By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers
The Coming Ecological Cold War
Four years ago, the
International Energy Agency (IEA) published a landmark report, “Net
Zero by 2050: A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector,” that proposed a
technical blueprint for a global green energy transition by the middle of this
century. The report focused on the economic and technological dimensions of
this energy transition. It was an admirable effort that calls for careful
study.
But the report was
also marked by the flaws of its technocratic conception. Crucially, the broader
stakes of the global energy transition went ignored. This is a mistake in
urgent need of correction. The decarbonization agenda is not simply about
reordering markets or industrial policies, but in fact represents the
crucible for a new geopolitical order.
The energy transition is likely to become the
center of a new eco-ideological Cold War that
will reshape global alignments and provoke existential resistance from the
fossil-fueled ancien régime. The
central axis of this geopolitical struggle will not be the 20th century’s
struggle between liberalism and authoritarianism, but a clash over the
metabolic basis of modern industrial society.

An aerial view shows
a floating photovoltaic solar energy farm under construction on Cottbuser Ostsee Lake, an
artificial lake that was previously an opencast coal mine, in eastern Germany
on Aug. 29, 2024.
The IEA’s net-zero
emissions scenario articulates a radical imperative: If we are to limit
global warming to the 2.0 degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit) target
enshrined a decade ago in the Paris Agreement—a threshold identified by climate
scientists, economists, and policymakers as the point where the risk of
dangerous and irreversible climate impacts (such as ice sheet collapse, extreme
heat, food insecurity, and sea-level rise) rise sharply—then the global energy
system must undergo a full-spectrum transformation by midcentury.
At the center of this
transformation is the electrification of everything, powered
predominantly by renewables. By 2050, electricity generation must more than
double, with 90 percent of it coming from zero-carbon sources—including nearly
70 percent from solar and wind alone. This means building the energy equivalent
of the world’s largest solar park every day for a decade.
The transport
sector must pivot just as dramatically. Electric vehicles will need to
leap from comprising 20 percent of global car sales in 2024 to more than 60
percent by 2030, with all new internal combustion engine sales ending by 2035.
The industrial sector, a formidable emitter, must be overhauled with
a 95 percent reduction in emissions by 2050—even as AI is
rapidly accelerating global electricity demand. Buildings, too, will
require transformation. By 2050, more than 85 percent of buildings must be “zero-carbon-ready,”
with half of the global building stock retrofitted to meet new standards.
Underlying all of
this is the imperative of a managed decline in fossil fuels. No new oil and gas
fields. No new coal mines. Coal consumption must fall by 90 percent, oil by 75
percent, and gas by more than half.
A transformation of
this scale and scope will be without historical precedent—with one possible and
crucial exception: what China has achieved economically over the past
half-century.
In 1978, China was
still a largely agrarian society, staggering under the economic consequences of
the Maoist era. Per capita GDP was less than $200, and more than 80 percent of
the population lived in rural poverty. But in the decades since former leader
Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, the country has undergone the most rapid
industrialization and urbanization process in human history. Sustained average
double-digit GDP growth rates for nearly 30 years transformed China from an
economic backwater into a global manufacturing powerhouse. Along the way, it
lifted close to 800 million people out of extreme poverty—an achievement that
accounts for roughly three-quarters of global poverty reduction
in that period.
This transformation
did not occur incrementally or organically. It was centrally orchestrated and
ruthlessly executed by a one-party state capable of mobilizing resources at an
immense scale, without the procedural friction or political gridlock common to
liberal democracies. Urban master plans were imposed with little
regard for local opposition; entire sectors were retooled by fiat; land and
labor were redirected en masse to serve national
development priorities.
The Chinese Communist
Party’s tight control over the state apparatus enabled it to pursue long-term
economic strategies insulated from electoral cycles or public referendums. In
short, China’s miracle was not just economic—it was also deeply political. It
was the most successful authoritarian development model that the world has ever
seen.
But this
unprecedented industrial ascent came at enormous environmental cost. By the
early 2000s, China had become the world’s worst polluter by most metrics. Its
cities were choked with smog, its rivers ran black with industrial runoff, and
its citizens suffered from some of the world’s highest rates of
respiratory illness and environmental disease. In 2007, China surpassed the
United States as the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide. Its economic
miracle had come to look increasingly like an ecological catastrophe.
Yet it is precisely
out of this crisis that China’s green transformation was born. Indeed, while
the IEA focuses on the “how” of the energy transition, it is equally crucial to
understand the “who” and the “why.” Because the central geopolitical fact of the
effort to decarbonize is that China has positioned itself to dominate this
emergent post-carbon system under the sign of what must be recognized
as green authoritarianism.

