By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

The English Ascendancy And After That

As we have shown on this website, Europe had a long historic relationship between religion and politics. Although there is no doubt that religion continued to be important in almost every European state, following WWI, the push of (and for) secularization hence became strong. There were exceptions however which I will highlight next in the form of: Ireland, Poland, Greece. Although social science has recognized that something is different, it hasn't yet explained why, the goal of following investigation.

Even to date, the ties between the Greek state and the Greek Orthodox Church are still strong, particularly by European standards, and yet there has been little decline in the religious nature of Greek society (96% still claim to be religious - drastically higher than other European states). Portugal provides a similar example. As an overall history trend, caesaropapism explains a great deal of the secularization phenomenon. However, it doesn't explain why certain nations remained religious in spite of strong linkages between church and state.  In addition, an understanding of the church-state relationship does little to help us untangle the mysteries of religious nationalism in stateless groups (ethnonational movements). How can the church-state relationship affect the secularism of a society when there is no state for the church to relate to?

The sheer variety of theories should tell us something about our understanding, or lack thereof. Some theories argue that religious diversity inhibits secularism, although not necessarily in terms of nationalism.1 Others argue the exact opposite - that groups which are strongly uniform in their religious beliefs are less likely to secularize.2 Still others claim that strong religious unity is bad for religion, but only when the church becomes tied to the state.3

What is agreed upon to a fair extent is the fact that religious pressures are a necessary part of our understanding of religion in modem states. Whether those pressures come in the form of subjugation, denominational interfaces, or from the Church itself is less clear. What is not clear, and what we must understand in order to understand religious nationalism itself, is the way that these pressures affect identity. How important are denominational interfaces? Is subjugation a necessary condition for religious nationalism? How important is the church-state relationship? Does it vary from country to country? What role does it play for national groups who do not yet have a state?

AIfred Korzybski once said, "There are two ways to slide easily through life: to believe everything or to doubt everything; both ways save us from thinking."

It is not enough however to hope and capture religion by merely looking at church attendance. Clearly, religious attendance can play a large part in religious identity, but the relationship is not concrete. An understanding of the situation surrounding the statistics must be included in any examination.

Therefore, taking as a starting point the conclusions that can be drawn from Religions View Religions: Explorations in Pursuit of Understanding (ed.2006) one could say that: 1) a nation's existence at a religious frontier and 2) a clear threat from that frontier. The frontier itself provides the soil, so to speak. The proximity of another religious group makes religion a useful tool for nation-building. However, it is only when the seed of a threat is planted that religion is actually used for that purpose. I do not argue that this combination of variables is necessary for religious nationalism. I will argue that the two factors are jointly sufficient. In other words, there may be other paths to religious nationalism besides the one laid out here. However, if there is a in fact threat across a religious border, then religious nationalism will be the result.4 Let us take this a step further on hand of the three just mentioned countries.

 

Ireland

The loss of the Gaelic language, oftentimes a blow for other nationalisms, only pushed lrish nationalism more towards the one distinguishing characteristic that remained: the Catholic Church. As suggested above, religious frontier is important in the formation of religious nationalism because it isolates religion as a key differentiator between two hostile or threatened groups. As such, it makes sense that the loss of the Gaelic language would encourage religious nationalism. Had the Gaelie language survived more extensively, it is likely that it would have remained a key ingredient in lrish national identity. It is unlikely, however, that it would have replaced Catholicism as the defining characteristic. The historic animosities between the English and the lrish along religious lines made it virtually inevitable that lrish identity would be shaped in opposition to English and British Protestantism. In addition, the role of the Old English in the sixteenth century determined that language was not the crucial difference between the oppressive English and the subjugated lrish. It was Catholicism instead.

Throughout history, lrish nationalism has been shaped in contrast and in resistance to an English "other." English identity, on the other hand, was strongly impacted by an lrish threat up to the nineteenth century. However, what began as a strongly Protestant image of nationhood shifted towards more secular conceptions as the threat from Catholic Ireland and France diminished.

