At the beginning of the Clinton administration, the absence of a Soviet threat sought to legitimize inaction where Iran, along with Iraq, was to be contained within a cordon sanitaire, within which Iran could do as it pleased as long as it did not bother anyone else. At this stage, the holy trinity of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), sponsorship of terrorism, and opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process began to crystallize as benchmarks of American policy towards Iran.

In the United States, the tendency was simply to ignore and contain Iran. In Iran itself, rejection resulted in reflection and a review of the nature of the relationship. Many Iranian policy makers were perplexed by America's response to the offer of an oil contract and could not understand America's failure to act according to rational and reasonable norms. And many interpreted this as that America's behavior exhibited their ideological enmity towards the Islamic Republic or/and towards Iran and the Iranians. And Americas initial welcome to the rise of the Taleban in Afghanistan confirmed the apparent double standard that permeated US policy towards the region.

In the case of the more left-wing expatriate Iranians who settled in Europe, their distaste for the Islamic Revolution was followed closely by their dislike for the United States. But because the official Iranian attitude towards the United States overlapped considerably with the feelings of those on the Left, there was some potential common ground.

In the United States, however, most politically active Iranians were monarchists with an intense dislike for the revolution and all that it stood for. One curious development was the strength and popularity of the Mojahedeene Khalq Organization (MKO), in part a result of their coherent organization but also a result of their effective exploitation of their name, which led many American donors to confuse them with the anti-Soviet Afghan Mojahedeen.

And in the meantime Khatami became the new Islamic Republican man, educated; modest though not puritanical.The American response, largely dealt with political consequences rather than philosophical roots. Thus the emphasis was on particularities as they related to American grievances-the hostage crisis, flag burning, attitudes towards Israel-along with some grudging recognition that America may not have conducted herself well in the past.

But when the United States subsequently announced that it would be happy in principle to open formal talks, Khatami suddenly appeared less than forthcoming. This was partly because the offer of talks by the United States was invariably prefaced by a long list of grievances for any proposed agenda list that may have mollified US hard-liners but antagonized their counterparts in Iran-and partly because the offer of formal talks was regarded by many in Iran as moving with indecent haste.

The Europeans, and the British in particular, were seen as more empathic and politically aware of the realities of Iran. Iranian Reformists often hailed the ambiguous but mutually satisfactory settlement of the Rushdie affair in 1998 as an exemplary case of British diplomacy. Over the next five years, British diplomacy was to move with considerable skill towards reestablishing Britain's political and cultural influence. This achievement was a testament to the skills of the individuals involved but may be seen as double-edged. But also, the Europeans had diplomats on the ground. The Americans had not had anyone in Iran since 1980.

During the first Rafsanjani administration, Iranian agents had been involved in targeted assassinations throughout Europe. For one reason or another, many of these agents managed to get away. (In the case of the murder of the Shah's last Prime Minister, Shahpour Bakhtiar, the French police proved extraordinarily complacent.) The notion that the Europeans were turning a blind eye-the victims were after all Iranians-gained credence among the Iranian public. This interpretation did not escape the notice of the leadership, who themselves grew increasingly complacent in covering their tracks. In 1992, a hit squad was sent to kill a number of Kurdish dissidents as they sat in the Mykonos cafe in Berlin. That a Middle Eastern country should send a hit squad to Europe was bad enough. That the hit squad should act with reckless abandon in spraying a Berlin cafe with machine-gun fire was beyond contempt, and the German government was forced to act.

Iran-German relations soured markedly and the protracted trial raised the prospect that senior leadership figures would be indicted on charges of murder. Whether such charges could be proved was debatable, but the trial was intended to send a signal to the Iranians that such behavior was no longer acceptable. Even now, however, as dissidents at home and abroad relished the embarrassment accruing to the Iranian political establishment, ambiguity pervaded the process. Iranian Intelligence Minister Ali Fallahian-the man apparently responsible for the affair-was invited for private consultations with his German counterpart in Bonn . What transpired at this meeting remains unknown, but the general public concluded that much of what was going on was a charade for public consumption. Meanwhile, the date of the verdict coincided with the election of Mohammad Khatami and the promise of better relations. This coincidence softened the practical impact of the severe verdict. The leadership of the Islamic Republic proceeded to express indignation. The EU ambassadors departed from Iran en masse, only to return a week later without the German ambassador, who was instructed to come last.

Iran had successfully turned a political crisis into a humiliation for the EU. It was a humiliation that nobody would forget, least of all the Iranians. Conservatives laughed at the meekness of a Europe determined to maintain its commercial links, while Reformists enthusiastic for a new start balked at the ease with which Europe had crumbled. Europe's reasoning was in fact less cynical than some of its American critics argued. It recognized the importance of Khatami's election and took the political decision to engage with the promise of a better relationship. In fact, no further attacks occurred on European soil. Nonetheless, it was an expensive leap of faith, and one that the EU was not prepared to repeat in the absence of clear reciprocity. Perhaps the only country to move with alacrity on the diplomatic front was Britain, with the settlement of the Rushdie affair in 1998. But this simply brought Britain up to the same level of diplomatic representation as its EU partners.

