announced withdrawal of all JNA forces in May 1992. Throughout 1992, the Bosnian Serbs had a credible military force and despite the personnel, logistic, and operational problems, it was able to achieve a number of strategic goals.

The Bosnian Muslims obviously posed an obstacle for the Bosnian Serbs. Karadzic threatened that the Muslims would suffer enormous casualties and even disappear in case of conflict. He further discussed what awaited the Bosnian Muslims, especially their leadership, if they insisted on the path to independence. Karadzic said that Serbs overwhelmingly supported him and what the SDS were doing in BH, noting that Serbs formed 35% of the population in BH on a huge territory that they controlled.99 Speaking to Milosevic on 24 October 1991, Kardzic explained that there could be no more compromise but action – meaning ethnic takeover of the majority (60-65%) of the land in BH. “We will establish Yugoslavia in all the areas where we live,” he said. “You can talk to him” he told Milosevic “tell him that Karadzic and the others will not give up on establishing an Assembly and parallel organs of authority, we, we will recognize this government as the federal BH government… we will establish full authority over the Serbian territories in BH and none of his lawyers will be able to show his nose there. He [Izetbgovic] will not be able to exercise power. He will not have control over 65% of his territory. That is our goal.” He assured Milosevic in conclusion: “No we’re not excited at all. Our steps are calculated and we have to establish authority and control over our territories, so that he doesn’t get sovereign Bosnia. Croatia doesn’t have control of over 30% of its territory, and Bosnia will not have control over 60% of its territory!“100

At a 7 November 1991 meeting of the Executive Board, attended by Karadzic, it was underlined that the goal was a “Serbian BH in Yugoslavia and to establish a confederal principle of relations with the Muslims and Croats.“101 Response of the International Community to sub-state entities The involvement of the international community in the issues pertaining to both Serbian and Croatian irredentism within Bosnia was one of the most complex engagements in ethnic conflicts in this century. The number of conferences, meetings, pleas, threats, visits and written exchanges made by international are unprecedented. After analyzing the process of creation of both Herzeg-Bosna and Republika Srpska, their goals, purposes and reasons for their existence become clearer. Since he came to power, Croatian President Tudjman actively pursued the policy of initially obtaining a greater autonomy for Croatia and later independence. With respect to Bosnia and Herzegovina he actively worked to undermine Bosnia’s territorial integrity. His cooperation with Milosevic and tolerance for his policies was based on self interest and broader plans which included dividing up Bosnia and Herzegovina between Serbia and Croatia. The main evidence of Tudjman’ s goals is his book published in 1981 in which he claimed that if he could not have all of Bosnia, he would settle for a Greater Croatia roughly based on the 1939 Cvetkovic-Macek Agreement, which partitioned Bosnia during the Royal Yugoslav period.102 Stipe Mesic in his testimony at The Hague clearly confirmed that Tudjman’s goals were to divide Bosnia and absorb the Herzegovina portion into Greater Croatia. Sporadic fighting between Muslims and Croats erupted throughout the fall of 1992 and the winter of 1993. With the introduction of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan in January 1993 which introduced the idea of the cantonization of Bosnia into ten provinces with a weak central government, Croatian and Muslim forces began scrambling to consolidate control over territories assigned to them under the plan. Fierce fighting erupted in spring 1993 and, according to U.N. officials and Western analysts, the level of “savagery rivaled anything seen so far in the republic’s three-sided factional war.103

It is clear that one of Tudjman’s principal goals was the eventual annexation of Croatian portions of Bosnia-Herzegovina into Croatia. Equally important, if not more so, was the desire to have Croatia firmly integrated into Western Europe. According to Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic:”[Croatia is] a Central European and Mediterranean country which wishes to pursue its integration into Central European and Euro-Atlantic associations political, economic and security associations. It is in our interests to be part of …[these] processes as soon as possible. This means we want to be part of Partnership for Peace, later NATO, and we also want to sign agreements on trade and cooperation, and later gain associate membership and finally become members of the EU.“104

