By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

Law is a fundamental component of every society, and every society has its own unique legal tradition born from its history and development. Given the central position law has in most states, this history, development, and understanding of law will logically affect policy-makers decisions concerning a state’s appropriate interpretation of international law. The field of international relations has only begun to marginally consider the significant role that legal tradition may play in explaining state behaviour and foreign policy decisions. We next seek to correct this omission and highlight how important domestic legal factors can be to state policy and action in the international system.

In 1999, the member states of NATO came together and agreed that action must be taken again the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Citing international human rights law and the prevention of aggression against Kosovo, the NATO states agreed that this international legal principle allowed for the use of force by NATO states against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to protect the Kosovar Albanians from ethnic cleansing.1 The interpretation these states made of the relevant international law was the same.

Once the operations got under way, however, disagreements arose among the NATO members as to what was required and allowed in such a campaign. Different NATO members, led largely by the U.S. and France, disagreed over the appropriate interpretation of the international legal rules regarding bombing civilian targets.2 The Geneva Conventions require that military forces assess potential targets to determine whether the objective is predominantly a military one, whether the means to be used are proportional to the end to be achieved, and whether there is a likelihood of civilian ‘collateral damage’ as a result of military action.3 While all sides agreed that the Geneva Conventions were applicable, there was a disagreement as to the meaning of the different components of the rules concerning the bombing of civilian targets.

In March 1999, NATO had moved into what was termed “Phase 2-plus” of its strategy. This phase was “characterized by tactical strikes against military forces in Kosovo, and an increasing emphasis on strategic strikes against targets in the FRY designed to coerce the Milosevic regime into accepting NATO’s political demands.”4

Given these goals, potential targets included power transmissions stations, oil refineries, and factories. All of these could be considered dual purpose targets, meaning they had military application as well as a function for the civilian population. Moreover, many of these types of targets were located in areas where civilian presence was likely, thus increasing the potential for collateral damage.5

The duality and location of the targets created disagreement between the United States and France over the appropriate interpretation of international legal rules. In a number of situations from March through May 1999, proposed military targets of dual purpose were consistently supported by the United States as being valid, and vetoed by the French as being in violation of international law.6 In each case, the U.S. representatives in NATO sought to go after what they viewed as strategic military targets, essential for achieving NATO’s goals in entering the conflict.7 France, on the other hand, consistently professed its belief that targets were being selected that had the potential for too much collateral damage and that, not only was this against existing international law,but it defeated the humanitarian purpose of NATO’s mission.8

In the case of Kosovo, many disagreements over the appropriate interpretation of international law in specific situations were overcome through negotiations and strategic military planning. The recurring differences in interpretation, however, caused considerable frustration and discord among the personnel actively engaged in the Kosovo campaign, and created tensions in what was otherwise a collaborative effort. As summarized by Wheeler in his discussion of this situation, what the case of NATO and the Kosovo bombing demonstrates “is that agreement on the relevant legal rules is no guarantee that actors will agree on their application in particular cases.”9 In this project, we thus  seek to understand what makes them disagree, as such conflict of interpretation can be costly for states in terms of time, resources, alliances, and reputation. While NATO ultimately succeeded in its endeavours, it was not achieved without a great deal of frustration and misunderstanding, which in the context of the use of force, can be deadly.

This project, therefore, addresses the question of how it is possible to explain differences in interpretation among states – particularly states as similarly situated as the member states of NATO – of the same, recognized principles of international law.

International law has long been part of the international system. Indeed the construct of the international system developed out of the Peace of Westphalia is based on the recognition that certain international norms exist. Despite this long-term existence and increasing relevance, however, minimal attention has been paid to the interpretations states make of international law, and even less attention has been paid to the methods states use to make their interpretations. Much of the literature addressing international law focuses on state compliance under international law and the various international system pressures which affect compliance, while others have considered various domestic restraints on state compliance with international law, including the influence of regime type, level of economic development, and state membership in international organizations.10 All of these works, however, focus on state action towards international law without considering the prior steps states take in considering international law before they move to act. The consideration of compliance or non-compliance does not take into account that, in order for a state to comply with a principle of international law, that state must first make an interpretation as to what the principle of international law means.

Without such interpretation, there can be no action. Interpretation thus acts as the first step to policy formation for any state action concerning international law. Most of the literature focuses on state policy towards international law based on the assumption that international laws each have a single meaning – the same meaning – for all states, and states choose a policy course that either complies with this meaning or does not comply. This, however, is inaccurate. There is generally not a single meaning of international law, and therefore, there is a preliminary step to policy formation and international law compliance that we must consider: what meaning is ascribed to international law by the different states to whom the law applies?

We suggest that international law does not just mean one thing - the same thing to all the states – but rather, international laws are interpreted differently by every state.

Therefore, in order to truly understand state policy concerning international law or state compliance with international rules, you must understand first what meaning a state attaches to the law. Of course, in some cases state interpretations can be clearly incorrect or outside the realm of reasonable interpretations, but in many cases, given the nature of law creation, there can be multiple interpretations that might be valid.11 Therefore, to truly understand state policy and behavior towards international norms, we must understand how they arrive at different interpretations of the same principle of international law.

 

Understanding Interpretation: The Legal Tradition of States

Given this critical role for state interpretation of international law in the creation of state foreign policy and adherence to international rules, it is important to understand how states arrive at different interpretations of international law since that will ultimately determine the course of the state’s foreign policy. The question, therefore, that this project addresses is how states arrive at their interpretations of international law, and what can account for differences in interpretation among states that would be expected to interpret international law in the same manner under existing international relations theory. Put another way, how is it possible that states can agree a particular international legal rule exists, but then understand the rights or obligations of that rule in different ways?

