lceland: The last time that a semblance of a religious frontier or dispute can be seen is in the 16th century, when Lutheranism was forced on the lcelanders by their Danish rulers. Since that time, lceland has been almost purely Lutheran, and its island status has meant that there are no potential religiously differentiated neighbors. lceland also was part of the Norwegian and Danish states for much of its existence. It was under Danish rule that the lcelanders were converted to Lutheranism, and it was against Denmark that lceland eventually strove for its independence. lronically, the conversion of the lcelanders to Lutheranism had a strong impact on the secular nature of lcelandic nationalism. By the time that modem lcelandic nationalism truly emerged in the 19th century, Lutheranism had become a solid part of lcelandic identity. Therefore, religion served little purpose in the strive for independence from Denmark, a fellow Lutheran state. However, the lcelandic language and literature was useful. Subsequent threats have only come from Britain (over fishing rights) and the United States (over military bases). Neither country however provides any real threat to the lcelandic nation, nor are they differentiated by religion. lcelanders are, as a whole, fairly religious. Ninety percent belong to the official state church, and about 75% claim to be religious. However, only a quarter of the population claim that religion is "very important and less than five percent actually attend church weekly. In the 20th century, the lcelanders have been relatively exclusive in their view of the nation, but the concept of lceland was not focused significantly on Lutheranism. In addition, the link between state and government is relatively weak. Although there is an established church that receives governmental funding, religious freedom is extensive, and there is increasing pressure to separate the two. The lcelandic approach to religion is similar to other states wherein religion is a cultural signifier which many people relate to (baptism, weddings, and funerals), but the relationship is not reflective of the actual religiosity of the people. Religion is neither an issue in the everyday life of the lcelanders, nor apolitical one. Major political and ethical issues are debated without reference to religion. However, the man in the street is keenly interested in various questions about religious experience, life after death, and so on, as a private matter and without reference to official doctrine. There is an almost total absence of a fully fledged atheistic world view, or anti-clericalism. lcelandic nationalism, though infused with a bit of religion, is secular. In many ways, the lcelandic case is not unlike the Czech case, wherein the nation has been cut off from its religious roots. The forced conversion to Lutheranism meant that the population was Protestant, but that the church was associated with oppression. Ironically, the last Catholic bishop in lceland (who was beheaded) has become a national hero. Significantly, this conversion introduced lcelandic language literature through the Protestant Sible - a feature that is central to lcelandic identity still.

ltaly: There are no major religious frontiers for the ltalian nation. All of its direct neighbors are strongly Catholic as well, with the exception of Switzerland, which is divided. The most significant others for the ltalians (since the dawn of modem national consciousness) have been other Catholic states (Austria during the Risorgimento). As there have been no major religious frontiers in modem Italy, there have been no significant associated threats either. Significantly, one of the major threats to Italian nation-building came from the Catholic Church itself. During the Risorgimento in the 19th century, the Neo-Guelph movement pressed for an ltalian state with the Pope at its head. The church, however, was unwilling to go to war with Austria, another Catholic state, in order to fultill the ltalian idea. In the years that followed, the Catholic Church continued to be one of the strongest opponents to Italian unification. As such, we see a pattern almost opposite to the Polish, lrish, or Greek cases. In each of those instances, the church supported the nation in opposition to the state. In Italy, the church represented opposition to the Italian nation, whereas the state symbolized the idea of unification. This stance had repercussions for the future of the ltalian nation. The Italian people are clearly influenced by Catholicism. Around 90% of ltalians are Catholic and 65% daim to be religious. These numbers are higher than average, but significantly lower than Ireland, Poland, or even the United States. Attendance is also relatively high. At the same time, however, there is a marked shift towards secularization. A new concordat between the Church and the state was agreed upon in 1984 which drastically altered the relationship. "According to the 1984 concordat, Roman Catholicism is no longer the established state religion Rome is no longer a 'sacred city' but its 'particular significance' was acknowledged.,,34 In addition, in the last two decades, major changes have occurred in regards to abortion and divorce laws - both being liberalized extensively. This somewhat odd relationship can be explained by Italy's unique situation. On one hand, the Catholic Church has lost its power over the nation because of 1) its actions during Italian unification, and 2) its inability to distinguish Italy from its neighbors. Whereas these conditions would almost certainly lead to secular nationalism in any other state, the unique relationship between Catholicism and Italy has slowed this process. Although Catholicism does not differentiate Italy from Austria or France, it is undeniable that the Catholic Church is an Italian institution. This predominance of the Catholic Church has lett national identity in a mixed situation. Because it is the home of Catholicism, ltalian identity has continued to emphasize its special relationship with the church. Rome was the obvious capital of ltaly but it was also, even more obviously, the city of the Pope and the papacy could never be a merely Italian matter. Even in the nineteenth century Italian nationalism would be profoundly embarrassed about how it should relate to the Popes. In the fifteenth the political, international and religious importance of the papacy was such that it placed the construction of Italian nationalism in a category all its own. Presumably the Italian pattern is influenced for Catholicism in that the Papacy is Italian, but against it in that the Pope was a temporal ruler and opposed to ltalian nationalism. n36 In the end, the Italian nation can best be described as a secular nation that is highly religious. Although the people of ltaly hold religion in high esteem, they tend to turn to other factors when describing what it means to be ltalian.

Latvia: In many ways, the Latvian case parallels the Estonian case. Latvia is a primarily Lutheran state; however, there are significant religious minorities as well, including Roman Catholics and Orthodox Christians. As a result, the population of Latvia is divided, but a fairly prominent religious frontier does exist between Lutheran Latvia and Catholic Lithuania, Orthodox Selarus, and Orthodox Russia. Significantly (as is true in Estonia and the Czech Republic), the predominant religion (Lutheran) is associated with foreign dominance (Germany). As a result, the Latvian nation is not strongly associated with the church. The religious frontiers that do exist in Latvia have, in fact, been quite threatening to the Latvian nation. Most significant is the religious frontier between Latvia and Russia. The Russians have played a prominent role in Latvian history, especially during the 20th century. The Russian role began in the 18th century when Peter the Great conquered Latvia. For the next two centuries, Latvians were under the control of German elites in the economic sphere (feudalism) and Russian elites in the political sphere. Significantly, Lutheranism was relatively useless in nation formation because of the German factor. Although the Latvians earned their independence after WWI, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in World War II meant that the Germans and Russians once again conspired to end Latvian independence, and the Latvians fell under Russian control once again. The Russian interference in Latvian politics for the next 50 years was central to Latvian identity. The date of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is still recognized in Latvia and was a key part of the Helsinki '86 movement in the 19705 and 80s. The large ethnic Russian minority in Latvia meant that the threat of Russian interference remained high even after independence (especially when compared to the other Baltic States). Religion is thus not a key factor in Latvian identity. The Latvian people are fairly divided religiously. Although Lutheranism is predominant among ethnic Latvians (approximately 55%), ethnic Latvians only comprise about two-thirds of the population. Roman Catholicism and Orthodoxy are also prominent particularly in the Russian minorities. In addition, only 38% of the population claims to be religious and less than five percent actually attend church weekly. This pattern can be explained by the relationship between Lutheranism and German influence in Latvian affairs. For centuries Latvian attachment to Lutheranism was rather tepid, in part because this religion had been brought by the Baltic barons and German-speaking clergy...37 As such, Latvian resistance to Russian control began at a time when Lutheranism was not central to Latvian identity, but was instead associated with foreign dominance. Ethnic factors were somewhat useful for nation-building, although the large Russian minority (30%+) weakens the power of ethnic ties. Cultural and linguistic ties, however, have proven useful in national differentiation and remain central to latvian nationalism. As such, the role of the church in politics is relatively weak, and national self-identification does not center on religious elements.