A wind energy base is seen amid fog in Suqian, Jiangsu
province, China.
Beginning in the late
2000s and accelerating dramatically after President Xi Jinping’s ascent in
2012, the Chinese government began to view environmental degradation not just
as a public health issue, but also as a threat to regime legitimacy
and long-term economic stability. Smog protests in major cities such as Beijing
and Shanghai, especially among the rising middle class, alarmed the Communist
Party. At the same time, the party recognized that the industries of the future
would be low-carbon and resource-efficient—and that global leadership in green
technologies could translate into a new form of geopolitical leverage.
China’s pivot to
green tech has been anything but hesitant. It has involved massive investments
in renewable energy, electric vehicles, battery technologies, and the mineral
supply chains that feed them. Today, China dominates every link in the green
industrial value chain. It produces more than 80 percent of the world’s solar panels and more
than 70 percent of lithium-ion batteries, and it controls
the majority of global processing for key minerals such as
lithium, cobalt, and rare earth elements.
Moreover, China’s
green transition is not limited to the export sector. Domestically, the country
is now home to the world’s largest fleet of electric vehicles and the most
extensive high-speed rail network. It leads the world in electric bus
deployment and has pledged to peak its carbon emissions before 2030 and achieve
carbon neutrality by 2060. These targets, while ambitious, are backed by real
planning infrastructure and a proven capacity for large-scale execution. In
2023 alone, China installed more solar energy capacity than the
rest of the world combined did the year before. In wind power, electric buses,
and high-speed rail, it has no rival.
How did all this happen so fast?
The answer lies in
the structure of China’s political economy. Beijing’s combination of
technocratic ambition and unapologetic top-down governance enables it to bypass
the procedural frictions that hamper democracies: NIMBYism, regulatory
fragmentation, and political short-termism. The country’s “Made in China
2025” strategy, a 10-year plan unveiled in 2015, explicitly identified new
energy vehicles and advanced green technologies as key pillars of national
development.
In support of these
goals, the state deployed a full suite of instruments: generous subsidies,
targeted financing through state-owned banks, favorable land-use policies, and
domestic content requirements. In many cases, the government created entire economic
ecosystems—clusters of suppliers, research institutions, and manufacturers—to
support the scaling of key green industries.
Equally important was
China’s ability to rapidly scale up production. Once a strategic decision is
made at the top, implementation cascades through its bureaucracy with
remarkable speed. In the solar industry, for instance, what began as a
state-led initiative to reduce urban air pollution quickly became a globally
competitive export juggernaut. Between 2010 and 2020, China drove down the cost
of solar photovoltaic panels by more than 80 percent, flooding global markets
and undercutting Western producers—many of which went bankrupt. Today, even
countries wary of Chinese political influence are structurally dependent on
Chinese green tech.
Some of this has been
achieved through what the West sees as unfair practices: forced technology
transfer, intellectual property theft, and subsidized dumping. But regardless
of the methods, the result is clear: Over the past two decades, China has leapfrogged
from the world’s greatest environmental villain to its green-tech hegemon. It
did not do so by becoming more democratic or market-driven—but rather by
leveraging the unique advantages of its authoritarian developmental state.
To be clear,
contradictions remain. China continues to build coal-fired power plants,
particularly to ensure grid reliability and support heavy industry. Its Belt
and Road Initiative has financed fossil fuel infrastructure in developing
countries, even as it touts its green leadership. But these tensions do not
negate the fundamental direction of travel: China’s centrally coordinated
industrial strategy, long-term planning horizon, and unrivaled production
capacity have enabled it to capture the commanding heights of the global green
economy.
This dominance is not
merely economic. It confers geopolitical power. Just as OPEC’s control over oil
gave it leverage in the 20th century, China’s grip on the green energy supply
chain gives it enormous influence in the 21st.
It is on this basis
that I’ve previously proposed the possibility of an emergent Sino-European
“green entente.” While the European Union and China are far apart on cultural
and political issues concerning human rights, they share “metabolic interests”
that make this sort of alignment plausible. Not only are China and the EU
currently the two biggest oil importers on the planet, but for exactly that
reason have also both become the fastest developers and deployers of renewable
energy technologies.
These material facts
have geostrategic implications: Europe, having already suffered the
consequences of its reliance on Russian gas, now confronts the unsettling
prospect of long-term dependence on natural gas from an increasingly hostile
United States—giving it a strong strategic incentive to seek energy autonomy.
At the same time, China’s unchallenged leadership in solar, wind, and battery
production provides a compelling foundation for a formalized Sino-European
supply chain partnership, ensuring Europe’s access to vital technologies and
raw materials.
