The
power of history and the new Nationalism in China
As
we early on have seen it was in the period of the late
Qing Dynasty and the early Republic of China was the formation stage of modern
Chinese nationalism and also the stage of the proposition and initial usage of
the concept of “Chinese nation”: Modern Chinese nationalism developed around
the period of the May 4th Movement.
And
although Mao Zedong in March 1953 still referred to "Han chauvinism"
to criticize his rival Kuomintang party, this drastically changed following the
1989 Tiananmen crackdown when history and memory were developed to become a new
nationalistic power.
To
understand where this unique present-day re-invented nationalism in China comes
from we have to understand that during the 20th century, the Chinese Communist
Party utilized first communism and then patriotism to mobilize the population.
Both times, the tremendous power of mobilization was seen and its implications
shocked the whole world. In two different periods of time and in quite
different international and domestic contexts, both communism and then patriotism
were truly welcomed and accepted by many Chinese people. Thus Chinese academic
historians routinely produce sophisticated works of “modern” critical history
modeled on the evidential research tradition and Western historiography.
All
this was obviously not just the evidence of the power of communist propaganda.
In fact, behind the two massive ideological movements, we can see the power of
history and memory.
The
reasons behind the relative lack of attention to history and memory even in W.
Europe and the USA, vary widely in different disciplines. In history, the
long-standing tradition of seeking "scientific objectivity" until
recently did not allow the examination of historical writing in relation to the
articulation of collective memory. In Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical
Framework, Judith Goldstein, and Robert Keohane explained why ideas (including
history and memory and other ideational factors) have been underestimated-if
not ignored-in the field of international relations. In fact, Madeleine
Albright recently mentioned some of this in an anecdotal way.(1)
History
and memory are not something that stays only in people's minds, they can also
be materialized. For example, there are a multitude of ways through which
collective memory is standardized and reproduced from national holidays, books,
articles in the popular press, documentaries, museums, monuments, films, and
other media have played key roles in the formation of collective memory and
identity, both nationally and globally. According to Anthony D. Smith (2),
while these media allow for the exposition and description of a rich tapestry
of details, they have to follow a particular logic inherent in nation-building.
This logic is crystallized in a "national narrative"-the historical
tale of the evolution of a particular people through the ages.
History
textbooks have been regarded as the major component in the construction and
reproduction of national narratives. Some scholars have conducted detailed
studies about how different countries deal with the history and memory issues
in their education systems and how conflicting national narratives of different
sides have generated conflicts. For example, Chunghee
Sarah Soh (2003) describes and interprets South Korean citizens' recent
national furor over Japanese history textbooks. The author observes that
Koreans harbor a deep sense of victimization in their collective memories of
the checkered historical relationship with Japan, which, in turn, has generated
a nationalist vehemence to vanquish Japan's ethnocentric representations of
bilateral and regional events in history textbooks. (3)
In
regards to China, a good example was presented earlier this year (2006), when
The Wall Street Journal reported that the Chinese Government ordered the closure
of Bingdian Weekly because the weekly argued that
“official textbooks inaccurately depicted the 1900 Boxer Rebellion, a
nationalist uprising” in which thousands of Chinese Christians and many
foreigners were killed. Not surprising, in the same article, the WSJ also
concluded,” Beijing’s anxiety over a news media that is increasingly driven by
market forces and a burgeoning sense of professionalism, rather than official
propaganda directives. Authorities have jailed several Chinese journalists in
the past two years and moved to tone down feistier publications.” (4)
As
for the historical subject mentioned in the WSJ, a hundred years following the
1840 Opium War, China was on the verge of subjugation and loss of its
thousands-year-long national identity. The Eight-Power Allied Forces occupied
Beijing in 1900. Japan annexed Taiwan and Manchuria and occupied more than 900
cities from China. Hong Kong, Macao, and numerous small areas became concession
zones to foreign powers. The invasion by Western powers and Japan reduced China
to the status of semi-colonial society. The Chinese nation was facing a grave
threat to national survival.
"The peoples
of China are in the most critical time, everybody must roar his defiance."
As represented by China's national anthem, a very strong sense of crisis, or
sense of insecurity, has always been an important theme of the national
political discourse in China. But as seen from even Albright’s above-mentioned
book, the narrative of national salvation depends upon national humiliation;
the narrative of national security depends upon national insecurity.
After
the end of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), the most serious challenge for
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the 1980s was a crisis of faith in
socialism, crisis of belief in Marxism, and crisis of trust in the party. When
the official Communist ideology lost credibility, the Communist regime became
incapable of enlisting mass support behind a socialist vision of the future.
There was a spiritual vacuum resulting from decades of communist repression of
both traditional and Western belief systems. Under these circumstances, some
intellectuals, particularly the younger generation of intellectuals, turned to
Western liberal ideas and called for Western style democratic reform. The
belief and faith crises finally evolved into a pro-democracy movement and
eventually led to the large-scale Tiananmen demonstration in the spring of
1989. These crises became even more evident following the international
collapse of the communist ideology itself. China's communist rulers feared
that, in the mind of ordinary Chinese, they had already lost the "mandate of heaven" to rule china.
