The basic conclusion of part 1 is that religious frontiers, when threatening, lead to the formation of a religiously-based national identity. Through the examination of three key religious nationalisms, I have shown the historical role of religious frontiers in nation-building.

As a next step then, my research team having read part 1, investigated a much larger number of countries than anybody has ever done. A resume was written about each case, and I will present an edited version as an overview in part 3.

I argued among others in p.1, that there are two key factors that tend to shape shape religious nationalism: religious frontiers and threats. Whoever as I mentioned, neither is sufficient to produce a religiously based national identity. As such, both must be present in order for a linkage to form between religion and nation. In each of the three cases I presented in p.1 in fact, religious frontiers and threats played a crucial role in nation-building.

In Ireland, the Norman Invasion brought an alien culture to the lrish island. The lrish nation began to identify in opposition to this new threat, but the lrish sentiment did not begin to take on religious tones until after the English Reformation, at which point the English became not just a threatening other, but a religious other as well, and lasted in the N.Ireland to this day.

In Poland, the threat from religious frontiers has also been clear. The religious divide between Poland and its non-Catholic neighbors (Russia and Germany) has been one of the more prominent features in the history of the Polish nation. Significantly, the role of threat is also demonstrated through the diminishing power of the Polish state following the Golden Era. The subjugation of the Poles to Russian and Soviet rule further enhanced the nation-building power of the Catholic Church.

In Greece, as in many nations formerly under Ottoman rule, the Orthodox Church played a critical role in national differentiation. This was due to the fact that Greeks were most dearly differentiated from their oppressors by religion - the Ottomans were, of course, Islamic. The threat from Turkey continues today on a variety of fronts, perhaps most notably in Cyprus. As a result, the Greeks continue to emphasize the importance of Orthodoxy in their national concept.

In each of these cases, it is clear that the interplay between religious frontiers and national threats had important ramifications for national development. The English case reinforced this understanding by demonstrating that the threatening nature of a religious frontier can change - and with it, the religious links to nationalism. As British power expanded, the lrish threat diminished, and Protestantism was no longer essential in national differentiation.

The findings in part 3, seem to reinforce this general argument as the majority of cases fit the broad pattern. To be exact thirty-two of thirty-nine states examined support the claim, seven do not and are therefore critical to our further understanding.

Many of these cases are on the borderline. Italy, for instance, is difficult to categorize. Is it a secular nation that is very religious? In other words, are the Italian people largely religious, although the linkage does not carry over into nationalism? Or is ltaly a case of a weak religious nationalism, wherein there is a linkage between religion and nation, albeit weaker than Ireland, Poland, or Greece? An argument could be made either way. Regardless, it is worth examining this and other outliers in order to: 1) clarify the causal processes involved in the formation of religious nationalism today, and 2) more thoroughly test the general theory at hand. 00 these outliers simply point to further nuances in our understanding, or do they call into doubt the explanatory power of the theory?

 

The broader context

I first will go back and take in account theories presented in earlier research, most of it quoted in the literature I mentioned in part 1 only in this case refer to the countries next presented in part 3:

 

Stipulation #1: The Role of Homogeneity

Some have suggested that much of the variation in the religiosity of nationalism can be explained by looking at the religious homogeneity or heterogeneity of a particular nation. To what extent can religious nationalism be explained by the fact that a nation is either largely or entirely alike in regards to religion? On the other hand, to what extent does religious variation within the nation exclude religion as a source of nationalism? These are both complex questions with complicated answers. However, it is possible to begin addressing them here.

We can begin by dismissing the notion that religious homogeneity causes religious nationalism. There are simply too many exceptions: France, the Czech Republic, Austria, the Scandinavian countries, and lceland – just to name a few. It is clear that simple homogeneity does not lead to a religiously-based national identity. This does not mean that homogeneity plays no role, however. If we look at the issue of homogeneity-heterogeneity not as a causal factor, but as an inhibitor of sorts, there is some credence to the argument. In other words, although homogeneity may not lead to religious nationalism, extensive heterogeneity might limit the power of religion in nation-building. Germany, for instance, is an internally divided nation. Approximately half of the population is Catholic and the other half is Protestant. As a result, other factors may (or may not) be more useful in building a strong unified national identity. Because religion divides rather than unites, other ethnic, linguistic, or cultural factors may take the lead in nationalism. Therefore, addendum #1 can best be stated as: Religious heterogeneity may limit the link between religion and nationalism in modernity.

