On July 24, 2003, the House and Senate Intelligence Committees released pan of a 900-page report entitled Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Actions before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 (S.Rept. 107-351; H.Rept. 107-792). The Bush Administration refused to allow the release of an approximately 28-page section of the report. According to press articles, persons who claim to have read the still ­classified section of the report say it covers Saudi links with individuals involved in the September 11 attacks; specifically, the classified section reportedly states that senior Saudi officials channeled hundreds of millions of dollars to charitable groups that may have helped fund the attacks. (Classified Section of Sept. 11 Report Faults Saudi Rulers," New York Times, July 26,2003.)

Saudi officials, including the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, have denounced the report, maintaining that "AI Qaeda is a cult seeking to destroy Saudi Arabia as well as the United States. By what logic would we support a cult that is trying to kill us?" ("Saudis Slam Congressional Report Accusing Kingdom of Poor Cooperation in Terror War," Associated Press News Wire, July 26, 2003.)

On July 29, in response to an urgent request from Saudi Arabia, President Bush met with Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al­Faysal, who called for the release of the still classified section of the report to enable Saudi Arabia to rebut the allegations contained therein. President Bush refused to do so on the grounds that disclosure could reveal intelligence sources and methods to enemies of the United States and might compromise the on-going investigation of the September 11, 2001, attacks. ("Bush Refuses to Declassify Saudi Section of Report," New York Times, July 30, 2003. "Classified Section of Sept. 11 Report Faults Saudi Rulers," New York Times, July 26, 2003.)

In its final report, released on July 23, 2004, the U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) described Saudi Arabia as having been "a problematic ally in combating Islamic extremism." The report takes note of long-standing cooperative relations between the U.S. and Saudi governments, growing misunderstandings at the popular level in recent years, and U.S. criticisms in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks that Saudi officials could do more to fight terrorism. The report acknowledges increased efforts in that regard since mid-2003 when terrorists began hitting targets in Saudi Arabia itself with more frequency; today, according to the report, "The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is now locked in mortal combat with al Qaeda." One of the key recommendations in the 9/11 report addresses the U.S.-Saudi relationship:

“The problems in the U.S.-Saudi relationship must be confronted, openly. The United States and Saudi Arabia must determine if they can build a relationship that political leaders on both sides are prepared to publicly defend - a relationship about more than oil. It should include a shared commitment to political and economic reform, as Saudis make common cause with the outside world. It should include a shared interest in greater tolerance and cultural respect, translating into a commitment to fight the violent extremists who foment hatred.”

A private report issued by French investigator Jean­ Charles Brisard in December 2002 made several detailed allegations about the involvement of prominent Saudi nationals in the financing of international terrorist organizations. The United Nations Security Council did not solicit or endorse Brisard's report, although it has been mischaracterized as a U.N. report in the public record. Although most public allegations of Saudi support for terrorist activities have not quantified the amounts of money involved, Brisard's report asserted that Al Qaeda received between $300 million and $500 million during the decade prior to 2002, by "abusing this pillar of Islam [charitable donations] and taking advantage of the Saudi regulatory vacuum." (Jean-Charles Brisard, Terrorism Financing: Roots and Trends of Saudi Terrorism Financing. JCB Consulting, Dec. 19, 2003.)

 

Financing Suicide Bombers.

In May 2002, Israeli officials released a report that alleged that the Saudi Committee for the Support of the Al Quds Intifada had "transferred large sums of money to families of Palestinians who died in violent events, including notorious terrorists."( Ben Barber, "Saudi Millions Finance Terror Against Israel," Washington Times, May 7, 2002. Israel also released allegedly seized documents that featured "the letterhead of the 'Saudi Arabian Committee for Support of the Al Quds Intifada.')

The report argued that this alleged financial support encouraged Palestinian terrorism by easing the potential burden on the families of attackers. Saudi officials called the allegations "baseless and false," and stated "unequivocally that Saudi Arabia does not provide financial support to suicide bombers or their families." Saudi officials also questioned the claim that Palestinian suicide attacks were financially rather than politically motivated. Statements made by Committee figures in response to specific claims that the Al Quds Intifada Committee provided support to the families of suicide bombers or otherwise supported terrorism have been less consistent. Saudi government spokesman Adel Al Jubeir has discussed the possibility that money from the Committee may have gone to the families of suicide bombers, but has categorically ruled out the existence of any quid pro quo arrangement or reward system similar to that sponsored by former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.

The Al Quds Intifada Committee website, maintained in the name of "the Saudi Committee for Relief of the Palestinian People," contains over 40,000 transaction records that feature the names individuals who received humanitarian aid and financial support from the Committee. The website states that "many accounts were opened for the harmed persons at the Arab [B]ank branches in the Palestinian territory, and fixed aids [i.e. donations] were transferred to the harmed people in their respective accounts." One of the Committee's programs supported Palestinian families whose primary breadwinners were killed by Israeli forces or under other violent circumstances during the uprising. Records for this program contain the names of deceased individuals, transaction numbers, the date of their deaths, their home towns, and the circumstances in which they were killed. The Committee's description of the program indicates that payments of 20,000 SR [$5,300] were transmitted to the family members of these individuals in their names following their death. Of the 1,300 names contained in the records for this specific Committee program, over 60 match or closely resemble the names of known Palestinian militants who carried out attacks on Israeli military personnel and civilians from October 2000 to March 2002.( The Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group maintains comprehensive English and Arabic language lists of suicide attackers.)