We suggest that the answer to these questions is found not in the framework of the international system, but rather in the historical development and cultural identity of the legal tradition of states. I theorize that a state’s legal tradition – briefly defined as the historical framework which constitutes how the decision-making elites within a state understand the role and purpose of law and how this in terms frames foreign policy choices12 – shapes the way a state interprets international law. The legal tradition does so in two ways. First, the legal tradition constitutes the way decision-makers think about the law, what the law is designed to achieve, and how the law can be used to these ends.

Legal tradition does this by serving as a roadmap which shapes policy makers decision-making process by increasing clarity in terms of the appropriate course of action.13 Legal tradition also identifies the set of “principled beliefs” which shape policy-makers conception of just versus unjust action, identifying those interpretations which would uphold their beliefs. This results in beliefs about the law that lead to the use of one form of interpretation over another.

The second mechanism by which legal tradition constitutes the way in which policy makers interpret international law is that legal tradition determines the extent to which a state’s interests may influence the decision-making process. As with general understandings about law, legal tradition will shape the extent to which state interests may be taken into account during the decision-making process. Those same attributes that create certain beliefs about the law also determine how free decision-makers are to take action based on material interests that may or may not be in line with the conception of appropriate behaviour accepted within that state. Some legal traditions, whether due to extreme flexibility or the absence of the rule of law, will allow greater consideration of state interests than others limited by non-interest-based concerns about appropriate behaviour. In other words, not only does legal tradition shape the way states think about the law, but it also affects the way they think about their interests, and in turn, the extent to which interests influence outcomes.

In the case of the dispute among NATO members concerning the meaning of the international rules outlined in the Geneva conventions, different legal histories and differing perceptions of the role of law in member states led to different interpretations of existing law, and ultimately, different policy preferences concerning courses of action.14

The French legal tradition, for example, founded on a mixture of Roman law, Canon law, and local custom, and heavily influenced by the French Revolution and France’s position in Europe, has developed into one in which law plays a central role in the life of all French people.15 The centrality of law and the conception that law exists to benefit the community facilitates the incorporation of international legal principles into the domestic legal framework.16 This, in turn, constitutes the framework under which state decision-makers will interpret international law. This framework minimizes the extent to which interests can dominate over concerns for the benefit of the largest number. In France this results in a conservative approach and the use of a more traditional interpretation of existing international law.

The legal tradition of the United States, on the other hand, originating in the common law tradition of England, but influenced by the principles of the American Revolution and by the unique circumstances of the growth and development of the United States as a country, uses the law primarily as a mechanism to protect individual interests.17 This focus inward and concentration on individual rights founded in U.S. legal history has made more varied the recognition of the settled interpretations and binding force of international law by the U.S. Moreover, in addition to the general attitude about law, the structure of the political and legal institutions in the United States makes incorporation of international law into the domestic legal system more difficult. This allows for a greater consideration of interests in the decision-making process, and consequently, although it is generally a state that adheres to international law and supports the international legal system, the U.S. has historically been more likely than France to push the outer boundaries of accepted concepts of international law and adopt more liberal interpretations of existing legal principles. In this research we thus seek to explore why a state’s legal tradition implies the method of interpretation a state will use when viewing a principle of international law, and explain, using a series of case study comparisons how legal tradition has played a role in state interpretation in a number of recent events, including intervention in Iraq in 2003, the enactment of the Kyoto protocol in 1997, and the creation of the International Criminal Court in 1998. As a result of this examination, we will suggest that considering legal tradition as a key factor in the view states take towards the appropriate meaning of international law facilitates our understanding of state behaviour in terms of policy formation and compliance with international law.

 

(A) International Law Matters

In this project, we start by assuming that international law is a factor in state decision-making processes.18 State interpretation of international law is therefore a central, but under examined, component of state foreign policy development and is the foundation upon which states ultimately act in the international system. This does not necessarily mean that international law is a positive factor, or indeed a primary factor, but we do posit that international law does exist and is recognized as existing by the states of the international system. While this assumption is contrary to much of the traditional literature in the international relations field, recent studies have gone further towards acceptance of international law as a relevant factor and focused on explaining how international law matters rather than if it matters.

The dominant theoretical approach in international relations for much of the 20th century, and the approach which drew the field away from the consideration of law as an important component of international relations in the years following World War II, realist literature does not consider international law as an important factor in understanding state behavior.19 The creation of realism in the 1930s and 1940s by writers such as Carr and Morgenthau was largely a reaction to the perceived failure of the “idealist” League of Nations system that Wilson created after the first World War. Both Morgenthau and Carr, who many consider to be the founders of the modern realist movement, believed that what Morgenthau called the “legalist-idealist” perception on the world was inaccurate, and more importantly, dangerous.20 This led to an enduring critique of those who espouse international law as idealists who do not understand the way the world works. As put by Michael Walzer, lawyers “have constructed a paper world, which fails at crucial points to correspond to the world the rest of still live in.”21

Since the end of WWII, realist thought has developed to take an even more stringent view of the role international law plays in state behavior. Led in large part by the work of Kenneth Waltz, neo-realism22 adopts many of the assumptions of realism, but shifts the focus from one of absolute power to one of relative power in which states weigh the costs and benefits of their actions with the goal of achieving a balance of power.23 Realist theory treats any influence on state behavior as exogenous, given and un changing, and founded on the notion that states seek to protect the balance of power above all else. Most scholars in the realist camp have deemed international legal principles simply “epiphenomenal”, cited by states only when it serves their purpose of maintaining and/or improving their relative power position in the international system.24

Neo-realists would argue that international lawyers have an idealized account of international treaties and the binding effect they have on states, and would point to the obvious gap between ideals and practices, particularly practices of powerful states like the United States. Material forces, not law, are for neo-realists the single most important determinant of global politics25, and compliance with international rules is done only to serve the interests of the state.