Lithuania: Predominantly Catholic state with over 80% of the population belonging to the Roman Catholic Church. A mere 9% claim no religious affiliation - a remarkably low number for a former communist state. The predominance of Catholicism means that Lithuania is at a religious frontier specifically with Orthodox Russia and Belarus, and Protestant Latvia. But a threat does, in fact, exist at Lithuania's religious frontiers. Over the past century this has come from Russia, a previously Communist now more R. Orthodox, state. Unlike the other Baltic States, lithuania's religion was not imposed upon it by outsiders, but was a key focus of lithuania's golden age. Catholicism was adopted in the 13th century by King Jagiello when the Polish-lithuanian Commonwealth was formed. It was this association that led to the most prosperous and powerful era in lithuanian history. The subsequent partition of Poland left Lithuania subjugated to Russian control, and due to Russian attempts at assimilation, the lithuanians fell back on their Catholic identity in an effort at differentiation. This religious focus of national identity flourished until the end of the First World War, when Lithuania achieved independence. During the inter-war period, clashes broke out between the Poles and the lithuanians over territorial concerns, and there was a remarkable push towards anti-clericalism, but the subsequent return to Russian control after World War II encouraged a shift back to religious identities. Now Lithuanian nationalists were confronted not by Polish cultural domination but by Soviet Communism. The Moscow Communists were atheists and were also in the popular understanding associated with the Orthodox Russian nation. All at once, then, the Catholic faith became a rallying point of Lithuanian national consolidation. Under perestroyka, the re-opening of the Vilnius cathedral was seen not only as a important religious event but also as a milestone in the struggle for the re-establishment of Lithuanian national independence.That Lithuania is predominantly Catholic, is reflected in national identity. When examining ethnic Lithuanians, the percentage of Catholics grows even larger. As a whole, the Lithuanian nation considers Catholicism as a key part of national identity. Because the Roman Catholic Church is the oldest continuously surviving Lithuanian institution, it has played a dominant role in the development of Lithuanian society, especially when Lithuanians had no state of their own. As a result, the religion is strongly associated with Lithuanian-ness. Thus as we find a tendency, at least in the past, for Protestants in Polish Masuria to identify as 'Masurs' or even as Prussians or Germans rather than Poles; for Protestants in Lithuanian Klaipeda to identify as 'Memellanders' rather than Lithuanians. This religious identity translates into the political realm less dearly than in Poland, Ireland, or Greece. Specifically, there is no state religion, abortion is allowed on demand, and the church plays a more minor role in formal politics. It is worth noting that during the inter-war period, divorce was made illegal and the church played a stronger part. All in all, there is a strong link between Lithuanian identity and religion, but the link is weaker than in Poland, Greece, or Ireland. Lithuania can best be classified as limited religious nationalism.

Luxembourg: A predominantly Catholic state, and as such, two of its neighbors (France and Belgium) provide no religious frontier. The border with Germany, on the other hand, does present somewhat of a religious frontier. However, the fact that Germany is a divided state that does not emphasize religion in its national identity minimizes the impact of this religious frontier. In addition, Luxembourg has been forced to assert its independence from France and Belgium in addition to Germany. As such, other factors prove more useful in nation-building. The attempt to integrate Luxembourg into the German state during WWII, however, took the form of an ethnic argument. Therefore. religion was not the focus of a national resistance in Luxembourg. In addition, over the past two centuries, France and Belgium have also proven threatening to the Luxembourg nation. This has led to an emphasis on non-religious differentiators since Catholicism is useless in separatingLuxembourg from France or Belgium. Language (Luxembourgish), however, has proven useful in national differentiation in all three cases. 90%+ Catholic, the state forbids collection of data regarding religious practice, so it is difficult to say how, religious the people are. Religious freedom is guaranteed in the Constitution, though, and there is no formal established Church. In spite of the predominantly Catholic nature of Luxembourg, religion has not been as useful as other factors in differentiating the nation from its threatening neighbors. Although Luxembourg is a trilingual state, there is only one official language (Luxembourgish) and this places a stranger role in nationalism than many other factors. This language was adopted by nationalist minded elites who sought to create a nation after the formation of the Luxembourg state in the 19th century. It remains important to this day, although Luxembourg could be easily classified as a multi-national state.

Macedonia: Originally ruled by the Bulgars, the Macedonians passed back and forth between the rule of the Byzantine Empire and the Bulgars until they were conquered by the Serbs and, later, the Ottoman Turks. Although the Macedonians were subjected to a long history of subjugation, it was not until Ottoman rule that the subjugation took place along a religious dimension. Subsequent history led to the development of tensions between the Macedonians and their Greek Orthodox superiors in the Ottoman kingdom. When Bulgaria gained independence in the late 19th century, the resulting feud over Macedonian territory led to the Balkan Wars. Tensions erupted again in the 1990s over the new Macedonian state, inflaming rhetoric throughout the Balkans. Therefore, in addition to the obvious religious frontier with Islamic Albania, there is also a significant national religious frontier with Greece. In addition, approximately one-third of Macedonian citizens are Muslim. As a result, Macedonia is dissected by the religious frontier. The contested nature of the Macedonian state since the early nineties has meant that the Macedonian situation has remained tenuous. The various disputes over who has the historic claim to the Macedonian name (Greeks due to linkages with Alexander the Great; Bulgarians because of the historic and ethnic links; Serbia because of Yugoslavia, have made the insecurity of Macedonia clear. The Greek intransigence over the issue surprised many who were not familiar with the situation. In addition, attacks have occurred across the Albanian border. Add to this the fact that there has been unrest amongst the Islamic Albanian minorities in the state, and it is apparent that these religious frontiers are threatening. Therefore Macedonia is a mixed case of religious nationalism. Because of the dual nature of national threats (Greece, Serbia, represent ethnic as well as religious divides), national identity does incorporate the importance of the Macedonian Orthodox Church. This is particularly evident in matters involving Albania and the divide between Orthodoxy and Islam. Approximately 30% Macedonians are Islamic, further exacerbating the issue. The ethnic divides that exist between Macedonia and their Greek and Serbian neighbors do tend to moderate the influence of religion. however. In many ways, cultural and ethnic distinctions are more useful in national differentiation. In addition, there have been shifts in recent years away from strongly nationalistic and religious rhetoric. The threat to Macedonian nationhood comes from a very complex mix of religious, ethnic, cultural, and historic frontiers. As a result, Macedonian nationalism has adopted a similarly complex nature.