These individuals include suicide bombers and gunmen who were killed during actual and attempted attacks inside Israel and the Palestinian territories. These lists contain names that also appear on the Saudi Committee website. Further information provided in these and other Committee records such as individuals' home towns and dates of death matches information provided in public press accounts of attacks. In some instances, date and name data reflect slight variations and inconsistencies. The PHRMG lists are available at [http://www. phrmg.org/PHRMG%20Documents/Suicide%20bombers/Tables/]The following is a sample of five names of beneficiaries featured on the Committee website which match those of individuals associated with attacks (The names listed are transcriptions of a sample of five names that appear on the referenced links to the Committee website. Transcriptions of Arabic names often differ in Western media reporting and there is considerable uniformity in Arabic names. Mohammed and Ahmed, for example, are very common Arabic names often found among Palestinians.):

·         Said Hassan Hussein Hotari - identified as suicide bomber in June 1, 2001, attack on Dolphinarium nightclub in Tel Aviv. Hamas claimed responsibility. (See also, Jamal Halaby, "Tel Aviv Suicide Bomber Was Muslim," Associated Press, June 3, 2001.)

·         Izzedin Shahil Ahmed Masri - identified as suicide bomber in August 9, 2001 attack on Sbarro pizza restaurant in Jerusalem. Hamas claimed responsibility. (Greg Myre, "Jerusalem Suicide Bomber Kills 15," Associated Press, August 10, 2001.)

·         Maher Muhiaddin Kamel Habeishi - identified as suicide bomber in December 2, 2001, attack on Haifa bus. Hamas claimed responsibility. (Karin Laub, "Islamic Militants Unleash Wave of Terror Against Israel," Associated Press, December 2, 2001.)

·         Wa'fa Ali Khalil Idris - female, identified as suicide bomber in January 27, 2002 street attack in Jerusalem. The Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade claimed responsibility. (Hadeel Wahdan, "Family Describes Palestinian Bomber," Assoc. Press, January 30,2002.)

·         Mohammed Ahmed Abdel-Rahman Daraghmeh - identified as suicide bomber in March 2, 2002 attack on Orthodox Jewish neighborhood in Jerusalem. The Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade claimed responsibility. (Greg Myre, "Suicide Bomber Kills Nine in Jerusalem," Associated Press, March 2, 2002.)

Most of the Committee records assigned to individuals whose names match or closely resemble those of suicide attackers list "assassination" as the cause of death - however other records credit "martyrdom." A handful of these records indicate that the individuals they refer to were killed during a "martyrdom operation." The Arabic text in the "Details" field of these Committee records reads "amaliyah istishadiyah," a commonly used euphemism for a suicide attack that translates literally to "martyrdom operation."

On July 2, 2004, six families of victims killed or injured in terrorist attacks in Israel filed a civil lawsuit against Arab Bank PLC of Jordan in the U.S. District Court of New York seeking $875 million in damages. Although the Saudi government is not a party to the lawsuit, the complaint alleges that the Saudi Committee for the Support of the Al Quds Intifada used accounts established at Arab Bank as conduits for funds to charities and individuals in the West Bank and Gaza Strip associated with the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), Islamic Jihad, and other terrorist entities (for a full description of the Committee, see 'Funding for Palestinian Organizations' below). The complaint also alleges that the Saudi Committee used accounts in Arab Bank and Arab Bank branches in the Palestinian territories to provide "insurance benefits" to the families of suicide bombers and others killed or detained in confrontations with Israeli security forces. In 2003, the Central Bank of Jordan ordered all Jordanian banks "to freeze any dealing" with six Hamas figures and associated charities. In response to the lawsuit Shukri Bishara, a senior executive at Arab Bank, reportedly said that "the accusations are completely false and baseless and Arab Bank never participated in any activity knowingly that could lead to violence." (Agence France Presse, "Arab Bank Denies Allegations it Funded Terrorists," July 7,2004.) A Saudi embassy official also reaffirmed that the Saudi government has not provided financial support for terrorism. [Linde et al. v. Arab Bank, 04 CV 02799 (E.D.N.Y. filed July 2, 2004)]

Since mid-2003 then, growing challenges to internal security and an increase in terrorist incidents in Saudi Arabia have impelled the Saudi leadership to devote heightened attention to countering sources of financing terrorism. The effectiveness of these measures however, will be tested by the degree to which Saudi authorities succeed in implementing the various institutions and regulations that have been established in recent years.
 

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