There have been many criticisms of realism’s approach to law. One of the dominant critiques of realism is that realism’s insistence that international law is simply a tool that states may use to emphasize their positions does not explain, or even attempt to address, the continually growing body of international legal rules covering a wide variety of subjects.26 Moreover, these international legal rules often do not conform to the theory that the powerful states dictate the emergence of international law. Since the end of World War II, there have been numerous international treaties created touching on subjects ranging from human rights, to the environment, nuclear weapons, the open seas, and international trade all of which have not only removed certain aspects of sovereignty from individual states, but which have in numerous cases, gone against what might be considered the express will of the dominant powers27.

A second critique of the realist treatment of international law is that realist theory maintains that in order for international law to be considered law at all it must be expressly consent to by states. If states do not express their consent to be bound by the law, then it is not possible for international law to have any constraining power whatsoever over states. Moreover, for realist theory, the only way that law can be effective is for it to be clearly defined and supported by hierarchies of authority and means of enforcement – both attributes that realists argue international law lacks.28

This position has been refuted by a number of works, even harkening back to one of the original realists, Hans Morgenthau, who acknowledged that “during the four hundred years of its existence international law has in most instances been scrupulously observed.”29 Decades later, Louis Henkin, an international lawyer who wrote one of the first books attempting to examine international law from an international relations perspective, devoted a great deal of attention in his work to the belief that state behaviour is guided by concern for following international rules.30

A third critique of realism is that, not only does it not account for how international law has come to constrain strong states despite a lack of overt consent in many cases, but also that it has no account of how weak states use the law to shape the outcomes they desire in the face of potential opposition and certainly greater power from large states.31

A fourth critique of realist literature, closely related to the above three, centers on the omission from realist work of a consideration of the domestic attributes of a state, including law, and how these influence not only the decision-making process through which states decide on a form of action, but also how domestic attributes may help define the state’s interest in the first place.32 Louis Henkin offered this critique of realist thought, stating: “[C]ynical realism about international law is unrealistic … it does not reflect the facts of international like: law is a major force in international affairs; nations rely on it, invoke it, observe and are influenced by it in every respect of their foreign relations.”33

Sharing many of the same assumptions as the realist literature, including acceptance of the state as the key actor in an anarchic international system, the neoliberal institutionalist scholarship which has surged to rival realist scholarship also assumes that influences on state behavior are exogenous, and thus constant and unchanging, not constitutive of the decision-making process.34 Neo-liberal institutionalism, however, differs from realism in several ways. First, rather that treating states as rational actors seeking to maximize survival through attainment and maintenance of power, neo-liberal institutionalism assumes that states seek to maximize their various interests, which may or may not be directly related to power.35 Second, states seek to maximize their individual as well as collective interests, whereas realism focuses solely on individual interests.36 Third, in seeking to maximize their interests, whether individual or collective, states in neo-liberal institutionalist theory believe this is something which is often best achieved through mutual cooperation37. Finally, neo-liberal institutionalism posits that in seeking to achieve mutual cooperation, states often create and utilize international laws, often through international institutions, in order to provide a set of “functional rules promulgated to solve co-operation problems under anarchy.”38 Thus, norms are developed based on state preferences regarding their material forces, with the goal of facilitating a state’s interest by, for example, providing clear rules of behavior, increasing the availability of information, and providing a clear indication of those states not acting in conformance with the norm.39 All of these increase the ability of a state to accurately gauge its position in the international system, and thus better achieve its goals and protect its interests.40

Therefore, unlike neo-realism, neo-liberal institutionalism does not treat international law as simply an epiphenomenon of state interests and does acknowledge that international law has an important role to play in the international system beyond simply that of a tool for states to use when they see fit. Moreover, scholars working within this approach have broadened their reach beyond simply focusing on the international system as the level of analysis, and have taken into account domestic actors and domestic institutions, as well as state and system characteristics, in formulating their theories of state behavior.41 Neo-liberal institutionalist studies that have considered the role of international law in state behavior include examinations of under what circumstances states comply with their international treaty obligations,42 the creation of new international normative obligations43, and the role of international law in state decision making.44

As with neo-realism, however, these theoretical assumptions are limited to an understanding of law – whether domestic or international – as a tool with which states may help maximize their interests. Any independent binding power of international law on states is not considered. Moreover, neo-liberal institutionalist theory, as with its neorealist counterpart, does not focus on how the law shapes either the decision-making process states engage in or the underlying ideas, identities, and cultural attributes which constitutes the state.45 Therefore, neo-liberal institutionalism, like realism, misses out on an important component in explaining the behavior of states and why they choose to act the way they do. And, as with realism, this carries over to the consideration of domestic law as well as international law as an important component of the process.46

 This project thus takes a constructivist approach to the question of state action under international law, providing an endogenous theory of which factors contribute to state compliance with international law and how state interpretation of such international law is made. One of the key contributions of this project is not only the consideration of the endogenous mechanisms which affect state compliance and development of a theory as to why similarly situated states may often maintain different approaches to the same international law, but the demonstration of the fact that to truly understand state compliance, we must understand the point from which states begin. This project seeks to explain that beginning point by focusing on how the legal tradition of states shapes the initial interpretation states make of international law, which then serves as the basis for a state’s efforts to comply or not comply, as the case may be.

(B) How International Law Matters – Building on the Compliance and Foreign Policy Literature

The question then becomes how international law matters in terms of state behavior. A great deal of existing literature focuses on the role that international law plays at both the system level in terms of state relationships with one another,64 and at the domestic level in terms of state decision-making about its own policies and course of action.65 One commonality among this literature, however, is that the international law studied is taken as a single, immutable entity. Whether provisions of the United Nations Charter, international environmental obligations, or state responsibility under international human rights law, existing work on the place of international law in the international political system works from the position that all states accept the same meaning of the international law at issue, and then all actions (or non-actions) are measured in terms of that single meaning.

The reality, however, is that international law, like all law, is open to interpretation and that there are multiple interpretations which are reasonable and could be considered valid.66 This means that states are not necessarily formulating policy or contemplating their course of action from the same starting point. This is a crucial factor to consider when attempting to understand state behavior in the international system.

