Most BJP, RSS, and
VHP activists usually speak approvingly of aspirators like Swami Vivekananda
(1863-1902); V D. Savarkar (1883-1966); Bankimchandra Chatterjee (1838-1894),
and M.S. Golwalkar founder of the RSS and co-founder of the VHP itself.
From a sociological
point of view the basic rhetoric of the RSS is telling when is
foundation is intended; For the creation of men and women with muscles of iron
and nerves of steel to fulfill their duties in the great up-hill battle of
nation-building that await us today. - Anthony Elenjimittam,
Philosophy and Action of the R.S.S. for the Hind Swaraj.
And earlier of course
Vivekananda already announced that; “We have to conquer the world. That we have
to! India must conquer the world, and nothing less than [that] is my ideal....
We must conquer the world or die. There is no other alternative.” (Jyotirmayananda (ed)., Vivekananda: His gospel of
man-making with a garland of tributes and a chronicle of his life and times
with pictures, Madras, 1992, p. 53)
Through its shakhas, publications, and speeches, the RSS circulates a
master narrative emphasizing the need for an organized and united India
represented by its valorization of the figures of Hindu soldier and warrior
monk.
The Vishwa Hindu
Parishad (or VHP) draws on a similar interpretation of nation, yet aims to
bring the image of a united, strong, and nonsectarian Hindu community to
ordinary folk (Basu, T, P Datta, S. Sarkar, T Sarkar, and S. Sen, Khaki shorts
and saffron flags: A Critique of the Hindu right. New Delhi,1993, p. 64).
On its website, the
VHP clearly states that it aims "to consolidate, strengthen and make
invincible the global [italics added] Hindu fraternity by following the eternal
and universal life values based on Sanatan Dharma [ancient religion] and work
for total welfare of humanity on the basis of the unique cultural ethos of Bharatvarsha " (VHP, Aims and Objects). The
organization's focus on the masses as well as its global reach distinguishes it
from the RSS. SEWA International does underline the RSS's move towards a more
international profile; however, India, still remains its primary arena of
mobilization.
A further difference
as articulated by an official spokesperson of the VHP lies in the objective of
each organization, while the VHP declares itself as a mass organization, the
RSS through its shakhas, training camps, and pracharak system envisions the creation of an elite cadre
of leaders devoted to patriotic duty. Through schools in rural areas, medical
camps, cultural events, satsangs, plus encourages its
young men and women to learn martial arts while pledging their lives in service
to the Hindu nation.
Yet masculinity
configured in the image of the warrior-monk and the Hindu soldier frames this
organization's activities. For example, the VHP's headquarters in New
Delhi-Sankat Mochan Ashram-is constructed as an ashram or a devotional retreat.
Saffron flags are evident everywhere while a temple occupies the central
courtyard. Our hosts kindly invited us to a vegetarian lunch served on the
floor in traditional Indian style. However, when interviewed, his unconscious
(or perhaps conscious) echo of the aggressive militarism advocated by Savarkar
was unmistakable. When overcome with passion, he banged on the table in front
of him to declare that if nonviolence did not enable national glory, then
Hindus had to win back their respect with violence if necessary (personal
interview, New Delhi, February 8, 2002).
This sentiment also
reverberates on the VHP website: "Are Hindus cowards then? Are they
forever going to take things lying down? Have centuries of Muslim conquests,
rape, looting, forced conversion, razing of thousands of temples, imprinted so
much on India's psyche, that we can only endlessly produce Vijay Amritrajes [Indian tennis player]; talented, nice, but
unable to fight, to win, to defeat the opponent.... COME ON INDIA: Stand up and
fight" (Gautier, http://www.vhp.org/englishsite/e.Special Movements/dRanjanambhumi%20M
uti/ayodhyaafterdec6.html).
In his book
“Hindutva”, Savarkar sketched the national boundaries he envisioned by
distinguishing between Sindhustan-the land between
the River Indus and the Indian Ocean-and Mlechhastan,
representing the domicile land of foreigners outside these geographical
boundaries.
Savarkar soon focused
solely on Islam as the enemy:
That is why some of
our Mohamedan or Christian countrymen who had
originally been forcibly converted to Non-Hindu religion ... are not and cannot
be recognized as Hindus. Their holy land is far off in Arabia or Palestine.