And
where during the 1980's, largely due to the relatively liberal political
environment and the policies of reform-minded top leadership, Chinese
nationalism had a moderate orientation, this changed following the 1989
Tiananmen crackdown when history and memory were developed to become a new
power.
China's
post-1989 patriotic education campaign
The
''patriotic education campaign", launched shortly after the
"Tiananmen Incident" was used to redefine the legitimacy of the post-
Tiananmen leadership in a way that would permit the Communist Party' s rule to
continue on the basis of a non-Communist ideology.
Thus,
since 1991, the ruling party has successfully made the education available at
all times and everywhere in people's daily lives. The content of history and
memory has become institutionalized in China-embedded in political institutions
and the Chinese Communist Party's new ideological tools. Although all
nation-states, from Western democracies to non-democratic societies, have laid
great emphasis on teaching their national history, it would not be an
exaggeration to say that the Campaign for Patriotic Education in China is one
of the most massive attempts of using national history to conduct ideological
re-education in human history.
In
August 1991, the National Education Council issued the "General Outline on
Strengthening Education on Chinese Modern and Contemporary History and National
Conditions." The Outline asked the education administrations of different
levels to organize all their officials and teachers and have them study the
Outline and President Jiang's letter and use the Outline as the "guiding
document" for history education.
Three
years later, in August 1994, the CPC Central Committee and the State Council
jointly issued another document "Outline on the Implementation of
Education in Patriotism." This Outline set off an upsurge of patriotic
education in the whole society. The education content of this Campaign is
"about what China was like in the old days and what kind of a country it
was to become.”
Beijing
called upon the whole nation to study China's humiliating modem history and how
much the country has been changed by the Chinese Communist revolution. The
education focuses on China's "chosen trauma" ("a century of
humiliation" starting from the Opium War in 1840) and "chosen
glory"-its splendid ancient civilization and "revitalization"
via the recent achievements.
In
the Outline on the Implementation of Education in Patriotism. the CCP Central
Committee states explicitly the mission of this nationwide political campaign:
The
purpose of conducting patriotic education is to inspire the national spirit,
strengthen the national cohesion, set up people's sense of self-respect and
sense of pride. and to consolidate and develop the most widely united front.
Our purpose is also to lead the people's patriotic enthusiasm to the great
cause of building socialism with Chinese characteristics and to unite our
people striving for the realization of the four modernizations and the rejuvenation
of Chinese nation.
As
Suisheng Zhao observed, this Campaign is "a
state-led nationalist movement," and "one of the most important
maneuvers" that the Communist government launched to redefine the
legitimacy of the post- Tiananmen leadership in a way that would "permit
the Communist Party' s rule to continue on the basis of a non-Communist
ideology.”(5)
As
Geremie Barme already
observed, "every policy shift in recent Chinese history has involved the
rehabilitation, re-evaluation and revision of history and historical figures.
"(6)
Under
Mao the emphasis was on China as a victor-it was under the leadership of the
CCP that Chinese people overcame the difficulties and won national
independence. In the new textbooks, the old class struggle narrative was replaced
by a patriotic narrative. Since 1994, the Chinese Modern and Contemporary
History has become a required core course in high school and a subject of the
nationwide university entrance examinations for all candidates. Beijing also
constructed more than ten thousand "patriotic education
bases"-museums, memorial halls, and monuments in memory of China's past
wars with foreign countries, civil wars and the myths and national heroes in
history. Visiting these memory sites has been a regular part of the school
curriculum.
In
October 2004, 10 government ministries and CCP departments issued a new
document-‘‘Opinions on Strengthening and Improving the Work of Patriotic
Education Bases.’’ This document asks government agencies and education
institutions to ‘‘liberate thoughts’’ and to improve teaching methods,
especially those that involve communication with the younger generation. It
also mentions that officials should try to ‘‘make entertainment a medium
of education.’’ That same month, Beijing put forward a new patriotic education
project-‘‘Three One Hundred for Patriotic Education.’’ The ‘‘three one
hundred’’ are 100 films, songs, and books with a common theme of
patriotism. Seven PRC ministries and CCP departments, including the Ministry of
Education and the Propaganda Department, jointly recommended 100 selected films,
100 selected songs, and 100 selected books to the whole society. Many of these films,
songs, and books were about modern and contemporary Chinese history.(7)
In
December 2004, the Chinese government formulated the General
Plan for the Development of Red Tourism and defined 12 major red tourist
areas. The Party also launched a special propaganda campaign to memorialize the
60th anniversary of the anti-fascist and anti-Japanese war.
Essentially,
the CCP skillfully replaced the term ‘‘education’’ with ‘‘tourism.’’ But a
national narrative in most cases is not an objective description of the past;
it is rather an act of selection, appropriation, and proliferation of selected
features from the people's past. The national narrative emerges out of
forgetting of possible or alternative past and constructing a past that is
meaningful in the present context. Thus
visualized items monuments, statues, hero figures in films and dramas-have
provided people evidence of the existence of national history and state
identity.