The Tudjman regime had a two-part vision for the Croat nation. It consisted on the one hand of integration with the West and the other the establishment of Greater Croatia. These two goals proved to be incompatible. Despite victories in the early part of the war, the Bosnian Croat’s military position rapidly deteriorated during the winter of 1993-4. In late January 1994, thousands of Croatian soldiers invaded Bosnia. The reaction by the international community came quickly. In response to a letter from Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, which confirmed Croatia’s involvement in Bosnia,105 the Security Council issued a statement that asserted that the Council was “deeply concerned” about the Croatian intervention and that it “strongly condemned [Croatia] for this serious hostile act… which constitutes a violation of international law, the Charter of the United Nations and relevant Security Council resolutions.” The Security Council demanded that Croatia withdraw immediately or it would consider other “serious measures.“106

The members of the European Union seriously considered the topic of sanctions and the fact that Croatia’s actions were unacceptable and should be prevented from escalating into another conflict. 832 As expected, one main factor holding up the imposition of sanctions was Croatia’s biggest ally in Europe, Germany. It wasn’t until German policy began to change in February 1994 that Croatia took the threats seriously. This position was pointed out by Chancellor Helmut Kohl who said: “Whoever changes borders through the use of force cannot count on the support of Germany,” nor will anyone “who oversteps the limits of normal, acceptable behavior under international law” receive Germany’s backing.107 He further called the Croatian troop deployment a “scandal” that must be countered by a serious response by the Europeans.108

It wasn’t until the United States joined Germany in their effort that agreement was reached and a commitment obtained from Croatia. Charles Redman, U.S. special envoy to the region and Peter Galbraith, U.S. Ambassador to Croatia in a meeting with Tudjman pointed out the link between Croatia’s Bosnia policy and the U.S. support for Croatia. According to Peter Galbriath, Tudjman was given an ultimatum. If he wanted the u.s. support for Croatia’s integration into the political, economic and security institutions of the West, he had to stop pursuing his irredentist claims on Bosnia.109 If Tudjman failed to cooperate, the West would shut their doors indefinitely.110 Ultimately, the Croatian government acquiesced to Western pressure. Zagreb ended its efforts to acquire Herzeg Bosna. The price they would have to pay for it would cause them to jeopardize their hard won independence, something Tudjman was not prepared to do. The Washington Agreement was signed on March 30, 1994 establishing a Federation between the Muslims and Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina. What on paper appeared as a sound ending to ethnic violence, in reality was a fiction, as animosity between two ethnic groups continued and the division between their territories has continued for years to come.

One of the key questions arises pertaining to why the U.S. and Europe insisted on the Federation rather than allowing a separate Muslim and Croat entities? According to Peter Galbrath, the United States wanted an end to conflict and a quick agreement. Many American and European policy makers believe that Europe would have never accepted the partition of Bosnian territory mostly because it would entail the creation of a Muslim state in the middle of Europe.111

Many Croatians in Herzegovina were dissatisfied with the fact that Republika Srpska was acknowledged as a separate entity while Herzeg-Bosna had to be satisfied with sharing the Federation with the Muslims. During the civil war, Serbs living on the territory of Bosnia started forming their regional cantons which resulted in a self proclaimed republic. Croats of Bosnia started doing the same and soon formed their own (mono)state/entity Herceg-Bosna. Muslims however never truly organized themselves into a separate state. This was partly because Muslims heavily depended on the financial aid from Zagreb, which was halted during the conflict between two ethnic groups which took place between 1992 and 1994. While Republika Srpska had strong backing from Belgrade and Herzeg-Bosna received financial aid and political support from Zagreb, Muslims were left by themselves. Hence, a Muslim state was never formed.

Acknowledging a Herzeg-Bosna as a separate entity would have left Muslims as an amorphous entity with no firmly established government and institutions, no financial support, no sound army. It would have clearly become another hot zone and an area of conflict. Should both Serbs and Croats have obtained recognition, they would not have stopped there. Their recognition would have led them to start fighting the weak Muslims in hope to divide up the Muslim territory as well. The example of the acknowledgement of Republika Srpska and the Federation by the international community indicates that there are no new uniform standard for the treatment of such entities. Some of the new implied standards that have been established include respect for human rights and no change of borders. However those norms, as shown in Bosnia, are only implemented if they suit the interests of the international community. With respect to Bosnia and partition, the main goal of the community was to end the fighting and reach a temporary peace agreement and cessation of hostilities. Furthermore the international community wanted to maintain the border of Bosnia and Herzegovina intact which was in agreement with the new EC Guidelines for the recognition of states. This was another reason why strong pressure was put on Tudjman in the form of an ultimatum which ultimately made him give up the idea of creating Greater Croatia that would include Herzeg-Bosna.