Their mythology and Godmen are not the children of this soil. Their love is
divided.... Nay if some of them be really believing what they profess to do,
there can be no choice, they must set their Holyland above their Father-land in
their love and allegiance. (Savarkar, The Indian war of independence. Mumbai,
India: Dhanvale Prakashan. 1960, p. 94)
The Islamic
"other," represented by millions residing within India, derives its
malevolent energy from divided loyalty. The Christian and Muslim reverence for
prophets and sacred spaces outside the ancient geographical territory known as
Hindustan makes followers of these faiths suspect and potential traitors in
Savarkar's eyes. He contended that Muslims and Christians (originally Hindus)
can redeem themselves by freely choosing to reject their conversion and
returning to Hinduism (p. 94).
In his narrative of
the Hindu nation and Islam, Savarkar evoked a culture based on masculine
Hinduism that despite the valiant attempts of the Rajputs
and Marathas failed to resist Islamic conquest and the forcible conversion of
its people. In explaining this weakness, Savarkar returned to his former
arguments against ahimsa (nonviolence). Whether because of its close contact
with Buddhism or other forces, Hinduism during the various Afghan, Mongol, ind Persian invasions could not resist because its martial
valor had been weakened by ideas of tolerance, kindness, chivalry, and
forgiveness. Savarkar does not demean these values absolutely but argues that
if one is to resist the "sword of Islam," a celebration of such ideas
weakens (effeminizes) masculine Hinduism and makes a nation vulnerable. He
illustrates this weakness with very explicit gendered imagery.
In his view, Muslim
conquerors raped Hindu women both to sully the honor of Hindu national manhood
and to spread Islam "and these [Hindu] women ... were distributed by fives
or tens amongst the most faithful followers of Islam. The future progeny of
these conquered women were born Muslim" (p. 176). Even Muslim women
"did everything in their power to harass such captured and kidnapped Hindu
women" (p. 178). However, Hindus could not resist such threats
"because [of] the then prevalent perverted religious ideas about chivalry
to women, which ultimately proved highly detrimental to the Hindu
community" (p. 179). Adopting the voice of the plaintive, raped Hindu
women, Savarkar chided the great Hindu warrior Shivaji: "Did not the
plaintive screams and pitiful lamentations of the millions of molested Hindu
women ... reach the ears of Shivaji Maharaj?" (p. 179).
In the above
material, women signify national honor; the capture and rape of Hindu women
highlights an effeminization of Hinduism as Hindu
warriors, weakened by "perverted religious ideas," fail to resist
this attack on their honor. Savarkar's denigration of Hindu notions of chivalry
seems to indicate his belief that the only response to the sullying of national
honor by Muslim men was retaliatory rape of Muslim women by Hindu men. Echoes
of this stance indeed seem to resonate in modem Hindu nationalist actions, in
the recent (2002) violence in Gujarat.
In Savarkar's mind,
Muslim machinations coupled with the Gandhian doctrine of nonviolence
(presumably a legacy of Buddhist influence) conspired to make Hindus
vulnerable. His advocacy of this belief became most in doing so I made it my
duty to give a fillip to military awakening amongst the Hindus by addressing
thousands and thousands of Hindu youths. (p. 204; italics added)
Savarkar stressed
that it was the duty of young Hindu men to join the Indian army to fight for
their country and to resist Islamic contamination of the Hindu army. He ended
his address to the twenty-fourth session of the Mahasabha by exclaiming: "Hinduise all politics and Militarise
Hinduism!" (p. 302)
The members of the
Bajrang Dal, a youth group affiliated with the VHP, declares it is the
"security ring of Hindu Society" and whenever "there is an
attack on Hindu Society, Faith, and Religion, the workers of the Bajrang Dal
come forward for their rescue." Such defense is necessary because
"Hindu Society and its faith are being kicked and insulted by various
forces for the last fourteen hundred years" (VHP, Dimensions of VHP).
The youthful members
of the Bajrang Dal have taken on the role of soldiers protecting the
motherland. Although, officially they reject violence and declare they only
resist insults to Hinduism through democratic means (VHP, Dimensions of VHP),
this support for democracy seems weakened in face of their avowed intention to
not appear submissive to their foes. As Dr. Surendra Jain, a Dal leader claims,
"The Bajrang Dal is assertive not militant ... missionaries consider
Hindus a soft target. Even words `soft target' were used in the missionary
literature. However, now the Hindus have woken up. We are no more a soft target
for their unholy activities" (Diwanji, Hindus
are a Soft Target). Although it is possible to demonstrate invincible strength
and resistance through democratic means, reality challenges this professed support
for democracy claimed by the Dal. The most recent challenge derives from the
Dal's implication in the Ahmedabad riots of 2002. A dramatic portrait of a Dal
activist on the cover of the news magazine Outlook (March 11, 2002) captures
the mode of participation undertaken by this group: a young bearded man whose
very being radiates fury with a steel rod upheld in one hand and a saffron
bandana tied around his forehead.
