While so far we have
seen New Delhi threaten to take action, with nothing measurable that could be
convincingly described as preparation for a war. We however, still expect
actions that take the form of unilateral precision strikes inside
Pakistan-administered Kashmir along with special-forces action on ground.
In this context we
have prepared a case study about the current Geostrategic environment.
The Indian
subcontinent physically divides into four parts:
· the mountainous
frame that stretches in an arc from the Arabian Sea to the Bay of Bengal;
· the North Indian
Plain, stretching from Delhi southeast through the Ganges River delta to the
Myanmar border, and from the Himalayas in the north to the southern hills;
· the Indian
Peninsula, which juts southward into the Indian Ocean, consisting of a variety
of terrain but primarily hilly;
· the deserts in the
west between the North Indian Plain and Pakistan’s Indus River Valley.
Pakistan occupies the
western region of the subcontinent and is based around the Indus Valley. It is
separated from India proper by fairly impassable desert and by swamps in the
south, leaving only Punjab, in the central part of the country, as a point of
contact. Pakistan is the major modern-day remnant of Muslim rule over medieval
India, and the country’s southwest is the region first occupied by Arab Muslims
invading from what is today southwestern Iran and southern Afghanistan.
The third major state
in the subcontinent is the Muslim-majority Ganges delta state of Bangladesh,
which occupies the area southeast of Nepal. Situated mainly at sea level,
Bangladesh is constantly vulnerable to inundations from the Bay of Bengal. The
kingdoms of Nepal and Bhutan rest on the heights of the Himalayas themselves,
and therefore on the edge of the subcontinent. There is also a small east-west
corridor between Nepal and Bangladesh connecting the bulk of India to its
restive northeastern states and its eastern border with Myanmar. In this region
is India’s easternmost state, Arunachal Pradesh, whose territory is also
claimed by China.
The bulk of India’s
population lives on the northern plain. This area of highest population density
is the Indian heartland. It runs through the area around Lahore, spreading
northwest into Pakistan and intermittently to Kabul in Afghanistan, and also
stretching east into Bangladesh and to the Myanmar border. It is not, however,
the only population center. Peninsular India also has an irregular pattern of
intense population, with lightly settled areas intermingling with heavily
settled areas. This pattern primarily has to do with the availability of water
and the quality of soil. Wherever both are available in sufficient quantity,
India’s population accumulates and grows.
India’s internal
divisions are defined by its river systems: the Ganges, the Brahmaputra, the
Narmada and so on. All of India’s major cities are centered around one of these
river systems, a fact that has been instrumental in the rise of so many
distinct cultures in India, Punjabis, Gujaratis, Marathis,
Tamils and others, which have manifested in modern times as states within
India. That said, Indian nationalism is very strong and counters the separatist
tendencies. There is a balance between a strong central governance and
substantial regional autonomy.
The geography of the
subcontinent constrains the behavior of governments that arise there. If there
is to be an independent India, and if it is to be a stable and secure
nation-state, it must do the following things:
· Achieve suzerainty
in the Ganges River basin. The broad, braided plains of the Ganges basin are
among the most fertile in the world and guarantee a massive population. India
must become the premier power in this heartland. This does not mean that such
power must be wielded by a unified, centralized authority. A coalition of
powers can be functional, and even somewhat hostile powers such as Bangladesh
can be tolerated so long as they do not challenge India’s authority or
security.
· Expand throughout
the core of the subcontinent until it reaches all natural barriers. Forests,
hills and rivers aside, there is little else in the confines of the
subcontinent that limits India’s writ. “Control” of the additional territories
can be a somewhat informal and loose affair. The sheer population of the Ganges
basin really requires only that no foreign entity be allowed to amass a force
capable of overwhelming the Ganges region.
· Advance past the
patch of land separating the Ganges basin from the Indus River basin and
dominate the Indus region (meaning Pakistan). The Indus Valley is the only
other significant real estate within reach of India, and the corridor that
accesses it is the only viable land invasion route into India proper. (Modern
India has not achieved this objective, with implications that will be discussed
below.)
· With the entire
subcontinent under the control (or at least the influence) of a centralized
power, begin building a navy. Given the isolation of the subcontinent, any
further Indian expansion is limited to the naval sphere. A robust navy also
acts as a restraint upon any outside power that might attempt to penetrate the
subcontinent from the sea.
These imperatives
shape the behavior of every indigenous Indian government, regardless of its
ideology or its politics. They are the fundamental drivers that define India as
a country, shaped by its unique geography. An Indian government that ignores
these imperatives does so at the risk of being replaced by another entity,
whether indigenous or foreign, that understands them better.