One of the reasons there were no more attacks on European soil was that Rafsanjani in 1992 decided that the cost for Iran's position overseas was too high. He thus persuaded hard-liners in the regime to divert their attentions elsewhere. Unfortunately for Iranian intellectuals, the Minister of Intelligence, Fallahian, decided to unleash his most radical elements against home-grown dissidents. One notorious character was Saeed Islami (alternatively named Emami), who was rumored to have been recruited following studies in the United States on account of his impeccable zealotry and loyalty to the system. This sojourn in the United States, which has never been confirmed, was later used to argue that he had been a CIA plant all along, with the avowed purpose of discrediting the Islamic Republic. Whatever the veracity of this point, those who knew Islami argued that he was far too dogmatic and inflexible to have been given the responsibility of dealing with internal opposition. Others agree on this point but argue that he was only following orders.

Operational matters aside, in 1998, four gruesome murders in Tehran caused outrage among the Reformist press and public alike. Some alleged that these murders were the tip of a large iceberg. It is worth remembering, however, that many former intelligence officials were campaigning on the Reformist ticket and many sympathizers were in the Ministry, which was composed of different factions.

Khatami ordered an immediate enquiry and indicated that action would be taken to purge the Ministry of rogue elements. This was not the way the President was expected to behave, and Khatami's decision caught hard-line conservatives by surprise. The result was a reorganization of the Intelligence Ministry, with a new Minister known for his Reformist leanings, Ali Yunessi, replacing the conservative incumbent (Fallahian had long since gone). Islami was arrested and charged, and he conveniently committed suicide in prison. He was a expedient scapegoat, a shadowy figure who could no longer be questioned. Some commentators even alleged that Islami had been behind the Mykonos murders in an effort to disrupt EU-Iran relations.

The main casualty was the conservative establishment itself, and two people in particular came in for damaging public criticism: the former Minister of Intelligence, Fallahian, and his boss, President Hashemi Rafsanjani, for having in the very least turned a blind eye. State and society were at loggerheads. The latter sought to further explore the extent of the murders, while the conservative establishment was determined to suffocate further discussion.

In 1999, these tensions erupted when the flagship Reformist paper Salaam published a letter allegedly from Islami outlining a policy of press repression with a view towards destabilizing the Khatami government. Appalled by these new revelations yet also sensing an opportunity, the conservatives moved to have the paper closed down. Frustrated students, galvanized by Reformist rhetoric, decided to hold a small protest outside the University of Tehran in defense of the newspaper. Hard-line vigilantes known as the Ansar-e Hizbollah (Helpers of the Party of God) attacked the demonstration, and at least one student died. What followed was to shake the foundations of the Islamic Republic. Long used to having a monopoly of violence, the conservative establishment was shocked by the students' anger not only in Tehran but throughout the country.

The conservative establishment had no response to these demonstrations, which were carefully orchestrated and organized through the use of mobile phones and the Internet. The Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei was so disconcerted by the student chants accusing him of murder that he failed to make any formal response for days, leading some to suspect that he had lost his nerve. Eventually, following gentle encouragement (and the protests of the Revolutionary Guard, whose veiled threat to launch a coup was indignantly dismissed by Khatami, quoting Ayatollah Khomeini's injunctions against military interference in politics), Khamenei emerged to turn the other cheek. This proved a misplaced act of humility that served only to encourage the demonstrators and dismay his supporters. Finally, Khamenei came out fighting, performing the role of "oriental despot" to perfection and demanding that the transgressors be punished.

Those overseas were almost as startled as the conservatives in Iran, with some commentators leaping to the conclusion that Iran was on the verge of a revolution. Appeals went out for Iranians to revolt en masse, while foreign journalists, particularly at the BBC, interviewed members of the Mojahideen-e Khalq Organization (MKO), who proudly announced that the students were their supporters and were seeking the overthrow of the regime. For all the disaffection that did exist and the popular desire for change, revolution was not on the minds of the students at that time. In fact, the term revolution brought back memories of the traumas of 1979-1980, and this was precisely what the vast majority of Iranians did not want to relive. One revolution in a lifetime was enough, and the strategy had to be reform through concerted pressure, not a thorough revolution. Even if such aspirations had existed at this stage, vocal Western support de-legitimized it at a stroke.

Within Iran, anxiety grew about matters spiraling out of control. Although political ambiguity was a hallmark of Iranian life, political anarchy brought forth shudders from all walks of life. The students themselves, faced with the prospect of the demonstrations turning to riots, decided to avoid the potential loss of public support by toning down the demonstrations. Khatami urged a return to calm, warning students not to precipitate a full-scale conservative backlash, which might derail the reform program altogether. Pursue change through legal means, he argued; look towards the parliamentary elections of the following year, 2000. Extensive arrests nevertheless followed as the conservative establishment feverishly sought to stamp out what amounted to a youth rebellion. Foreign readings of this event were largely misplaced, focusing as they did on the reaction rather than on the views and strategies of the students.

Throughout the summer of 1999, the leadership of the main student union was buoyant, in stark contrast to the image painted in the West. Repression was to be expected, they had anticipated a backlash, and the casualties were within acceptable limits. The target was the seizure, through legal electoral means, of the legislative house, the nation's Parliament, to which the Constitution had allocated all responsibility for the ratification of new laws. Control of Parliament would remove the last obstacle to serious reform, and a coalition of the media and students were determined to lead the movement that would seize it. The one remaining obstacle was the Guardian Council, a body of twelve religious lawyers who had acquired the power to vet candidates. The students would approach this problem by proposing so many candidates that the Guardian Council would be overwhelmed.