In
their book Ideas and Foreign Policy, Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane (1993)
proposed an analytic framework to study how ideas (defined as ‘‘beliefs
held by individuals’’) help to explain political outcomes. According to them,
once ideas or beliefs become embedded in rules and norms—that is to say, once
they become institutionalized-they constrain public policy. Furthermore, once a
policy choice leads to the creation of reinforcing organizational and normative
structures, the policy idea can affect the incentives of political
entrepreneurs long after the interests of its initial proponents have changed.
Thus
China's "chosen trauma" and "chosen glory" have been used
by the Communist government, especially its top leaders, to construct the rules
and norms of the ruling party. The discourse of national humiliation has become
embedded in patterns of political discourse and the identity of the ruling
party, and also, an integral part of the construction of Chinese nationalism.
The CCP leaders are the educators or the manipulators of history and memory in
China, but at the same time, they are also the believers of their own ideology.
The
content of history and memory has provided a whole set of theories to define
the identity and worldview of the Chinese Communist Party: The Party's
responsibility and leadership role have been entrusted by the history of the
past century the Party has made the biggest sacrifices and contribution in the
struggle to "put an end to the past humiliation."(8) Therefore, the
Party is "the firmest and most thoroughgoing patriot." The CCP has
claimed legitimacy through a portrayal of itself as the history agency that
restored national unity and independence. The central myth of the Party and
also the "theory" that has been used to explain how the world works
for the Chinese people is this statement: Only the Communist Party can save
China; only the Party can develop and rejuvenate China. Since history tells us
that "backwardness incurs beatings by others," the great rejuvenation
of the Chinese nation thus has become the unswerving goal and grand mission of
the Party.
And
although the national-humiliation discourse certainly is propaganda in today's
China, it is more: it has a large and sympathetic audience. For the Chinese
people, the foreign invasions, the military defeats, the unequal treaties and
all the details of invaders' atrocities during the "100 years of national
humiliation" are not merely a recounting of national history. They learn
these sad stories from their parents or grandparents, from school textbooks and
from media, films, novels and posters in their daily life. The discourse of
national humiliation is the key to understand the contemporary Chinese psyche
of nationalism.
With
this, the current CCP leaders are the educators, the manipulators, but at the
same time, are also the believers of their new ideology.
But
there is also an inconsistency between the regime’s current foreign policy and
its longstanding domestic propaganda. On one hand, a cooperative relationship
with the Western countries and a professional, open and active diplomacy will
serve China’s national interests; but on the other hand, artificially
creating an enemy image and willful political usage of history and memory are
still important strategies for the regime to increase internal cohesion. Along
these lines, Gerrit Gong writes that China’s ‘‘overreliance on history to
provide national legitimization could challenge the ability of any Chinese
government to satisfy its own people or to engage easily internationally.’’(9)
In
today’s school textbooks, the emphasis now is put on the international and
ethnic conflict between China and for example Japan, rather than the internal
and class conflict between the CCP and KMT as was the case with earlier school
text books. This "China as victim" in nationalist discourse, with for
example a focus on Japanese brutality and Chinese misery during the war, is not
without results as can be seen on the anti-Japanese protests today.
Periodically,
the official propaganda apparatus would go into overdrive whenever there were
international incidents in which China was apparently disrespected or poorly
treated. Example that we will analyze is the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis,
the 1999 crisis after the NATO bombing of the P.R.C. Embassy in Yugoslavia, and
the 2001 crisis after the collision of warplanes off the Chinese coast.(10)
Interviewing
many Chinese military leaders in Beijing, a belief shared widely at all levels
of military and political leadership- is that the United States during the
three incidents was trying to divide China territorially, subvert it
politically, contain it strategically, and frustrate it economically. And that
from the standpoint of many Chinese people, the United States has a master plan
against China.
1.
See Albright, The Mighty and the Almighty: Reflections on America, God, and
World Affairs, 2006.
2.
Anthony D. Smith, Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity, 2004
3.
Chunghee Sarah Soh, interpreting South Korea's
National Furor over Japanese History Textbooks." American Asian Review.
Winter 2003. Vol.2l, Iss. 4; 145-179.
4.
WSJ, China Shuts Down Outspoken Publication, January 25, 2006, 9:13 a.m.
5.
Suisheng Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction:
Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism, 2004, 288.
6.
Barme, "History for the Masses," in
Jonathan Unger, ed., Using the Post to Serve the Present: Historiography in
Contemporary China, 1993, P. 260.
7.
Suisheng Zhao: "A State-led Nationalism: The
Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen China", Communist and
Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3. 1998. pp. 287-302.
8.
Gries, Peter Hays. China's new nationalism: Pride,
politics, and diplomacy. Univ of California Press, 2004.
9.
Gerrit W. Gong, Memory and History in East and Southeast Asia: Issues of
Identity in International Relations (Significant Issues Series), 2002.
10.
On this see also Peter Hays Gries, China’s New
Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2005.
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