By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers
How Tariffs Erode Democracy
Global growth is
expected to decline, and downside risks to intensify as major policy shifts
unfold. Hence, as we have seen, great
power competition has returned.
Protectionism has met
with plenty of criticism over the last several months, but the magnitude of the
danger it poses is not yet fully appreciated. Much of the discussion
surrounding the tariffs proposed by U.S. President Donald Trump has focused on
their short-term consequences, stock market disruption, rising inflation,
retaliation, and a potential recession. But as bad as these outcomes are, a
worse possibility looms. Protectionism, if allowed to linger, could lead to a
complete disfiguration of U.S. capitalism and democracy as they are known
today.
Latin America
experienced such a devolution in the mid-twentieth century. Driven by a logic
similar to that which the Trump administration seems to be following today,
leaders implemented protectionist tariffs and trade restrictions as part of an
effort to encourage domestic manufacturing and rebalance trade relationships
that they perceived to be unfair.
The result, however,
was not an economic renaissance but financial unrest and undemocratic
governance. As long as Washington follows a similar playbook, it risks a
similar fate.
An Industrial Trap
After the Great Depression took hold in the 1930s, several of
Latin America’s strongman leaders, such as Getúlio Vargas in Brazil, Lázaro
Cárdenas in Mexico, and, later, Juan Perón in Argentina, concluded that the
answer to the region’s many problems was industrialization. Since the colonial
era, Latin America has been an extractive enclave, producing and exporting
mostly agricultural products while importing most industrial goods. In the
1930s, many politicians and intellectuals deemed this an unfair trade structure
because it kept the region under-industrialized and thus underdeveloped.
U.S. President Donald Trump is trashing the world trade system over a basic
economic fallacy.
Businesses in Germany
and Britain produced less this month amid worries about President Donald
Trump’s near-universal tariffs, in another sign that the global damage from his
import levies is adding up.
Closely watched
surveys of purchasing managers showed Wednesday that private sector output
contracted in Germany, Europe’s biggest economy, and the United Kingdom.
“Tariff concerns and
uncertainty weighed on business confidence and demand,” S&P Global and
Hamburg Commercial Bank, which publish the survey of German companies, said in
a news release.
Likewise, in the UK,
“survey respondents widely commented on the negative impact of US tariffs and a
subsequent slump in confidence among clients,” S&P Global said.
The first reading of
Germany’s Purchasing Managers’ Index, which tracks activity in the
manufacturing and service sectors, came in at 49.7, from 51.3 in March. A
reading below 50 indicates a contraction.
The downturn is
probably the result of multiple forces, said economists at Berenberg, a bank.
“Beyond international
headwinds such as the tariff-related uncertainty, this likely also reflects the
broad-based domestic economic weakness,” they wrote in a note.
Early data already
points to a slump in global trade in the face of Trump’s import taxes. South Korea’s
Customs Service reported
that exports for the first 20 days of April declined 5.2% compared with the
same period last year. That singular data point is a “key bellwether” for where
trade is heading, Min Joo Kang, a senior economist at ING, said in a note
Monday.
Leaders thus set out
to rebalance their countries’ trade relationships. If Latin America
went heavy on protectionism and blocked imports from industrial trading
partners, they believed, local manufacturing would proliferate. Governments
enacted policies that came to be known as import substitution
industrialization, or ISI: increased tariffs, enormous barriers to foreign
investment, and high spending on newly created state-owned enterprises,
especially utilities and infrastructure.
These policies did
lead to manufacturing growth. But they also made Latin American industry one of
the least competitive in the world and fueled corruption. By the 1960s, the
damage was palpable. Countries that had embraced this strategy developed huge macro-
and microeconomic problems. Inflation soared, reaching annual rates that were
often three times higher than the world average (except in oil states, Mexico, and Venezuela). Government budget
deficits ballooned as states found it increasingly necessary to provide
subsidies to local manufacturers. And the manufacturing base that emerged was
uncompetitive: locally produced industrial goods were often more expensive and
of lower quality than those that had previously been imported, which made them
completely unmarketable abroad.
The cause of these
problems was simple: when states shield firms from competition, for example,
through trade barriers, they take away their incentives to innovate, maximize
efficiency, introduce cutting-edge technologies, and keep costs low. As the
political scientist Gustavo Flores-Macías recently put it, “ISI created
complacency.” The region entered a trap: manufacturing expanded, but exports of
manufactured goods declined, depriving local economies of sources of foreign
exchange.
Even at the height of
ISI, it was impossible for the region’s protected manufacturing to survive
without imports. Factories still needed to import machinery and parts, but
firms could not gather the capital to buy them because they lacked export
revenue. The state had to step in with more and more subsidies. This increase
in government spending sent states into a chronic fiscal crisis.