In the absence of
direct external threats, modern India’s strategic outlook has been shaped by
the dynamics of the Cold War and its aftermath. The most important strategic
relationship that India had after gaining independence from Britain in 1947 was
with the Soviet Union. There was some limited ideological affinity between
them. India’s fundamental national interest was not in Marxism, however, but in
creating a state that was secure against a new round of imperialism. The
Soviets and Americans were engaged in a massive global competition, and India
was inevitably a prize. It was a prize that the Soviets could not easily take:
The Soviets had neither an overland route to India nor a navy that could reach
it.
The United States,
however, did have a navy. The Indians believed (with good reason) that the
United States might well want to replace Britain as a global maritime power, a
development that might put India squarely in Washington’s sights. The Indians
saw in the United States all the same characteristics that had drawn Britain to
India. Elsewhere, India saw the United States acting both to hurry the
disintegration of the European empires and to fill the ensuing vacuum. India
did not want to replace the British with the Americans, its fundamental
interest was to retain its internal cohesion and independence. Regardless of
American intent, which the Indians saw as ambiguous, American capability was
very real, and from the beginning the Indians sought to block it.
For the Indians, the
solution was a relationship, if not quite an alliance, with the Soviet Union.
The Soviets could provide economic aid and military hardware, as well as a
potential nuclear umbrella (or at least nuclear technical assistance). The
relationship with the Soviet Union was perfect for the Indians, since they did
not see the Soviets as able to impose satellite status on India. From the
American point of view, however, there was serious danger in the Indo-Soviet
relationship. The United States saw it as potentially threatening U.S. access
to the Indian Ocean and lines of supply to the Persian Gulf. If the Soviets
were given naval bases in India, or if India were able to construct a navy significant
enough to threaten American interests and were willing to act in concert with
the Soviets, it would represent a serious strategic challenge to the United
States.
In the late 1950s and
early 1960s, the United States was facing a series of challenges. The British
were going to leave Singapore, and the Indonesian independence movement was
heavily influenced by the Soviets. The Egyptians, and therefore the Suez Canal,
also were moving into the Soviet camp. If India became a pro-Soviet maritime
power, it would simply be one more element along Asia’s southern rim
threatening U.S. interests. The Americans had to act throughout the region, but
they needed to deal with India fast.
The U.S. solution was
an alliance with Pakistan. This served two purposes. First, it provided another
Muslim counterweight to Nasserite Egypt and left-leaning Arab nationalism.
Second, it posed a potential threat to India on land. This would force India to
divert resources from naval construction and focus on building ground and air forces
to deal with the Pakistanis. For Pakistan, geographically isolated and facing
both India and a not-very-distant Russia, the relationship with the United
States was a godsend.
It also created a
very complex geographical situation.
The Soviet Union did
not directly abut Pakistan, the two were separated by a narrow strip of
territory in the northeasternmost confines of
Afghanistan known as the Wakhan Corridor. The Soviets could not seriously
threaten Pakistan from that direction, but the U.S. relationship with Pakistan
made Afghanistan a permanent Soviet interest (with full encouragement of the
Indians, who wanted Pakistan bracketed on both sides). The Soviets did not make
a direct move into Afghanistan until late 1979, but well before then they tried
to influence the direction of the Afghans, and after moving, they posed a
direct threat to Pakistan.
China, on the other
hand, did border on Pakistan and developed an interest there. The
aforementioned Himalayan clash in 1962 did not involve only India and China. It
also involved the Soviets. India and China were both putatively allied with the
Soviet Union. What was not well known at the time was that Sino-Soviet
relations had deteriorated. The Chinese were very suspicious of Soviet
intentions and saw Moscow’s relationship with New Delhi as potentially an
alliance against China. Like the Americans, the Chinese were uneasy about the
Indo-Soviet relationship. Therefore, China also moved to aid Pakistan. It was a
situation as tangled as the geography, with Maoist China and the United States
backing the military dictatorship of Pakistan and the Soviets backing
democratic India.
From the Indian point
of view, the borderland between Pakistan and China, that is, Kashmir, then
became a strategically critical matter of fundamental national interest. The
more of Kashmir that India held, the less viable was the Sino-Pakistani
relationship. Whatever emotional attachment India might have had to Kashmir,
Indian control of at least part of the region gave it control over the axis of
a possible Pakistani threat and placed limits on Chinese assistance. Thus,
Kashmir became an ideological and strategic issue for the Indians.