The Council turned out to be far more lenient than many had anticipated, and Reformist candidates began to drop out so as not to split the vote. The Reformist campaign had one last-minute blessing in disguise, and this was the sudden decision of former President Hashemi Rafsanjani to run for a seat. So hated had Rafsanjani become among Reformists, especially in light of his alleged culpability in the murder of dissidents, that his presence gave Reformist strategists a personal target. Much to the chagrin of the conservatives, the Reformists swept to power, defying their critics and proposing a dramatic agenda for change. Yet at the very moment of their triumph, the Reformist leadership lost their nerve.The euphoria that characterized the mood on the streets was matched by anxiety among the political establishment. This anxiety was expressed in an assassination attempt on Saeed Hajarian, the strategist behind the election victory. Hajarian had always argued that the various vested interests would never give up power but had to be coaxed out of it through a mixture of persuasion and pressure. The bullets did not kill him but did cripple him for life, in a cruel metaphor for what was to happen to the Reform Movement over the next four years.

Khatami was stunned. Hajarian had been a personal friend, and he immediately arranged for him to have surgery abroad. Khatami began to reflect whether the entire project was worth it. At this crucial time, when the masses were calling for change and for their leaders to capitalize on the success they had engineered, the leadership chose to seek compromise. This compromise had a view to more durable gains later, but the effect was to take the sting out of the movement and deprive it of much needed momentum.

The conservatives could hardly believe their luck. They were in no mood for compromise, because the threat was too serious. The new Majlis deputies were not only discussing the possibility of further liberalization in the social and cultural arena but also demanding political and economic accountability. This last demand hit a nerve because most members of the conservative establishment were complicit in the complex web of commercial corruption that increasingly defined the elite structure of the Islamic Republic.

For many in the mercantile elite, who may have been sympathetic to the reform movement and the prospect of new markets abroad, the fear of a left-wing assault on the sources of their wealth (through taxes, accountability, and transparency) was too much to contemplate. Consequently, they moved into a tighter alliance with the Islamic authoritarians. In securing a landslide in the Parliamentary elections, the Reformists had not only raised their own expectations of what could be achieved but also recklessly if inadvertently galvanized the conservative elites into a swift reaction. The proper response at this stage would have been for the Reformist leadership to ride the tide of reform. In prevaricating, they allowed a reenergized conservative opposition to hit back, while deflating their own side. When the hard-line conservative Judiciary moved to close down Reformist newspapers, in an unprecedented cull of the progressive press, the Reformist leadership called for calm and urged their followers not to take to the streets but to instead await the inauguration of the new Parliament, after which new legislation would be passed.

This determination to use legal channels wherever possible was high minded and commendable, but it was a characteristic flaw in the Khatami strategy. His political strategist, Hajarian, had been a ruthless political realist in understanding that popular pressure was a necessity against a hard-line conservative establishment that was impervious to meaningful dialogue. Concomitantly, Khatami's decision to go exclusively through the Parliament made sense only if everyone was playing by the same legal rules. For conservatives, however, especially the more hardline and authoritarian elements, the law existed to serve their political interests, and as such it was flexible. As a result, when the new deputies energetically drew up a liberal press law enshrining freedom of the press (something that had always been guaranteed in the Constitution), the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamanei took the unprecedented step of publicly intervening to prevent its ratification. His predecessor had never been so bold, at the very least maintaining the fiction of an independent legislature (the House of the Nation). Khamenei's action tore away this veil in an authoritarian gesture applauded by his supporters and derided by his critics.

Up until this point, the Constitution had always been flawed but reformable. Now, even this expectation had been removed. The conservative establishment, in successfully protecting their interests, had done incalculable damage to the long-term credibility of the system. Some remained optimistic that the Parliament could still push through meaningful change, but a pattern of repression was now getting into its stride, helped in large measure by the Reformist determination to be rigorously legal in their procedure. Not only did they manage to contain the Reformists in the isolated cocoon of Parliament (where they gradually lost touch with their constituents), but they handed the political initiative back to the conservatives, who held the two levers of legal control: the Judiciary, which interpreted the law, and the Guardian Council, which vetted legislation for compatibility (politically defined) with Islamic law.

Some suggest that Khatami was persuaded upon this path by a promise from his opponents that they would ultimately respect the legislative will of the Parliament, even if there had to be compromise on particular pieces of legislation. If so, the next four years were to prove the hollowness of that promise. Instead, the Guardian Council repeatedly blocked legislation. The Judiciary, newly reinforced by staff recently purged from the Intelligence Ministry, moved to harass and imprison key Reformists, always being careful to locate the balance between selective repression and reckless provocation. The strategy was to de-politicize a boisterous and hijackers were not characteristic of Shia Muslims. Khatami, anxious that the blame not be associated with Iran, summoned Hizbollah leaders to Tehran to make sure they could confirm that they were not involved. Reassured, Khatami recognized the opportunity that could emerge from the catastrophe. Americans had been traumatized by the attack and had spent the better part of the following month collecting their thoughts and reflecting on what had happened. In many ways, the psychological impact of the attack was more profound than the material damage. Prejudices had been challenged and stereotypes shattered. The leaders of the attack were not Shia or Hizbollah but Sunni, and most hailed from two countries long held up as staunch allies of the United States: Egypt and Saudi Arabia. With old dogmas being revisited, the potential for a diplomatic revolution on par with 1979 seemed in the cards. Khatami aimed to make the most of the window of opportunity afforded to him.