The final agreement for Bosnia, the famous Dayton Agreement signed on December 14, 1995 was an extension of the Washington Agreement. It created a state consisting of two entities. Republika Srpska satisfied three elements of the four Montevideo criteria. The one element it couldn’t satisfy was the” ability to conduct foreign relations with other states. However what’s unique about Bosnia at the time of its recognition was that both Republika Srpska and Herzeg-Bosna wanted to be recognized as states. Bosnia and Herzegovina was therefore not an effective state. The artificial states are those in which its constituent peoples do not owe allegiance to its government. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbs of Bosnia pledged their allegiance to Serbia while Croats of Bosnia did the same to Croatia. In addition, Bosnia and Herzegovina had 14 Constitutions which together made one Bosnian Constitution. Those included the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, two Constitutions for two entities of Bosnia: The Federation and Republika Srpska, and then 10 Constitutions for the same number of kantons (areas) within the Federation. On March 5, 1999, the District of Brcko received its own constitution.

 

Conclusion

Republika Srpska and Herzeg-Bosna were both created during a civil-war. As such they were created by violent means against the principles of international law. As the above has shown, they managed to create their own entities, establish borders and set institutions in place which at least on paper made them appear as viable, legitimate entities. The two entities had the same goals and aspirations as both of them wanted to join their respective states of Serbia and Croatia. Neither of them desired to be a part of a Muslim state, especially since their populations owed allegiance to Belgrade and Zagreb respectively. In the old Yugoslavia Croats and Serbs living in Bosnia always affiliated themselves with Croatia and Serbia respectively. With Croatia declaring its independence and Bosnia following suit, it meant that the two peoples living in Bosnia had to pledge their allegiance to the Bosnian government only, something they were not prepared to do. With respect to the standards of recognition, this study clearly shows that even though there is normative criteria on guidelines, there is no set of enforceable criteria with respect to entities that form within states regardless of their aspirations. Herzeg Bosna was not acknowledged as a separate entity within Bosnia because of political interests and because Muslims would have been left as an ambiguous, undefined population within the Bosnian territory. Ifboth Republika Srpska and Herzeg-Bosna joined their 'mother' countries, Muslims who already refused to be absorbed into either of those two ethnic groups would have been left by themselves as a weak, unsustainable entity. The international community would in that case face a crisis of significant proportions. Furthermore the EC guidelines clearly stated the importance of inviolability of borders. The decision by the European Community not acknowledge Herzeg-Bosna was a result of the fear of the desires of both entities to join their 'mother' countries which would involve changing of borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina and a prolonged brutal war.

 

From Belgium to Kosovo P.1.

From Belgium to Kosovo P.2.

From Belgium to Kosovo P.3.

From Belgium to Kosovo P.4.

From Belgium to Kosovo P.6.

From Belgium to Kosovo P.7.

 

 

1 Nicholas Wood, An Effort to Unify a Bosnian City Multiplies Friction, New York Times, March 15, 2004.

2 Interview May 2003.

3 Today there is a bar in Kosovo called 'Tricky Dick', after Ambassador Holbrooke.

4 Council on Foreign Relations meeting, The Balkans: A Trip Report and Update, With Richard C. Holbrooke and Roger Cohen, November 6, 2003, Washington DC.

5 Nicholas Wood, More NATO troops arrive in Kosovo, with more to come, New York Times, March 19, 2004.

6 Eiril Ribicic, Geneza Jedne Zablude: Ustavnopravna Aanaliza Formiranja J Djelovanja Hrvatske Zajednice Herceg-Bosne, Prologue written by Alija Izetbegovic, p.2.

7 Interview on June 5, 2003, Ljubljana,Slovenia.

8 Ibid

9 Danos magazine, Interview with Stjepan Mesic, 27 May 2001.

10 Ibid.

11 Tudjman referring to the Cvetkovic-Macek Agreement known as 'Sporazum' reached in 1939. Realizing that the Serbs had a more powerful army, he went as far as offering some territory where Croats formed a majority such as Vukovar. Cited in Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, pp.146-7.

12 Alija Izetbegovic, Inescapable Questions, p. 128

13 European Stability Initiative report "Reshaping International Priorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina", Part Three The End of the Nationalist Regimes and the Future of the Bosnian State, 22 March 2001.

