Protesters wearing
pink and yellow armbands succeeded in ousting the regime of Kyrgyz President
Askar Akayev, overtaking the presidential palace in
Bishkek early March 24. Akayev and his family reportedly
fled by helicopter to Russia.
The fall of Akayev's pro-Russian regime, in what has been dubbed the
"Tulip Revolution," could be viewed as yet another blow for Moscow in
its near abroad, where a series of pro-Western "velvet" revolutions
have been steadily shrinking Russia's sphere of influence. Now, it is not clear
that what has occurred in Kyrgyzstan is indeed a pro-Western revolution. The
opposition is hardly a unified movement: Clan affiliations, ethnic divisions
and other internal demographics are all in play. And, as some have noted, the
fact that demonstrators have been unable to settle on a common color for their
armbands does not bode well for consensus on larger political matters.
Recognizing that a
forecast for political upheaval in Central Asia does not necessarily draw
screaming headlines, it is important to remember a few geographic facts.
Kyrgyzstan is nestled high in the Tien-Shan Mountains, bordering China on its
south and east. And, as a former part of the Soviet Union, it remains of
strategic interest to Russia. What makes all of this particularly interesting
is that both Russia and China have a tendency to view any upheaval in regions
where they take interest as part of a conspiracy orchestrated by the United
States in order to challenge their hegemony.
This might be
paranoid thinking. It might be prudent "worst-case scenario"
planning. Or it might be a rational appreciation of Washington's intentions.
Whichever it is, the simple fact is that both regional powers regard any
instability in any country in the area as being generated by the United States
and intended to harm them.
Because Kyrgyzstan is
part of the Muslim world, the United States certainly cannot afford to be
indifferent to anything that happens there. U.S. forces are still conducting
operations in Afghanistan and probing into Pakistan's northern provinces -- and
supplying its forces there from a logistics base in Kyrgyzstan. That base is
one of two interests Washington has in Kyrgyzstan; the other is making certain
al Qaeda or other radical Islamist groups don't increase their power in the
region. So it would stand to reason that Washington has no interest in
fostering instability in Kyrgyzstan.
The Russians are not
so sure. They see the United States turning its attention from al Qaeda to
other issues, and they don't buy the Bush administration's line that its
political involvement in the region -- specifically in Ukraine, where
Washington helped secure a win by pro-Western President Viktor Yushchenko late
last year -- is simply about the American love for free elections. They believe
the United States sought to install a pro-U.S. government in Kiev in order to
bring Ukraine into NATO and undermine Russian national security.
Russian leaders also
see the United States as locking down its power in Central Asia. The United
States, having exerted influence in the region initially for economic
development, had Russia's support when it introduced troops following the Sept.
11 attacks. Leaders in Moscow and elsewhere think the Americans now are using
these troops to create a strategic reality: denying Russia its sphere of
influence in the region. They think Kyrgyzstan is part of this strategy.
On the other side of
Asia is China. Its westernmost province, Xinjiang, is predominantly Muslim and
in rebellion against Beijing. Chinese leaders have never been comfortable with
the American position on Xinjiang -- which seemed to argue that the U.S. war
against al Qaeda was one thing, but that China's battle against Muslim
separatists in Xinjiang was quite another. Government officials occasionally
have indicated a belief that the Americans actually liked the Xinjiang
insurrection because it weakened China.
The Chinese are
concerned that instability in Central Asia will increase the flow of supplies
to Xinjiang militants. Therefore, they view events in Kyrgyzstan as part of
Washington's strategy to threaten China, at a time when Washington has
pressured Europe to back away from arms sales to Beijing. The Chinese don't
believe the United States is obsessed with al Qaeda any longer. They believe
the Americans are obsessed with China, and they see events in Kyrgyzstan as a
security threat.
Washington did not
engineer the Kyrgyzstan rising, but it can use the uprising to increase its
influence in Central Asia. The world has changed sufficiently that al Qaeda is
no longer the top story; relationships among great powers are.
In fact on Oct. 11
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice first arrived in Kyrgyzstan for the start
of a regional tour that includes plans for stops in Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and
Afghanistan. She is calling for political change in the region, but the U.S. is
more concerned with having Central Asian governments help in its war against
militant Islam than in providing security assistance for these governments at
home.
With respect to the
former Soviet republics, Rice has said that the purpose of her visit will not
be to push for military bases, as has been the case with other recent
high-level U.S. visits to the region, but to promote democracy and regional
economic development.
Rice's statement
constitutes a change of tune for the United States in the region and is
indicative of efforts by Washington to reverse its decline of influence in the
region since the May uprising in Uzbekistan and the reinvigoration of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in July.