The United States, with the full support of the international community and the United Nations, intended to seek redress against the Taleban in Mghanistan. Khatami sensed the moment was at hand and persuaded skeptics in the conservative establishment that assisting the Coalition war in Mghanistan would be in Iran's best interests. The hated Taleban would be removed, striking a blow against Pakistan and enhancing Iran's regional reach, and the hard task of building bridges with the United States would be facilitated. The key to the argument was this: the United States needed Iran, and Iran should be gracious enough to assist. Events had effectively served to balance, at least at a particular and regional level, the nature of the Iran-US relationship. It was an egalitarian moment that should be seized. According to some Iranian sources, this was not noticed by their American interlocutors, who continued to demand access to facilities in a manner not calculated to win them friends in the Islamic Republic.

It is the nature of secret discussions that we will never know how particular negotiations were conducted. Success or failure is often determined by not only words but also the way in which those words are delivered. Whether American negotiators demanded anything from the Iranians is a matter for debate, but we can be fairly certain that for all the Iranian admiration for Anglo-Saxon frankness, their appreciation soon dissipated when it was directed, occasionally aggressively, at themselves. Many a negotiation has failed because of American arrogance and Iranian pride. Nevertheless, it would appear that some arrangement was reached, even if this was negotiated by Britain-the British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw had been among the first visitors to Iran in the aftermath of 9111, well aware that Iran's support in the ensuing struggle would be useful.

The visit seems to have settled some nerves in Iran because the ritual anti-American chanting restarted soon after, leading some local wits to point out that Perfidious Albion (Britain), envious of a possible US-Iran rapprochement, had moved quickly to get things back to normal! It was the first visit by a British Foreign Secretary since 1979 and the clearest indication yet of the impressive progress made in Anglo-Iranian relations since their formal reestablishment in 1998. While Iran officially criticized any impending attack on a fellow Muslim country, few people in Iran shed tears for the Taleban, which had long been mocked in popular slogans as the epitome of all that was wrong with political Islam. Hard-line militants in Iran were regularly derided as being the Taleban of Iran, and this characterization of the conservative opposition had been an effective electoral tool in the Reformist political lexicon.

It was made public that because this was a UN-led mission, Iran would assist with the rescue of any Coalition pilots who found themselves in Iran, an allusion perhaps to the fact, never acknowledged, that overflight rights were being granted. Far more important, however, was the assistance provided in the form of the Northern Alliance, led by the charismatic Ahmad Shah Massoud. Massoud had been assassinated, but the Northern Alliance was to form the backbone of the Afghan resistance to the Taleban, and its participation hastened their fall.

Iran similarly played a constructive role in the subsequent negotiations in Bonn about Afghanistan's future, negotiating with a skill and diplomacy that impressed a number of their American interlocutors, who conjectured that perhaps the moment had arrived for a thaw in relations. After all, never was the US and Iranian coincidence of interest so blatantly apparent to all. Here was a situation that eschewed the need for affection but depended entirely on a realistic assessment of mutual interests. In short, it was a realist dream made in heaven. Unfortunately for the bureaucrats at the table, politics would soon ensure that this sweet moment of detente was an anachronism that belonged to an earlier, simpler age. Khatami's gamble, which appeared so close to success, proved to be no more than a mirage.

Expecially after 9/11 then, At the same time, rumors abounded in Iran of new networks being cultivated between Iran's hard-liners and Bin Laden's associates. Such a relationship is difficult to verify and was the subject of some conjecture in Iran. Another allegation was that some members of Iran's revolutionary guards (IRGC) were facilitating the flight of Afghan fugitives for money. It was generally acknowledged that Rafsanjani and Khatami had to intervene to put an end to this act of entrepreneurial spirit after it had been brought to their attention by disaffected members of the IRGC protesting the stupidity of such a venture. Such rumors, whatever their veracity, fed the neoconservative imagination in the US, particularly the argument that Khatami, for all his personal attraction, was not in charge of Iranian policy. For those in any doubt, the next discovery was to provide the much needed hard evidence.

Then, at the end of January 2002, President Bush delivered his State of the Union address in which he described Iran, along with Iraq and North Korea, as part of an axis of evil. Rarely has such a rhetorical device had such devastating consequences. While many in Iran could empathize with the preamble that condemned the un-elected minority in Iran, few Iranians could reconcile themselves with the notion that they belonged in the same category as their old foe Saddam Hussein or the totalitarian regime in North Korea. More crucially, however, was the impact that the speech had on Khatami's own credibility. Having failed to effectively transform the domestic agenda, he had now shown himself incompetent on the international stage. When he made the argument for Iranian support for Coalition efforts in Afghanistan, he had stressed, in the face of concerted hard-line opposition, that the potential rewards would be worth it. Arguably, the fear that Khatami's gamble was about to payoff led to the sabotage that was the Karine A.

The State of the Union speech unashamedly announced a return to a familiar track. The speech was as startling for what it left out. References to Bin Laden and Al Qaeda were minimal in contrast to the list of terrorist groups related to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Certainly, none of the three members of this new axis had connections to Al Qaeda or 9/11. The allusion certainly seems to have caught some American policy makers off guard as well. They struggled to come to terms with its implications, and commentators posited a number of theories as to how the speech was constructed. It was generally known, for instance, that Bush had an affection for Churchill's skill with rhetorical devices, but other than that, Iran's inclusion in the list was either deliberate or accidental depending on one's sources.

Was Iran really in the same category as Iraq and North Korea? Was it possible to have a dialogue with a state that was evil? Even Bush seemed to stumble on this particular incongruity, while others pondered the irony of the United States adopting theological motifs usually associated with the mullahs in Iran. While commentators attempted to dissect the implications of Bush's speech, the real and immediate casualty of the speech in the West was Great Britain. Tony Blair had been the only European leader to endorse Bush's comments at a time when Britain had been engaged in tortuous negotiations over its nominated candidate for ambassador, David Redaway.