Malta: Although there is no current religious frontier (Malta is an island nation), historically Malta has been subject to the control of several religious others most significantly the Arabs and most recently the British. Much of the religious heritage of Malta can be traced back to the Order of Knights of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem. The Knights of Malta, as they became known, were given control of the island in 1530 as a reward for their service in the Crusades. The islands have been strongly Catholic since, and attacks by the Turks and domination by the British have reinforced this identity over time. The Knights of Malta originally came to power as a result of their deeds in the Middle East during the crusades - a fact that explains the strong Catholic sentiment of the original Maltese identity. The island was subsequently attacked by the Ottoman Empire, further reinforcing the religious identity. Later, the island was captured by Napoleon's forces and the Maltese people initially welcomed the change of government, although the harsh policies of Napoleon (specifically regarding church property) quickly led to a backlash. Ultimately, the island became a part of the British Empire in 1814. Although initially desirable, British control ultimately led to poor conditions for the Maltese people, and the refusal of home rule sparked a nationalist drive into the 20th century. In addition, the island suffered tremendous damage during World War 11 because of its role in the British military. Although the threat was not religious in nature, the fact that Catholicism helped to differentiate the Maltese people meant that it remained central to national identity on the island. In terms of national identity, Catholicism plays a large role. The population of Malta is almost entirely Roman Catholic (98%) and Catholicism is central to national self-perception. Thus the Catholic Church and its ethos and ceremonies remain today the closest to a national Maltase symbol. In spite of evident secularization, around 70 per cent of the population attend weekly mass regularly; a third of all young Maltese complete their schooling in church schools; and most young Maltese have to attend long hours of 'doctrine' to qualify for the sacrament of confirmation. There is one church or chapel for every square kilometre on the small archipelago, and many remain in use. In addition, religion plays an important role in politics. Abortion is completely banned (only Ireland has laws as strict), the church plays a crucial role in education, and religion is formally established via the constitution. Although religious freedom is technically granted, the Maltese constitution states that:

(1) The religion of Malta is the Roman Catholic Apostolic Religion. (2) The authorities of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church have the duty and the right to teach which principles are right and which are wrong. (3) Religious teaching of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Faith. shall be provided in all State schools as part of compulsory education. There is little doubt that religion is a vital part of Maltese nationalism. British control has meant that language is less useful for national identity, and Catholicism easily filled the part.

Moldova: An almost entirely Orthodox state, is surrounded by two other significant Orthodox countries - Romania, which the Moldovans feet a strong kinship towards, and the Ukraine. Although there are no key religious divides, there is a substantial ethnic divide that exists between the Bessarabians (predominantly Romanian) and the Transnistrians (predominantly Slavic).  Moldova has spent much of its existence under the domination of other regional powers. In the 16th century, Moldova passed from Hungarian control to the Ottoman Empire, where it remained until the early 19th century, when it was awarded to Russia following the Russo- Turkish Wars. It remained apart of Russia until the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 when Bessarabian nationalists declared their independence and expressed their desire to unify with Romania. During World War II, the Soviets reacquired Bessarabia. As part of the Russification program that followed, a Cyrillic alphabet was pushed on the people. This linguistic conflict remained the most prominent issue in Moldovan nationalism through its independence in the early 1990s. As a result, the Transnistria region attempted to secede during the independence process - an action that resulted in a tenuous peace and an agreement that would allow the Transnistrians to secede should Moldova seek to reunite with Romania in the future.The statistics regarding Moldovan religious practice are somewhat vague. Some studies state that over 98% are Orthodox, while others point to a much lower number (60% or less). What is important to note is the fact that the discrepancy is a result of disagreement regarding the level of non-adherence, not a division between other religious groups. The Moldovans are, without a doubt, religiously homogeneous. One religious element of Moldavan national identity has emerged - there is a strong desire to reunite with the Romanian Orthodox Church, as opposed to the Russian Orthodox Church which the Moldovans have been subject to since the dawn of the Soviet era. This has provided another route for differentiating the Bessarabian identity trom the Russian identity, although the linguistic ties have been predominant. The people largely think of themselves in ethnic terms (Bessarabian versus Transnistrian), and the religious affiliations tend to follow. In other words, there is an ethnic divide within the state, and religious divisions have emerged based on that divide. For instance, a Bessarabian Orthodox Church has emerged because the Moldovan Church is linked to Russian Orthodoxy. Religion has proven to be a way of differentiating themselves from Russian (and Transnistrian) power. This religious divide, however, is secondary to ethnicity. In addition, the government has guaranteed freedom of religion, although non-Bessarabians have been persecuted somewhat for their views. All in all, nationalism in Moldova is based primarilyon linguistic and ethnic ties. However, as nationalism develops, religion is increasingly being used as yet another tool for national differentiation from Russia and national affiliation with Romania.

The Netherlands: Dutch history has, to a great extent, been defined by religious frontiers. Specifically, the Netherlands were originally part of the Spanish crown, and the contemporaneous rise in anti-Spanish sentiment and Reformation ideology led to a unification of religion and national identity. The spread of Protestantism throughout the Northern Netherlands introduced a religious frontier between the Dutch, their Spanish rulers, and the Belgians to the south (who remained largely Catholic). This religious frontier still exists, although it also dissects the Dutch population. In fact, a larger percentage of Dutch claim to be Catholic (31%) than Protestant (21%). However, there is a conspicuously large number of unaffiliated-atheist citizens (40%) that might potentially ally with the Protestant national image should a religious threat arise. Currently, however, the religious frontier in the Netherlands is internally as well as externally (Belgium) divisive. Early on, there was little doubt about the threatening nature of Holland's religious frontier. The Dutch solidified their national identity in a time of religious and national conflict. The Dutch battle for independence from Spain happened to occur along the emerging lines of religious separation and for some time afterward, the Dutch national cause was associated with Protestantism - in opposition to Spanish Catholicism. As such, it fit the general pattern perfectly. However, after its independence was earned, the Netherlands quickly became an international and colonial power, rapidly expanding their influence throughout the world. As such, the threat from Belgium and Spain diminished drastically. David Martin points out the importance of both the decrease in threat and the amount of time that has passed since this important era in Dutch nation-building: in nations like Britain or Holland where the myth of origins is some four centuries old, where the external threats once associated with it have long since receded and where nationhood is not experiencing any contemporary threat, there the sense of linkage between nation and religion lies dormant. Holland was created in its separateness via religious struggle, but, once established, nationalism largely took over from religion. The threat today from the religious frontier in Holland is very minor. The Dutch, much like the British, have a history of religious nationalism that was diluted by political economic and military growth and expansion. The power of the Dutch state minimized the threats to the Dutch nation. As such, Dutch identity has a historie link to religion, but no modem tie. The result is a highly secular population - 40% claim to be atheist or agnostie. Religion and state have been separated since 1798 and there is little discrimination. However, recent rises in Muslim populations have led to an upsurge in religious rhetoric. including the killing of Pim Fortuyn who had espoused controversial anti-Islamic views. Should the growth of Islamic populations continue to be seen as threatening, it is likely that religion would reenter the national debate in the Netherlands. Today, however, Dutch nationalism is indeed secular.