The convergence, if
it happens, will not be ideological, but pragmatic: Europe will provide
affluent markets and a stable political commitment to greenery, while China
will supply the industrial muscle. Though incongruous from the point of view of
the democracy-versus-autocracy ideological divisions of the 20th century, a
Sino-European geo-ecological condominium makes much more sense if we recognize
that the central geopolitical debate of the 21st century is not over which
governance model offers the best route to economic prosperity and political
recognition, but rather over how best to address planetary challenges.
And here, for better
or worse, there is a strong alternative to the Sino-European vision of a green
energy transition.

US President
Donald Trump wears a coal miner’s protective hat while addressing the crowd
during a campaign rally in Charleston, West Virginia.
As the green
transition gathers momentum, underpinned by Chinese technological prowess,
a reactionary counter-bloc has already begun to coalesce—not around a
commitment to liberal democracy or human rights, but to the continued
extraction and political centrality of hydrocarbons. Call it the axis of
petrostates: a nascent coalition of states—notably, the United States, Russia,
and Saudi Arabia—whose economic models, geopolitical power, and civilizational
narratives are inextricably tied to fossil fuels.
Each of these
countries is responding to the decarbonization agenda not as a technical
challenge to be managed, but as an existential threat to be resisted.
At first glance,
these countries differ in regime type: The Trumpified
United States remains formally democratic (though increasingly authoritarian),
while Russia is a post-Soviet autocracy, and Saudi Arabia is a near-absolute
monarchy. Though all are authoritarian, what unites them is not political form,
but a shared vision of national sovereignty that subordinates environmental
constraints to national identity, economic primacy, and civilizational pride.
Each rejects the premise that climate imperatives should dictate economic or
political reordering. In their shared rejection of the green transition, they
are forming not merely an economic alignment, but also a reactionary
ideological bloc—one rooted in ethnonationalism, energy dominance, and
revanchist nostalgia.
A year ago, the
inclusion of the United States in this axis might have seemed counterintuitive.
After all, under the Biden administration, the United States had pledged to
reach net-zero emissions by 2050 and passed the Inflation Reduction Act, the
most ambitious climate legislation in U.S. history. But underneath this policy
veneer lay a structural contradiction: The United States is the world’s largest
oil and gas producer, and maintaining the stability of global fossil fuel
extraction is now (as it has long been) a critical pillar of its geopolitical
strategy.
With that said, the
second election of President Donald Trump last year does represent a sea
change. While Republican-led states have long resisted federal renewable energy
mandates, and right-wing media outlets have framed decarbonization as a
globalist assault on national sovereignty and working-class livelihoods, the
second Trump regime has made what were long political talking points into the
center of an overtly anti-renewables energy policy. If the United States in the
first quarter of this century promoted a broadly bipartisan “all of the above”
energy policy (except nuclear energy), the new regime is taking a stridently
“fossil fuel-or-bust” line.
Beneath this
resistance lies a deeper ideological formation: a petro-populist
vision of the United States as a land of rugged independence, boundless energy,
and divine entitlement to carbon-intensive modernity. This version of American
identity is aggressively defended by fossil fuel lobbies, right-wing think
tanks, and a political base mobilized by anti-elite grievance. While members of
the national security elite have emphasized the need for vast new amounts of
electrical production in order to be able to develop new AI models that can
compete with Chinese models, so far, this has not moved the energy policy of
the Trump regime.
From this
perspective, the Trump regime’s rejection of climate commitments represents the
consolidation of a petro-nationalist political
economy in which fossil fuels become both the material basis of power and a
symbolic bulwark against “cosmopolitan” or “globalist” green governance. As so
often with the Trump regime, a trolling line like “rolling coal” has gone from
culture war meme to hard-nosed policy.

The stand for the Russian oil company Lukoil during
the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum.
It is in this context
that the Trump regime’s formation of a petrostate axis with Russia and
Riyadh makes as much practical as ideological sense.
For Russia,
hydrocarbons are not just an economic lifeline but also the foundation of its
ongoing geopolitical relevance and civilizational self-conception. Oil and gas
revenues fund the Kremlin’s domestic patronage networks and foreign adventures.
Energy exports give Moscow leverage over Europe and political influence across
the global south. In Russian President Vladimir Putin’s revanchist narrative,
fossil fuels are entwined with Russia’s imperial legacy—a source of national
pride and global stature.
The green transition,
in this context, threatens to strand Russian assets, hollow out its
governmental budget, and marginalize it from emerging technological value
chains. From this point of view, working with the Trump regime to slow or stop
the global green energy transition is simply a matter of shared national
interests.