Redaway was a fluent Persian speaker with considerable experience in Iran and was the natural choice to maintain and extend the considerable diplomatic momentum that Britain had built up with skill since 1998. Anglophobes in the Iranian establishment opposed his appointment on the perverse grounds that he was too familiar with the country. Blair's unqualified support for Bush's categorization of Iran provided hard-liners.

 Khatami, well on the way to being a lame duck president, was now confirmed as such. Although hard-liners had always argued that nothing was to be gained from negotiating with the West, even moderates reluctantly accepted the notion that the only approach was to be tough and confrontational. Clearly Khatami's strategy of dialogue had failed. In Iran, the Reformists were put on the defensive, as hard-liners in the Revolutionary Guard urged the imposition of martial law and an end to the Reform process. This was their third attempt to decisively overturn the Reform Movement. Previous threats had been made during the student demonstrations and in the aftermath of the parliamentary elections.

Those in Reformist circles feared that the hard-line establishment was determined to launch a coup. The hope, expressed through a variety of channels, was that Europe would oppose such a development. Europe enjoyed an authority in Iran that America did not, and the belief, not unjustified, was that hard-liners would back down if faced with overwhelming resistance.

Hawks in the West drew their own conclusions from this development, ignoring the fact that they had been complicit in the effective suffocation of the Reform Movement by refusing to acknowledge it. By not engaging in dialogue with those who were willing to participate, they had facilitated a hard-line backlash. For the hard-liners, tough posturing rather than negotiation was the only way forward. It was a deteriorating, absurd, vicious cycle in which the rigid obstinacy of the hawks on both sides produced a self-fulfilling prophecy and its own justification.

For some Reformists, the American rebuff was too much to handle and clearly could be traced to other more manipulative agents: "By taking such a stance, George Bush is trying to test public opinion. And when the public opinion would correspond to his, he would then act. [The] European Union and a number of Asian and European countries have criticised Bush's position describing it as inappropriate and wrong. Only England has supported Bush .... England is behind those crises created in our country and the outside movements that support them. England is the one who motivates America to act brutishly. We must discover England's footprint in these events. In truth, England is the one who fuels events." Old habits die hard!”

For all the indignation, the prevailing discussion revolved around whether or not negotiations were desirable, and opinions were based on the normal political divides. Hard-liners were opposed. Reformists, and some moderate conservatives, argued that flexibility had to be retained. The debate grew lively, with some deputies arguing that the record of the United States compared favorably with that of Russia, whose aggrandizements against Iran over the past two hundred years had been far more damaging to Iranian interests but did not prevent reasonable relations. As one reader noted in the letters page of a newspaper, "In my opinion America has provided the greatest help to Muslims and Iran." Politicians, echoing this public mood, noted that America had at times been supportive of Muslim causes (again contrasting favorably with the Russian experience in Chechnya). A clerical deputy went so far as to draw a religious analogy by pointing out that the Imam Ali (the first Imam of the Shias) had deigned to negotiate with his arch opponent the Umayyad Mu' awiya, and that the United States was surely not worse than Mu'awiya! Reformists stated that engaging in dialogue allowed Iran to better represent its interests and did not mean that the two parties had to have any affection. In addition, US and Iranian diplomats had negotiated on a variety of disputes and interests, the most recent case being the Bonn discussions on the future of Afghanistan. In the words of one Reformist journalist:

"There is no rational strategic explanation for refusing to hold talks with America. The sooner Iran begins to hold public and official talks with America, the sooner it will be able to further its own interests. However, the longer Iran postpones the talks, the greater the losses it will incur. In fact, if we had started to hold official talks publicly a few years ago, we would not have faced many of the problems in the bilateral relations between the two countries. Postponing the talks means that Iran has hardened its position. Eventually, Iran and America will have to negotiate. The longer such talks are postponed, the greater the losses Iran will incur and this will primarily serve America's interests."

The debate became so intense and obsessive that by the summer of 2002, the head of the Tehran Judiciary, taking his lead from a speech by the Supreme Leader, issued a directive outlawing "discussions about discussions with the United States." This absurd initiative broadcast on state television took some time to digest because it was not clear what the remit of such a decree might be or on what authority the head of the Tehran Judiciary had issued it. Reformist politicians and university professors were furious about its implications and roundly condemned it. One professor suggested that if discussions were to be banned, the government might as well close down the universities. Some Iranians remarked sardonically that the best thing to do was to decamp to the provinces and discuss the United States beyond the jurisdiction of the Tehran Judiciary. Finally, Khatami himself intervened, lampooning the Tehran Judiciary for its stupidity (the decree was quickly rescinded) and pointing out that the timing for talks with the US was incorrect. Khatami abhorred the politics of the bully either at home or abroad, and w offer talks now would be to send the wrong message to the US administration.

The level of debate far outshone that taking place in the United States, where the focus was firmly fixed on Iraq. Although some neoconservative commentators argued that the focus of US attention should be on Iran, this attention did not entail a nuanced policy of engagement. The only intervention the Bush administration made during this intense period of discussion was to brazenly support the resignation of Ayatollah Taheri, the venerable and highly respected Friday Prayer leader of Isfahan. Taheri had resigned in protest of the rampant political and economic corruption of the Islamic Republic, and the failure of the revolution to deliver on its promise of political freedom and social and economic justice. His resignation speech, delivered in the summer of 2002, sent shockwaves through the political establishment in Iran, in light of the ruthless condemnation he heaped upon the corruption of the Revolutionary organs of power. President Bush's clumsy intervention in support of Taheri revealed a woeful ignorance of the political dynamics of Iran and effectively consigned Taheri's thunderbolt to the political margins. The press was forbidden to reproduce the speech, which hard-line conservatives argued had been drafted by the CIA.