Norway: Like the other Scandinavian countries, Norway is predominantly Lutheran and is surrounded by other Lutheran states. As such, there are no major religious frontiers for the Norwegian nation. There is a small and minor frontier with Russia, which does bring in the contrast with Orthodoxy. This frontier, however, is very minor and plays a much smaller role than in Finnish nationalism. Because there are no significant religious frontiers for Norway, there have been no significant religious threats either. The most significant others in Norwegian history have been the Danes and the Swedes, both of whom have had control over Norwegians at some point. Denmark is responsible for the introduction of Lutheranism into Norway, and as a result, subsequent independence movements have had to rebel against the Lutheran tradition as well as the Danish tradition. Furthermore, the focus of Norwegian national liberation turned to Sweden when Norway was granted to Sweden after the Napoleonic Wars. Since Sweden was also a Lutheran state, religion proved once again to be somewhat useless in national differentiation. Instead, the nation turned to language, as was the case in Sweden and Finland. Norway is predominantly Lutheran (86%) and the Lutheran Church is the State church of Norway. Approximately half of Norwegians claim to be religious, although only 15% claim that religion is very important and less than 15% actually attend services regularly. Because the Norwegian nation was primarily formed in opposition to the Danes and Swedes, the nation has focused on nonreligious factors - particularly language. A Norwegian language was more-or-less created in the 19th century and made the focus of Norwegian identity. There have been some shifts in Norwegian identity over the years, but religion continues to play a minor role at best. As such, Norway fits the broader pattern of religious nationalism.

Portugal: Mimics the pattern of Spain to a large extent (see below for more detail). Although there are no religious frontiers today for Portugal (Spain is also strongly Catholic), Portuguese history has been heavily influenced by the Moorish expansion into lberia and the subsequent Reconquista that retook Spain and Portugal for Catholicism. The threat from Islam was clear for much of Portugal's history . From the 8th century, Muslim forces from North Africa began invading and conquering territory that had previously beenChristianized under the Visigoths. The fight against Islam continued for the Portuguese until1250. For the subsequent 300 years, the power of the church was diminished somewhat as the threat from Islam subsided (the Spanish did not complete the expulsion of Islam until the turn of the 16th century). During this period, the monarchy was able to exert a great deal of control over the church, and Portugal began to extend its influence around the globe. During this era of colonialism, Catholicism provided a useful tool in the rhetoric of imperial growth (Le. the white man's burden). The reformation brought religion back to the foretront at home and the Inquisition was established in Portugal under the model of Spain.

Catholicism provided a tool for expansionism against local and foreign heretics and an excuse for Imperial ambitions. The "other" for Portugal during this time was Spain- in the Americas and lberia. In 1640 Portugal revolted against this Spanishization, but the long-drawn struggle brought no political awakening of the masses nor any quickening of the intellectual and social life of the leading classes. n46 In the 17th century, Portugal was briefly united with Spain, and during the Napoleonic Wars Spain and France allied together against the Portuguese and the English. An emphasis on the Portuguese language accompanied this era. The French Revolution brought with it ideas of liberalism and modem nationalism which took root in Portugal (and Spain) during the 19th century. Portugal, however, fell under the rule of an absolutist regime that was strongly allied with the church in the early 20th century. Salazar's regime falsely maintained religion's influence in Portugal much as Franco did in Spain. Since the fall of Salazar, however, religion's role has declined rapidly. Portuguese nationalism, like Spanish nationalism (below), represents a strange mixed case of sorts. The Portuguese history of anti-Islamic sentiment has shaped national identity. In short the Portuguese Nation grew out of religious war, this time the Crusades. Portuguese nationhood was characterized in consequence for centuries by a particularly militant type of Catholicism, aggressive, nationalist, anti-Islamic. The commitment to Christian reconquest of the lberian peninsula was no less crucial in the construction of Spanish nationhood. For both a militant nationalist Catholicism remained a significant force well into the twentieth century.As was the case in Spain, a pro-Catholic authoritarian regime maintained the influence of religion artificially. In terms of population, Portugal is over 95% Catholic (nominally), and 76% claim to be religious. Catholic rituals are a key part of Portuguese culture and history. However, these numbers have been falling rather sharply in the past few decades. The age gap is wide, with younger populations attending less frequently than older generations. In addition, the number of individuals entering the priesthood is in decline. Although these numbers are significant, it is worth noting that this pattern is also evident in Ireland, Poland, Greece, etc. It is fair1y straightforward to claim that Portuguese national identity is still strangely associated with religion. Politics are also closely linked to religion. Portugal is one of the few European states wherein abortion is prohibited under nearly all circumstances. However, church and state are officially separated and freedom of religion is constitutionally guaranteed. In total, Portugal can be viewed as an anomaly of sorts. It is, in many ways, a nation in transition. It will be of great interest to watch as Portuguese identity continues to shift over the subsequent years. For now, Portugal can be classified as a religious nationalism.

Romania: Has several significant religious frontiers. The various regions of Romania were not unified into a single state until the 20th century. Until that point, Romania had been divided between a variety of foreign conquerors. Transylvania had been subject to Habsburg rule which included repression of cultural and religious expression. The Catholic nature of Austria-Hungary meant that Orthodoxy was particular1y useful in national expression. Similarly, the regions of Walachia and Moldavia had been ruled by the Ottoman Empire under similar circumstance, thereby leading to a strong linkage between Orthodoxy and nationalism (as occurred in most Orthodox states under Ottoman rule). By the time Soviet influence impacted Romania so heavily in the latter half of the 20th century, Romanian identity and Orthodoxy had a threat from Hungary, which had territorial aspirations in Transylvania. A dominated society or a society sandwiched between other societies which throw its identity into high relief turns to its religion. Romania is an instance of the latter and probably exhibits the highest practice of any Orthodox society under Communism. Today, there is still a clear religious frontier between Romania and Catholic Hungary. There is also clear division and animosity between the Romanian Orthodox Church and its Russian counterpart. Domination by Austria, Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire led to the unification of national identity and religion. The importance of religion and the Orthodox church for the maintenance of national consciousness in Moldavia and Wallachia was matched by a similar function in Transylvania, which was under Habsburg rule for centuries. It seems clear that religion in general, and in particular Orthodoxy, represented a vital element of national defense for the Romanians in Moldavia and Wallachia. and also Transylvania, in the face of severe repression suffered in all three provinces by the Romanian peasant masses. The threats from Romania's neighbors continued into the 20th century, at which point Romania was sandwiched militantly between Russia itself and pro-Russian Bulgaria. After World War II, Romania faced Hungarian, Soviet, and Bulgarian demands for restoration of territories lost under the treaties. The result was an ongoing insecurity regarding the Romanian nation. The easiest response was a religious one. Romania is a highly religious society. Approximately 87% of the population is Orthodox, and the number increases when ethnic minorities (i.e. Hungarians) are excluded. In addition, 94% claim to believe in God and 42% claim that religion is very important - both remarkably high for a former communist country. Although church and state are officially separated, the government does have extensive power over the Romanian Orthodox Church. In addition, the treatment of religious minorities reflects the ongoing view that Orthodoxy is an important part of Romanian identity. Although the Constitution provides for freedom of religion, the Government exercises considerable influence over religious life under laws and decrees. The Orthodox Church exercises substantial influence in its dominant role among a majority of the population and policymakers, including the commission for construction of new places of worship. Government registration and recognition requirements still pose obstacles to minority religions. Several minority religious groups continued to claim credibly that low-level government officials and the Romanian Orthodox clergy impeded their efforts at proselytizing and interfered with other religious activities. Although the linkage between religion and nation may be weaker in Romania than in other countries (Greece, Poland, Ireland), there is little doubt that the Romanian Orthodox Church factors into national identity. As such, Romania fits the broader trend laid out in this dissertation and can certainly be classified as a limited form of religious nationalism.