This pattern can be seen in a couple of the European outliers. Albania, for instance, is a prime candidate for religious nationalism. Because of its location in the Balkans, religious frontiers have played a key role in Albanian history. Primarily Muslim state, Albania has been surrounded by Orthodox and Catholic powers for quite some time and these other states have proven threatening throughout. In addition, the subjugation of Albania to Communist rule seemed a prime motivator for a religious resistance as occurred in Poland. However, Albania is not a religiously homogeneous state. Nearly thirty percent of Albanians are either Orthodox or Catholic, and the seventy percent which are Muslim are themselves divided into Sunni and Bektashi sub-groups. The result is an ethnic emphasis in national rhetoric because of the diminished power of religion in uniting the Albanian people.

The Ukraine displays a similar pattern. Although it is seemingly a perfect breeding ground for religious nationalism because of its threatening religious frontiers (with Russia to its east and a number of Catholic states to its west), the Ukraine is divided internally between United Christians, Orthodox Christians professing their allegiance to the Ukrainian church, and Orthodox Christians professing their allegiance to the Russian church. As a result, religion was useful in the independence movement, but has been more limited in its ability to create a unitary and strong nation-state. This limiting power of religious heterogeneity is not constant, however. There are examples of heterogeneous nations which adopt a religious concept of nationalism and then proceed to purge those that no longer belong to the newly conceptualized nation. Poland provides a good example. In the 17^th century, Poland was conspired to be one of the most tolerant and diverse nations in Europe.

A large Jewish population lived in the state and participated in society. However, as Polish power waned and the threat from non-Catholic neighbors increased, the Polish nation became increasingly centered on Catholicism and its role in nationalism. It was from this point forward that the Polish nation became increasingly homogeneous. As a result, the homogeneity was created by religious nationalism and not vice versa.

The point of the above discussion is to clarify two key ideas: 1) the relationship between religious demography and religious nationalism is highly complex, and 2) it is fair to say that religious heterogeneity may hinder religious nationalism in certain cases. As such, some states which experience threatening religious frontiers may not necessarily resort to religious nationalism as there may be other national identifiers which are more successful at national unification.

 

Stipulation #2: The Role of Historic Religious Associations

Another argument that appears in the sociology literature claims that historic shifts in religious identification may play a role in modem nationalism. Specifically, nations that associate their religion with negative outside influences are less likely to turn to that religion for national differentiation and pride. David Martin, in his classic work, lays out this idea as fallows: "...there is ambiguity where domination restores a religion, as the Counter-Reformation restored Catholicism in Hungary and in Czech Lands, yet has to leave the National myth in the hands of a beaten minority.” (Martin, A General Theory of Secularization,1978, 108.)  Martin's argument is best exemplified through the Czech case. He argues that Czech nationalism has strong ties to the story of Jan Hus because of his emphasis on the local language. The Hussite movement led to an initial awakening of Czech identity which quickly swept across the region. However, the Counter-Reformation devastated the new religion. The Holy Roman Empire banned the practice and expelled all non-Catholic clergy from Czeeh lands. As a result, the people were reconverted to Catholicism, but the national identity still lay in the concept of Hussite Protestantism. In addition, the Catholic Church was now associated with foreign domination by the Germans in spite of the fact that most Czechs were Catholic themselves. Czech identity could not be associated with Catholicism because Catholicism had been oppressive and foreign, nor could Czech identity be associated with Protestantism because the Czechs were largely Catholic.

Martin places the emphasis on the reconversion aspect. However, it is not the reconversion that causes problems for nationalism. Rather, it is the association of religion with an oppressive and foreign power. As a result, a nation does not have to actually go through a conversion-reconversion process in order to feet historically severed from the Church. Therefore, the second addendum can be formulated as: A historic association of religion and national oppression will limit the link between religion and nationalism in modernity.

Two more of our outliers are useful illustrations: both Estonia and Latvia are predominantly Lutheran states. They also have very strong and threatening religious frontiers - most notably with Russia. However, neither demonstrates a strong religious nationalism. This is largely due to the fact that Lutheranism has been associated with German domination throughout much of their histories. Germanic influences brought Lutheranism to the Baltics and German nobles remained in a position of power in these states for centuries. The treatment of locals by these nobles led to a great deal of resentment. As a result, although the majority of Latvians and Estonians are Lutheran, the Lutheran church is associated with oppression and therefore loses its power in the mind of the nation.