It is now generally acknowledged that not only was the Bush administration firmly focused on Iraq, but its strategy was almost exclusively one of force. For all the protestations of diplomacy, the military juggernaut was mobilizing. If some insisted on the diplomatic route, the window of opportunity was a good deal shorter than the public face of the administration cared to admit.

All war is deception. The decision to pursue Saddam Hussein and Iraq was a blunder of extraordinary proportions. Many of the reasons for this have been cited in numerous other works. As we have detailed several times, elsewhere on this website, the failure to provide for postwar planning with the potential opportunities provided to Iran in this case.

Both Iraq and Afghanistan became American problems as a result of a determination to contain revolutionary Iran, and yet the greatest superpower on the planet could not bring itself to engage in a meaningful way with its core problem in the region. Instead, it hid behind a veil of hubris, presenting rhetoric as policy and pretending all along that America had no need for Iran.

The invasion of Afghanistan could be justified on the basis of 9/11. But Iraq was pursued because it was militarily possible, and Iran was ignored because it was politically too difficult. Rather than pursue the military solution in Iraq, the United States should have taken the opportunity to pursue the political solution in Iran at that time. The events of 9/11 and subsequent polling throughout 2002 had shown a population eager for dialogue. They were ignored.

 Instead, the impending Iraq war exacerbated an already difficult situation by redirecting all personnel with any experience of the Middle East to work on the immediate crisis of Iraq. From 2002, the West took its collective eyes off the Iranian ball, while Iranian hard-liners prepared to contain and ultimately close off the window of opportunity. Their first targets were the political pollsters who had dared to proclaim that Iranians were interested in a dialogue. The pollsters protested that the survey had indicated the sophistication of an Iranian public who remained distrustful of American intentions but nevertheless regarded exploring a dialogue to be in the national interest.

For hard-liners, however, animosity towards the United States was an article of faith, opposition to which was tantamount to treason. At the same time, they moved to sabotage any attempts by pragmatic conservatives, particularly Rafsanjani, to open a covert channel of negotiation with the United States. Indications are that a number of routes were being investigated with a view to negotiating a "grand bargain" that would resolve all outstanding issues between Iran and the US. Reformists along with their hard-line opponents were contemptuous of any unofficial approach, and it would appear that likewise the United States was incredulous that old Iran-Contra contacts were being activated. Yet at the same time, there were strong hints that a formal diplomatic representation had been made to the United States in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion through the offices of the Swiss ambassador in Tehran. The precise details of this offer remain classified, but we do know that the United States rejected it. In the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, the impression was of a superpower high on hubris. If the Iranians were seeking to deal now, just think what they might offer following the triumph in lraq.

Now that Kathani’s Reform Movement was crippled, fractures in the elite began to reappear, particularly between the traditional conservatives (pragmatists and moderates) and the hard-liners, who may be defined as neoconservatives. Whereas traditionalists at least paid lip service to the notion of democracy, the neoconservatives had no such urges. Although the former eschewed the woolly liberal hypocrisy of the Reformers, they likewise detested the dogmatic inflexibility of the hardliners. Trade, after all, depended on a certain amount of flexibility, and the emergence of an Iranian neoconservative movement was something to be concerned about. But the traditionalists did not take the neocons seriously as a political force, despite the fact that they were making themselves felt over the past few years.

Perhaps as long as the traditionalists and neoconservatives seemed to share the same ends, the latter were simply not perceived as a threat. Even in 2003, the traditional elite was more concerned about the apparent threat from abroad. In this way, they too failed to see the threat emerging before their eyes and ignored the changing patterns of politics in the country. Khatami and his supporters warned of the impending danger, but this was dismissed as political hyperbole. The elite was more preoccupied by America's intentions and the lack of any clear policy, particularly with respect to the concept of regime change. Many members of the elite with no affection for the hard-liners, or the Supreme Leader around whom they tended to congregate, were nonetheless anxious that regime change meant that they too would be subject to eviction. Some even went so far as to argue that regime change entailed the dismemberment of the Iranian state itself.

In the absence of any clear statements from the United States, these fears accumulated to the point of forcing together reluctant elements of the elite. They were acutely aware that the regime as a whole, following several years of systematic repression, was losing its social foundation. The cost of promoting apathy and disillusionment with the political process was that the people might not rally round when you needed them most. But dislike for the regime did not necessarily translate into support for a foreign government whose ambitions with respect to Iran remained unclear. In this respect, although Iranians were impressed by the strength and purpose of American leadership (Rumsfeld's can-do attitude was favorably compared with the procrastination of Iranian leaders), the one card that the regime kept up its sleeve was that of nationalism. Whenever international tensions increased, state broadcasting would play the highly emotive unofficial national anthem (Ey Iran) or broadcast a short television piece on the history, mythology, or sheer beauty of Iran. These were calculated to convince Iranians that America posed a challenge to the nation, not simply the regime.

Some European diplomats privately complained that the lack of response and absence of a democratic agenda in favor of an exclusive focus on the issues of security and proliferation had handed the moral high ground to the US neoconservatives. Britain's priorities, and by extension its foreign policy resources, were directed towards solving the unfolding crisis in Iraq. Arguably, democracy in Iran was a victim of the West's pursuit of democracy in Iraq. Rarely have scarce resources been so misdirected and opportunities so recklessly squandered.