Russia: The Russian state maintains a variety of very clear religious frontiers. Specifically, the Orthodox nature of Russia contrasts numerous Protestant (Baltics) and Catholic (Poland) states to Russia's west. In addition, there is a very large and very significant religious frontier with Islam to the south of Russia. Ever since its conversion to Orthodoxy in the 10th century, Russia has dealt with significant religious frontiers. Later, after the fall of the Byzantine Empire, the Russian Empire took up the Orthodox cause itself in an attempt to establish a Third Rome in Moscow. Although religion was suppressed under communism, it has emerged quite dramatically since, and the religious frontiers (Le. Chechnya) are once again a key part of Russian identity.

For much of its history, the Russian Empire was sufficiently strong as to minimize the threats from religious frontiers. However, this is not to say that religious frontiers have been entirely non-threatening. The Islamic threat from the Ottoman Empire led the Russians to take a particular interest in their Orthodox brethren in the Balkans. In addition, the threat from Afghanistan and, even more recently, Chechnya have provided significant threats - particularly because of the terrorist tactics used by the Chechen rebels. Of particular importance are events such as the recent Beslan massacre which have been widely attributed to Islamic groups. With the recent fall of communism, Russia's prominence and security has also been challenged. The added impact of economic devastation has enabled religion to return to the center of national sentiment once again. It is not yet possible to declare that Russian nationalism is a religious nationalism. It is, however, fairly clear that Russian nationalism has made remarkable shift in that direction over the past decade and a half. Although statistics are not widely available, the majority of ethnic Russians associate with the Orthodox Church. According to polis, in the first half of the 19905 the church inspired greater trust among the Russian population than most ether social and political institutions. This relationship has strengthened since the fall of communism, as has the relationship between church and state. As Curtis indicates, "After enduring the Soviet era as a state.-controlled religious facade, the church quickly regained both membership and political influence in the early 1990’s. In the 1990’s, the Russian citizenry has shown that the traditional, deeply felt linkage between Russian Orthodoxy and the Russian state remains intact. That linkage has a palpable effect on Russian secular attitudes towards religious minorities, and hence on the degree to which the new constitutional guarantee of religious liberty is honored. As already mentioned elsewhere on this web site, increasingly today only ethnic Russians who belong to the Orthodox Church. Catholics, Muslims, Protestants or Jews can be Russian subjects, they can be tolerated and given freedom of religious practice, they can even be given certain civic rights. But since 'Holy Russia' is meaningless for them, they cannot be true Russians. Although religious matters are not a source of societal hostility for most citizens; however, many citizens firmly believe that at least nominal adherence to the Russian Orthodox Church is at the heart of what it means to be Russian. Popular attitudes toward traditionally Muslim ethnic groups are negative in many regions, and there are manifestations of anti-Semitism as well as societal hostility toward Catholics and newer, non-Orthodox, religions. Although Russia may not be a true religious nationalism yet, it has made significant steps in that direction. This is likely due to the fact that the Russian religious frontiers have become increasingly threatening due to the weakening of the Russian position. Of course, the reduction of governmental restrictions of religion has contributed as well.

Serbia and Montenegro: Like most of the former Yugoslav states, Serbian history has been greatly affected by the presence of a religious frontier. The Serbs likely migrated to the Balkan Peninsula and converted to Eastern Orthodoxy around the ninth century. Ever since, the Serbian nation has existed at the crossroads of Catholic, Orthodox, and Islamic cultures. Serbian power actually expanded for quite some time - mostly at the expense of the Byzantine Empire. This changed, however, as the Ottoman Turks expanded into the Balkans in the 14th century. Shortly thereafter, Serbia fell under Ottoman rule, where it remained untill the late nineteenth century. Since that time, the Serbian nation has continued to deal with the presence of a significant religious frontier - most notably with Catholic Croatia and Hungary, and predominantly Islamic Bosnia and Albania. Perhaps more so than any of the other former Yugoslav states, the Serbs were threatened by their religious frontier. This is due to the fact that the Serbs were controlled by a religious ‘other’, whereas the Slovenes and Croats were ruled by Catholic Austria-Hungary and the Albanians and Bosnian Muslims were ruled by the Ottoman Turks. Similar to the other nations under Ottoman control, the Serb story was a mixed blessing of sorts. Although the Orthodox faith was allowed, the Serbs were clearly an inferior class - Serbs were conscripted into the military and church land was confiscated throughout Serbian territories. The Serbs rebelled several times over the years - often citing religious ties to Russia or an objection to Greek control of the Orthodox Church. Serb power grew as Ottoman power waned, and although independence was achieved in the late 19th century, religious issues have continued to plague Serbia since. The Balkan Wars of the early 20th century saw a number of nations unite to throw off Ottoman rule, but discussions between the groups inflamed shortly thereafter. In addition, the formation of one Yugoslav state seemed to weaken links between nation and religion on the surface, but as was proven in the past two decades, these divides continued to play an important role. Historic divides between Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs (i.e. the killing of 2 million Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies by Croatian Ustase during World WarII) proved to be useful tools for mobilization under Slobodan Milosevic's rule. Ethnic hatred, religious rivalry, language barriers, and cultural conflicts plagued the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, from its inception. When Milosevic needed a tool to gain more power during the disintegration of the Yugoslav state, religion was easily accessible. The result was clear, and the religious threat from a ‘power-hungry’ Croatia proved clear enough for a national-identity shift. Still today, the issue of Kosovar nationalism provides a rallying point for Serb nationalism. Over 80% of the Serbian people belong to the Serbian Orthodox Church, and this figure is further inflated if the scope is narrowed to ethnic Serbs. Although few attend Church regularly (only about 7% weekly), this pattern is consistent with other Orthodox nations. Because of its history, the Serbian nation had long been associated with religion. In fad, the connection between religious belief and nationality posed a special structure. This linkage was enhanced through events during the existence of Yugoslavia - including threat to the postwar communist government's official politics of national unity and a federal state the atrocities of World WarII. As a result, religious affiliation was closely linked with the politics of nationality; centuries-old animosities among Yugoslavia’s three main religions remained a divisive factor in 1990. The rhetoric which emerged during the 1990s from Serbian leadership clearly linked nation and religion. Where according to pre-1990’s discourse however, ethnic wars occur only in so-called primitive, ethicized, underdeveloped nations that are not yet evolved (or have not yet graduated) to the ranks of civilized nation-states. These conflicts where thought to be based upon ethnic divisions and are associated with the homogenization of spaces and symbolic places--again a marker of the last century as post-Cold War territorial re-organization--and whose citizens would stop at nothing to erase the signs and symbols of competing cultures. Such culture wars gnawed away at positive identity narratives, and what remained were the negative identity narratives manipulated by the pathologies of nationalism. As a result, the discourse of identity became a negative construct and impacted the ways in which violent conflict was codified and comprehended by the West. But the ways in which the West imagined ethnic warfare assumes Western culture to be superior to those involved in the contemporary armed conflicts. This then simplifies and falsely categorizes the identities of those participating, either willingly or otherwise, in wars that are ‘named’ ethnic. Also, political scientists continued to intentionally overlook data that suggests these conflicts were something more than battles over ethnic regionalism and bounded homogenous territories. The pre-1990 ethnic spaces in the Balkans were heterogeneous, textured with multiple languages, economies, social behaviors, and forms of identification. These, though, have been left out of the simplified arguments, which suggest that clear ethnic dividing lines existed prior to the wars and that the conflicts were nothing more than tribal territorialism. Anthropological studies the past ten years however consider identity as a process of identification rather than an absolute, static attribute, then the story of the Yugoslav wars can be re-examined. The new evaluation considers the pathologies of nationalism rather than the common assumption that Serbian and Croatian civilians subscribed to an agreed-upon identity, culture, or homogenous nation and this then propelled them towards violence. During the early 1990’s Western theorists were led to simplify the Yugoslav wars as the "bad Serbs" against "good Croats." Since then the Yugoslav polling data from the late 1980s has offered researchers an alternative narrative, showing that nationalistic elites required some strategy to undermine the voice of its political opponents and the heterogeneous publics of both Serbia and Croatia. Via ‘demobilization’, in the sense of mobilizing the voice of a people and supporting their role as powerful agents in an inclusive society; demobilization becomes the intentional silencing of a people’s voice, the undermining of their role as social agents, and their increased marginalization and exclusion from the public realm. In Serbia and Croatia, the strategy of violence and demobilization became necessary because ethnic identities were not the powerful motivating forces that elites anticipated. In these two countries the regimes managed to perpetrate a strategy of violence to demobilize the people, and, silence their voices and the voices of the challenging elites. It was also used to marginalize the people as well as the issues they used to oppose the status quo; portraying them and their concerns as outside the realm of legitimate political discourse. Thus, significant demobilization strategies, perpetrated by political elites against the wider populations, were required in order for the post-Cold War territorial, ethnic, cultural, and social reorganization to occur at a grassroots level. Civilians were reticent to support the disruption of their own multi-ethnic communities and thus allowed the elites to manipulate their reorganization. Much of the literature on the former Yugoslavia during the 1990’s instead argues that religion serves a very superficial role, and that the conflict of the nineties was about other issues specifically political ambitions. Certainly this is true; however, the tie to religion is clear. Although the fighting was not about religion per se, religion did provide the best tool for national mobilization. As such, Serbian nationalism has been centered quite obviously on Orthodoxy.

