By Eric Vandenbroeck
and co-workers
Leaders in the United
States agree that the country is locked in strategic competition with China.
The Biden administration’s National Defense Strategy, released in 2022, bluntly
stated that China represents “the most comprehensive and serious challenge to
U.S. national security.” Not to be outdone, Wisconsin Representative Mike
Gallagher, the Republican chair of the House Select Committee on China, a
special panel established in January, described U.S.-Chinese competition as “an
existential struggle over what life will look like in the twenty-first
century.” Now more than ever, it is easy to imagine today’s competition with
China turning into a protracted regional conflict, such as a war in the Taiwan
Strait.
War is always scary,
but it is even scarier when your side is unprepared. And indeed, the U.S.
defense industrial base would be inadequate if the United States and China were
to go to war. In 2022, the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS), where I serve as senior vice president, conducted a war game involving
a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan in 2026. The exercises
revealed how quickly the United States would run through its current supply of
weapons in the first few weeks of a major war. Certain critical munitions—such
as long-range, precision-guided munitions—would likely run out in less than one
week. The United States would need to scale up its weapons production to avoid
these shortfalls, but doing so quickly would be extremely difficult.
Equally
concerning, these gaps undermine deterrence—the linchpin of the
United States defense strategy—because they reveal to all that the United
States cannot endure a lengthy war. China has not made the same mistake.
According to some U.S. government estimates, Beijing is acquiring high-end
weapons systems and equipment five to six times faster than the United States.
Additionally, China would fight a war in the Taiwan Strait in its backyard,
with easy access to its industrial base. The United States would have to fight 7,000
miles from the shores of California.
The clock is ticking.
In March 2021, Admiral Phil Davidson, then the commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific
Command, predicted that China might invade Taiwan “during this decade, in fact,
in the next six years.” And U.S. President Joe Biden has repeatedly
stated that the United States would intervene militarily in the event of a
Chinese attack on Taiwan. In this competitive international landscape, the
United States needs a national strategy to reinvigorate its lagging defense
industrial base—much like the Roosevelt administration expanded its military
capacity in the 1930s and early 1940s. Fortunately, the United States has a
strong foundation to build, with a highly capable industrial base and a rich
tradition of technological innovation.
Burning Through Ammo
The war in
Ukraine provided one of the first indications of a problem with the U.S.
defense industrial base. Following Russia’s invasion, the United States
provided the Ukrainian military with various weapons, from Javelin antiarmor systems
to High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and Stinger antiaircraft
systems. This assistance was critical in helping the Ukrainian military halt
Russia’s invasion. But the aid came at a cost. The rate at which soldiers use
ammunition in Ukraine has strained the U.S. defense industrial base.
American military aid
reached $32 billion a year into the Ukraine fight. Many weapons systems and
munitions came directly from U.S. inventories, depleting the country’s
stockpiles. The United States, for example, provided Ukraine with over 8,500
Javelin antitank systems, 1,600 Stinger antiaircraft systems, and 38 HIMARS
between February 2022 and March 2023. Providing this aid was the right decision
because it helped prevent a successful Russian invasion of Ukraine. But the
United States could have used these systems to train U.S. troops or stockpile
in the Indo-Pacific for a future war.
The number of
Javelins transferred to Ukraine over the first six months of the war is the
same number the United States would normally produce over seven years. This
volume strained the Javelin production line, which needed a major infusion of
funding from the Department of Defense to restock. Even at accelerated
production rates, it will likely take several years to replenish the inventory
of Javelins, Stingers, and other in-demand items. In addition, the rate at
which several weapons systems are being exported—such as Javelins, Stingers,
HIMARS, Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS), and Harpoon anti-ship
missiles—may mean there will not be enough munitions in stock to match the
requirements of U.S. war plans for China and Russia.
More broadly, the war
in Ukraine has demonstrated that great-power wars—particularly wars of
attrition—are industrial conflicts. The effort to deploy, arm, feed, and
supply forces is monumental. Massively consuming equipment, systems, vehicles,
and munitions require a large-scale industrial base for resupply. Some days,
the Russian military has launched 50,000 artillery shells at Ukrainian military
and civilian positions. Ukraine is also burning through munitions at a frenzied
rate, firing as many 155-millimeter rounds in five days as the United States
produces in a month. Meanwhile, fighter aircraft, main battle tanks, artillery,
and drones have been destroyed or broken down and must constantly be replaced
or repaired.
More Missiles
The U.S. defense
industrial base would face even greater challenges if war broke out in Asia.
CSIS conducted two dozen iterations of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan to help
understand the complexities and challenges of war in the Taiwan Strait. In the
war game, retired military officers and civilian experts played the roles of
military leaders from China, Japan, Taiwan, the United States, and other participants.
Using an operational map of the western Pacific and a map of Taiwan for ground
combat, players took turns conducting military actions, such as firing
ballistic missiles and deploying aircraft carriers.
In virtually every
iteration of the war game, the United States expended over 5,000 long-range
missiles of various types in three weeks of conflict. Among the most important
munitions to prevent a Chinese seizure of all of Taiwan are long-range
precision missiles, including missiles launched by U.S. submarines, and these
ran out quickly in the war game. The same applies to ship-based munitions, such
as the SM-6, which would also be expended in large quantities in such a
conflict.