The juxtaposition of the Bam earthquake and the subsequent parliamentary elections showed the complexity of Iranian politics. The Reform Movement may have been suffocated, but this did not automatically mean a de-politicization of the public or a desire for more autocratic religious rule. Far from it. People were disillusioned with the process and exhausted by the effort. They were appalled by the their leaders' lack of courage, which failed to match the convictions they apparently held. They were equally disdainful of the contempt shown by the hard-liners towards their views, and the Guardian Council was harshly criticized. In the words of one Iranian official, the Council was not a generation out of touch; it was at least a century behind the times.

In seeking to restore their power, the conservatives (and their hard-line allies) had sacrificed a considerable amount of their authority, and many conservatives recognized this problem. Indeed, none but the most extreme authoritarians considered the problem insignificant. But they did regard it as manageable. The population might be disgruntled now, but nationalism would serve, where perhaps an appeal to Islam would not, to rally the people behind the Islamic Republic. For this they needed a well defined enemy and a crisis.

For the hard-liners in the regime, the enemy was clear and well defined. It was and continued to be the United States in particular and the West in general. There was no point in building bridges or fostering detente. Of certain eternal truths, one was the animosity between the United States and the Islamic Revolution. To think otherwise was to sully the purity of the Revolution and hasten its demise. For this reason, engagement was an act of treason. It was a view that dove-tailed neatly with the perspective of American hawks, who likewise considered any form of compromise with the Islamic Revolution tantamount to treason. Engagement would, by necessity, affect the nature of the Revolution, but Reformists regarded this process inevitable in the modern world and felt that the best one could do was to manage it effectively.

Even traditional conservatives accepted this principle; they simply wanted to manage the process in their interests rather than leave it to the Reformists. In rejecting meaningful engagement, American hawks played into the hands of Iran's neoconservatives: more so because America's failure to even recognize the Revolution encouraged many members of the elite who had little sympathy for the political developments in the country to stick with the devil they knew. Thus, when American commentators and politicians talked loosely of regime change, without defining what they meant, members of the Iranian political establishment saw themselves as the target. The consequence of regime change was obvious for all to see in Iraq. Moreover, it was argued, the Americans not only were interested in regime change but also sought to challenge the integrity of the Iranian state itself.

The situation after the 2004 election in Iran became more complicated on a number of fronts. The new Parliament, stacked with hard-line deputies, now believed atomic energy negotiating team, was too soft with the Europeans and should insist on the retention of all Iranian national rights. This emphasis on nationalism was important because, in the absence of authentic electoral legitimacy, the new Parliament had to resort to emotive nationalist rhetoric to both rally the people round and blind them to the fraud that had occurred.

Just as those in the United States who dared challenge the legitimacy of the war in Iraq were labeled traitors, so too in Iran now were those, who dared query the details of the nuclear issue. Nuclear development, particularly the need to enrich uranium, became an iconic issue that would brook no questions, not even those relating to the cost of the venture. It became an exercise in vulgar nationalism, a hijacking of an ideology in the interests of power that disguised the supreme irony: a Parliament elected on the basis of contempt for the national will presenting itself as the protector of that nation.

Furthermore, the team in charge of the negotiations, led by Hasan Rowhani, now faced a different type of challenge at home. Hard-line critics had always exerted pressure, but this had been balanced by the more moderate position of the Reformist deputies, some of whom were reportedly just as anxious as the West to find out what was going on with nuclear development. (There were reports that the Parliament intended to set up an investigative commission.) Now these Reformist deputies were gone, and Rowhani found himself trying to secure an agreement to contain further hard-line gains, while the neoconservatives sought to ensure the opposite. In other words, the nuclear negotiations became subject to political pressure of a wholly different nature. Also , now with Abu Ghraib, the image of the Great Satan was given greater public impetus.

Where the development of democracy in Iraq would have been music to the ears of Iran's political activists; anarchy and disorder played straight into the hands of the neoconservatives. The Coalition forces found the fractious anarchy of Iraq difficult to manage, but Iranians were well equipped to take advantage of the opportunity. While the Coalition was determined to normalize political life, Iranians thrived on a crisis, viewing it as an opportunity to be seized (especially the potential for commercial gain). This reflected the mercantile character of the Iranian political state-short term, volatile, and dominated by opaque personal networks. Iraq was the ideal extension for the Iranian political system. In contrast to the occupying forces, Iranians had access to the networks (largely through the Shia seminaries but also through Shia Arabs in general and the Kurds in the north), tended to speak the relevant languages (Kurdish and Arabic), and had considerable experience of organizing in a crisis situation, the Iranian presence in Iraq increased dramatically.

As far as the Iranians at that point where concerned, the British presence was considered useful in shielding them from trigger-happy Americans. In many ways, British forces sat uneasily between two largely antagonistic forces, especially when the infiltration of Revolutionary Guard forces was taken into account. Britain viewed such infiltration with justifiable concern but felt that they could impress the need for restraint through political channels.

This restraint was soon to be sorely tested. In the summer of 2004, British troops patrolling the Shatt-al Arab waterway, which divides Iran from Iraq, were seized by a team of Revolutionary Guards. The seizure of the eight servicemen, along with their boats, provided the first clear indication that politics were changing in Iran. It was a fiasco in public relations terms. The British press began to question the modus vivendi that had governed British-Iranian relations to date.