Slovak Republic: Is predominantly Catholic. As such. the only traditional religious frontier which it encounters is with the Ukraine. which is largely Orthodox. Slovakia's remaining neighbors are all also primarily Catholic Poland. the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Austria. The unique nature of Czech identity, however. has meant that the Slovak-Czech divide has played the role of a pseudo-religious frontier. When the two states were unified in the early part of the 20th century. the Czechs dominated the new Czechoslovakia. At the time. these Czech leaders emphasized the rhetoric of the Czech Hussite tradition. As a result: The third source of national awareness an addition to economic and political under-representation) was religion: Slovaks distrusted the Hussite and atheist traditions of the Czechs. So when the Slovak People's Party was founded in 1913 it was led by a priest Hlinka and it expressed religious and status and economic devaluations. It declared itself 'For God and People.’ In Slovakia Catholicism dominated the social life of the people to the extent that when. in 1918. the leadership of the new Republic of Czechoslovakia identified its national ideology with the Hussite rebellion of the fifteenth century Slovakia was estranged. Whereas previously Slovak identity had formed in opposition to Hungarian domination. the new unification of Czechoslovakia turned national focus towards the Czechs. and the secular/Protestant heritage of their sister nation led to a new emphasis on the Catholic nature of Slovak identity. In this way. the Slovak case parallels the Polish resistance to secular Russia. although the extent of association between religion and nation was more limited in Slovakia. The predominant historic threat to the Slovak nation came from Hungary, which controlled the Slovaks for a long period of time, During this era, the Slovaks emphasized linguistic identifiers in their struggle with the Habsburg crown (which emphasized Germanization). The Czechs were similar1y inclined in their struggle against the Germans and Austrians. However, the unification of the Czechs and Slovaks created a new national threat. Specifically, a Czech dominated state combined with less economie and political development in the eastern Slovak regions led to a perception of Czech dominance. Slovak national identity truly emerged at this point and aimed its rhetoric at the Czechs in the western half of the country. As such, the frontier between Czech and Slovak became threatening, although the threat was more economic and political than existential. This combined with the fact that the Czechs had emphasized their Hussite heritage led to a new link between the Slovak nation and the Catholic Chuch. So the Slovak Republic is largely Catholic - nearly 70% claim to belong to the church. Interestingly, the number of people who claimed a religious affiliation actually increased from 1991 to 2001 - from 73% to 84%.65 Catholicism does play an important part in society, and this relationship transfers over into the political arena to some extent. Specifically, there has been a heated debate regarding abortion over in the past year. There were attempts to pass a Constitutional Amendment which would drastically curtail the availability of abortions. The bill was vetoed by the President, but the amount of popular support is indicative of the role that Catholicism plays in the state. Slovakia provides an interesting example of the give and take of religious nationalism. Unlike many of the nations in this study, the importance of a religious frontier in the Slovak case is relatively new. Most of its history was spent focusing on the other dominant Catholic states in its region (Germany, Austria, Hungary). It was only in the 20th century that the Czech border became truly significant for Slovak nationalism. Even then, the frontier was not a true religious frontier. Although there were religious divides, the Czechs are also predominantly Catholic. As such, the frontier focused on historical heritage (Jan Hus and later atheism) more than current religious realities. It is important to note, though, that during the Communist era the Slovaks had been targeted by the Soviets and Czechs for their sustained religiosity. All of this combined (brief significance of the frontier, emphasis on historic rather than current religiosity, economic and political threat as oppose to existential) means that Slovak nationalism does in fact emphasize the importance of the Catholic Church. The symbiosis of nation and church is well advanced in Slovakia. However, the importance of religion is more minor than in Poland or Ireland where the frontier is clear and so is the threat.