Our self-conception is built around what sets us apart - what we are not is as important as what we are. In terms of national identity, nationalism is structured around the characteristics that set one nation apart from others. In addition, identities are shaped by the pressures placed upon them. In the British Isles, Ireland proved to be a continual thorn in the side of the English monarchy and Parliament. In particular, the repeated use of Ireland as a staging ground by the Spanish, French, and Germans for invasions into the English homeland proved to be highly threatening. On the other hand, the English and British mistreatment of the lrish beginning in the twelfth century proved to be the strongest pressure on lrish nationalism. The result was that both sides built their identities in response to one another.

The presence of a threat only meant that the lrish and English nations were mutually constituted. The focus of that construction could have been language, culture, history, or any number of other factors. The fact of the matter, however, is that religion provided the easiest, clearest, and most accessible tool for national mobilization. The English Reformation determined that the nationalist movement in Ireland would be primarily religious, as opposed to cultural or linguistic. Michael Carey explains how the English pushed the issue into the religious realm:

Unwittingly, the English colonizers provided a very clear point for lrish cultural identity, the identification with Roman Catholicism by the native population. The English Ascendancy, with its own church, then proceeded to define political loyalty as religious loyalty too, and aggravated this split with specific policies to promote the English Church and denigrate and suppress the lrish Church.5

The presence of a religious frontier meant that political and economic grievances could be easily wrapped in religious garb. The result, as history has shown, was a political conflict along religious lines. Unfortunately, religious conflicts and identities, by their very nature, lend themselves to intractability. One reason for the strength of opposition to religious interpretations of the Northern Ireland problem conflict is that they tend to the conclusion that nothing can or should be done to promote apolitical settlement on the grounds that the differences at the heart of the confliet are not amenable to compromise.6

However, religious divisions were a key factor in the ongoing formation of national identity in both Ireland and England. If there had been no nationalist spirit in Ireland, maybe its people, Catholics included could have been as satisfied with a British identity as were the Scots or the Welsh in the heyday of the British Empire. But such an 'if requires the absurdity of forgetting the whole history of Ireland prior to 1829, and how the role of religion in an of that had been decisive. It shaped the lines which have still not gone away and much as church leaders may wish to affirm that the conflicts of today are not about religion and are not between religious people, the fact remains that without the impact of religion they would be totally incomprehensible.7

The important point is this: had there been no religious frontier in Ireland, English and lrish identity may still have been formed in contrast to one another; however, they would not have been formed along religious fines. Had there been a religious frontier but no lrish threat to England, English identity would have been formed in contrast to another threat and, as a result, would likely have focused on a different constitutive factor - language, culture, history, etc. But the course of history dictated that, for both the lrish and the English nations, the religious division created by the English Reformation was a crucial and conspicuous threat to both nations, and each responded by rallying around religion as a key differentiator in nation building.

An important corollary of this theory is the fact that, although religion is central to national identity in lrish history, the factors that led to the linkage were political, not theological. Again, religious threats produce religious groups, the lrish nation and the English nation were already threatened by one another prior to the introduction of a religious element. Once religion entered in, the identities formed around it. Thus, it is not the case that Ireland and England were threatening because they were of different religions, although this was eventually true. Rather, Ireland and England focused on religion because they were threatened, and Catholicism and Protestantism were the easiest ways to rally the nation in response to that threat.8

This can be seen in lrish politics today - most notably in the North. Religion has been so central to identity for so long that it has become indistinguishable from political identities. However, at the core of things, religious identities in Ireland are largely political and very seldom theological. The clash between Catholicism and Protestantism is certainly doctrinal for some; but for most, religion is simply a matter of identity. As Jonathan Tonge points out:

Labeling by religious denomination remains the most convenient method of identifying the division between the communities. The terms Catholic and Protestant are preferred to nationalist and Unionist or republican or loyalist as they embrace the vast majority of the people and are less problematic than other labels.9

For many, religion's role as a social category is, at the core, more important than its theological role. "What matters is not an individual's religiosity but the individual's incorporation in an ethnic group defined by a particular religion. Josephine Squires also indicates the same:

Social segregation of Catholics and Protestants still exists, entrenched though it may be, but this is due to the reliance on historical memory as a guide for present and future actions. Although religion played a large role earlier in the England Ireland conflict it has now become a scapegoat, an easy label, while the true reasons for the current conflict, which are more difficult to explain or justify, are, to a large extent, neglected.10

But as Guelke indicates, religion and national identity have become coterminous. "The number of Protestant nationalists in Northern Ireland is virtually insignificant. In fact, not a single respondent out of a survey of over two thousand identified himself or herself as both a Protestant and a supporter of either of the two nationalist parties." The same is also true of Catholic Unionists.11