The more populist of Britain's journalists advocated a strongly confrontational posture. This stance was counterproductive to Britain's overall strategy, which was to avoid unnecessary tensions. Nevertheless, democratic politics being what they are, Her Majesty's opposition (the Conservative party) leapt into the fray, demanding to know why the government was not being more robust against this key member of the axis of evil. All this made the job of the diplomats far more difficult, and in this they were mirrored by their Iranian counterparts, who were likewise confronted by an unhelpful piece of political theatre. Hard-line elements in the Iranian political establishment-the local Revolutionary Guard Commander-wanted to make a point. Part of this was for internal political consumption, but the major audience was abroad, specifically the British and the Arabs, because a film of the captured soldiers was broadcast only on the Arab satellite network of Iranian state television.

One suggestion was that the abduction was retribution for the abduction and humiliation of Iranian fishermen by the authorities of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Because Iranian hard-liners regarded the UAE as a British client state, the decision was to retaliate not against the UAE but against the puppeteer. This justification was an interesting indicator of the political views of the Iranian neoconservatives. But something more sinister was afoot. The released film depicted the soldiers blindfolded in a fashion reminiscent of the US Embassy hostage crisis in 1979.

Thus, it revealed an unhealthy nostalgia for the halcyon days of the early revolution among key sectors of Iran's neoconservative movement. The full implications of this development were felt later, with the emergence of Ahmadinejad. The new Parliament and the confrontational attitude of its allies in the Revolutionary Guards did nothing to enhance Iran's international image or improve its chances of negotiating a favorable settlement on the nuclear issue. As the political situation deteriorated and the landscape became dotted with minor crises, the possibility of mutual trust diminished. The terms of any agreement became tougher, leading to a further radicalization of political opinion. The transformation of the negotiations into political theatre began in earnest in 2004, when the new Parliament viewed the prospect of a compromise deal with disdain. Instead of a compromise, they were determined to redefine Iran's relations with the West and turn to the East.

This essentially meant fostering relations with Russia and especially China, although the new Speaker of the Parliament announced to much press ridicule that his agenda was to pursue policies that would turn Iran into the Japan of Islam. None of these models of development showed an awareness of history, even recent Iranian history. The business culture in Russia might appeal to the Iranian mercantile community, but Russia had not been a reliable political ally. Apart from the historical legacy was the more recent experience of the legal status of the Caspian Sea, in which Russia peremptorily abandoned its show of solidarity with Iran after it received favorable terms from the West. As for China and Japan, their economic success depended in large part on their relations with the United States, a prospect Iran's neoconservatives did not even venture to contemplate. The allusion to Japan, given that country's especially turbulent relationship with the United States over the previous century and a half, seemed particularly ignorant.

In immediate terms, the appeal to Eastern models of development meant less attentiveness to the needs of Europe, who then spent a year catching up with the events they had unwittingly encouraged. A number of areas of dispute belied the triumphal tone of the October 2003 agreement. Indications were that the Additional Protocol was not going to be ratified. Although Iranian officials insisted that the terms of the agreement were nonetheless being implemented (inspections were occurring), these were not to the level expected by the Europeans-and the Americans, who were watching with a skeptical eye. Indeed, Iranian politicians seemed to relish the position of splendid isolation towards which they were taking the country, insisting that the West needed Iran more than Iran needed the West.

In truth, no one in the West had a good idea how one was to deal with the new President, whose unorthodox religious views and hard-line politics were a matter for serious concern. For all the problems the previous administration had with the West, they at least believed negotiation was possible and relations desirable. Only stability could provide Iran with the basis for the economic growth the country so desperately needed. For Ahmadinejad, relations are not desirable and the possibility is irrelevant. Iran could seek other friends or thrive in splendid isolation. With oil prices so high, there is no need for foreign relations that ultimately could only pollute the purity of the revolution and the perfection of the nation. See our previous case study about Iran: (Although we must stress again, that we do not see the disintegration of Iran as an option with a change of prevailing.)

Ahmadinejad has begun his presidency as he means to go on: with a history and contemporary politics as the suggestion that the United States ought to encourage the territorial disintegration of the modern Iranian state, as what appears to be happening to Iraq. This fear is at the heart of the political inertia that has constrained political debate and allowed a hard-line reaction to take hold. No serious internal challenge will be contemplated while the very idea of Iran (as a former empire) is considered under threat. Plus although the Iranians have misread the political situation in the United States, for a nation that tends to view developments in the long term, Iran cannot even work with a four-year electoral cycle because limits are often set by the biannual Congressional cycle.

Where the only moment of meaningful contact was the last two years of the Clinton administration, with the advent of the Bush administration, the two political cultures were increasingly defined by a shared belief in confrontation. Politics, therefore, define Iran-US relations. Populist and rich with emotion, this narrative of confrontation has permeated the popular imagination and driven the elites. The first step, therefore, must be to confront these myths, recognize their importance and potency, and begin their deconstruction. They cannot be dismissed as mere politics; they are the engines that drive our perceptions and must be handled carefully and critically. As we have seen over and over, nothing so affects individuals as their beliefs.

We have consciously abstained from extensive references in this two part comment because all of the facts can be accessed if you are interested, via the archives of mainstream news services on the internet. What is unique of course is not only that we present here for the first time ever an overview, but more important within this context, a commentary explaining, what new services have not explained. However, for our detailed overview of historical developments with, extensive references, see the links embedded in our first part of two.

 

P1.The Iran US Conflict

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