Washington's efforts
in recent months to secure its military bases in the region and to find
substitutes for its soon-to-be-lost Karshi-Khanabad Air Base in Uzbekistan
smacked of self-interest to Central Asia's governments - which have economic,
political and security interests of their own that are strikingly different
from Washington's. During this same period, Moscow strengthened economic ties
(via a merging of the Central Asia Cooperation Organization and the Eurasian
Economic Union) resulting in an upgrade of infrastructure ties. In other words
Russian investments create employment and serve economic needs.
Hence all three
Central Asian countries are merely speaking politely and offer gestures of
friendship during Rice's visit - but nothing of substance will change, and U.S.
influence will continue to decline in the region to the benefit of Russia in
this new phase of the Great Game.
The Sept. 19-24
Russo-Uzbek military exercises in Uzbekistan are just one of many signs that
the "Great Game" in Central Asia is intensifying as Washington faces
Moscow and Beijing's combined strength.
Central Asia: Why The 'Great Game' Heats Up
A key element in the
"Great Game" is outside powers' security presence -- whether bases or
joint exercises with host countries or arms deliveries -- in the region.
Geopolitically, a security presence allows an outside power to exercise more
control over a host country's policies and make sure the outside power's
national interests are observed and promoted in the host country. Economically,
a security presence allows an outside power to ensure that Central Asia's
energy riches are exported in the direction the outside power wants; the
outside power can also make sure such deliveries are safe and that other
outsiders cannot easily reroute the region's energy outflow. In
military-strategic terms, a security presence allows an outside power to
project forces and power from a host country to other countries in the region,
including the outside power's rivals.
Uzbekistan
Moscow and Beijing’s
positions in Uzbekistan are strong, and will grow stronger in the near future.
Knowing well that Washington is working to overthrow him – most likely through
a popular uprising such as the Andijan uprising in May, in which pro-Western
and Islamist elements joined forces – President Islam Karimov quickly is
developing military, political and energy ties with Moscow and Beijing, which
Karimov sees as capable protectors.
The latest sign of a
growing Russo-Uzbek alliance is the Sept. 19-24 joint counterterrorism
exercises. The goal is to train Russian and Uzbek forces together to quickly
put down an armed rebellion in Uzbekistan similar to the Andijan uprising but
larger in scale, Uzbek military sources said. Through the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO), Tashkent is entitled legally to receive such help from
Moscow – and from Beijing, for that matter. Two paratrooper companies from the
76th Russian Airborne Division and several special forces groups
from the Russian General Staff’s Main Intelligence Directorate are
participating along with the same number of Uzbek paratroopers and special
forces groups. To emphasize the exercises’ importance, the two nations’ defense
ministers are attending.
The exercises are
being held in the Jizzax region, about 170 miles
southwest of Tashkent, in the foothills of mountains. The terrain is similar to
that of the volatile Fergana Valley, where the next Uzbek uprising is most
likely. The Jizzax region itself has become restive,
with Islamists and pro-Western activists fomenting anti-government sentiments
and with some Jizzax clan leaders suspected of
participating in a power struggle against Karimov.
Kazakhstan
Kazakh President
Nursultan Nazarbayev, concerned with the prospect of a pro-U.S.
"revolution" that could remove him from power, is moving closer to
both Moscow and Beijing. This is especially true in the fields of politics and
security; in addition to worrying about a "revolution," Nazarbayev
sees his country facing a real threat from international and domestic Islamist
militants and he realizes that Moscow and Beijing -- not Washington -- can give
him quick and efficient help. Though Kazakhstan has been increasing its
military cooperation with the United States regarding the Caspian Sea, that
cooperation only involves U.S. funding for new maritime equipment and is
significantly smaller in scope and depth than Kazakhstan's cooperation with
Russia and Astana's SCO commitments. Economically, Astana is bent on customer
diversification and is working with Western, Russian and Chinese companies.
Astana's closer
relationship with Beijing was evidenced when visiting Chinese Defense Minister
Cao Gangchuan and his Kazakh counterpart Danial
Akhmetov agreed Sept. 19 that their countries' and agencies' military
cooperation should be strengthened. Kazakh defense sources say the two
ministers discussed joint high military staff consultations, Kazakh officers' training
in Chinese military academies and proposals from the Kazakh defense complex to
develop modern-arms systems for China.
The latest example of
growing Kazakh-Russian security collaboration is a joint counterterrorism
exercise that Kazakhstan's Pavlodar regional police department and Russia's
Novosibirsk regional police conducted Sept. 13. The exercises, located in the
Kazakh town of Karasuk on the Kazakh-Russian border,
included a scenario in which terrorists took hostages and special forces troops
stormed the hideout and released the hostages. Kazakh and Russian joint
counterterrorism training has intensified vastly in the last couple of years, with
police forces alone conducting 13 exercises. Kazakhstan is concerned with
Islamist militants training in its southern areas to stage attacks against
energy infrastructure, while Russia is concerned with jihadists coming from
Central Asia to implement terrorist attacks within Russia.
Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan offers a
curious example of how geopolitics can play tricks with expectations. The Bush
administration thought Kyrgyzstan’s pro-Western “revolution” in April would put
the country squarely in the U.S. sphere of influence. Bishkek is maintaining
good ties with Washington – for example, Kyrgyzstan still hosts the United
States’ Manas Air Base – but recent developments show the government is
drifting further toward Moscow and, to an extent, Beijing. The underlying
reason for this is that no matter what clan is in power, members of the Kyrgyz
elite feel a pressing need to protect their personal and national security
against Islamist militants and civil disturbances, and it knows U.S. troops
from Manas are unlikely to interfere if a new uprising occurs, though Beijing
and especially Moscow will be ready and able to oblige for their own interests.
The future of Manas
Air Base is coming into question. On Sept. 21, Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek
Bakiyev said Washington should pay a higher rent for the base and withdraw from
Kyrgyzstan once the situation in Afghanistan stabilizes. Bakiyev said the terms
and conditions of the lease agreement and current rent amount should be
reviewed and were discussed when U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld toured
Central Asia in July.
During a visit to
Kyrgyzstan, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said Sept. 21 that Moscow is
set to invest several billion rubles in a long-term program for its air base at
Kant. Ivanov’s announcement came as he signed an agreement with Kyrgyz Defense
Minister Ismail Isakov to provide Kyrgyzstan with $3 million in military aid
consisting of dozens of Kamaz trucks, an Mi-8 Hip helicopter, firearms and
spare parts for support vehicles and armored vehicles. By providing the aid,
Moscow is fulfilling Bishkek’s wish list. In a mountainous country such as
Kyrgyzstan, helicopters are very useful for transportation and logistical
support – and would facilitate support operations in the hills away from
Kyrgyzstan’s towns and cities, where Bishkek’s control over the locals is
tenuous at best. One feature of the Mi-8 is that gun pods and 57 mm unguided
rocket pods can be mounted on the helicopter easily; thus a transport
helicopter can be turned into a gunship. Also, armed with aging Soviet-made
weapons and equipment, the Kyrgyz army needs spare parts from Russia.
Tajikistan
The Tajik government
is balancing carefully between Moscow and Washington, with Russia maintaining a
military base at Dushanbe and the United States hoping to get one to three air
bases in the country to partly substitute for the loss of the large Karshi-Khanabad
Air Base in Uzbekistan. Because some key Tajik officials could be under the
influence of drug lords -- who are extremely powerful in Tajikistan and want to
push Russia out of the country because Russian security forces interfere with
their drug-trafficking operations that run from Afghanistan to Russia and
Europe -- Tajikistan could tilt toward Washington.
There already are
signs that Dushanbe is leaning toward the United States; on Sept. 16, a senior
official in Tajikistan's ruling People's Democratic Party said Dushanbe is
willing to host some of the U.S. military equipment and personnel that will
have to leave Uzbekistan by early 2006. The statement indicates that Washington
is having some success in its response to Russia and China's concerted efforts
to roll back U.S. influence in Central Asia.
Turkmenistan
Turkmen President
Saparmurat Niyazov traditionally keeps both Moscow and Washington at bay.
Turkmenistan has been officially neutral since independence. Siding with either
Moscow or Washington would shift the way that all of Turkmenistan's neighbors
see the country and would force them all -- particularly Iran and Uzbekistan --
to reconsider their regional postures and strategic positions.
Niyazov so far has
not allowed the United States to establish bases in his country, but he also
has refrained from aligning firmly with Moscow by keeping Turkmenistan from
joining security alliances with Russia or the SCO. Niyazov is not overly
friendly toward the West, either, fearing the possibility of a pro-Western
"revolution" in Turkmenistan. Despite Niyazov's attitude, Washington
has been making overtures toward Ashgabat.
Gen. John Abizaid,
commander of U.S. Central Command, visited Turkmenistan and Tajikistan in
August in an effort to secure alternative bases after the U.S. leaves Manas and
Karshi-Khanabad. Though U.S. and Turkmen officials denied the visit had
anything to do with bases, it is difficult to otherwise explain Abizaid's
visit; when he was busy commanding U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, Abizaid
was not likely to go to Ashgabat with less meaningful goals in mind. German
media reported that Washington was seeking bases in Turkmenistan and that
Niyazov agreed to accept them in exchange for Washington's promise not to try
to overthrow him. Russian intelligence sources say that agreement has not yet
been made.
One of the Turkmen
bases Washington reportedly is looking at is Mary, near the Iranian border. The
former Soviet base was used heavily during the 1979-1989 Afghan war to stage
Soviet bombing missions, and it has a long runway capable of accommodating large
transport aircraft and strategic bombers. With some upgrades, the base at Mary
would make an excellent regional logistics hub to support U.S. operations in
Afghanistan and elsewhere in Central Asia. The base's proximity to Iran cannot
have gone unnoticed; Washington knows that having a large U.S. presence on a
third border will give Tehran something to worry about.