Religion is indubitably important. However, it must be understood that the religious division is a result of political conflict. The introduction of a religious frontier into the Anglo-lrish conflict meant that religious nationalism in each country would be formed around their unique religious identity instead of another potential constitutive factor such as language or culture. This process was certainly furthered by the near elimination of the lrish language. However, as it stood, religion was the most efficient tool for subsuming the various groups in Ireland under a single national identity. To this day Protestants and Catholics are divided by religion by definition, but they are also divided by differences in economic and political power, by historical experience, and, most intensely, by national political identity. Religion is the key ethnic marker, facilitating the residential, marital and educational segregation which helps reproduce the two ethnic national communities. Because religion is the key marker its importance is exaggerated.

In England, religion served the same purpose until the mid-nineteenth century, when British power grew to the point that the lrish threat was no longer critical for national identity. As such, the religious frontier did not vanish, but its importance for British identity was diminished. This combination of a religious frontier and a national threat is not isolated to the lrish and British cases.

 

Poland

Looking at Poland, again supports the fact that religious frontiers are crucial to the formation of religious nationalism, for it is at such frontiers that religion becomes a useful tool for national differentiation.  This argument also supports the contention that a threat is essential for a religious turn in national identity. Although Poland had existed at a religious frontier since Prince Mieszko accepted Catholicism in 966, religious nationalism cannot truly be seen in Poland until the Deluge of the seventeenth century emphasized the weakness of the Polish position. Particularly important is the fact that, during the Golden Age of Polish politics, Poland had been a very wealthy state in comparison to its contemporary neighbors. And while in this case the ‘modernization argument’ is true, the actual causal mechanism would be missed. Because economic development leads to secularization because it increases national security and decreases assimilation threats. A prosperous state instead becomes the assimilation threat. As a result, most economically advanced states do not demonstrate strong linkages between religion and nationalism. However, an economically developed state may still be threatened, and thus susceptible to religious nationalism, as is demonstrated by an increasingly developed Poland and Ireland.

The following quote by the great Polish poet Czeslaw Mihosz demonstrates the process by which a powerful state may, in fact, come to foster a religious nationalism:

The history of Poland seems extravagant and full of incongruities: a huge state which for centuries stood up to the Teutons, Turkey, and Muscovy bul..literally fell apart while its once weaker neighbors partitioned it and erased it from the map of Europe for some one hundred and twenty years;... habits of religious and political tolerance which gave way, as a result of collective misfortunes, to wounded, morbid nationalism. This chaos of elements so disparate, yet interrelated by a logic of their own, may contain some lessons of universal portent.12

As was the case in Ireland, Polish national identity was continually shaped by a threatening "other." In Polish history, that threat has consistently come from the German and Russian empires. As such, Polish identity has historically been shaped in opposition to these two forces. Both states had tampered with Polish politics leading up to the partition, at which point they agreed to dismember the Polish states completely. The partition experiences of the eighteenth through the twentieth centuries produced an acute awareness that the very existence of the Polish nation was in jeopardy. Later, the Germans were guilty of some of history's most infamous additions during World War II, and the Soviets were guilty of similar crimes under communist rule.

As Adam Bromke points out, the attitude of the Poles towards the Russians is still clear today:
What then is the attitude of the Poles toward Russia and the Russians? No doubt, it is primarily characterized by enmity accompanied by a large dose of contempt. The reasons for this are natural. They stem from the past and present pattern of Polish-Russian relations. Since the beginning of the 18th century, when the pendulum swung against them, it has been the Poles who have been systematically hurt by the Russians.13

Stewart Steven, in his interviews with average Polish citizens, found a similar sentiment:

'If we Poles are anti-Soviet, it is because the Russians have made us so,' says one prominent university professor. 'They believe they liberated us and gave us socialism, and so we owe them a debt of gratitude. We believe they killed many of our people and took away from us our independence of thought and action, and so we have nothing to thank them for.14