 This relationship between church and oppression can also be seen in the French case. Although the circumstances were very different, the strong ties between the Catholic Church and the monarchy meant that religion lost much of its power leading up to the French Revolution. It had become associated with an illegitimate and oppressive regime, as well as a foreign influence (through Marie Antoinette's Austrian ties).  For example in ltaly, the Church itself became the opposition to national unification. The late 19th century saw the church lining up against Italian unification for a variety of reasons, and the end result was a weaker link between nation and religion. In the end, it is safe to argue that threatening religious frontiers almost always lead to religious nationalism; however, if the church itself is threatening or associated with a threat, this link is weakened severely.

 

Stipulation #3: The Role of Religiously-Minded Regimes

A third clarification that must be considered examines the role of authoritarian governments. Specifically, what effect does a religiously-minded government have in the overall process of secularization? Can a strong government essentially force secularization on an otherwise religious nation? Or, on the other hand, can a strong government force religion on an otherwise secular (or secularizing) nation? In other words, can the broader causal factors discussed in this dissertation be overruled by force? The answer is maybe, but only temporarily.

There are a wide variety of cases that can illustrate the role of a strong state in the secularization or sacralization of the nation. The most obvious ones occurred in Eastern Europe under Communist rule. Communist ideology dictated the repression of religion in general, but the success of this policy varied widely. In many cases, religion was successfully repressed, but the end of communism in the 1990s led to a near universal surge in religious attitudes, beliefs, and identification. Even in Russia itself, there was a give and take throughout the Soviet years. During World War II, for instance, the church was given more freedom when the state needed to rally support for the war effort. In other cases, the state had little success in deflating the power of religion - Poland is probably the best example, although Romania and Bulgaria are also good. In general, it is safe to say that force was only successful at secularizing society in those states that were already predisposed to secular nationalism (i.e. they had no religious frontiers or were not threatened). In those countries where threatening religious frontiers were present, force was sometimes successful in repressing religious identity. It was never fully successful in destroying it. Those nations that were most obviously threatened by religious frontiers (Poland, Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia) were also the ones in which religion was the most difficult to suppress.

On the other hand, there are also several examples of states that experienced the opposite situation: an authoritarian government that sought to support religion rather than suppress it. Although this type of regime is not uncommon in European history, it is fairly rare in modem European history. The two most obvious examples are Spain and Portugal. In each of these cases, a reactionary government was formed in response to liberalizing and anti-clerical forces in the early 20th century. In both cases, the forces of secularism had begun to influence society in the 19th century. In both cases, leaders who were strongly aligned with the Catholic Church came to power, and in both cases, they used their power to retard the progress of modernization. As was the case in Eastern Europe, this effort was successful in the short term. However, the broader context of Iberia meant that there was no threatening religious frontier to preserve a religious concept of the nation. 80th Spain and Portugal are currently in the process of secularizing after the Franco and Salazar regimes came to an end in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Although both are still largely religious, the shift towards secularism has been clear - particularly in Spain. As a result, it is fair to argue that the third stipulation in this theory is: A powerful government may temporarily impose either secularist or religion from above. However, its long-term success will ultimately be dictated by the broader social conditions at hand (i.e. threatening religious frontiers). In addition, forced secularization or sacralization is never as successful as that which occurs in a more organic fashion. As a result, the religiously-minded Iberian states and the secular-minded former Communist states are likely to continue to revert back to their natural states as dictated by religious frontiers and threats. Perhaps the best way to summarize the above stipulations is to say that context matters. In general, the argument that threatening religious frontiers creates religious nationalism holds true. However, circumstances are unique in each and every nation, and these unique attributes must always be taken into account.

In several cases (Portugal, Spain), it can be argued that their seemingly contrary state will self-correct in the near future. For a few other cases (Latvia, Estonia), we see that unique historical circumstances have dictated that Lutheranism will not likely play a role in national identity even in the presence of religious frontiers. And in others (Albania, the Ukraine), internal religious divides weaken the broad mobilizing power of religion, thus severing it from national rhetoric. In each of these cases, the broader argument would have held true had it not been for a number of unique conditions. As a whole, though, it is quite obvious that threatening religious frontiers play a very important role in determining the level of national secularization.

