Eric Vandenbroeck 4 Nov. 2019
China between trade war and imperial ambitions
As pointed out before
China's sense of history among others is rooted in the concept of Han Chinese an idea that derived from the Song
period when the first form of Chinese diplomatic cosmopolitanism was conceived.
It was during the described Song period that
Chinese colonists spread relentlessly southward, recurrently provoking
armed opposition from tribal groups in their path.
But the new Chinese
empire is different. At once more modest and more arrogant, it is an empire of
theater and presumption. It is a construct both of domestic repression and of
international aspiration. Its arsenal of weapons includes secrecy, deception,
and a sense of history that enables it to take a long view of China's interests
and ambitions. Thus adding to the long debate about China and the Thucydides
Trap something that continues to be a subject today.
Then, last week again
Chinese President Xi Jinping emerged from a Communist Party conclave with
a resolute endorsement of his leadership, despite a slowing economy, a
bruising trade war with the U.S. and unrest in Hong Kong.
Underreported during
last week's Party conclave however was the unease among the country’s leaders
about their earlier attempt to secure its vulnerable
supply lines, expand its maritime presence and extend its international
financial and political presence. Plus more important, in
tandem with the current trade war, China now contends with its country’s
first sustained economic slowdown in a generation.
The country’s growth
rate has fallen by half and is likely to plunge further in the years ahead, as
debt, foreign protectionism, resource depletion, and
rapid aging take their toll.
The signs of
unproductive growth are easy to spot. China has built more than 50 ghost
cities, sprawling metropolises of empty offices, apartments, malls, and
airports. Nationwide, more than 20 percent of homes
are vacant. Excess
capacity in major industries tops 30 percent: factories sit idle and goods
rot in warehouses. Total losses from all this waste are difficult to calculate,
but China’s government estimates that it blew at least $6
trillion on “ineffective investment” between 2009 and 2014 alone. China’s
debt has quadrupled in absolute size over the last ten years and currently
exceeds 300 percent of its GDP. No major country has ever racked up so much
debt so fast in peacetime.
Worse still, assets
that once propelled China’s economic ascent are fast turning into liabilities.
In the 1990s and early 2000s, the country enjoyed expanding access to foreign
markets and technology. China was nearly self-sufficient in food, water, and energy
resources, and it had the greatest demographic dividend in history, with eight
working-age adults for every citizen aged 65 or older. Now China is losing
access to foreign markets and technology. Water has become scarce, and the
country is importing more food and energy than any other nation, having decimated
its own natural endowments. Thanks to the one-child policy as pointed out in my 2018 article, China is about to
experience the worst aging
crisis in history, because it will lose 200 million workers and young consumers
and gain 300 million seniors in the course of three decades. Any country that
has accumulated debt lost productivity, or aged at anything close to China’s
current clip has lost at least one decade what will become near-zero
economic growth.
How China will react going forward
The question, then,
is not whether a struggling rising power will expand abroad but what form that
expansion will take. The answer depends in part on the structure of the global
economy. How open are foreign markets? How safe are international trade routes?
If circumstances allow it, a slowing great power might be able to rejuvenate
its economy through peaceful trade and investment, as Japan tried to do after
its postwar economic miracle came to an end in the 1970s. If that path is
closed, however, then the country in question may have to push its way into
foreign markets or secure critical resources by force, as Japan did in the
1930s. The global economy is more open today than in previous eras, but a
global rise in protectionism
and the trade
war with the United States increasingly threaten China’s access to foreign
markets and resources. China’s leaders fear, with good reason, that the era of
hyper globalization that enabled their country’s rise is over.
The structure of a
country’s home economy will further shape its response to a slowdown. The
Chinese government owns many of the country’s major firms, and those firms
substantially influence the state. For this reason, the government will go to
great lengths to shield companies from foreign competition and help them
conquer overseas markets when profits dry up at home. A state-led
economy like China’s is unlikely to liberalize during a slowdown. Doing so
would require eliminating subsidies and protections for state-favored firms,
reforms that risk instigating a surge in bankruptcies, unemployment, and
popular resentment. Liberalization also could disrupt the crony capitalist
networks that the regime depends on for survival. Instead, regimes like China’s
usually resort to mercantilist expansion, using money and muscle to carve out
exclusive economic zones abroad and divert popular anger toward foreign
enemies. The most aggressive expanders of all tend to be authoritarian
capitalist states, of which China
is clearly a prime example.
China’s peaceful rise?
During his recent
speech commemorating the 70th anniversary of the Chinese Communist
Party’s rule President Xi once
more emphasized that China would pursue peaceful development. President Xi
Jinping, however, has also given multiple
internal speeches
warning party members of the potential for a Soviet-style collapse. The
government has doubled internal security spending over the past decade,
creating the most advanced propaganda, censorship, and surveillance systems in
history. It has detained one million Uighurs in internment camps and
concentrated power in the hands of a dictator
for life. State propaganda blames setbacks, such as the 2015 stock
market collapse and the 2019 Hong
Kong protests, on Western meddling. These are not the actions of a
confident superpower.
China has projected its
power abroad throughout this turbulent period, tripling foreign direct investment and
quintupling overseas lending
in an ambitious attempt to secure markets and resources for Chinese firms.
Beijing also has gone out militarily, launching more warships over the past
decade than the whole British navy holds and flooded major sea lanes in Asia
with hundreds of government vessels
and aircraft. It has built military outposts across the South China Sea and
frequently resorts to sanctions, ship-ramming, and aerial intercepts in
territorial disputes
with its neighbors.
If China’s growth
slows further in the coming years, as is possible, the Chinese government will
double down on the repression of the past decade. When the country’s leaders
cannot rely on rapid growth to bolster their domestic legitimacy and
international clout, they might be all the more eager to squelch dissent,
burnish their nationalist credentials, and boost the economy by any means
necessary. Moreover, powerful interest
groups, most notably, state-owned enterprises and the military and security
services, have developed a vested interest in maintaining China’s current
strategy, which funnels money into their coffers. As a result, the government
would struggle to extricate itself from foreign entanglements even if it wanted
to.
Possible solutions
Some initiatives
could help strike the proper balance. Instead of deterring Chinese expansionism
by sailing provocative but vulnerable naval armadas past China’s coastline, for
instance, Washington could deploy mobile anti-ship and surface-to-air missile
launchers on allied shores. And as for the current trade war if the United
States joined the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership, and invited China to join, too, Beijing would have the motive and
means to reduce its trade-distorting practices without fighting a 1930s-style
trade war. China might spurn the offer, but then the treaty would at least
strengthen the commitment of its signatories to the free flow of goods, money,
and data. In so doing, it would limit the spread of China’s mercantilist and
digital authoritarian policies. The United States could supplement this stance
by investing more in scientific research
and investigations
into specific Chinese companies and investors so that it can maintain
technological superiority without banning Chinese investment and immigration
into the United States. These moves would not eliminate the root causes of
U.S.-Chinese rivalry, but they would protect U.S. interests while avoiding a
slide into a cold or hot
war.
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