States begin their policy process with different understandings of the world around them, and this goes for their understanding of international law as well. In order, therefore, to truly understand the position states take on specific issues, the policies they create, and the actions they take, we must understand what it is that makes up state understandings.

In this project, it is state understandings of international law – of the international rules that bind them – that are being considered.

This project builds on two primary literatures within the field; the literature on state compliance with international law and that concerning on the formulation of foreign policy. Each offers foundations upon which to build, but neither goes far enough in considering the development of state understandings of international rules, and the extent to which these rules guide state behavior. Particularly in the compliance literature, the focus on exogenous factor and traditional power and institutions theories limits the consideration of those factors which create the starting point from which compliance may be measured.

The literature addressing state compliance with international law has grown substantially since the end of the Cold War. A number of studies have been done seeking to understand the external and internal factors which contribute to state compliance with international rules. Some studies have focused on external factors such as economic incentives, regional pressures, and reputational concerns.67 Others have concentrated on the characteristics of the domestic factors which influence compliance with international law, such as regime type, electoral pressures, and level of NGO activity.68 None of these studies, however, consider the influence that a state’s domestic law may have on its treatment of international law. Moreover, while there are a growing number of studies which seek to address the ideational, cultural, and normative factors which may affect compliance,69 these are still outnumbered by more traditional systemic and institutional explanations. This project seeks to address both of these gaps by focusing not only on the legal beliefs held by states and the domestic legal institutions which protect these beliefs, but also by seeking to understand the mechanism by which these beliefs are translated into policies of interpretation of international law.

Like the compliance literature, existing work on foreign policy identifies a number of factors which influence state formulation of policy, including policy regarding a state’s position on international law. Much of this work, however, focuses on exogenous factors which influence the policy-process, rather than seeking to understand the constitutive components which shape policy-makers understandings of what state policy should be. For example, work has been done on how regime type and government structure affects foreign policy70; how public opinion affects foreign policy71; and how events in the international system affect foreign policy.72

Goldstein and Keohane’s book Ideas and Foreign Policy is one a work, however, which does seek to understand the mechanisms by which endogenous factors – those characteristics unique to states – may shape the policy development process. Arguing that there are three ways in which ideas can influence foreign policy, the authors create a framework upon which this project builds.73 Whereas Goldstein and Keohane focus on the mechanisms themselves, however, this project provides a theory as to what domestic factors actually drive these mechanisms. Focusing on two of the mechanisms in particular – road maps and principled beliefs – I suggest that legal tradition provides the basis for which ideas are translated into the foreign policy process concerning international law.

 

The importance of understanding interpretation: bringing law back in to politics

In addition to building on the literatures concerning foreign policy formulation and state compliance with international rules, an additional contribution of this project is the incorporation of law and legal considerations into international relations. Much attention has been paid in the field to the role that the legislative and executive branches of government have n creating foreign policy or complying with international rules. Much less attention has been directed, however, to the role of judicial branch of government, legal institutions, and legal tradition in influencing outcomes. This oversight has been recognized by scholars in the fields of both international law and international relations, but little has yet been done to address the gap.74 This is particularly surprising given the similar characteristics between domestic law and international law. Law is, after all, law. Therefore, it makes sense that the role of law at the domestic level would influence the approach a state takes to law at the international level. Little has been done, however, in the existing literature to address this relationship.

The following research-project seeks to address this gap. Law and interpretation go hand in hand. Law is a foundational component of society, one which at times precedes even the development of political systems.75

Developing as society develops, law not only creates the rules that govern everyday action, but also provides the shared understandings by which people are able to live together in a society without reversion to Hobbes’ war of “all against all”.76 There can be “no society without a system of law to regulate the relations of its members with one another.”77 Once law develops, the need for interpretation of that law emerges. Every law must be interpreted, whether it is an ancient tribal custom interpreted by village elders; a religious precept interpreted by leaders of the faith; constitutional principles of modern democracies interpreted by courts and legislatures; or principles of international law interpreted by states. Interpretation of the law may also bring about disagreement, as different peoples, sects, ideologies, and cultures may have varying ideas about the correct approach to interpreting the law. In most cases, varying interpretations are all based on plausible understandings of the law from the point of view of the interpreter.78 This, however, does not diminish the fact that differing interpretations between groups such as states can cause significant tension in state relationships. Understanding how states arrive at different interpretations may therefore provide a mechanism for lessening such tensions in future situations.

Along with much of the constructivist literature, international legal scholars have more and more been developing theory that examines the relationship between international law and international relations, combining the pragmatic and prospective discussion of international law most often found in the legal community with the empirical examination and theoretical and methodological rigor found in international relations. Much of this recent cross-over is due in great part to the rise of constructivism as a theoretical approach in international relations, as its reliance on constitutive theory and consideration of the process behind state action falls in line with that traditional considerations of the international lawyer in the development, interpretation, and then at the end, application of law. This has resulted in a discussion among members of both fields on the need to “bridge the divide” between the two disciplines.79

It is at this intersection of international law and international relations where we next build our theory on the constitutive implication for legal tradition on state interpretation of international law. Building on the idea of “politics within law, the idea that law can be constitutive of politics, that politics may take a distinctive form when conducted within the realm of legal reasoning and practice,”80 I theorize that it is law - specifically the legal tradition of a state – which constitutes the state decision-making process and the method of state interpretation of international law.