On February 27, 2002,
coach S-6 of the Sabarmati Express on its way to New Delhi pulled out of
Godhra-a small station just outside the city of Baroda in Gujarat-and stopped a
little less than a mile outside the station. VHP activists who occupied S-6 were
suddenly attacked with acid-filled containers, stones, and burning rags. The
railway carriages caught on fire and fifty-eight people, including twenty-six
women and sixteen children burned to death. There was no question that this was
a well-orchestrated attack undertaken by Islamic militants. Such aggressive
behavior was seen by the Bajrang Dal as a call to battle for the protection of
the Hindu homeland. Cities in Gujarat erupted into violence as Hindu activists
targeted Muslim homes and businesses to exact retribution for the horrific
attack on the Sabarmati Express.
But aggression and
violence of this sort is one possible outcome of a cultural nationalism
articulated with images of warriors and the vocabulary of martial prowess.
Further, such language within the VHP narrates a monolithic nation devoid of
diversity and nuance: "In place of `India that is Bharat,' we should have
said 'Bharat that is Hindustan.' Official documents refer to the `composite
culture,' but ours is certainly not a composite culture.... In a very
fundamental sense, this country has a unique cultural oneness [italics added].
No country if it has to survive can have compartments" (VHP, Unifying
Heritage).
The VHP
rejection of "composite culture" or diversity is tied to its fear
that an acceptance of "compartments" will usher in chaos and
seemingly obstruct the unity required for a disciplined, masculine nation. It
follows a chain of reasoning similar to that of the RSS to configure a
homogenous, monolithic India: caste hierarchies as well as diverse
interpretations and manners of Hindu worship are erased, Sikhs, Jains, and
Buddhists are included into the Hindu fold, while Christians and Muslims are
constructed as "original" Hindus converted to an alien religion.
Finally, like the RSS, the VHP objects to the notion of Adivasis or indigenous
peoples of India, preferring the term "vanavasis."
Thus the VHP, through
devotional meetings, texts, electronic media, and schools, disseminates the
notion of a united, homogenous Hindu nation embodying martial prowess and
invincible strength. Put another way, masculine Hinduism-interpreted as Hindu
soldier-represents the ideal citizen of a strong Indian nation. In the VHP's
vision manhood becomes quite unidimensional as ideas of spiritual vigor, moral
fortitude, and asceticism popularized by Vivekananda retreat to the background
and Savarkar's view of Hindu manhood as an expression of raw military power
moves to the fore.
The VHP as well as
the RSS are not political parties; rather, they define themselves as social
organizations aiming to build a strong and proud Hindu India. In contrast, the Bharatiya Janata Party is political, it contests elections,
and until recently (2004) Atul Behari Vajpayee of the BJP was the Prime
Minister of India. However, for many Indian social observers the BJP's status
as a participant in electoral democracy does not mute this party's affiliation
with strident cultural nationalism, and they argue that the BJP as a member of
the "Sangh Parivar" (or the Sangh family) comprising the VHP and RSS
together with all their affiliated groups is implicated in the spread of
xenophobic conflict in India.' There is no doubt that BJP politicians have
strong ties to the RSS. For example, Vajpayee himself was a RSS pracharak as was Narendra Modi, the BJP Chief Minister of
Gujarat.' Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that a variation of the
masculinized interpretation of nation emerges in its ideology.
PS. Already Paul R.
Brass in The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India, Oxford
University Press, 2003 asked;1) Why do Hindu-Muslim communal riots persist in
India? (2) Why do they wax and wane, bursting out here and there at various places
differentially and at different times? (3) How does it happens that massive
episodes of violence--in which particular religious groups are targeted--get
classified in the public domain as riots rather than pogroms? (4) What
interests are served and what power relations are maintained as a consequence
of communal antagonisms and violence?
Brass ventures an
explanation, bolstered by the fieldwork in Aligarh: that were riots are
endemic, what he calls "institutionalized riot systems" exist in
which "known persons and groups occupy specific roles in the rehearsal for
and the production of communal riots. Even more explicitly, he states that the
production of communal riots is very often a political one, being associated
with intense inter-party competition and mass mobilization.
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