By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

Whatever the outcome, the West must begin to plan for the collapse and the reinforcement of Putin’s regime. If Putin reinforces his power, Western policy needs to act correspondingly. Its sanctions on Russia need to be maintained until all Russian troops leave Ukraine. While the West should offer Ukraine substantial material support for its reconstruction, sanctions on Russia should be maintained until Russia has agreed to make reparations for the horrendous damage it has caused to Ukraine. Future flows of Russian émigrés are likely to exceed the millions currently streaming out of Ukraine.

As Russia’s all-out war of aggression in Ukraine drags on for a fourth consecutive month, calls for dangerous deals are getting louder. As fatigue grows and attention wanders, economic stability in their own countries. Although they may pose as pacifists or realists, they are better understood as enablers of Russian imperialism and war crimes.

It is only natural that people and governments lose interest in conflicts as they drag on. The world stopped paying attention to Libya after Muammar al-Qaddafi was toppled in 2011. It disengaged from Syria, Yemen, and other ongoing conflicts. The rest of the world lost interest in Ukraine after 2015 when fighting raged in Donbas.

Putin has made no secret of his aim to destroy Ukraine’s cultural and national identity. In the parts of Ukraine, they occupy, Russian forces have established “filtration camps” where they question Ukrainians and deport them against their will to Russia.

The Kremlin here uses a circular logic—we punish you; therefore, you must be guilty—informs Kremlin propaganda today. Whereby yesterday, Putin’s foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, even went further by yesterday claiming: We didn’t invade Ukraine.

But Russia’s current invasion is graver than its past one, whereby the Kremlin denies the reality of the Ukrainian state and he is speaking the familiar language of the empire. when Vladimir Putin denies the existence of the Ukrainian state, Putin here is speaking the familiar language of the empire.

The circular logic—we punish you; therefore, you must be guilty—informs Kremlin propaganda today. Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, has argued that Russia had to invade Ukraine because Ukraine might have started a war.

Putin, who has said the same, draws on Stalin’s rhetoric.

The West must begin to plan for the collapse and the reinforcement of Putin’s regime. If Putin reinforces his power, Western policy needs to act correspondingly. Its sanctions on Russia must be maintained until all Russian troops leave Ukraine. While the West should offer Ukraine substantial material support for its reconstruction, sanctions on Russia should be maintained until Russia has agreed to make reparations for the horrendous damage it has caused to Ukraine. Future flows of Russian émigrés will likely exceed the millions currently streaming out of Ukraine. Suitably armed, our forces can stretch Putin’s troops—already exhausted—past the breaking point. 

This circular logic—we punish you; therefore, you must be guilty—informs Kremlin propaganda today. Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, has argued that Russia had to invade Ukraine because Ukraine might have started a war. Putin, who has said the same, draws on Stalin’s rhetoric.

Whereby yesterday, Lavrov suddenly claimed that: We didn’t invade Ukraine.

After Russia’s invasion on February 24, the United States and its allies quickly imposed sanctions to choke off Russia’s economy. Western sanctions no longer aim to deter Russia but weaken the Russian economy and reduce its ability to pursue wars. Critically, Western sanctions are now targeted against major Russian state banks.

And critically, they need to ignore calls for diplomatic settlements that would help Putin before he makes serious concessions. And while awe pointed out that compromising with Russia may seem tempting to some abroad, significantly as the costs of the war grow, bowing to Putin’s aggression will help him destroy more of our nation, embolden his government to carry out attacks elsewhere in the world, and allow him to rewrite the rules of the global order. His talk approach could change; if we succeed in pushing back Russian troops far enough, Putin may be compelled to come to the table and deal in good faith. 

From the minute Russian forces poured across Ukraine’s borders, some Western commentators have called for a compromise with Moscow. Such comments have been made many times between 2014 and 2022. But today’s war is different from the war that raged before February, and in recent weeks these calls have started coming from prominent foreign policy elites. In early June, French President Emmanuel Macron told journalists that “Putin should not be humiliated” so that it can “build an exit ramp” for the country to end the war. Speaking to the World Economic Forum in May, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger went further, arguing that Ukraine should cede territory to Russia in exchange for peace.

These declarations are premised on the idea that Ukrainians cannot defeat Moscow's forces no matter how well they fight. Whereby despite the current carnage, Russia’s president appears to be in a good mood. According to leaders who have recently spoken to Putin, he is sure that his “special operation” will, as we heard he told one European leader, “achieve its goals.” It isn’t hard to see why: Russian invaders have been able to crawl forward in the Donbas by resorting to total artillery terror. Putin has begun comparing himself to Peter the Great—perhaps the Russian empire’s most famous conqueror. It’s an ominous declaration that suggests that Putin will not settle for control over the Donbas or for control over Ukraine as a whole.