There have been a few works over the past several decades have touched on the issue of interpretation of international law by states. For example, Louis Henkin, in one of the first comprehensive works to cross the boundary of the two fields of international law and international relations, How Nations Behave, discusses how international law is a significant and restraint and influence on state behavior.81 A few years later in his work Rules, Norms, and Decisions, Friedrich Kratochwil argues that rules and norms matter for decision-making, not by being causes of action, but by providing reasons for action.82

A volume edited by Christian Reus-Smit entitled The Politics of International Law, examined the question of the interplay between politics and law in the behavior of states.83 In a number of different pieces within the volume, the authors have referred to the idea that states have different interpretations of international law. In the Reus-Smit book in fact, it is mentioned that: “As the recent debate about war with Iraq illustrates, much argument in international relations is precisely over the legal validity of the justifications advanced by states and other actors in defense of their actions.”84

Whereas this statement refers to the legal validity of different state interpretations under international law, what I have undertaken to explain in this project is what creates the different state interpretations in the first place.

As the focus of these works was predominantly a system-level examination of how existing international norms construct state behavior, none of the works considered how it was that states came to these different interpretations on the norms that influence behavior in the first place. This despite the fact that differing interpretations by states of international law is not “a new feature of international relations”85 and a number of these authors recognized that different interpretations exist. (One of the reasons we decided to undertake this researchproject)

Realist approaches do not consider law a causal factor in the behavior of states, let alone a constitutive one.86 For realist theory, state interpretation of international law, if considered at all, would be assumed to be a reflection of state interests, driven by power considerations. As anarchy and the drive for power form the principal assumptions of realist theory, little room is available for the consideration of legal factors. Further, given that state views on power are considered exogenous factors (i.e., every state seeks to improve its relative power position and use this power to its advantage), no constitutive examination is made of the factors which shape state views in the first place.87

Neo-liberal institutionalism, which shares many of the same core assumptions as realism, also has not considered the constitutive effects of legal tradition on state decision-making, nor how states arrive at differing interpretations of international law.

Institutionalist theory has recognized that international law does play a role in state behaviour 88 and studies have been done that examine which domestic factors contribute to state compliance with international law.89 However, little attention has been devoted to either legal tradition as a factor in the decision-making process, or understanding interpretation as an outcome.90 For neo-liberal institutionalism, the motives behind international law adherence often stem from a desire to engage in cooperation to protect one’s own interests or position. As with realism, little consideration is made of the endogenous factors that might drive these decisions. This paper adopts neither a realist nor an institutionalist approach to the problem of how states arrive at different interpretations of the same principle of international law.

Rather, it turns to constructivism and a constitutive analysis of the framework under which such interpretations are made. By rejecting the reliance on exogenous state interests and a common perception of an anarchical world, constructivism has opened the door to an examination of the constitutive origins of state interests and other motives for behavior.91 In adopting a constructivist approach to understanding the reasons behind a state’s particular interpretation of international law, this paper also seeks to address one of the common critiques of this approach by incorporating an examination of state interests into the theoretical structure.92 Unlike realism and institutionalism, however, this current  research project  does not presume that state interests are given and the consideration of interests bears the same weight in all decision-making processes, whether those interests focus of power relations or economic benefit. Nor is it assumed that interests uniformly serve as the primary motivating factor for state action. Rather, this paper examines interests as relevant to state interpretation of international law, but suggests the interests themselves must be viewed through the lens of legal tradition and can only be part of the policy process when they do not conflict with understandings of appropriate action under the law.

Law, and specifically in this case the legal tradition of a state, is a cornerstone of every society. At the same time, however, the law within every society is different; has developed out of a different history and has manifested itself in a different set of beliefs and institutions. When contemplating an action under an existing principle of international law, decision-making elites “assume the existence of a set of socially sanctioned rules.”93 Legal rules often, however, leave open the possibility for a number of different interpretations as to their meaning. These differences, I suggest, are fundamental in influencing the way state decision-makers, as products of their society, think about the law; whether it be the purpose of the law, the creation or amendment of legal principles, or the sources of law. Different interpretations of international legal principles are therefore reflections of the unique legal tradition of the state. Thus, because legal tradition is so foundational to each state, and constitutes the unique environment within which state decision-makers interpret international law, I suggest that a failure appreciate the strengths and weaknesses of the different legal traditions leads to controversy among states.94

Consideration of the constitutive effect that legal tradition may have on state decision-making regarding the appropriate interpretation of international law is important for a number of reasons. Understanding how it is that states interpret international law is important for our ultimate understanding of how states act. Understanding the methods of interpretation used by states may open a window into state disagreement over different forms of action in crucial times, and facilitate the working towards a mutually acceptable solution. In has long been understood that there may very well be more than one viable interpretation of the often-vague provisions of international law.95 Understanding how a single state arrives at one such interpretation when a different states arrives at the opposite can provide guidance has to how to overcome such obstacles. This is particularly important since, as we suggest here, the interpretation adopted by a state is usually based on socially-constructed ideas about law that go to the very heart of the decision-makers beliefs and identity. Without an understanding of how these beliefs came about, it can be very difficult to overcome such inherent beliefs.

Additionally, understanding how legal tradition shapes state interpretation of international law may provide insight for policy-makers and others working on rule of law issues in developing countries and struggle with different legal traditions that do not have the same view of the role of law we have in the United States.96 Understanding the different traditions of countries around the world has the potential to greatly facilitate negotiation and monitoring of international rules, and can provide insight into different reactions that states have to different issues, perhaps minimizing the types of misunderstandings we saw during the NATO action in Kosovo in 1999. It is thus our expectation that this study will help other researchers and policy-makers alike better understand the way in which states will approach international law.

 

State Behaviour in the International System P.2

State Behaviour in the International System P.3

State Behaviour in the International System P.4

State Behaviour in the International System P.5

State Behaviour in the International System P.6

1 Frederic R. Kirgis, “The Kosovo Situation and NATO Military in Action,” American Society of International Law ASIL Insight (March 1999), http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh30.htm.

2 Nicholas J. Wheeler, “The Kosovo Bombing Campaign,” in The Politics of International Law, ed. Christian Reus-Smit (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 207. In this case there “was no disagreement among contending actors as to what the appropriate legal rules were; nor was there any attempt to deny the binding character of these. The controversy existed over what counted as a legitimate target and whether the proportionality rule had been satisfied.”
3 Wheeler, “Kosovo Bombing Campaign,” 198.