Thus, not only did protectionism lead to runaway inflation in the short term by
eliminating cheap imports, but it also created the conditions for inflation to
persist: insulating local firms from competition incentivized price gouging and
led to expanding fiscal deficits, which states could support only by printing
money. Wages lost purchasing power rapidly. Although workers could find jobs in
the local industry, they struggled to afford locally produced consumer goods.
Competition Among Cronies
The political fallout
of import substitution industrialization was even worse. Protectionist policies
invariably required new bureaucracies to enact them, determining which products
from which countries would be subject to which tariffs or import licenses. Many
of these decisions were arbitrary—or at least, were not bound to strict rules
or standards. The details of licenses, rates, and tariffed products were
regularly arranged in backroom deals between bureaucrats and private actors
with vested interests in how and when those protectionist measures were
applied. Private companies directed their energies to lobbying the state for
more protection, such as higher tariffs on their competitors, or for special
import licenses if they needed foreign inputs to produce their finished goods.
In return, they offered favors such as bribes, campaign contributions, or
political endorsements. Protectionism, in short, led to corruption on a massive
scale.
It also impeded the
rise of modern capitalism. Economies in twentieth-century Latin
America transitioned from oligarchic extractivism to
state-led cronyism, or what became known as rent seeking. Although the private
sector was more or less profitable under ISI, those profits depended mostly on
state favors, not on market gains. Firms devoted resources not to innovation
but to lobbying; competition between firms took place not in the markets but in
backroom negotiations.
As Latin America’s
political economies became reliant on deals hidden from public view, democratic
processes weakened, and in some cases, the system collapsed altogether.
Ever-rising inflation led to labor unrest; ever-rising rent-seeking
led to spiraling demands on the state for more favors. The system could not
deliver. In 1973, the Argentine sociologist Guillermo O’Donnell became famous
for recognizing that this crisis of mounting labor and business pressures,
which he called the “exhaustion stage” of ISI, was producing an inevitable
outcome: the military stepping in to try to end the madness. In the 1960s and
1970s, military coups in Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Peru, and Uruguay
paved the way for years of autocracy.
Even under new
military leadership, ISI continued everywhere except Chile, and governments
continued to accumulate bureaucracy, debt, and deficits. To describe these
military juntas of the 1960s and 1970s, O’Donnell coined the term
“bureaucratic authoritarianism.” Local industry became only more
inefficient and dependent on state favors. Corruption and inflation
flourished into the early 1980s. Poverty remained unabated. Business insiders,
shielded by their political sponsors, posted profits while everyone else
suffered the corrosive effects of inflation. Inequality grew.
In countries where
democracy survived along with protectionism, such as Venezuela in the 1970s and
1980s, public discontent with the corrupt system led to widespread support for
radical movements. Those attitudes gave rise to the left-wing authoritarian government
of Hugo Chávez, who ruled Venezuela from 1999 to 2013. Chávez also relied on
protectionism to gain favors from business elites.
Eventually, under
protectionism, something has to give. When the United States raised interest
rates in the late 1970s, Latin America’s system of import substitution
industrialization imploded. Higher interest rates meant governments could no
longer service their debts, and private banks could not step in to subsidize
the economy to the same extent that state bureaucracies had. Credit tumbled. A
depression set in. Private banks collapsed or faced huge stresses such as bank
runs. Governments couldn’t borrow money at home or abroad to save the banks or
to meet their debt obligations, much less to spend their way out of the
recession. The result was the 1982 debt crisis, which would plague Latin
America for a decade and, in the case of some countries, two.
Protecting Insiders
Protectionism is not
the solution that its advocates often proclaim. It led to industrialization in
Latin America only because the region had none before. Its more salient
byproduct was the destruction of market forces, with the rise of noncompetitive
firms; macroeconomic distortions in the form of inflation and debt; and the
entrenchment of a chronically arbitrary state.
In the United States
today, the decline of manufacturing is not the result of trade imbalances but
mostly of secular trends such as supply chain manufacturing. Most modern
manufacturing today involves assembling products that require various
intermediate parts. Many of these components can be purchased, at competitive
prices, from small vendors located in manufacturing hubs around the world.
These international hubs did not exist before the 1990s, when most
manufacturing was concentrated in a handful of countries. Further contributing
to deindustrialization in the United States are technological changes in
production, educational deficiencies, and tax structures that preclude states
from generating revenue to retrain workers. None of these problems can be resolved
through protectionism.
Instead,
protectionism disfigures capitalism and undermines democracy. It
makes consumers angry about inflation and a lack of choice. It makes private
companies less competitive and more corrupt. Lobbying the state for trade
favors becomes the dominant game. This already started to happen in the United
States during the first Trump administration, with firms filing over 100,000
exclusion requests for tariffs on steel and aluminum imports. Now that tariffs
have increased, these requests will certainly multiply, giving the second Trump administration even more
opportunities to negotiate special deals with private actors.
In short,
protectionism grants states too much arbitrary power to intervene in the market
and thus spawns more platforms for the exchange of political favors. This is
not the path toward business regeneration but one toward the demise of
capitalism and transparent governance.
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