Like Russia, Saudi
Arabia depends on fossil exports for national survival. Despite talk of “Vision
2030” and investments in renewables, the kingdom continues to double down on
oil, aiming to increase production capacity and capture market share as other producers
(theoretically) phase out. Its ambition is not to phase out fossil fuels, but
to monopolize them as global supply tightens. Saudi oil is among the cheapest
and least carbon-intensive to produce, and the country maintains the most extra
production capacity—making it the inevitable swing producer (and thus power
player) in a world where some level of fossil fuel use persists.
The House of Saud
uses its oil rents to finance both its domestic social order and its
international influence. Saudi Arabia’s version of petro-authoritarianism
is rooted in a dynastic, patrimonial state that fuses nationalism and oil
wealth into a coherent ideological formation that has sidelined formerly
powerful religious authorities. Like Russia and the United States, Riyadh views
climate governance not as global stewardship, but as an encroachment on its
sovereign prerogatives. As with Russia, the Saudi regime regards the prospect
of a green energy transition as an existential threat. Unsurprisingly, the
kingdom has used its position in OPEC+ and international climate forums to
obstruct ambitious targets and undermine fossil phaseout language.
Though the Trump,
Putin, and Saud regimes are all authoritarian, what ties them together is not a
shared governance model, much less an ideological conviction that this model
should be generalized to other countries, but an underlying interest in the domestic
and international power that each of them derives from fossil sovereignty. They
want other states to remain fossil fuel-dependent because that dependency
translates to geopolitical leverage for them. Their strategy is rooted in a
revanchist yearning to restore past greatness through fossil-fueled
nationalism.
These regimes will
seek allies among other carbon-intensive economies, fostering counter-networks
that resist the new green order. In this geopolitical configuration, fossil
fuels become not just commodities but symbols of cultural autonomy and
political defiance.
For these states, the
IEA’s vision of a net-zero world, perhaps under Sino-European leadership,
represents political and economic warfare. Their likely response will not be
passive decline but active resistance, potentially escalating to kinetic
conflict. One can expect them to weaponize energy markets, foment instability
in resource-rich regions, conduct cyberattacks on green infrastructure, and
amplify climate disinformation. Their ideological counternarrative will not
only denigrate green tech but will also cynically conflate decarbonization with
neocolonialism, painting the green transition as a Chinese imposition designed
to entrench global hierarchies and erode national sovereignty.
Of course there will
also be tensions within each bloc. During the original Cold War, there were
famous tensions within both camps. On the Communist side of the Iron Curtain,
there was the rivalry between Yugoslavia’s Josip Tito and the Soviet Union’s Josef
Stalin from 1948 on, and even more famously, the Sino-Soviet split, which led
to actual border skirmishes between China and the Soviet Union in 1969. On the
other side, there were also many tensions between the United States and its
allies, with French President Charles de Gaulle, for example, famously removing
France from NATO’s integrated military command in 1966 primarily to assert
French independence and sovereignty on the world stage. The same will no doubt
be true in the new eco-ideological order: the Sino-European entente will
certainly not be without its internal tensions, just as Russian-U.S.
geopolitical rivalry will continue despite their metabolic alignment.
As with the original
Cold War, a big question will be how the global south aligns. The decision on
which side to pick in the new cold war won’t be merely about ideas, but about
the whole infrastructural model for a country, including the computing infrastructure.
Choosing to go with the Sino-European entente will mean that a country will
probably also have to commit to building its computing infrastructure on the
China stack, which, depending on what the United States does with its own
infrastructural assets, could be an opportunity or a liability.

Clouds from the
cooling towers of a coal-fired power plant in Gelsenkirchen, western Germany,
are seen in front of wind turbines.
This vision of an
eco-metabolic division of the world is at odds with the alternative view,
proposed by lingering nostalgists for the liberal international order, of an
Iran-China-North Korea-Russia axis versus a still-unified alliance of “western
democracies.” But the alliance of democracies is already dead, slaughtered by
Donald Trump’s triumphant return to power. In this emerging post-liberal
geopolitical order, the world is not dividing along the lines of democracy
versus autocracy; the axis of petrostates and the Chinese model both include
unapologetically authoritarian members. Rather, the division is between those
who see ecological modernization as a biogeochemical imperative for sustaining
planetary habitability and those who see decarbonization as a threat to their
so-called way of life.
In this new Cold War,
the battle is not just over emissions, energy markets, trading systems, and
technology. Nor is it just about sovereignty or identity. Rather, it is about
the metabolic basis of modern civilization in a warming world. This reshuffling
of alliances is ultimately about competing visions and narratives of modernity,
over what it takes to modernize, to survive, and to flourish. Will the future
be forward-looking, green and bravely planetary—or will it be backward-looking,
carbon-intensive and stridently sovereigntist?
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