By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

In the early hours of Dec. 8, the Assad dynasty’s more than half a century of brutal rule in Syria came to an end.

With Bashar al-Assad fleeing the country, not only did Syria’s domestic political order change overnight—so too did its geopolitical identity. It is no longer part of Iran’s “axis of resistance” or one of Russia’s longest-lasting allies in the Arab world, where Moscow had its most profound strategic footprint in the form of both air and naval bases.

Many are busy declaring winners and losers of this pivotal moment. Drawing a list of losers at this stage is relatively easy. The regime itself, Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah are among them. However, drawing a list of winners is not as straightforward. Although Assad’s fall has significantly boosted Turkey’s influence and stature in Syria and in broader regional geopolitics, HTS—Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the rebel faction that led the offensive that toppled him—is not a Turkish proxy. That said, Ankara remained committed to the Syrian opposition groups during difficult times and now has significant influence over HTS and the ability to affect its actions and decisions.

That commitment ultimately bore fruit with the removal of Assad, marking a pivotal shift in the regional landscape. In northern Syria, opposition forces—bolstered by years of military and administrative experience and assistance from Turkey—emerged with enhanced governance capabilities.

This transformation became evident not only in the group’s cohesive execution of the operation that led to Assad’s downfall but also in the disciplined and methodical approach that it adopted in the aftermath. These developments signal a substantive evolution in the Syrian opposition’s capacity to govern, reflecting both the dividends of sustained external support and the intrinsic adaptability of these actors in navigating Syria’s fraught and ever-shifting political terrain.

However, HTS and other rebel groups may soon discover that building a new Syria might prove more cumbersome and challenging than bringing it down. We know what collapsed in Syria, but we do not know what awaits it. A concerted effort by Syrian, regional, and international actors is needed to prevent further bloodshed, fragmentation, and proxy wars in the country.

That effort must begin with a nonsectarian interim government in Damascus and a new regional and international bloc to help with the political process, reconstruction, and rebuilding—a bloc that replaces the old pro-Assad power brokers in Moscow and Tehran with a group including Turkey, Syria’s Arab neighbors, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia—as well as the European Union and the United States.

Within Syria, one of the gravest dangers would be if regime collapse turns into a state collapse, as was the case in Libya. Such a collapse would only lead to more chaos and a bleak future for the country. Therefore, the Syrian state’s institutions and mechanisms need to be maintained.                    

Political transition and government formation are interlinked, but they can be separated. The political transition is an arduous and time-consuming process. Yet a new interim government is needed immediately to provide essential services, preserve state institutions and functions, and prevent a power vacuum and chaos from emerging.

In this respect, the recent decision by HTS to convene its first joint cabinet meeting with ministers from the Assad era suggests a commitment to a transition process and can be interpreted as a promising development. The attainment of stability in Syria is not merely a local imperative but a regional one as well.

Appointing a caretaker prime minister tasked with putting an interim government in place just one day after the fall of Damascus was a step in the right direction. As the group that led the march on the capital, HTS will have a significant say in the political transition and government formation. Yet, to gain societal legitimacy and international acceptance, this new government should be inclusive and reflect the country’s diversity. It cannot be HTS’s previously Idlib-based “salvation government” writ large.

 

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