14 Transcripts from the meeting of a recorded meeting between President Tudjman and HDZ representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which took place in Zagreb on 27 December 1991 Minutes of the meeting attached to Ribicic's Geneza Jedne Zablude pp. 113-170.

15 Alija lzetbegovic, Inescapable Questions, p.130.

16 Cited in Oslobodjenje newspaper from 18 October 1991.

17 Bosanski Brad, Odzak, Modrica, Derventa, Bosanski Samac, Orasje, Broko I Gradacac) See Kasim Begic, Bosna I Herzegovina: od Vanceove Misije do Daytonskog Sporazuma, Sarajevo: Bosanska Knjiga, 1997, p.65

18 These include Herzegovacka and Travnicka regional entity. Archives ofthe Institute for Research for War Crimes against Humanity and International Law, Sarajevo, AllZ, 2-19.

19 Document also cited in Dr. Becir Macic, Zlocin Protiv Mira., Sarajevo 2001, pp. 392-395.

20 Ibid.

21 The thirty opcinas (regions) that were included in this territory were Jajce, Kresevo, Busovaca, Vitez, Novi Travnik, Travnik, Kiseljak, Fojnica, Skender-Vakuf(Dobrctici), Kakanj, Vares, Kotor.varos, Tomislavgrad, Livno, Kupres, Bugojno, Gornji Valeur, Prozor, Konjic, Jablanica, Posusnje, Mostar, Siroki Brijeg, Grode, Ljubuski, Citluk, Capljina, Neum, Stolae, Trebinje -Ravno. Arehive of the Institute for War Crimes against Humanity and International Law, Sarajevo, 2-788.

22 Susan Woodward, Balkon Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War, p. 231.

23 Cited in Borba, Belgrade, 61uly 1992.

24 Interviews conducted with Serbs from Herzegovina.

25 Narodni List HZ Herceg-Bosna , br. 1/1992, str. 2.

26 Cited in Oslobodjenje 19 November 1991.

27 The districts included were Zenica, Zepce, Zavidovici and Maglaj. Cited in Kasem Begic, Bosna I Herzegovina: Od Vanceove Misije do Daytonskog Sporazuma, p. 65.

28 Officially, the Croatian Community Herceg-Bosna was proclaimed on 4 July 1992 in the city of Gruda, even though even before that date it has begun its operations and functioned as a para(state) in its full capacity.

29 Banovina Hrvatska from 1939 was mentioned in the Preamble of the Constitution of Republic Croatia in the section that addresses the historical roots of the Croatian state.

30 Oslobodjenje paper published 19 November 1991.

31 Croatian Defense Council of the Croatian Community ofHerceg-Bosna, Mostar, March, 1992 subj: A Report on Work in 1992,1, KC Z511 in Shrader p. 25.

32 Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, p. 293

33 In his book "Inescapable Questions Izetbegovic states: "In its early stages the war in Bosnia was not a classical war, if by this is meant a conflict between two armies. It was an attack by a powerful military machine on an unarmed people. The aim was to create Greater Serbia" The preparations to achieve the Greater Serbia idea began in the mid-19th century with Ilija Garashanin's Nacertanije and culminated with the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) in September 1986. The person who was to bring the idea into reality was Siobodan Milosevic with the "Serbianized" JNA and Serb paramilitary units in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro. Izetbegovic, Inescapable Questions, 127.

34 Sefer Halilovic, Lulcava Strategija, p.166.

35 Ibid. p. 57

36 Charles R. Shrader, The Muslim-Croat Civil War in Central Bosnia: A Military History /992-/994, p.13

37 Some elements, including the HVO Main Staff, the Main Logistics Base at Grode, the military Police and the Personnel Administration, had been created earlier, and some HVO combat units had already been formed. The emerging HVO defense organization followed the old JNA Territorial Defense model both at the regional and at the local level. While the Bosnian Muslims bad taken over the old JNA Territorial Defense organization and then aIlowed the JNA to disarm it, the Bosnian Croats had to set up new local defense units formed from the existing Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina and municipal political organizations. Croatian Defense Council, subj: A Report on Work in 1992, p. 5.