In order to be as thorough as possible, it makes sense to take a step back and consider some alternative theories.

 

Alternative #1: Economics and Modernization

The first theory worth exploring is one which has been held in some esteem in the social sciences for quite some time. Modernization theory essentially argues that economic development is part of a natural process that carries with it a variety of other social changes – urbanization, rationalization, secularization. As such, the assumption has long been that economically developed states are more secular states. On the surface, this argument makes sense. After all, Europe is both the most secular and the most developed region of the world.

Closer examination reveals the flaws, however. Some of the most economically developed states in Europe are also some of the most religiously nationalist. Ireland alone is enough to cause a problem for this argument. When one considers that ltaly, Spain, Portugal, and Greece are all in the upper half of European economies and are all considered developed by the World Bank, the argument is damaged even further. On the other hand, many of the poorest states in Europe are also the most secular. Albania, Latvia, and Estonia are all examples. The United States even further complicates the picture: one of the most advanced economies in the world and an undoubtedly high prominence of religion in society.

 It is worth noting that there is a broad pattern which does seem to hold true. In general, economically advanced countries tend to be more secular than those that are economically underdeveloped. However, this correlation has long been taken for granted, and there has been Iittle scientific explanation for this phenomenon. I suggest however that economic development is one of many ways in which a nation can diminish threats to its existence. A nation which exists at a religious frontier may experience a variety of threats from that frontier. We tend to think of military threats first and foremost. However, economics can playa large role in the susceptibility of a state to military and cultural threats. The chances of an economically developed nation being integrated or subsumed by a neighbor are significantly less than that of a nation which is economically weak.

A few examples from European history will help to demonstrate this process. Poland illustrates how a strong and economically developed state can collapse into a position of economic weakness and vulnerability. During its Golden Era, Poland was one the strongest economies in Europe. It thrived on agricultural exports and boasted a powerful military alignment with Lithuania. However, as its economy collapsed in the 17^th and 18^th centuries, Poland became an increasingly threatened nation. In addition, it transitioned from a religiously tolerant state to an exclusive and highly Catholic state. The same transition can be seen in the other direction in many other European states. Britain, for example, demonstrated a strong linkage between Protestantism and national identity until the 18^th and 19^th centuries, when Britain established itself as the world’s economic leader. As Russia’s economy has collapsed over the past two decades there has been a shift towards insecurity and an increase in the prominence of its religious frontiers – most notably with Islam.

What is important to note in each of these cases is that there was a shift in national threat. As these countries became either more or less economically secure, the importance of their religious frontiers waxed or waned. The religious frontier stayed the same; the threat was altered. Although economics is only one form of security or threat, it does playa role in religious nationalism in this indirect manner.

As a result, a state like Ireland may be very advanced economically and still exhibit the signs of religious nationalism because the threat from Britain has not been adequately calmed by the economic success the island has experienced in the past decade. Therefore, the level of economic development at which each state secularizes will vary based on its own unique circumstances: Is there a religious frontier? How threatening is it? Will economic development diminish that threat? As a result, it is safe to say that economic development does playa rote in secularization, but only indirectly through the ability of economics to diminish national threats across religious frontiers.

 

Alternative #2: Cultural Defense

Actual conflict is not required to create a religiously based national identity. The threat of assimilation or destruction, however, is clearly linked. In many cases (i.e. Greece and Turkey), actual direct conflict has not occurred for quite some time. The threat, however, has been sufficient to maintain religious ties to national identity . Also, there are times when external domination in fact leads to secular identity (Latvia, Estonia, Czech Republic). In addition, external domination is successful in explaining the independence movement in Greece, but does little to explain why religion has continued to play a key rote in Greek nationalism to present. When foreign domination ceases, religious nationalism does not necessarily follow suit.

 

Alternative #3: Denominational interfaces

The actual political borders are the ultimate goal of religious nationalism; they have only a minor role in it’s beginnings. Rather, religious frontiers have no concern for actual political borders. This is clear when one examines cases in which the political borders have been corrected, but religious nationalism continues to be strong – Greece, Ireland, Pakistan, and Poland are all good examples. The religious frontier is present regardless of what the political landscape looks like. As a result, the political borders may or may not play a strong role in the creation of religious nationalism. Denominational interfaces however are unable to explain the continued religious nationalism of states that have earned their independence. Once again, the religious frontier is persistent, even if the political conditions have changed.