As a result, nationalism in Poland has been developed in stark contrast to Germany and Russia. The fact that each of those states resided across a religious frontier simply assured that Polish nationalism would focus on Catholicism to emphasize their uniqueness and their status as a "chosen" people. Had there been no religious frontier, it is likely that Polish nationalism would have focused on their Slavic heritage in contrast to Germany or linguistic and cultural ties in contrast to Russia. However, "Polish Catholicism has been repeatedly - at the forefront of Catholic expansion or Catholic defense against other religions in Eastern Europe, to wit, different versions of paganism, Orthodoxy, Islam. Protestantism, and. finally, atheistic Communism.15

Jose Casanova argues that "Church and nation became identified at a time when the Catholic church was the only institution capable of cutting across the partition of Prussian, Russian, and Austrian Poland.16 Although Casanova makes a good point, I argue that Polish nationalism was becoming linked to Catholicism in the period leading up to partition, particularly during the "Deluge." The threat was clear before partition was enacted. However, Casanova is certainly correct in pointing to the unifying force of religion in the history of Polish nationalism. It remains important to this day: Religion has been both a spiritual and cultural force maintaining national identity in a country historically vulnerable to external domination. As a consequence of the lack of legitimacy of the various authorities during most of Poland's modem history,the Church has become in popular consciousness the most credible and respected national institution.17

Thus religious identities were convenient containers for a variety of political grievances. Although the conflict in Ireland seemed to be a Protestant/ Catholic conflict, the religious labels were actually the simplest way to identify a series of political beliefs dealing with self-determination, political equality, etc. This is also the case in Poland. A large percentage of the population still remains active in the Catholic Church, but that identity has been encouraged because it was symbolic of resistance to a variety of conquerors and oppressors. As seen above, it is common knowledge that a sizeable portion of Poles ignore Church positions on birth control, sexual mores, and even abortion.18

The Church is central to Polish identity, although it may not be central to Polish personal life. Theology is less important than identity, in spite of high attendance figures, the religious rules and principles of the church, have been treated less rigorously. For example Gregorz Weclawowicz pointed out that "In 1992 more than 82% of respondents rejected the involvement of the Church in political life, and 68% were against shows of religiosity by employees of the state administration." 19

This is not to say that Poles are not Catholic. It simply shows that there is a distinction between national identity and personal religious practice. A Pole need not go to church weekly in order to consider himself or herself a Catholic. Whether during the partitions, under German occupation in World War II, or in the Communist period, the Catholic Church served as a galvanizing force of national resistance and constituted the principal institutional opposition to alien rule.20  As a result, the Polish nation still holds Catholicism dear in spite of disputes over its proper role in modern society.

Polish nationalism however, is unique in its particular conditions: first, its presence at a major crossroads of religion in the middle of the European continent; and second, a persistent and savage threat from its Orthodox, Muslim, and Protestant neighbors. The Politesse also demonstrates the importance of a threat in the equation. Although the Poles had lived at the frontiers of Catholicism, religion was not tied to Polish nationalism until after the Deluge, which saw the previously powerful and tolerant state reduced to a weak and Catholic state. This combination of a religious frontier and an assimilative threat remained constant throughout Polish history - through the partitions of the eighteenth century, into the horrors of World War II, and continuing into the communist era. In each instance, Catholicism proved to be the easiest, most central factor in the uniqueness of the Polish people. Although the Polish nation has become more hesitant about the Catholic Church since the elimination of the communist threat, the importance of Catholicism will remain below the surface for easy retrieval should another threat emerge across the religious frontier.

 

Greece

Samuel Huntington famously wrote that: "The Albanian and Greek governments are at loggerheads over the rights of their minorities in each others countries. Turks and Greeks are historically at each others throats. On Cyprus, Muslim Turks and Orthodox Greeks maintain hostile adjoining states.21  However these animosities are a result of the religiously-based national identities in these regions. Although Huntington would like to daim that the animosities are a result of religion, it would be much more accurate to point out that the religious identities emerged because of historical animosities. Today Greek nationalism still continues to be shaped by Greco- Turkish tensions. As a result, any shifts in Greek nationalism away from the Orthodox church have been generally muted. And again, national identity becomes particularly strong as a result, of existential threats that happen to cross religious frontiers.