Slovenia: Religious frontiers have played a much more minor role in Slovenia than in the other former Yugoslav states. The Slovenes were converted to Catholicism in the 10th century and fell under the dominion of the Habsburg Empire in the 13th century. They remained a part of that empire until the 20th century and as such their primary "other" for much of their history was the Catholic Austrian and Hungarian Empires. As such, there was a time wherein the Slovenes were somewhat separated from their heritage - as in the Czech case. The reformation had some impact in Slovenia, but was quickly quelled by the counterreformation. In addition, during the 19th century, as Slovene identity began to strengthened, it did so in response to Hungarian and Austrian identity. The presence of the Ottoman Turks was, however, always apparent, and often disrupted Slovenian life. As a result, the religious dimension never fully subsided. Once Slovenia was integrated into the Yugoslav state, the Serbian efforts at dominance created tension within the Slovenian community as it did in the Croat community. Ultimately this tension proved less severe than the Serb-Croat tension. As a result, although there is no current religious frontier for Slovenia, the frontier created by a Serb-dominated Yugoslavia in the latter part of the 20th century did lead to Catholic ties to Slovenian Nationalism. The main threat to Slovenian identity over the years has come from Austrian and Hungarian dominance. This fact changed, however, in the 20th century with the creation of Yugoslavia. As a result of the multiple religions within the Yugoslav state, a new emphasis was placed on Catholicism in Slovenia. When Yugoslavia crumbled in the 1990s, Slovenia was the first to move for independence - an act that led to a brief war between Slovenia and Yugoslavia. The Slovenian victory allowed for a swifter transfer to independence than was possible in Croatia or Bosnia. As a result, there was a clear threat involved (a 10 day war was fought); however, the threat was less than in other former Yugoslav states. The impact is clear. One could argue that the public presence of the Catholic Church in Bosnia and Croatia, manifested in the affirmation of the collective-national as a dominant social value, and the failure of the Slovenian Catholic Church to have the same role and influence, was shaped by the conditions of the wars in Bosnia and Croatia and the mainly peaceful transition from communism to democracy in Slovenia. Therefore, the religious frontier in Slovenia was lass significant than in many of its neighbor states, and when it was significant, the threat was relatively minimal. Nationalism in Slovenia is, as a result of the mixed circumstances listed above, partially linked to religion and partially secularized. In terms of demographics, the Slovenian people are largely Catholic - over 71 % in the 1990 census. Interestingly enough, in the ten years to follow, the rate of self identification dropped rather drastically to slightly over 57%.68 It is no coincidence that the significantly higher figure occurred during a time of national struggle for independence from a religiously differentiated group - the Orthodox Serbs. This shift to secularism has continued, but it has been accompanied by a continued emphasis on religious identity in society. For instance, "In the period from September 2001 to February 2002, mass media have participated in the perpetuation of the dominant perception of the Muslim community and Islam as inherently alien to Slovenia. In addition, there is a formal separation of religion and state, and this is reflected in policies such as abortion (Slovenia allows abortion in most cases). Religion played an important part in Slovenian nationalism for a relatively brief period of time. However, as more time passes, Slovenia will likely continue its return to secular notions of nationality.

Spain: Has no true modem religious frontiers. Spain shares only two borders of any significance (Portugal and France), and both are heavily Catholic. The Spanish proximity to North Africa is worth considering, however, due to the long history between the two and the potential implications that Morocco could have on Spanish trade. It is also important to note that, although there are no current religious frontiers, religious frontiers have played a crucial role in Spanish nation-building for over a thousand years. In the 7005, Islamic forces began spreading across the Iberian peninsula, and the subsequent Reconquista would not be completed until the turn of the 16th century. In the meantime, Muslim rule meant a delicate balance between Islamie, Jewish, and Catholic communities - often with negative consequences for the Catholie Spaniards. The Reconquista, however, did not end with the recapture of Spanish lands. Rather, the war against the religious "other" continued internally under the guise of the Inquisition, which wasn't fully abolished until the 1830’s. The internal threat from Islam was demonstrated numerous times - for instance, an uprising in Andalusia in 1568 in which an appeal was sent out to the Ottoman Empire for aid. Because the conquest of the Moorish kingdoms achieved in the thirteenth century came to be seen both as a national war of liberation there was a special holiness, a special Christiannes and Catholicism, in Spain's very existence_ That holiness and therefore national identity too seemed inherently threatened by the survival of Muslim or Jew in the kingdom and especially by secret Jews or Muslims. By the 16th century, Spanish identity had become fully linked to Catholicism, and the subsequent international religious threats continued to solidify the bond. Over the following centuries, conflict between Spain and newly Protestant England (the rise and fall of Mary, the defeat of the Armada, colonial expansion in North America) led to a strengthened Catholic identity. The Spanish also fought against the Turks several times in the 16th century (Lepanto and Malta). In the 17th century, wars in the Spanish Nether1ands were fought along religious lines, resulting in the independence of the Protestant Netherlands. The subsequent decline of Spanish power meant a withdrawal from international (European) politics and a resulting attempt at Enlightenment and reform under Charles III in the late 1700’s. Although secularism was gaining some ground, the French Revolution and the Napoleonic invasion of Spain had major repercussions. What had previously been an organic push for secularism now became a foreign-imposed shift, and the Spanish reacted harshly against the secularism of the French Revolution. Secularism again gained ground in the second half of t!1e 19th century and would likely have continued had it not been for the rise of Franco. A serious of conflicts over reform of society and religion brought about the Civil War and Fascist control of Spain. In 1931, the secular constitution of the Second Republic imposed a series of anticlerical measures that threatened the church's very existence in Spain and provoked its support for the Franco uprising five years later. Franco's dominance put the religious nature of Spanish society on life-support if you will essentially extending its life artificially. After the fall of Franco in the 1970’s, Spain returned to its secularizing pattern and quickly implemented reforms regarding church-state relations, education, social policies, and more. Today, there are no true religious frontiers and no serious threats to the Spanish nation. As such, the past fifty years have shown a remarkable shift towards secularization. This will likely continue unless the threat from Islam (as demonstrated in the Madrid train bombings) increases significantly. The Spanish case is interesting because of its unique circumstances. There is no doubt that Spanish identity is linked to Catholicism. Estimates put the percentage of Catholics in Spain between 85 and 98%. In addition, a significant number of Spaniards claim to be religious - including nearly 65% of youth between the ages of 15 and 24.74 However, being a Catholic in Spain had less and less to do with regular attendance at Mass and more to do with the routine observance of important rituals such as baptism, marriage, and burial of the dead. In addition, the numbers of Spaniards entering the clergy has dropped drastically in the past thirty years. Although the Spanish ties between national identity and religion may not be as strong as in Ireland, Poland, or Greece, they do not lag far behind. The conception of Spanishness as Catholic is in many ways accurate. In terms of politics, however, the differences can be seen. The butter between religion and politics is more established in Spain than in other true religious nationalisms. Church and state are officially separated, but the Catholic Church does receive certain privileges. For instance, religious education, albeit optional, is provided in public schools. Abortion is allowed, but the limitations are stricter than in many European states. There is a clear religious influence on politics in Spain, but the influence is diminishing and has certainly progressed further than the other examples of religious nationalism discussed. As a result, it would be wrong to categorize Spain as a fully religious nation, but it would also be erroneous to describe it as secular. The best way to describe Spanish nationalism would be a "secularizing partially-religious nation." This is due to the long historical ties between religion and nation in a part of the worlds where religions collided for centuries. This link has been carried over into modem times and is now being loosened, although the process is gradual. Thus, Spanish nationhood was shaped by its position on the frontier with Islam. Here religion was more continually decisive than for any other in western Europe, decisive through the character of the medieval wars which initially established it, decisive through the activity of the Inquisition in ensuring its continuance, decisive in the highly and narrowly religious ideal which became nationally normative. Spanishness and Catholicism, the Catholicism of Isabella, 'La Catolica', seemed tor centuries insurable and only a very agonized modem history would tear them, partially, apart.