Antiship cruise
missiles offer a practical case study. In every iteration of the CSIS war game,
the United States expended its inventory of antiship cruise missiles within the
first week of the conflict. These missiles were particularly useful because
they could strike Chinese naval forces beyond the range of Chinese air defenses.
These air defense systems are likely to be formidable—especially early in a
conflict—and may be able to prevent most aircraft from moving close enough to
drop short-range munitions. Bombers used in the war game generally employed
these munitions because they could be based outside the range of Chinese
missiles.
There are no quick
solutions to ramping up missile production capacity to meet these needs, but
that is another reason to start now. The first step is to incentivize U.S.
defense companies to build more. But these firms are generally unwilling to
ramp up arms production and take financial risks without contracts, especially
multiyear ones. Given the large capital and personnel investments required, it
is only a sound business decision to produce more munitions or weapons with a
clear demand signal and financial commitments from the U.S. government.
Although the Department of Defense signs multiyear contracts for ships and
airplanes, it generally only signs multiyear contracts for a few munitions. In
addition, the U.S. military services frequently cut munitions from their
budgets at the end of each fiscal year to make room for other priorities or to
fix problems that arise when acquiring larger weapons systems.
Workforce and supply
chain constraints also prevent companies from increasing the production of
weapons systems and munitions needed in a major war. Companies need to hire,
train, and retain workers. Moreover, supply chains for the U.S. defense sector
should be more secure. In some cases, just a single company makes a key
component. The Javelin, for instance, relies on a rocket motor currently
produced exclusively by the company Aerojet Rocketdyne. Only one company,
Williams International, builds turbofan engines for most cruise missiles.
There are also
significant vulnerabilities with some rare-earth metals, which China has a near
monopoly on, that are critical for manufacturing various missiles and
munitions. China dominates the advanced battery supply chains across the globe,
including refining cobalt, copper, lithium, and nickel, as well as producing
anodes, separators, and electrolytes. China is the global leader in cast
products used in most military platforms and munitions, from ships to missiles.
Beijing produces more than the next nine countries combined, including over
five times as much as the United States. The Department of Defense depends on
foreign governments, including China, for a large cast and forged products used
in some defense systems and machine tools.
Finally, lead time is
a significant constraint. Missiles, space-based systems, and ships face the
longest replacement times. It can take roughly two years to produce many
missiles, generally based on the time needed to deliver the first missiles—not
the last ones.
Buying Now
The United States
needs a new industrial base strategy designed to produce sufficient quantities
of the most important weapons systems and munitions to deter and, if deterrence
fails, effectively fight Russia and China. The goal should be to assess
the wartime demands on a limited set of weapons systems and munitions and
establish a more certain production future for weapons manufacturing. The added
capacity is also important to deter adversaries, such as China, and to credibly
demonstrate that the United States and its allies can conduct a sustained
military campaign if necessary. Greater industrial capacity would also support
U.S. efforts to provide additional capacity to Asian and European allies.
The key to improving
defense industrial base capacity is a reassessment of total munitions
requirements for deterrence and going to war against China and Russia.
Important munitions questions that should be addressed include whether military
planning is aligned with the realities of high-intensity combat in one—or more
than one—theater. This might include modeling the expenditure rates of critical
guided munitions among land, naval, and air forces in a major conflict at
various levels of intensity and duration, including how long it would take to
restart or increase production. Today, the Defense Department bases its
procurement on operational plans, generally for short wars. Instead of asking
defense industries to assess their capacity to produce specific munitions or
weapons systems, as sometimes occurs, a better option would be for the
Department of Defense to analyze what it needs based on wartime scenarios and
analyses. The Pentagon could then provide direction and resources to defense
suppliers to fill the gaps.
Another step would be
accelerating manufacturing using advance-purchase agreements and multiyear
contracts. These options have often been limited to large programs such as
ships and aircraft, but they could help with munitions. This should include
signing multiyear contracts for specific munitions and weapons systems
necessary to deter—and to fight if deterrence fails—adversaries such as China
and Russia. The 2023 National Defense Authorization Act was a good start to
approving multiyear contracts for some munitions, but Congress needs to expand
these efforts.
Finally, the
Department of Defense needs to look for more opportunities to codevelop and
coproduce weapons systems with friendly countries, what some have called “ally
shoring.” Coproduction facilities can have multiple benefits, including
strengthening the production capacity of allies and increasing economies of
scale. And American companies have done it before manufacturing HIMARS with
Poland; a new tactical ballistic missile, known as the PrSM,
with Australia; a new antiship missile with Norway; and SM-6 components and
Tomahawks with Australia and Japan.
The military is
taking some promising initial steps. The U.S. Army plans to boost its monthly
capacity to produce 155-millimeter shells from about 14,000 to 30,000 in 2023
and eventually to 90,000. The Pentagon is spending $80 million to bring a
second source online for the Javelin missile’s rocket motor and plans to double
production to around 4,000 a year. Overall, the U.S. Army hopes to increase the
production of artillery shells by 500 percent within two years to replenish
stockpiles sent to Ukraine—the largest production expansion since the Korean
War.
After two decades of
operations against al Qaeda and the Islamic State (also known as ISIS), the
United States has shifted its defense strategy
from counterterrorism to competition with China and Russia. But words
are not enough. The U.S. defense industrial base is sorely lagging. Without
urgent changes, the United States cannot fight a protracted war or deter
Russian or Chinese aggression.
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