Whether or not the conflict is truly religious is unimportant. What matters is religion's ability to differentiate the nation from the threat. Greece, although deviating somewhat from the example of Ireland and Poland, still fits this model. Greek identity, like that of Ireland and Poland, has rallied around its religious uniqueness. This is a result of the fact that Greece has long existed at a religious frontier with Catholicism and then Islam - from the Byzantine Empire's struggles with its Roman counterpart through the rise of Islamic invaders and Ottoman rule. Thus, the religious frontier with Turkey continues to play a prominent role in Greek national identity. Significantly, the linkage between the Orthodox Church and the modem Greek people did not become fully developed until the War of Independence was underway. In many ways, the linkage was a result of the war - not a cause.

This can be explained by the fact that, although there was a clear religious frontier in the Ottoman Empire, the threat to the Greek people was minimized by the privileged position they held in the Ottoman administration. However, once the war began, Orthodoxy quickly became a rallying point for the Greek movement because it was the most obvious tool for differentiation between the Turkish and Greek peoples. In Poland, religion entered the realm of nationalism when the Polish state began its economic and political collapse that ultimately ended in partition. The frontier was ever-present, but the threat waxed and waned - and national sentiment followed.

The same was true in Greece. As the War of Independence climaxed, the threat from the Ottoman Empire waxed, as did religious sentiment.

In Ireland, the threat was a relatively constant British "other", and the resulting lrish identity was relatively constant as well. In Poland, the importance of a variety of others ebbed and flowed - from Orthodox Russia, to Protestant Prussia and Germany, to Islamic invaders. Although Polish identity remained focused on Catholicism throughout these shifts, minor adjustments in what it meant to be Polish can be seen based on who the primary "other" is at any given time. The same is true in Greece. Although the Ottoman Empire Turkey has been and continues to be the primary other in Greek identity, the problems created by Great Power involvement (particularly Russia) and Balkan collapse have meant that Greekness has been reformulated almost constantly. The creation of Bulgaria in the nineteenth century, the movement of large Orthodox and Muslim populations after World War I, and Russian desires for control of Istanbul allied to narrower definitions of Greekness. It took Greek identity from a wide focus on all the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire to a much narrower focus on Greek Orthodoxy, Greek language, and Hellenistic culture and descent. "The non-Greek Orthodox Christians, the Latin or Western Christians and the Muslims have been the three principal 'others' for the Greeks.” 22

And as Nicholas Gage points out: It is not surprising that religion is so important in Greece. During the hundreds of years when the Turks ruled the country, only their church provided Greeks with a sense of unity and national identity. The music, art, literature, and oral history that survived the Turkish occupation were conserved by the churches and monasteries.23

The existence of special bonds between the Orthodox Church of Greece and the State is explained by the fact that this Church helped the nation survive through 400 years of Ottoman occupation, by maintaining the faith, the language and the eulture. The Orthodox Church preserved Greek culture while under the control of the Ottoman Empire and, as such, it became a repository for Greek identity. It did so partly because of its privileged position, but more so because of its ability to differentiate the Greeks from their Turkish oppressors.

As with the previous two cases, religion in Greece was used in an instrumentalist fashion. The ultimate divide between the Turks and Greeks was not theological or liturgical, it was instead about issues of land control, sovereignty, and equality. Even after independence, the Megali Idea - the key driving force for nearly one hundred years of Greek foreign policy - was inspired by territorial ambitions. It was, however, justified with religious rhetoric. The calls for enosis, or unity, were driven first and foremost by political goals and aspirations. This same trend continues today in Greece. There is no doubt that Orthodoxy is central to Greek identity and culture, perhaps even more so than in Poland or Ireland, but much of the association can be explained by culture rather than theology. And most Greeks view Orthodoxy - as equal to Greekness, but with limited relevance for an individual's personal spiritual life.24

Despite the centrality of Orthodoxy as a marker of Greekness, Greeks on the whole, by contrast to practicing Catholics, are notorious for the absence of theological conformity or spirituality... [T]he predominant Greek attitude remains one of conformity to Church rites and rituals but minimal adherence to doctrine and dogma.25

The same phenomenon can be seen with Greeks living abroad, for example at the Easter celebrations where many nonreligious Greek attend church services and participate in the celebrations. As one explained to me, "I'm not a believer, but to be Greek is to be Orthodox. That's why I go.” In today's Greece, as is true in Ireland or Poland, the willingness to tolerate church involvement in politics is on the decline. David Close argues that Greeks, similar to the lrish, would like to see the Church take a more informal role in politics. The Church is viewed as having priorities that are "out of tune with social needs. The evidence, direct and indirect, is that most people wanted the clergy to act more as social workers, and take a greater interest in pressing social problems.