38 See, among others, HQ, HVO, no, 01-93/92, Mostar, April 23, 1993 subj: Order, KC Z79; and HQ, Municipal HVO Command Kiseljak, no. 1 1-05/92, Kiseljak, May 10, 1992, subj: Order, KC Z99 in Shrader 1,26

39 Ibid. p. 33

40 Croatian Defense Council, A Report on Work in 1992, I in Shrader, p. 25

41 Interview with General Prljak, Death of Yugoslavia, Discovery Channel,1995.

42 The Decree on the anned forces of the Croatian Community ofHerceg-Bosna stipulated that the anned forces constitute a unified whole comprising the "regular and reserve forces". Borba, Belgrade, 6 July 1992. Also, the "Report of the Secretary General pursuant to paragraphs 4 of Security Council Resolution 752 (1992), confirms this fact.

43 Speech by Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic held at the 49th Session of General Assembly of the UN. 27 September 1994. No. I. 1-23 UN Doc A/49fPV.7.

44 Brian Lapping, Yugoslavia: Death of Nation.

45 Discovery Channel series, Interviews with Mate Boban and Radovan Karadzic, 1995.

46 Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, p. 294.

47 Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, p. 294.

48 Shrader. p. 161

49 In 1994, the International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated that some 150,000 to two hundred thousand persons were killed and an equal number wounded in the three-way conflict in BosniaHerzegovina between 1992 and 1994, IISS, Strategic Survey, 1993-1994, p. 104.

50 The Vance-Owen plan recognized Bosnia within its existing borders but granted substantially devolved powers to each of the ten provinces which it defmed based on plurality of ethnic groups. Three of the provinces would have a Serb majority, two a Croat majority, three a Muslim, and one would be mixed Croat - Muslim population. The tenth province of Sarajevo would retain power-sharing between all three ethnic groups. Even though the republic would retain a central government, its powers would be minimal. Laura Silber and Allan Little: Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, p. 296-297

51 Odluka 0 uspostavi Hrvatske zajednice Herceg-Bosna, Narodni List HZ H-B, br. 1/1992, str. 2.

52 Serb nationalists fought with the Cetniks (ceta or a unit). They took their name trom the Serb guerilla fighters of the Turkish wars led by Draza Mihailovic.

53 Odluka 0 Uspostavi Hrvatske Zajednice Herceg-Bosna. Narodni List HZ H-B, br. 1/1992 strn.2

54 Ciril Ribicic, Geneza Jende Zablude, p. 38

55 The foundation for this article of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was article 119 of the Socialist Federal Republic of Jugoslavia Constitution trom 1974 which permits the Constitutions of the Republics to allow association of different opcinas into regional groupings as separate socio-political entities. Taken trom Majda Strobl, Ivan Kristan, Ciril Ribicic, Ustavno pravo SFR Jugoslavije, Uradni list, Ljubljana,1986,p.289.

56 Text of the decision available in Bosnian language on file with author. Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Art. 387, stav 1, tacka 3. Sluzbeni list SRBiH broj 1/91 and Sluzbeni list RbiH broj. 8/92; Sluzbeni list RBiH broj 1609/181992.

57 Oslobodjenje, Clan 387 stav 1 tacka 3. Constitutija of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Amandmana LXXVII tacka 1 na Ustav RBIH I elana. 72 tacka. 3 Sluzbeni List SRBH broj 1/91 and Sluzbeni List RBiH broj 8/92 Sjednica odrzana 14.9.1992.

58 The Opinion of the Ministry of Justice, Sarajevo 20 November, 1991, p. 3.

59 According to the Statute of Croatian democratic Party (HDZ) Bosnia and Herzegovina, "HDZ BIH is a constitutional part of a unified HDZ organization with a seat in Zagreb, Croatia (Statute of Croatian Democratic Community BIH) Sarajevo, 18 Kolovoza 1990, article 4)

60 Curil Ribicic, Geneza Jedne Zablude, p. 46

61 Narodni List br. 8/1994, p. 339.

62 HVO was organized like the government itself, comprised of the president, vice-president and representatives. The representatives had a role compared to the status of ministerial positions in the government. HVO had a central control over the operations of opcinskih HVO, it had the power to void or cancel their laws and roles. Art. 13 and art. 14 Narodni List br. 9/1993 p. 213.

63 Odluka of Formiranjy Hrvatskog Vijeca Obrane, Narodni List HZ H-B, br. 1/1992, Art. 2, p. 4.

64 Narodni list br. 1/1992, p. 12.

65 Ciril Ribicic, Geneza Jedne Zablude, p. 68.

66 Ciril Ribicic, p. 95.

67 Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 310-311.