The most effective way to end Putin’s expansionism is to stop it in eastern Ukraine before he can go further and kick his occupying forces out of southern Ukraine, which he plans to annex. This fact requires helping Ukraine defeat Putin on its battlefield. U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration has made some groundbreaking decisions to help us accomplish this task, including a historic new lend-lease program that makes it easier for the United States to supply Ukraine with weapons. Answering Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s call, the United States decided in May to provide us with four multiple-launch rocket systems. My counterpart and friend, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, has been closely engaged in crafting these steps. Ukraine’s military leaders have been in active contact with U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. General Mark Milley, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman, has also been very supportive of our cause.

This assistance has been a crucial first step, for which we are grateful. Yet we wish it had been provided much earlier, which is still too little. Now it is time to turn political decisions into real game-changing actions. Russian artillery outguns ours by one to 15 at the most crucial parts of the frontline, so a few U.S. rocket systems will not be nearly enough for us to gain the upper hand. We urgently need more heavy weapons from various sources to turn the tide in our favor and save lives. Our most pressing needs are for hundreds of multiple-launch rocket systems and various 155-mm artillery pieces. These weapons would allow us to suppress Russia’s artillery barrage. But stopping artillery is not Ukraine’s only concern. We also need anti-ship missiles, tanks, armored vehicles, air defense, and combat aircraft to be able to launch effective counterattacks.

                                       

Live free or die hard

Since the invasion began, Ukraine has repeatedly tried to find a diplomatic settlement with Russia. But Putin has rejected any meaningful talks because he expects that Western support for Ukraine will wane as the war grinds on. It’s natural to feel worn out by months of full-scale war. But Russia’s war is driven by genocidal intent, so Ukraine and the whole West cannot agree to Russia’s demands. As Putin declared two days before the invasion, Ukraine’s very existence is a mistake—the Soviet Union, he said, “created” Ukraine by casually drawing boundaries on a ma. In his view, Ukrainians can either become Russians or die.

Putin has made good on this promise. After taking territory, Russian forces have looked through kill lists drawn up by the Federal Security Service and knocked on doors. They have tortured and executed people who teach Ukraine’s language and history, civil society activists, human rights defenders, former Ukrainian soldiers, local authorities, and many others. They have changed road signs from Ukrainian to Russian, destroyed Ukrainian monuments, banned Ukrainian television, and prohibited the Ukrainian language from being used in schools.

We in Ukraine are not surprised by this brutal campaign. We have a deep knowledge of Russia and have watched for centuries as Russian intellectuals and state-controlled media incited hatred toward our nation. We have also seen how Moscow’s animosity extends beyond our borders. Russian media routinely condemns other neighboring states, the West more broadly, and various minority groups—including Jews and LGBTQ people. The Russian political elite has a generalized, deep-seated loathing of others.

This hatred is another reason the West cannot afford to wave the white flag. A Russian military victory would not just enable the torture, rape, and murder of thousands more innocent Ukrainians. It would undermine liberal values. It would free up Russia to menace central Europe. Indeed, it would allow Russia to threaten the Western world at large. There is nothing more dangerous for the European Union and NATO than having an emboldened Russia or pro-Russian proxy across more of its eastern borders.

Thankfully for Europe and the United States, Ukraine is fighting this dark force and is motivated to keep doing so until it wins. But we cannot succeed alone, and the West must understand the stakes and consequences of our failure. If we lose, there will not just be no more Ukraine; there will be no prosperity or security in Europe.

                               

Bad to worse

It is unrealistic to suggest that Ukraine sacrifice its people, territory, and sovereignty for little peace. These recent calls for compromise are merely a byproduct of growing fatigue. 

But although rising food and energy costs are serious problems, giving in to Moscow is no solution—not only because of what it will mean for Ukrainians. Russia is a revanchist country bent on remaking the entire world through force. It actively works to destabilize African, Arab, and Asian states both through its military and through proxies. These conflicts have created humanitarian crises; if Ukraine loses, they will only worsen. In victory, Putin would be emboldened to stir up more unrest and create more disasters across the developing world.

Putin’s increased aggression wouldn’t be limited to the developing world. He would meddle with more vigor in U.S. and European politics. If he succeeds in conquering Ukraine’s south, he may march deeper into the continent by invading Moldova, where Russian proxies already control a slice of territory. He could even trigger a new war in the western Balkans, where increasingly antagonistic Serbian elites have looked to Russia for inspiration and support.

The West must not suggest peace initiatives with unacceptable terms and instead, help Ukraine win. That means not just providing Ukraine with the heavy weaponry it needs to fight off Moscow’s forces; it also means maintaining and increasing sanctions against Russia. Critically, the West must kill Russian exports by imposing a full energy embargo and cutting off Russian access to the international maritime shipping industry. The last step may seem difficult to carry out. Still, it is, in fact, highly achievable: Russia’s export-oriented economy relies heavily on foreign fleets to deliver its goods abroad, and the fleets could stop serving the country.

These economic measures are key. Sanctions have undermined the Russian economy and impeded its ability to continue the war. But Moscow still feels confident about its decision, so the West cannot afford any sanctions fatigue—regardless of the broader economic costs.