The other Turkmen
base Washington is looking at is at Gusgy, on the
Afghan border. During the Afghan war, Soviet troops used the border crossing
there as a main transit point into Afghanistan, and there is still a small
Turkmen-maintained air base there.
It remains to be seen
whether Niyazov will allow U.S. forces into his country, or if the U.S.
requests will be used only to further his policy of playing both sides of the
fence between Washington and Moscow, though the latter is more likely. Overall,
with the question of U.S. bases in Central Asia still unanswered, much of the
"Great Game" still lies ahead.
KYRGYZSTAN
Askar Akayev became president in 1990. He was re-elected by
direct popular vote shortly after independence in 1991 and again in 1995 and
2000. In the early years of his presidency, Mr Akayev was widely regarded as the most liberal leader in
former Soviet Central Asia. But there was growing discontent with his
leadership, amid reports of political suppression, economic stagnation and
widespread corruption.
Analysts have
expressed surprised at how quickly institutions collapsed in Kyrgyzstan, and
the speed at which Mr Akayev
lost control of government. They say the fall of the regime is an indication of
its weakness, rather than the opposition's strength.
Observers says
Kyrgyzstan's political future depends on how well the opposition is able to
develop. At the moment, many personalities and interests are jostling for
power, and it is not entirely clear what they stand for.
KAZAKHSTAN
Kazakhstan is the
wealthiest and most stable country in Central Asia thanks to its oil reserves,
but the political system has become increasingly authoritarian, corruption is
widespread and rural areas are still very poor.
Political power is
concentrated in the hands of Nursultan Nazarbayev, who came to power in 1989 as
the communist leader of Soviet Socialist Republic and has been president since
1991. His party has a comfortable parliamentary majority, ensuring he maintains
tight control. Like some other Central Asian rulers, Mr
Nazarbayev has been keen to promote his relatives and allies.
Previous elections
have failed to meet international standards. Privately owned and opposition
media are subject to harassment and censorship.
Analysts say the country
is relatively stable in the short term. However, the small opposition is
increasingly active, and oil wealth has created a business class that is
interested in political power. Presidential elections are slated for 2006.
TAJIKISTAN
Tajikistan is the
only Central Asian country to have had a civil war since the break-up of the
Soviet Union. The five-year conflict, from 1992-1997, killed up to 50,000
people, and more than one-tenth of the population fled the country.
Emomali Rahmonov was
elected president in 1994. His People's Democratic Party occupies almost all of
the 63 seats in the lower house of parliament. Previous elections have failed
to meet international standards. Opposition Islamic and communist parties have
a handful of seats between them.
The main issues that
dog Central Asia - widespread poverty and repressive leadership - are of
concern here, too. While Mr Rahmonov has experienced
serious challenges to his rule, observers say the opposition is weak and
divided, and that the government is increasingly authoritarian.
Tajiks are still
"war-weary", one observer says, and unwilling to take risks. However,
the country's economy is increasingly reliant on revenues from its position as
a drugs route out of Afghanistan, and there continue to be simmering divisions
related to the civil war.
TURKMENISTAN
Turkmenistan is
effectively a one-party state, and the regime is considered highly
authoritarian and repressive. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, head of
the Communist Party Saparmyrat Niyazov was elected president in 1991, and named
president-for-life in 1999. Mr Niyazov has nurtured a
personality cult and likes to be known as Turkmenbashi,
or Father of All Turkmens.
There is no official
political opposition. There is no free press, and only a handful of opposition
demonstrations have been reported since independence. A small number of
fractured opposition groups exist in exile, but their influence is said to be
negligible.
Analysts are
concerned about the country's growing poverty - despite revenue from important
reserves of natural gas - and the absence of political institutions. The lack
of a clear line of succession after Mr Niyazov is a
potential cause of instability in the longer term.
UZBEKISTAN
The political leadership
has been dominated by Islam Karimov since 1989, when he became Communist Party
leader in then Soviet Uzbekistan. The regime is
unpopular. There is no real internal opposition and the media is tightly
controlled by the state. A UN report has documented the systematic use of
torture. There is widespread frustration about the country's low standards of
living.
A series of bomb
blasts in 1999 was blamed on Islamic extremists, who were accused by the regime
of seeking to destabilise the country. Mr Karimov has been accused of using the perceived threat
of Islamic militancy to justify his repressive style of leadership, and
observers say that has strengthened sympathy for militant groups.
The absence of a
legitimate means of expressing dissent could create fertile ground for violent
protest. Mr Karimov will be watching developments in
Kyrgyzstan very carefully, and is expected to intensify efforts to stifle any
potential spread of "people power".
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