68 For the first time, the term constitution is being used which shows the ambition for an independent republic. In the Constitutional arrangement of the former Yugoslavia, the republics after the second world war, had constitutions and in the 70s even the autonomous regions Vojvodina and Kosovo had separate Constitutions.

69 Kasim I. Begic, Bosnia I Herzegovina: Od Vanceove Misije do Daytonskag Sporazuma (1991-1996), Bosanska Knjiga: Sarajevo, 1997 p. 66.

70 Paddy Ashdown testifying in the Tihomir Blaskic Case for the International Tribunal for Fonner Yugoslavia, Case no. IT-9S-14-T, 3 March 2000.

71 Ciril Ribicic, Geneza Jedne Zablude, p.176.

72 Fadil Ademovic, Dogovor u Karadjordjevu 0 Podeli Bosne i Herzegovine.

73 Slobodna Dalmaeya, Split. 18 December 1995.

74 Ibid.

75 Siobodna Dalmaeya, 09 Prosinca 2000, Trascript from the Hague: Secret testimony of protected witness Stjepana Mesica.

76 "STA TUT SRPSKE DEMOKRA TSKE STRANKE BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE" (Statutes of the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina), Sarajevo, 12 July 1990.

77 Interview with Karadazic "Serbs in Bosnia, NIN (Belgrade), 20 July 1990, pp. 24-26.

78 Radovan Karadzic, Srpska Demokratksa Stranka BH, Uvodni referat na Osnivacku skupstinu" (Radovan Karadzic, Serbian Democratic Party of BH, Introductory Report for the Founding Assembly)

79 "Program Srpske Demokratske Stranke BH" (Program of the Serbian Democratic Party of BH), St. Peter's Day 12 July 1990

80 Speeches by Kardadzic and Koljevic at the Banja Luka meeting founding the Serbian National Council 13 October 1990 and "Prva Odluka SNV BH (First decision of the DNV/Serbian National Council of BH, Banja Luka 13 October 1990. See also, Momcilo Krajisnik's "Introductory Speech at the 2nd Session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in BH. "12 November 1991.

81 Karadzic's letter, as President of the Serbian National Council of BH, to Milan Babic, President of the Serbian National Council, Knin and his letter to Dr. Jovan Raskovic, President of the Serbian Democratic Party, Knin, congratulating them on the proclamation of the "Serbian Autonomous Area Krajina" in Croatia in late 1990.

82 Interview with Karadzic titled "Serbs in Bosnia," NIN (Belgrade), 20 July 1990, pp. 24-26.

83 Kriteriji za raspodelu opstinskih funkcija I resora uvrdjenih izmedju predstavnika narodnih stranaka SDS SDA HDZ" (Criteria for the Distribution of Municipal Functions and Departments Confirmed between Representatives of the National Parties - SDS, SDA and HDZ). Sarajevo, 22 December 1990.

84 Interview with Karadzic titled "Serbs in Bosnia," NIN (Belgrade), 20 July 1990, pp. 24-26.

85 "Odluka oflmenovanje Staba za Regionlizatciju" (Decision on naming a Headquarters for Regionalization), SDS BiH, Sarajevo City Board, No. 01-37-1/91 September 25, 1991.

86 "Odluka of Imenovanju Staba za Regionaliziju (Decision on Naming a Headquarters for Regionalization), SDS BiH, Sarajevo City Board, No. 01-37-1/91, September 25,1991.

87 "Odluka Skupstine Zajednice Opstina Istocne 1 Stare Herzegovina / Formiranje SAD Herzegovine (Decision of the Assembly of the Community of Municipalities of Eastern and Old Herzegovina/SAO Herzegovina Formed") Javnost 14 September 1991. p. 3.

88 Odluka ofVerifikaciji Proglasenih Srpskih Autonomnih Oblasti u Bosni i Herzegovini", (Decision on Verification ofthe Srbian Autonomous Districts Proclaimed In Bosnia and Herzegovina No. 37-02/91, Sarajevo November 21 1991.

89 Speech by Radovan Karadzic regarding the Serbian plebiscite, November 1991. available in Patrie J. Treanor, The Bosnian Serb Leadership, Research report prepared for the case ofKrajisnik & Plavsic (IT00-39 &40), 30 July 2002.

90 Privremeni Poslovnik Skupistine Srpskog naroda U Bosni I Herzegovini, (Temporary Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovian).