4 Ibid., 199.

5 For an in-depth discussion of this phase of the NATO action, see Wheeler, “Kosovo Bombing Campaign,” 189-216.

6 These include the bridges over the Danube in Belgrade and elsewhere, the headquarters of Milosevic’s ruling Socialist Party, which also housed the offices of his daughter’s radio and tv stations, the headquarters of Radio Televisija Srbije, and shutting down the electrical grid in Belgrade. All described in Wheeler, “Kosovo Bombing Campaign,” 202-206.

7 Regarding the targets the U.S. military personnel overseeing the NATO campaigned wished to strike, Lt. General Michael C. Short, commander of the air campaign, stated, “There were still military and political targets in Belgrade I’d like to have gone after. Clearly, I’d like to have dropped the Rock and Roll bridge. There were other bridges across the Danube that we would like to have dropped. There were economic targets, factories, plant capabilities that had dual capacity for producing military goods and civilian goods. . . There was still part of the power grid that we hadn’t hit. … Air war … is designed to go after that target set, as rapidly and as violently and with as much lethality as possible. Just stun the enemy. And we never stunned them, from my perspective.”, quoted in Wheeler, “Kosovo Bombing Campaign,” 201-202.

8 President Chirac “boasted after the war that any bridges left standing on the Danube were down to him.” Wheeler, “Kosovo Bombing Campaign”, 202.

9 Wheeler, “Kosovo Bombing Campaign,” 213.

10 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, “On Compliance,” International Organization 47 (1993); Antonia Chayes and Abram Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); W. Dixon, “Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict,” American Political Science Review 88 (1994); George Downs, David Rocke, and Peter Barsoom, "Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?,” International Organization 50 (1996): 379-406; Judith Goldstein and Lisa Martin, “Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics,” International Organization 54 (Summer 2000): 603-32; Beth Simmons, Beth, “Compliance with International Agreements,” Annual Review of Political Science 1 (1998):75-93; Beth Simmons, “International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs,” American Political Science Review 94 (2000): 819-836.

11 “[T]he Law is open to interpretation.” Wheeler, “Kosovo Bombing Campaign,” 205-206

12 Legal tradition is discussed in detail in part 2.

13 Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds. Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994).

14 Wheeler, “Kosovo Bombing Campaign.”

15 René David, French Law: Its Structure, Sources, and Methodology, trans. Michael Kindred (1960; Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University. Press, 1972).The continental conception of law, which prevails in France, is very different [from the common law]. Although law is certainly the concern of jurists, it is not their concern alone. It involves the whole population, because it establishes the very principles of social order and thus tells citizens how they should behave, in accordance with the community’s ideas of what is moral and just. Law should not be, and is not, an esoteric science; rather, it must be accessible to the greatest possible number of persons. Because it has an educational role, it is linked to the whole prevailing existential philosophy. It takes the place of social morality and, for some, aspires to replace religion itself.

16 International law is created at the international system level through multilateral discussion, treaties, and the work of international organizations. Compliance with international law, however, must take place through incorporation of international legal principles into the domestic legal structure of a state. For a state to truly comply with its international legal obligations it must believe such rules are binding. In countries like France and the United States (i.e. representative democracies) it is the voting population that influences government decisions about state behavior. The better international law is incorporated into the domestic framework, the more likely the populations of these states are to acknowledge and accept its tenets, and the more likely it is that the population will want the government to act according to those tenets that it feels are binding. Once incorporated, principles of international law are viewed in the same manner as domestic laws, both in terms of binding authority and in terms of interpretation and alteration.

17 See generally Mary Ann Glendon, Michael Wallace Gordon, and Christopher Osakwe, Comparative Legal Traditions, 2nd ed. (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing, 1994); Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law, 2nd (Touchstone/Simon & Schuster,1985); Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, France and the United States: From the Beginnings to the Present, trans. Derek Coltman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1978), 12.

18 Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 4. “I wish to show that cynical “realism” about international law is unrealistic, that it does not reflect the facts of international life: law is a major force in international affairs; nations rely on it, invoke it, observe and are influenced by it in every aspect of their foreign relations.”; see also Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, “ International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda,”. American Journal of International Law 87 (1993):205-239; Emilia Justyna Powell and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, “The International Court of Justice and the World’s Three Legal Systems,” The Journal of Politics 69, 2, May 2007.

19 Christian Reus-Smit, “The Politics of International Law,” in The Politics Of International Law, ed. Christian Reus-Smit (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 15. Realist thought treats politics as a struggle for material power between sovereign states, and law as either irrelevant or a reflection of the prevailing balance of power.

20 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th ed. (New York: Knopf; 1985); Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939 (London: Macmillan and Company Limited, 1939).

21 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 3rd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2000), xix quoted in Reus-Smit, “The Politics of International Law,” 46.

22 The remainder of discussion in this project focuses on the tenets of neo-realism rather than the realism of Morgenthau.

23 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979).

24 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law, 2nd ed. (London; New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1912); Waltz, Theory of International Politics; John Gerard Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge,” International Organization 52 (1998); John J. Mearsheimer, 1994/95. “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19 (1994/1995):5-49; Christian Reus-Smit, “The Politics of International Law”, 14. The majority of international relations scholars “still see international law as an epiphenomenon, a simple reflection of underlying power politics or a functional solution to co-operation problems.”

25 Carr, Twenty Years Crisis; Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations; Waltz, Theory of International Politics; Mearsheimer, “False Promise”.12

26 Henkin, How Nations Behave, 337. “Realists” who do not recognize the uses and the force of law are not realistic….”; Rosalyn Higgins ; Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Martha Finnemore, "Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism," International Organization 50 (1996a); see also Reus-Smit, “The Politics of International Law,” 17. It is “clear that contrary to realist claims strong states are, in important cases, constrained by international law.”