Sweden: A predominantly Lutheran state, is surrounded by religiously similar groups (Norway, Finland, and Denmark). Historically, Sweden has been influenced by religious frontiers - with Poland, Germany during the 30 Years War, and Russia. Swedish issues of independence have largely been determined through wars with it Scandinavian neighbors - specifically Denmark. As a result, Swedish identity has focused on the differences between Sweden and Denmark, Norway, and Finland. Religion had played a much more minor role than language and culture. As stated above, religious borders are insignificant for Swedish nationalism. As a result, there is little to no threat from religion for the Swedish people. Rather, opposition to Danish, Finnish, and Norwegian nationalism has led to an emphasis on non-Lutheran identifiers - specifically language and culture. Earlier in Swedish history, religion did playa part. For some time, the Swedes were the defenders of Protestantism as they fought against the Holy Roman Empire and the Russian Empire. These issues have faded in modernity, and Lutheranism is still apart of Swedish culture, but its tie to national identity is weak. Although Sweden is predominantly Lutheran (87%), religious practice is weak at best. Only 30% claim to be religious, 10% claim that religion is "very important" and 10% attend church monthly. These numbers are remarkably low even in the European context. In addition, church and state have recently been separated, and "Since the Church and the State separated in 2000, a number of people have left the Church each year. In 2003, 58,746 people left the Church. In addition to disestablishing the Lutheran Church, there have been movements towards establishing all churches in Sweden. In the end, Lutheranism plays a part in Swedish culture, but its links to nationalism are weak. Swedish nationalism is secular.

Switzerland: All of the surrounding states are predominantly Catholic, assuming that southern Germany is considered separate tram the whole. The Reformation, however, had a major impact on Switzerland through the impact of such leaders as Zwingli and Calvin. That strong Protestant role is still evident today in certain cantons. Ultimately, Swi1zerland today is divided roughly equally between Catholics (46.1%) and Protestants (40%). This is encouraged to same extent by the federal nature of Swiss government and the resulting localized identities. The internal religious division in Switzerland has, at times, been threatening to the Swiss people. Specifically, civil war in the mid-19th century brought out religious identities, as did the Second World War. The dispute between French speaking Swiss citizens and German-speaking citizens eventually turned to the religious dimension as well. Also, the seeming dominance of Protestant cantons has encouraged a stronger Catholic identity in the Catholic-dominated cantons. However, as a whole, the external threats to Switzerland (i.e. Napoleonic France, etc) have encouraged a broader nationalism that has suppressed religious labels. Switzerland, because of its unique circumstances, has an interesting relationship between nationalism and religion. Due to the fact that the Swiss cantons united with the goal of mutual defense in mind, there has been a national adoption of the federal and neutral mindset. Add to this the fact that Switzerland is divided religiously and the result is a largely secular national identity. However, prominent religious divisions and a fair level of self-rule for the cantons has led to a noticeable amount of religiously-based regional identity. This identity has been somewhat overwhelmed by linguistic divisions, but there is no doubt that Catholicism and Protestantism play into regional awareness. This is clearly reflected in the fact that Switzerland is one of the more religious states (51% claim to attend weekly) and yet does not truly qualify as a religious nationalism. As such, the formula for religious identity holds true at both the national and sub-national level in

Ukraine: One of it’s religious frontiers is the divide between Catholicism and Eastem Orthodoxy. Ukraine is largely Orthodox (although there is a significant Uniate population) and this contrasts with the highly Catholic populations of Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary. In fact, Ukraine was part of Poland or lithuania for a substantial period of history. This had two significant results: 1) the formation of a religiously minded national movement and 2) the introduction of the Uniate faith - a hybrid of sorts between Catholicism and Orthodoxy. In addition to the Catholic-Orthodox divides, there are also significant intra-Orthodox divides as well. Most substantial is the distinction between Ukrainian Orthodox and Russian Orthodox beliefs. Significantly, the Ukrainian Orthodox church was created in response to Russian domination. As such, there is a slightly different pattern in Ukraine. Whereas most states lean on religion when it differentiates the nation, the Ukraine created an autocephalous church as a result of the nationalist movement away from Russia. Regardless, Ukraine features two significant religions (Uniate and Orthodox), both of which are successful at differentiating them from their most threatening neighbor - Russia. These primary religious frontiers have proven quite threatening throughout Ukrainian history. Initially the Ukraine fell under the rule of the Poles and lithuanians. Later, at the partition of Poland, the vast majority of Ukrainians became Russian subjects, whereas approximately twenty percent became part of the Austrian Empire. After World WarII, the western lands were incorporated into a single Ukrainian state. However, it was not until the 1990s that the Ukrainians finally earned their independence. The tensions between the Ukraine and Russia continued after independence, and have left a lasting impact on Ukrainian national identity. The Ukraine provides yet another interesting case to examine. In the broader picture, it fits the overall argument that threatening religious frontiers create a national emphasis on religion. Religion did, in fact, play an important part in the nation-building stages of Ukrainian development. It was useful in establishing independence from Poland, Lithuania, Austria, and Russia (although a new Ukrainian Orthodox identity had to be established in the last case). As a result, there is a linkage between nation and church. As David Martin indicates, "In Lithuania, the Ukraine and Armenia, the church has deep roots in national awareness and is relatively strong. In the Ukraine, national culture has been inspired by religion for over one thousand years and therefore a symbiosis of religion and nationality is taken for granted. The Ukrainian case, however, is more complicated than most. The Ukraine is internally divided as well. Although most citizens are Orthodox, a fair number still ascribe to the Uniate faith. Therefore, religion was useful in a variety of nationalist independence movements in that it separated the Ukrainians from their oppressors. Interestingly, the different regions of Ukraine provide an additional test of the theory much as the partitions of Poland did. The Western Uniate regions of the Ukraine were more stubborn in their resistance to foreign domination that were the Eastern Orthodox regions. The west also proved to be more religiously minded. It is noticeable how different it was for the Russians, to try to incorporate Catholic Poles or Armenians from incorporating Ukrainians, most of whom were Orthodox Christians. To the differing roles played by clergy in each location, the nineteenth century witnessed almost a complete alienation of the Russianized Ukrainian clergy from the emerging modem national movement in Eastem Ukraine. In contrast, the Galieian (West Ukrainian) revival largely was promoted and led by the Uniate clergy. The aftermath, however, was more complicated. Religion has not been as useful in the national-unification process. The Ukraine, as a result, is an interesting case in that religion proved highly useful in national differentiation, but much less so in building a unified national identity. As a result, religion is strong in the country, but its links to the nation are weaker that in true religiously based nations.

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