91 For example, at its 21 November 1991 meeting, the SDS Main Board gave recommendations to the Assembly on various issues; at a meeting of the executive Board attended by Karadzic, Koljevic and others on the previous day, a number of the same issues had been discussed and these positions agreed .Minutes of the SDS BiH Main Board (third) session of November 21, 1991.

92 Kriteriji za raspodelu opstinskih funkcija I resora uvrdjenih izmedju predstavnika narodnih stranaka SDS SDA HDZ" (Criteria for the Distribution of Municipal Functions and Departments Confirmed between Representatives of the National Parties - SDS, SDA and HDZ). Sarajevo, 22 December 1990. 809 Interview with Karadzic titled "Serbs in Bosnia," NIN (Belgrade), 20 July 1990, pp. 24-26.

93 "On the basis of the proposal of the Executive Boards of the Serbian Democratic Party ofBH." (see the first sentence of the document) the Assembly also reached "Conclusions" giving full support to the JNA "in defense ofthe joint state of Yugoslavia" and mobilization of the Serbian people in BH.

94 Odluka 0 Prevodjenju Plebiscita Srpskog Naroda (Decision on the Holding of a Plebiscite of the Serbian People), 18 October 1991.

95 "Odluka 0 Rspisivanju I Provodjenju Plebiscita Srpskog Naroda u Bosni I Hercegovini" (Decision on the Arrangement and implementation ofa Plebiscite of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovian) 0216/91,24 October 1991 SGSNBiHI, No.1 (15 January 1992). According to Para. 2 of the Decision, the Serbian People were asked to answer the following question: "Do you agree with the Decision of the Assembly of the Serbian people in BH from 24-0ct-91 on Serbian People staying in the same state of Yugoslavia, together with Serbia; Montenegro; SAO (Serbian Autonomous Region) Krajina; SAO Siavonija and Baranja and Zapadni (Western) Srem; and other who agree with the decision?"

96 "Odluka 0 teritorijama opstina, mjesnih Zajednica] Naseljenih Mjesta u BH koja se smatraju Teritorijom savezne drzave jugoslavije" (Decision on the territories of municipalities, local communities.

97 Edgar O'Ballance, Civil War in Bosnia 1992-94, p. 74.

98 He compared it to Croatia where Serbs represented 12 % of the total and were able to create major difficulties for the authorities in that republic.

99 MiloseviclKaradzic, 24 October 1991 (0212-9006-0212-9011).

100 Minutes of the SDS BiH Executive Board Fifth Session, 7 November 1991 (SA02-1 4-SA02-3S97).

101 Franjo Tudjman, Nationalism in Contemporary Europe, East European Monographs, no. 76 (New York: Columbia Press, 1981), p. 113.

102 Jonathan C. Randal, "Croat-Muslim Combat in Bosnia Reaches New Ferocity," Washington Post, April 21, 1993, A21.

103 Croatian TV (Zagreb), October 29, 1996, 21 :22 GMT, reproduced as "Foreign Minister Stresses Croatia's Wish to be Part of Europe, " in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, October 31, 1996, EElD2757/A.

104 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Letter Dated I February 1994 trom the Secretary -General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, " United Nations Security Council, February 2, 1994, S/1994/109. Boutros-Ghali stated: "As the offensives of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Government forces against the HVO have become successful, the numbers of Croatian soldiers appear to have increased".

105 Although the final text did not include an explicit threat of economic sanctions, there was a clear implication that the Security Council was leaning that way. "Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand Three Hundred and Thirty-Third Meeting," United Nations Security Council, February 3, 1994, SIPV.3333.

106 Discussed sanctions included trade sanctions and withdrawing the preferential status Croatia had in its trade with the Community, Agence France Presse (Paris), February 10,1994,00:52 GMT, reproduced as "EC Considering Sanctions Against Croatia," in FBIS- WEU, February 10, 1994, p. 7.

107 TANJUG (Belgrade), February 5,1994,18:02 GMT, reproduced as "TANJUG: Kohl Says Tudjman Violating Law," in FBIS - EEU, February 7, 1994, p. 2.

108 "Kohl Threatens to Withdraw Croatian Aid, as Pressure Mounts," Agence France Presse, February 5, 1994.

109 Interview 24 November 2003.

110 David B. Ottaway, "U.S. Prevails on Croatia," Washington Post. February 26, 1994, A14.

111 According to Susan Woodward the main goal was to build a military alliance between Bosniaks and Croats. See Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy.

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