 

The path to victory

Despite Ukraine’s early successes, it may be hard for Western policymakers to envision how we can defeat Russia’s larger and better-equipped forces. But we have a pathway to victory. With sufficient support, Ukraine can both halt Russia’s advance and take back more of its territories.

Ukraine can gain the upper hand in the east with more advanced heavy weapons, allowing us to stall Moscow’s crumbling invasion in the Donbas gradually. (The Kremlin’s gains in this region may make headlines, but it is essential to remember that they are limited and have resulted in extremely high Russian casualties.) The pivotal moment will come when our armed forces use Western-provided multiple launch rocket systems to destroy Russia’s artillery, turning the tide in Ukraine’s favor along the entire frontline. Afterward, our troops will aim to take back pieces of land, forcing Russians to retreat here and there.

On the battlefront in the south, the armed forces of Ukraine are already carrying out counterattacks, and we will use advanced weapons to further cut through enemy defenses. We will aim to put the Russians on the edge of needing to abandon Kherson—a city that is key to the strategic stability of UkraineSupposeIf we advance in both the south and the ea. In that case,t, we can force Putin to choose between abandoning southern cities, including Kherson and Melitopol, to cling onto the Donbas, and abandoning newly occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk so he can hold the south.

The author, with Blinken at the Ukrainian-Polish border crossing in Korczowa, Poland, March 2022.

When we reach this moment, Putin will likely become more serious about cease-fire negotiations. Our goal will still be to get Russian forces out of Ukraine. Keeping up the pressure may push Putin to accept a negotiated solution that entails Russian troops withdrawing from all occupied territories. Putin, after all, pulled Russian troops from the areas around Kyiv after encountering enough setbacks at the hands of our forces. If our military grows stronger and more successful, he will have good reasons to do so again. For example, it will be easier to present a retreat as goodwill before further negotiations instead of as an act of embarrassing necessity if it is organized rather than hasty. Putin could even claim that the “special operation” has successfully achieved its goals of demilitarizing and denazifying Ukraine, whatever this means for him. By publishing images of destroyed Ukrainian units and equipment, Putin’s propaganda machine will reinforce a message of success. Propaganda can also help Putin present the withdrawal as a sign of his humane treatment of Russian soldiers and as a wise step toward peace in general.

But if Putin remains intransigent, Ukraine can proceed farther into Luhansk and Donetsk until he is willing to negotiate in good faith or until our army reaches and secures Ukraine’s internationally recognized border. And whether Russian troops choose to retreat or are forced to, Ukraine can speak with Russia from a position of strength. We can seek a fair diplomatic settlement with a weakened and more constructive Russia. It ultimately means that Putin will be forced to accept Ukrainian terms, even if he denies it publicly.

 

The only thing to fear is fear itself

Some Western decision-makers are wary of doing too much to help Ukraine because they are scared of what Putin might do if he is roundly defeated on the battlefield. They worry that he will become more dangerous and difficult to deal with.

But Putin is not suicidal; a Ukrainian victory will not lead to nuclear warfare. The Kremlin itself may deliberately fuel such fears for strategic purposes. Putin is a master of gaslighting, and I am sure that Russians themselves are peddling worries of a cornered Putin to weaken Western support for Ukraine.

The United States and Europe shouldn’t fall for it. Experience shows that he opts to downplay and conceal it whenever Putin faces a failure, not to double down. For example, Finland and Sweden’s applications for NATO membership were an apparent political defeat for Putin, who claimed that he launched his invasion of Ukraine to prevent further NATO enlargement. But it wasn’t followed by an escalation. Instead, Russian propaganda minimized its significance. The Kremlin claimed that the withdrawal from Kyiv, another clear failure, was a gesture of “goodwill” to facilitate negotiations. The same pattern will apply to a broader battleground defeat. (The strength of his propaganda apparatus will help minimize the domestic backlash Putin faces for losing in Ukraine.)

Instead of focusing on Putin’s feelings, the United States and Europe should focus on practical steps to help Ukraine prevail. They should remember that a Ukrainian victory would make the world more secure. It would deplete Russian forces, making it harder for Moscow to meddle in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the western Balkans. It would promote global stability more broadly by strengthening international law and demonstrating to other would-be aggressors that barbarism ends poorly. The Wen must give Kyiv what it needs to push Russian invaders back.

Committing to Ukraine’s victory will have one final advantage: it will eliminate the uncertainty in the long-term strategies of the United States and Europe toward Russia, girding them for the long haul and helping them no longer be plagued by war fatigue. They will see that our mission—substantially weakening Russia—will enable them, and the rest of the world, to seriously negotiate with a humbled and more constructive Moscow.

We look forward to this day; any war ends with diplomacy. But that moment has not yet come. Right now, it is clear that Putin’s path to the negotiating table lies solely through battleground defeats.

 

For updates click hompage here