The fact that Greeks are less religious does not mean that they are less Orthodox. In other words, Greeks may view the institutional church with increasing skepticism, but they by-and-Iarge continue to think of themselves as Orthodox; and in terms of nationalism, it is self-identification that is critical. What does it mean to be Greek? There is little doubt that Orthodoxy is still a key part of that definition.

The importance of Orthodoxy has been a near constant in Greek history certainly since the 1800s. This is due to the constant threat posed by the Islamic Ottoman Turks to the Greek people. Orthodoxy came center stage because of its ability to differentiate the Greeks from those who provided the most significant threat to their existence. Although Greece earned its independence nearly two hundred years ago, the Turkish threat has continued to reinforce the Greek association with the Orthodox Church. Some are rather quick to dismiss the depth of this relationship. Adamantia Pollis claims that "Eastem Orthodoxy could have been disassociated trom the state and become part of civil society were it not for the power of the church institutions in everyday life, the clergy's participation in the revolution and the defeat of the Greek troops in Asia Minor after World War I.” 26  While Pollis may be correct, her "ifs" are enormous stipulations. The argument is almost like claiming that secularization wouldn't have happened in Europe if the church had remained important. The fact of the matter is that reliance on Orthodoxy was unavoidable due to the contrast with Islam dating back to Byzantium. This animosity explains all of Pollis' stipulations - from a linkage between church and state to clerical participation in the War of Independence. So long as Turkey continues to be the key antagonist in Greek foreign policy, Greekness will continue to be defined in terms of religion.

 

1. Stark and Bainbridge, The Future of Religion: Secularization, Revival and Cult Formation, 1985.

2. B. Rieffer, "Religion and Nationalism: Understanding the Consequences of a Complex Relationship, Ethnicities,2003; 3: 215-242.

3. José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World,1994.

4. See also Gary Goertz and Jack S. Levy, "Causal Explanation, Necessary Conditions, and Case Studies: The Causes of World War I" , paper presented at the Institute for Qualitative Research Methods, Tempe, AZ, 2002.

5. Carey, "Catholicism and lrish National ldentity," 107.

6. Guelke, "Religion, Nationalldentity and the Conflict in Northern Ireland," 105.

7. Adrian Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion, and Nationalism, 1997, 90-91.

8. Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 1997.

9. Tonge, Northem Ireland: Conflict and Change, London, 1998, 81.)

10. Squires, "The Significance of Religion in British Politics,” in W.Safran (ed.), The Secular and the Sacred: Nation, Religion and Politics, 2002, 86.

11. Guelke, "Religion, National Identity and the Conflict in Northern Ireland," in W.Safran, 2002, 104.

12. In M.K. Dziewanowski, Poland in the Twentieth Century, 1977, 1.

13. Bromke, The Meanings and Uses of Polish History, Columbia University Press, 1987, 210.

14 Steven, The Poles, 1982, 150.

15. Casanova, 1982, 92.

16. Ibid.

17. Michael D. Kennedy and Maurice D. Simon, "Church and Nation in Socialist Poland," in Merkl, ed., Religion and Politics in the Modern World, 2002, 149.

18. Kennedy and Simon, in Merkl, 2002, 128.

19. Weclawowicz, Contemporary Poland Poland, 1996, 110.

20. Ray Taras, "Poland's Transition to a Democratic Republic: The Taming of the Sacred,"in Safran, 2002, 140.

21. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 1996, 255.

22. J. Koliopoulos and T.Veremis, Greece: The Modern Sequel; from 1831 to the Present, 2002, 249.

23. Gage, Hellas: A Portrait of Greece, 1986, 96.

24. loannis M. Konidaris, "The Legal Parameters of Church and State Relations in Greece," in Greece in the Twentieth Century, ed. T. Couloumbis, 2003, 225.

25. A. Pollis, "Greece: A Problematic Secular State," in Safran, 2002, 163-64.

26. Pollis, "Greece: A Problematic Secular State," in  Safran, 2002, 157.
 
 

Towards a New Sociology of Religious Nationalism P.2

Towards a New Sociology of Religious Nationalism P.3-a

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