 

Alternative #4: Church-State Relations

According to this theory, caesaropapist states (or states with a strong linkage to the church) weaken the ability of the church to respond to societal demands. As a result, the church is much more likely to lose its power over the nation. The caesaropapist embrace of throne and altar under absolutism that determined the decline of church religion can be seen in France (wherein the church and state were so closely aligned that the church was no longer representative of the people). At the time of the French Revolution, an overthrow of the monarchy necessarily included an overthrow of the church.

In contrast however, the lrish church has been historically independent of any central authority and, as a result, has been much more able to respond to and represent the will of the lrish people. Therefore, the church has maintained a stronger presence in the national self-conception.  In general, there is little doubt that strange usage of religious symbols and rhetoric by European monarchs over the years has led to the overall strength of secularism in Europe. However, on a case-by-case basis, this theory is problematic. Of particular concern are the Orthodox states of the former Ottoman Empire. Greece in particular casts doubt on the premise. The Greek Church was used by the Ottoman Empire to maintain rule over Greek subjects. However, at independence, the Greek Church was not cast aside as in France. Rather, it was heartily embraced by the Greek people. To this day there is a strong tie between the Greek state and the Greek Orthodox Church. Modem Greece is clearly a caesaropapist state, and yet it is also one of the strongest religious nationalism in Europe.

In addition, one would expect a strong separation of church and state (i.e. France) to then encourage the linkage between nation and religion, but this simply has not occurred. Instead, the linkage between religion and national identity has been shaped by religious frontiers and threats in spite of current or historic ties between church and state. It so happens that some church-state linkages prove threatening and others do not. In the end, the general concept that strong church-state linkages lead to secularism simply does not hold up.

 

Alternative #5: Rational Choice

The final theory worth addressing is rational choice. The basic logic behind rational choice approaches to secularization is that if the demand, desire, or need for religion is more or less stable, then the manifest variations in the pace and intensity of religious activity, commitment, and interest must be explained by variation in supply.  In other words, rational choice offers a supply-side approach to religion, suggesting that a demand for religious activity will increase if the supply is both sufficiently diverse and sufficiently attractive to entice the religious consumer.

There are a number of problems with this approach in Europe. At the most basic level, there are issues with the assumption that demand for religion is constant. The entire point of this dissertation is to argue that varying conditions lead to varying demands for religion. It is likely that a nation that is threatened by religious frontiers will experience a much higher demand for religion than a safe and isolated nation. In other words, this paper takes a demand-side approach, whereas rational choice (in this particular case) takes a supply-side approach. There are also major concerns with the supply-side aspect of the theory. Simply looking at the countries in Europe shows this assertion to be problematic. Many of the most secular states are religiously diverse - in fact, one of the major stipulations above showed that religious plurality may be detrimental to religious activity in a country. The religious pluralities of Britain and Germany have not created strong religious societies. Nor has the lack of diversity created a secular society in Ireland, Poland, or Greece. It is likely that the equation is actually reversed. Highly religious societies (religious nationalisms) are likely to destroy religious plurality, as was the case in partitioned Poland or post-Independence Greece. Similarly, a secularized society is more likely to be tolerant and, therefore, pluralistic. It is likely that Britain's pluralism in the religious realm is due to the fad that it is no longer a nation defined by religion. As such, a Muslim or a Catholic is no longer perceived as an outsider.

The basic problem with rational choice explanations of secularism or religiosity (in this case at least) is that they get the process reversed. The demand for religion is not fixed. Rather, demand for religion varies according to a variety of factors, including religious frontiers and threats. As such, the assumption that supply shapes overall religiosity is faulty. Rather, as is true of most economic situations, supply is driven by demand. In Poland, there was a strong demand for Catholicism due to historical and political circumstances. In Britain, there was a more subdued demand (in general) and a wider demand across the spectrum. In the end, the evidence simply does not support the argument.

Where still more needs to be examined (sub state identity, impacts on foreign policy, the complexities of how identity shifts occur) by clarifying the complex relationship between religious frontiers and national identity, will be better understood following a reading of upcoming, part 3.
 
 

Towards a New Sociology of Religious Nationalism P.1

Towards a New Sociology of Religious Nationalism P.3-a

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