In 1992, India’s
strategic environment shifted: The Soviet Union collapsed, and India lost its
counterweight to the United States. Uncomfortable in a world that had no
balancing power to the United States, but lacking options of its own, India
became inward and cautious. It observed uneasily the rise of the pro-Pakistani
Taliban government in Afghanistan, replacing the Indian-allied Soviets, but it
lacked the power to do anything significant. The indifference of the United
States and its continued relationship with Pakistan were particularly troubling
to India.
Then, 2001 was a
clarifying year in which the balance shifted again. The attack on the United
States by al Qaeda threw the United States into conflict with the Taliban. More
important, it strained the American relationship with Pakistan almost to the
breaking point. The threat posed to India by Kashmiri groups paralleled the
threat to the United States by al Qaeda. American and Indian interests suddenly
were aligned. Both wanted Pakistan to be more aggressive against radical
Islamist groups. Neither wanted further development of Pakistan’s nuclear
weapons. Both were happy to be confronting the Pakistanis with more and more
aggressive demands.
The realignment of
Indian relations with the United States did not represent a fundamental shift
in Indian geopolitics, however. India continues to be an island contained by a
ring of mountains. Its primary interest remains its own unity, something that
is always at risk due to the internal geography of the subcontinent. It has one
enemy on the island with it, but not one that poses a significant threat, there
is no danger of a new generation of Muslim princes entering from Pakistan to
occupy the Indian plain. Ideally, New Delhi wants to see a Pakistan that is
fragmented, or at least able to be controlled. Toward this end, it will work
with any power that has a common interest and has no interest in invading
India. For the moment, that is the United States, but the alliance is one of
convenience.
India will go with
the flow, but given its mountainous enclosure it will feel little of the flow.
Outside its region, India has no major strategic interests, though it would be
happy to see a devolution of Tibet from China if that carried no risk to India,
and it is always interested in the possibility of increasing its own naval
power (but never at the cost of seriously reshaping its economy). India’s
fundamental interest will always come from within, from its endless, shifting
array of regional interests, ethnic groups and powers. The modern Indian
republic governs India. And that is more important than any other fact in
India.
Pakistan
While Pakistan’s
boundaries encompass a large swath of land stretching from the peaks of the
Himalayas to the Arabian Sea, the writ of the Pakistani state stops short of
the country’s mountainous northwestern frontier. The strip of arable land that
hugs the Indus River in Punjab province is the Pakistani heartland, where the
bulk of the country’s population, industry and resources are concentrated. For
Pakistan to survive as a modern nation-state, it must protect this core at all
costs.
But even in the best
of circumstances, defending the Pakistani core and maintaining the integrity of
the state are extraordinarily difficult tasks, mainly because of geography.
The headwaters of the
Indus River system are not even in Pakistan, the system actually begins in
Indian-administered Kashmir. While Kashmir has been the focus of Indo-Pakistani
military action in modern times, the area where Pakistan faces its most severe
security challenge is the saddle of land between the Indus and the broader,
more fertile and more populated Ganges River basin. The one direction in which
it makes sense to extend Pakistani civilization as geography would allow takes
Pakistan into direct and daily conflict with a much larger civilization: India.
Put simply, geography dictates that Pakistan either be absorbed into India or
fight a losing battle against Indian influence.
Controlling the Buffers
Pakistan must protect
its core by imposing some semblance of control over its hinterlands, mainly in
the north and west, where the landscape is more conducive to fragmenting the
population than defending the country. The arid, broken highlands of the
Baluchistan plateau eventually leak into Iran to the southwest. To the north,
in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), the Federally Administered Tribal
Area (FATA), the Federally Administered Northern Area (FANA) and Azad Jammu and
Kashmir (AJK), the terrain becomes more and more mountainous. But terrain in
these regions still does not create a firm enough barrier to completely block
invasion. To the southwest, a veritable Baluch thoroughfare parallels the
Arabian Sea coast and crosses the Iranian-Pakistani border. To the northwest,
the Pashtun-populated mountains are not so rugged that armies cannot march
through them, as Alexander the Great, the Aryans and the Turks historically proved.
To control all these
buffer regions, the Pakistani state must absorb masses of other peoples who do
not conform to the norms of the Indus core. Russia faces a similar challenge;
its lack of geographic insulation from its neighbors forces it to expand to
establish a buffer. But in Pakistan, the complications are far worse. Russia’s
buffers are primarily flat, which facilitates the assimilation of conquered
peoples. Pakistan’s buffers are broken and mountainous, which reinforces ethnic
divisions among the regions’ inhabitants, core Punjabis and Sindhis
in the Indus Valley, Baluch to the west and Pashtuns to the north. And the
Baluch and Pashtuns are spread out over far more territory than what comprises
the Punjab-Sindh core.
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