27 For example, in completing the International Convention on the Law of the Sea, the wishes of the United States were not granted in terms of the ability by states to enter the territorial waters of others, and the responsibilities of states towards the commons. Similarly, in creating the Rome Statute to the International Criminal Court, which is discussed in detail in Chapter six, the wishes of the United States in terms of the role of the UN Security Council and the referral of cases to the court were not incorporated into the text.

28 Reus-Smit, “The Politics of International Law,” 40.

29 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. Another early realist, E.H. Carr also understood that international relations could not be understood by power relations alone, recognizing the underlying importance of societal beliefs and moral/ethical principles in state behavior. See Carr, Twenty Years Crisis.

30 For a discussion of the constraining effect of international law without express consent see Henkin, How Nations Behave; see also Robyn Eckersley, “Soft law, hard politics, and the Climate Change Treaty,” in The Politics of International, ed. Christian Reus-Smit (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 91 discussing the concept of regulative ideals which guide state behavior in the absence of explicit consent.

31 Henkin, How Nations Behave, 31. “Even the rich and mighty, however, cannot commonly obtain what they want by force or dictation and must be prepared to pay the price of reciprocal or compensating obligation. Even they, moreover, seek legitimacy and acceptance for their policies, desire order and dependability in their relations and the conservative influence of the law. Sometimes, even, they seek protection in the law from the will of majorities and the “tyranny of the weak.”

32 Higgins . Higgins suggests that decision-makers are faced with making choices between competing legal claims, each of which could, depending on the situation, be valid.; Wheeler, “Kosovo Bombing Campaign,” 193.

33 Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave.

34 Richard H. Steinberg and Jonathan M. Zasloff, “Power and International Law”, American Journal of International Law 100 (2006), 81. “Much rationalist work in international law – particularly the early work – treats states as unitary actors with interests that are exogenous to the model. This approach swept under the carpet a crucial question: where do state interests come from?”

35 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 3rd ed. (New York: Addison, Wesley, Longman, 2001); David A. Baldwin, “Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics,” in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. by D. A. Baldwin. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

36 Philip G. Cerny, “Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action,” International Organization 49 (1995):595-625; Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, Jr., “How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms,” International Studies Quarterly 40 (1996): 451-478.; Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971); Beth Simmons, “Compliance with International Agreements,” Annual Review of Political Science 1 (1998): 75-93.

37 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Robert Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation," International Security
24 (1999); Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence; Reus-Smit, “The Politics of International Law,” 18; Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 3.

38 Reus-Smit, “The Politics of International Law,” 15; see also Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation; Keohane, After Hegemony; Goldstein and Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy; Simmons, “Compliance with International Agreements”.

39 Keohane, After Hegemony; Henkin, How Nations Behave, 29. “Every nation derives some benefits from international law and international agreements. Law keeps international society running, contributes to order and stability, provides a basis and a framework for common enterprise and mutual intercourse. Because it limits the actions of other governments, law enhanced each nation’s independence and security; in other ways, too, by general law or particular agreement, one nation gets others to behave as it desires. General law establishes common standards where they seem desirable. Both general law and particular agreement avoid the need for negotiating anew in every new instance; both create justified expectation and warrant confidence as to how others will behave.”

40 Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation; Keohane, After Hegemony; Simmons, “Compliance with International Agreements”; Goldstein and Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy.

41 Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." International Organization 42 (1988): 427-60; Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory." International Organization 41 (1987).

42 Chayes and Chayes, "On Compliance”; Simmons, "Compliance with International Agreements"; Beth Simmons, "International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs," American Political Science Review 94 (2000): 819-36; Linda Camp Keith, "The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does It Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?," Journal of Peace Research 36 (1999): 95-118.

43 Robert Axelrod, "An Evolutionary Approach to Norms." American Political Science Review 80 (1986): 1095-111; Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," International Organization 52 (1998).

44 Cortell and Davis, "How Do International Institutions Matter?”; Henkin, How Nations Behave.

45 Reus-Smit, “The Politics of International Law,” 19.

46 Eckersley, “Soft law, hard politics, and the Climate Change Treaty,” 81. “Mainstream approaches to treaty-making take the distribution of material capabilities and/or interests of states in the context of a fixed structure and logic of international anarchy as a sufficient explanation of the treaty processes and outcomes.”

47 Reus-Smit, “The Politics of International Law,” 19-20. International law can serve as the basis of action. For example, “[w]hen states negotiated the laws of war, or codified the norms comprising the ‘International Bill of Rights’, they were not just formulating and enshrining a set of rules, they were enacting and proclaiming a particular conception of legitimate statehood and rightful state action.”

48 Ibid., 20.

49 Ibid., 21 “The idea that politics is simply power or utility-maximizing action, and that international law is at worst epiphenomenal and at best a set of functional rules, has been challenged over the past decade by a new wave of constructivist international theory.”

50 Constructivists also differ from realists and institutionalist in that they recognize with greater ease the important role actors besides states play in the international system. For purposes of this project, however, since we are looking at state interpretation of international legal principles, we will just refer to states.

51 Reus-Smit, “The Politics of International Law,” 21-22. In fact, constructivism argues that norms explain what is, in fact, not easily explained by traditional paradigms in political science. See also Finnemore, “Norms, Culture, and World Politics”; Martha Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of
Humanitarian Intervention," in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). Given that the major paradigms highlighted above are framed primarily in terms of material forces, constructivists argue they should be able to explain why the drive for power or specific interests are important. However, given that neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism treat these drives as exogenous, they are not explained. That, according to the constructivist approach, is a problem.

52 Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What the States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization 46 (1992): 391-425; Ted Hopf "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," International Security 23, (1998).

53 Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism" International Security 23 (1998).

54 Eckersley, “Soft law, hard politics, and the Climate Change Treaty,” 95. Neorealists and neoliberals assume that the anarchic character of international society is such that states will always behave in mistrustful and/or instrumental ways. Against assumptions, Wendt has argued that just as different social structures can produce different social roles and identities, and different modes of relating, so too can different ‘cultures of anarchy’ produce different state roles and relationships.”.

55 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics.

56 For example, a bomb (a material force) means something different to the terrorist using the bomb and to the individual who will be blown up by the bomb.

57 Goldstein and Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy.

58 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics.

59 Reus-Smit, “The Politics of International Law,” 22.

60 Reus-Smit, “The Politics of International Law,” 15; Steinberg and Zasloff, “Power and International Law,” 82. “In the analytical approaches above, interests 0 whether those of individuals, the group, or the state – are taken to be real, solid, and usually driven by material considerations. And the actors that are privileged in various theories – whether individuals, interest groups, or the state – are presumed to matter because they have power based on various material assets. At its core, constructivism offers a revolutionary, ontological challenge to that stance, claiming that neither power nor interests exist independently of the group. Interests and identity are constructed socially; they are plastic and may be refined. International law may be understood as both a reflection of identities and interests of the powerful, and as a social artifact that reinforces identities, interests, and power.”

61 Henkin, How Nations Behave, 337. “[I]dealists who do not recognize the law’s limitations are largely irrelevant to the world that is.”

62 My theory and research design incorporating legal tradition and interests into a constructivist
framework are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

63 Richard Price, “Emerging customary norms and anti-personnel landmines,” in The Politics of International Law, ed. Christian Reus-Smit (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 108. Not only norms, but “state interests themselves are socially-constructed” by the constituting norms, which in this case is legal tradition.

64 Burley, “International Law and International Relations Theory,” 205-239; Simmons, “International Law and State Behavior,” 819-836.

65 Cortell and Davis, “How Do International Institutions Matter?,” 451-478; Goldstein, “
International Law and Domestic Institutions,” 541-64.

66 Wheeler, “Kosovo Bombing Campaign,” 195. “States can agree on relevant principles, but disagree on what this means in terms of their application …”.

67 Simmons, “Compliance with International Agreements,” 75-93; Simmons, “ International Law and State Behavior,” 819-836; George W. Downs and Michael A. Jones, “ Rational Choice and International Law: Reputation, Compliance and International Law,” Journal of Legal Studies 31 (2002): 95-114.

68 Jack Donnelly, “International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis,” International Organization 40 (1986): 599-642; Simmons, “Compliance with International Agreements”; Simmons, “International Law and State Behavior”.

69 Simmons, “Compliance with International Agreements.”

70 Goldstein and Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy; Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence.

71 Ole R. Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996); Dan Reiter and Allen Stam, Democracies at War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); Amy Skonieczney, “Constructing NAFTA: Myth, Representation and the Discursive Construction of U.S. Foreign Policy,” International Studies Quarterly 45 (2001): 433-54.

72 Goldstein and Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy.

73 Ibid.

74 Slaughter Burley, “International Law and International Relations Theory”.

75 H.L.A. Hart, 1994 (1961) The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (1961; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 1.

76 Henkin, How Nations Behave, 330.

77 J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations, 6th ed., ed. Sir Humphrey Waldock (Oxford: The Clarendon University Press, 1963).

78 Wheeler, “The Kosovo Bombing,” 191. “There is no single correct way of applying the law in particular cases because it is open to different interpretation, each of which is plausible in its own terms.”

79 Christian Reus-Smit, “Introduction,” The Politics of International Law, ed. Christian Reus-Smit (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 2.

80 Reus-Smit, “The Politics of International Law”, 14.

81 Henkin, How Nations Behave.

82 Fredrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs, Cambridge Studies in International Relations. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

83 Christian Reus-Smit, “The Politics of International Law.”

84 Reus-Smit, “The Politics of International Law,” 17-18.

85 Kritsiotis, at 64.

86 Oppenheim, International Law; Waltz, Theory of International Politics; Mearsheimer, “False Promise of International Institutions,” 5-49; Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together?.”

87 Waltz, Theory of International Politics.

88 Steinberg and Zasloff, “Power and International Law,” 64-87.

89 Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation; Keohane, After Hegemony; Jervis, “ Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation”; Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence.

90 A recent article by Beth Simmons has identified the potential for the explanatory power of legal tradition. Beth Simmons, “Why Commit? Explaining State Acceptance with International Human Rights Obligations” (working paper, International Legal Studies Working Paper Series, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley, 2002); reiterated in Sonia Cardenas, “Norm Collision: Explaining the Effects of International Human Rights Pressure on State Behavior,” International Studies Review 6 (2004): 213-231.

91 Steinberg and Zasloff, “Power and International Law”; see also Reus-Smit, “Introduction,” 21-22.

92 For a discussion of this particular critique of constructivism, see Reus-Smit, “Introduction”; see also Henkin, How Nations Behave, 337.

93 Reus-Smit, “The Politics of International Law,” 41.

94 Henkin, How Nations Behave, 337. Law “a major force in international relations and a major determinant in national policy. Its influence is diluted, however, and sometimes outweighed, by other forces in a “developing” international society. Failure to appreciate the strengths and weaknesses of the law underlies much misunderstanding about it and many of the controversies about its significance.”

95 Wheeler, “Kosovo Bombing Campaign,” 191. “There is no single correct way of applying the law in particular cases because it is open to different interpretations, each of which is plausible in its own terms.”

96 It is important that a work of international relations scholarship be as useful (policy-relevant) for diplomats, police-makers and international lawyers, as it is to scholars. For a discussion of the need for policy-relevant scholarship, see Joseph Lepgold and Miroslav Nincic, Beyond the Ivory Tower: Scholarship and Statesmanship in International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001) and Miroslav Nincic and Joseph Lepgold, eds. Being Useful: The Policy Relevance of International Relations Theory (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000).
 

 

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